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 Abstract 
This thesis posits as its central argument that placing semiotic theory in dialectic with the discourses 
of and about ‘schizophrenia’ will produce novel insights into both. Simultaneously, this thesis 
develops a semiological sign system for ‘schizophrenia’, mapping and critiquing its central 
narratives, organising ethics, aesthetics and thematics, whilst also offering a practical model as 
exemplar for a semiotic method of cultural, textual, medical, psychological and social critical 
analysis. 
 In so doing, this thesis presents and develops the concept of ‘schizomimesis’, a term to 
describe the process by which the discourse and semiological sign system of ‘schizophrenia’ adopts 
formal qualities that mimetically embody the ‘disease’ symptomatology. The thesis explores this 
idea, placing different ‘symptoms’ in dialectic with different discourses: thought insertion, influence 
and the instability of signs in relation to diagnostics and aetiology; ‘psychotic’ speech and so-called 
thought disorder; distrubances of ipseity and magical thinking in narrative medicine and illness 
memoirs; hallucinations and delusions of reference in popular cinematic and televisual 
representations; deictic crises in the person, in the therapeutic process, and across popular culture 
and society. Throughout, the thesis constructs a de-psychologised and socialised, inter-subjective 
model of the self, inseparable from the dynamic of indivisible sign relations, and strives to 
understand ‘schizophrenia’ within this conceptual context. 
 This thesis thereby offers a model of how medical humanities research can contribute 
evenly to the discplines from which it draws its materials and methodologies. At the same time, it 
hopes to offer humane and thoughtful observations on the personal, cultural, medical and social 
disadvantages and difficulties, and highly idiosyncratic experiences, endured by those with lived 
experience of ‘schizophrenia’. 
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‘Language is the instrument by which the world and society are 
adjusted …’1 
‘… but isn’t it the truth of the voice to be hallucinated?’2 
  
                                                
1 Émil Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. by Mary Elizabeth Meek, Miami Linguistics, 8 (Coral 
Gables: University of Miami, 1971) [1966], p.71 
2 Roland Barthes, ‘The Grain of the Voice’ in Image Music Text, trans. by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana 
Press, 1977) pp.179-189 (p.184) 
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Rehabilitations 
Why schizophrenia? 
It's all semantics until somebody comes up with a decent blood test for schizophrenia. […] For 
years there have been arguments on this subject. Many people distinguish schizophrenia on the 
basis of outcome. If you get better, then you were not schizophrenic in the first place. But diagnosis 
by hindsight lacks clinical usefulness.1 
 
Norwegian media and prosecutors have argued and will continue to argue that the reasons that I 
executed the 22.7 attack was an accident and because I was a pathetic and spiteful loser who does 
not have integrity, does not have dignity or trust, that I am a notorious liar, that I lack morals, I’m 
crazy and that I therefore should be immediately ignored and forgotten by other Cultural 
conservatives and nationalists in Norway and Europe.  
They try to say that I lost my job, that I had father’s desire, a lack of networking, that I am a cruel 
and insane person, who is only looking for attention to my own person. All of this, they claimed. 
They also claimed that I am narcissistic, antisocial, psychopathic, that I suffer from germ phobia and 
put on a face mask daily for many years, I only like red sweaters and that I have an incestuous 
relationship with my own mother. They also claimed that I am miserable, pathetic, a baby killer, a 
child killer despite the fact that I am not accused of having killed someone under the age of 14. That 
I’m a coward, inbred, homosexual, pedophile, necrophilic, racist, sociopath, fascist, Nazi, Zionist 
and anarchist. All this has been claimed. They also claimed that I am physically and mentally 
retarded with an IQ of about 80.2 
 
Schizophrenia refuses to depart. The tenacity of the diagnosis, once attached to an individual, is 
matched only by its variability. Though 2011 marked the centenary of the coinage, schizophrenia 
remains ill-defined; its diagnostic and nosological definition plagues psychiatric and psychological 
discourses to the point of monomania. Similarly, for society schizophrenia remains a chronic 
concern. If the poor are always here, so consequently are those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia; a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia positively correlates with poverty, whether through being, becoming or 
remaining poor.3 Bluntly, ‘we are still facing a disorder that takes the person into a downward path 
leading to poverty, or is responsible for perpetuating poverty for those born into it.’4 Poverty and 
poor mental health are no more two separate things than poverty and poor diet. Mental ill health is 
poverty acting on the psyche. This consanguinity brings the prejudices against poverty to bear on 
‘schizophrenia’ and ‘schizophrenics.’ Even when not treated as criminals themselves, the condition 
experienced by them is metaphorically rendered villainous and sinful.5 
                                                
1 Mark Vonnegut quoted in Sobel, Dava, ‘Schizophrenia in popular books’, New York Times, 17 February 
1981 <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/02/17/science/schizophrenia-in-popular-books-a-study-finds-too-
much-hope.html?pagewanted=all> [accessed 20 February 2016] 
2 Anders Behring Breivik, ‘Court statement,’ 17 April 2012, The Commander Anders Breivik Resource Collection 
<https://sites.google.com/site/breivikreport/documents/anders-breivik-court-statement-2012-04-17> 
[accessed 6 January 2016]. The website hosts English translations of Breivik’s court statements and web 
comments. These are unattributed, and clearly imperfect, though comprehendible. The politics of the site are 
not detailed but can be safely inferred from the non-ironic adoption of Breivik’s self-styled title of 
commander. The text is quoted as it appears, complete with syntactical, grammatical and typographical errors. 
3 Carl Cohen, ‘Poverty and the course of schizophrenia: Implications for research and policy’, Hospital and 
Community Psychology, 44: 10 (1993) 951-958 
4 Benedetto Saraceno, Itzhak Levav, Robert Kohn, ‘The public mental health significance of research on 
socio-economic factors in schizophrenia and major depression’, World Psychiatry, 4:3 (2005) 181-185 p.184 
5 To give a recent example: the editorial of a 2015 number of Schizophrenia Bulletin devoted to studies looking 
for biomarkers refers to ‘a potential fingerprint of schizophrenia.’ Liberal ideology postulates poverty and 
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 A diagnosis of schizophrenia remains a descriptive diagnosis only: ‘all semantics’. Perhaps 
uniquely in the field of medicine, the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia is most often 
outside the community defining the semantics of their diagnosis. To be schizophrenic is to be 
stripped of a voice in the conversation. This attitude is at least as old as the disease concept. In 
Emil Kraepelin’s account of dementia praecox in Psychiatrie, III (1913) – translated into English and 
published as Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia three years later – there is no space in the discourse 
for the patient’s perspective and no possibility for insight within the condition: ‘patients commit a 
great many of the most nonsensical and incomprehensible acts of which they themselves are usually 
unable to explain the cause.’6 The word ‘senseless’ punctuates the description of each of the psychic 
and bodily symptoms carefully recorded by Kraepelin. For him, the utterances of his patients were 
‘senseless rigmarole’7; their writings, ‘an arbitrary, peculiar disorder.’8 
 For Kraepelin, the condition – its aetiology, its pathology and its sufferers – was ‘wrapped 
in impenetrable darkness.’9 It will be the work of this thesis to demonstrate that this impenetrable 
darkness is a product of – rather than obstruction to – currently practised ways of reading 
schizophrenia. A new semiotic method of reading is therefore proposed which – it will be argued – 
reveals profound structural similarities between descriptions of schizophrenia and non-pathological 
phenomenological experiences. This semiotic approach does not negate or belittle the hard reality 
of living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Signs do not just signify, as Roland Barthes observes in 
Elements of Semiology (1977): 
Many semiological systems (objects, gestures, pictorial images) have a substance of expression 
whose essence is not to signify; […] We propose to call these semiological signs, whose origin is 
utilitarian and functional, sign-functions.10 
 
This thesis will not lose sight of the sign-functions within the semiological system of schizophrenia 
under investigation.  
A new way of talking about schizophrenia is urgently needed. In this regard, the latest 
iteration of the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders – DSM-5 – stands as an abject failure. Though DSM-5 ‘engender[ed] … a remarkable level 
of criticism, rhetoric and passion,’11  it brought only a loosening of the diagnostic criteria for 
                                                                                                                                         
mental illness as aberrant thieves in the night rather than inevitable consequences of the economic machine. 
Iris E Sommer, ‘Are we a step further toward a useful biomarker?’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 41:6 (2015) 1223, 
p.1223 
6 Emil Kraepelin, Dementia Praecox and Paraphrenia, trans. by R Mary Barclay (New York: Robert E Krieger 
Publishing, 1971) [1913], p.41 
7 Kraepelin, p.62 
8 Kraepelin, p.66 
9 Kraepelin, p.224 
10 Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology, trans. by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1977), p.41 
11 Charles Nemeroff, Daniel Weinberger, Michael Rutter, Harriet MacMillan, Richard Bryant, Simon Wessely, 
Dan Stein, Carmine Pariante, Florian Seemüller, Mihcael Berk, Gin Malhi, Martin Preisig, Martin Brüne and 
Paul Lysaker, ‘DSM-5: a collection of psychiatrist views on the changes, controversies, and future directions’, 
BMC Medicine 11:202 (2013) <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/202> [accessed 20 March 
2014] 
 4 
schizophrenia. Where DSM leads, the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) most often follows. DSM – only officially used in US diagnostics – generates the 
column inches, but ICD is the coding system employed throughout the rest of the world. ICD-11 
was originally planned for rollout in 2012. This was later revised to 2015 and, at the time of writing, 
had been pushed back until 2018.12 But the psychiatric consensus seems to be fraying. ICD-11 in its 
beta form (which is tattooed with capitalised caveats that it is not approved by WHO, may be 
subject to considerable change before publication and should not be used for coding) makes an 
unprecedented distinction between first episode, multiple episodes and continuous schizophrenia.13 
A now notorious blog post on the eve of the publication of DSM-5 by then-director of the US 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Thomas Insel announced the launch of a rival 
diagnostic system, the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) with the rallying battle cry that ‘[p]atients 
with mental health disorders deserve better.’ 14  (Only two weeks later, Insel published a joint 
statement with the president of the APA downplaying the depth of any doctrinal schism between 
the two organisations.15 In late 2015, Insel departed the NIMH for Google Life Sciences.)16 
Given that psychiatry has ‘produced not less than 40 definitions’ of this ‘elusive entity,’17 it 
is not difficult to dismiss each of these multilateral revisions as yet another ‘“rearrangement of the 
furniture” of the various diagnostic possibilities.’18 Yet there is especial professional curiosity, or 
anxiety even, over what may change in relation to schizophrenia. In particular, the validity of the 
diagnostic Spaltung between the thought disorder of schizophrenia and the mood disorder of 
bipolar disorder was strongly contested in advance of the DSM-5 revisions, by Fischer and 
Carpenter (2009),19 Talya Greene (2007),20 and a thematic collection of papers on ‘deconstructing 
                                                
12 According to the World Health Organisation. International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Information Sheet 
<http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/factsheet/en/> [accessed 12 June 2015] 
13 The International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) Beta Draft, &A50 Schizophrenia 
<http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd11/browse/l-
m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd%2fentity%2f1683919430>  [accessed 12 June 2015] 
14  Thomas Insel, ‘Director’s blog: transforming diagnosis’, 29 April 2013, 
<http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/director/2013/transforming-diagnosis.shtml> [accessed 15 January 
2016] 
15  Thomas Insel and Jeffrey Lieberman, ‘DSM-5 and RDoC: shared interests’, 13 May 2013, 
<http://www.nimh.nih.gov/news/science-news/2013/dsm-5-and-rdoc-shared-interests.shtml> [accessed 15 
January 2016] 
16 In his departing statement he claimed: ‘[t]he Google philosophy has been to seek a 10x impact on hard 
problems. I’m looking forward to a 10x challenge in mental health.’ Patients with mental health disorders 
certainly deserve better prose. ‘Dr Tom Insel to step down as NIMH director’, 
<http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/dr-tom-insel-to-step-down-as-nimh-director.shtml> [accessed 15 January 
2016] 
17 Lennart B Jansson and Josef Parnas, ‘Competing definitions of schizophrenia: what can be learned from 
polydiagnostic studies?’ Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33:5 (2007) 1178-1200, p.1178 
18 Allen Frances, Head DSM-IV taskforce, ‘A warning sign on the road to DSM-V: beware of its unintended 
consequences’, Psychiatric Times, 26 June 2009 <http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/warning-sign-
road-dsm-v-beware-its-unintended-consequences> [accessed 10 January 2015] 
19  Bernard A Fischer and William T Carpenter Jr, ‘Will the Kraepelinian dichotomy survive DSM-V?’, 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 34 (2009), 2081-2087 
20 Talya Greene, ‘The Kraepelin dichotomy: the twin pillars crumbling?’ History of Psychiatry, 18:3 (2007) 361-
379 
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psychosis’ in the Schizophrenia Bulletin (2007)21 to name a few. This poses a question at the heart of 
this thesis: what is meant by the word ‘schizophrenia’? And what might come to be meant by it in 
the wake of DSM-5 and ICD-11? 
Who can define schizophrenia? Mark Vonnegut’s quotation above demonstrates the 
frustration of those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia at being excluded from the debate. He was 
speaking in response to an influential paper by North and Cadoret (1981) which retrospectively re-
diagnosed five memoirists self-identifying as schizophrenic, of whom Vonnegut was one. 22 
Vonnegut himself acutely embodies the problem of Kraepelin’s dichotomy: for his first memoir, 
The Eden Express (1975) his diagnosis was schizophrenia; for his second, Just Like Someone Without 
Mental Illness Only More So (2010) it was bipolar disorder.23 North and Cadoret explicitly re-diagnose 
Vonnegut because he recovered and hence, ‘[h]e fits best into the category of bipolar affective 
disorder, which according to the DSM-III has a more favourable prognosis for remission.’ 24 
Because Vonnegut recovered, he could not have had schizophrenia. The inevitable progressive 
nature of Kraepelin’s original dementia remains. For the concept to work, cure cannot happen.25 
Schizophrenia departs from the individual, in order to preserve itself. To corrupt the Epicurean 
aphorism: where cure is, schizophrenia is not. Truthfully, this is no departure of schizophrenia. 
Rather the subject qua cured subject is banished from the realm (discursive and clinical) of 
schizophrenia. 
 Cure is not the only exile from this terrain. Schizophrenia admits no rivals. On 24 August 
2012, Anders Behring Breivik was found by a Norwegian court to be sane (precisely, non-psychotic 
but ‘suffering from “narcissistic personality characteristics”’ 26 ) when he killed 77 people and 
wounded 242 more on 22 July 2011. According to the UK Guardian, ‘Breivik’s mental state 
                                                
21 Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33:4, ed. by Carol Tamminga and Jim van Os (2007) 
22  Carol North and Remi Cadoret, ‘Diagnostic discrepancy in personal accounts of patients with 
“schizophrenia”’, Archives of General Psychiatry, 38 (1981) 133-137 
23 In advance of the publication of DSM-5, Vonnegut, by now a primary care pediatrician, was unequivocal: 
‘[c]urrent psychiatric diagnosis through the multiple versions of DSM has reframed the old arguments but has 
not had a significant impact on care or outcomes.’ Mark Vonnegut, ‘Personal reflections on diagnosis’, Journal 
of Mental Health, 19:4 (2010) 373-375, p.373 
24 North and Cadoret, p.136 
25 The diagnostic necessity of an established poor prognosis turns chronology on its head. A position that 
Philip Thomas, a critical psychiatrist, describes as ‘absurd.’ Philip Thomas, The Dialectics of Schizophrenia, 
(London and New York: Free Association Books, 1997), p.87 
26  ‘Anders Behring Breivik: Norway court finds him sane’, BBC Online, 24 August 2012, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19365616> [accessed 06 January 2016]  
In what sense Breivik was ‘suffering’ from this condition – the word being the choice of the BBC journalist 
rather than a quotation from Judge Wenche Elisabeth Arntzen’s verdict – should be left an open question. 
The status of his sanity varied across reports. For the UK Telegraph, he was ‘declared sane’, whereas the US 
CBC News favoured qualifying speech marks around the word sane. 
Chris Irvine, ‘Anders Breivik declared sane: live’, Daily Telegraph, 24 August 2012, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/norway/9496330/Anders-Breivik-declared-sane-
live.html> [accessed 6 January 2016] 
‘“Sane” Breivik sentenced to prison for Norwary mass killing’, CBC News, 24 August 2012, 
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2012/08/24/norway-anders-breivik-verdict.html> [accessed 6 
January 2016] 
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constituted the central narrative of the trial.’ 27  Curiously, Breivik, the relatives of his victims, 
survivors of his attacks and the majority of Norwegians were united in hoping that the court would 
reject the findings of the first psychiatric assessment of Breivik, which diagnostically ‘found’ that he 
was a paranoid schizophrenic and psychotic when he committed these crimes. The fear all these 
parties had in common was that schizophrenia would be unable to share discursive space with any 
other concepts, specifically: culpability (legal and moral), justice (retributive and restorative) and 
multiculturalism (loved or loathed). The diagnosis of schizophrenia – as was perhaps the hope of 
the state prosecutors and certainly the worry of Breivik himself to judge from the above quotation 
– would allow of no debate of political motivation. As the victims and relatives feared, it would also 
allow of no emotional resolution.  
Breivik’s case illustrates, obliquely, many of the qualities that allow schizophrenia to endure 
in the public, artistic and clinical imagination: it reflects (in the dual senses of representing and 
revealing) socio-political concerns including, but not limited to, violence, poverty and racism; it 
stands at a point of intersection between legal, medical and philosophical categorical systems; it 
defies fixed definition whilst condemning the recipient to an immutable, inescapable fate in its 
posited incurability (the residue from the progressive dementia element to Kraepelin’s historic 
dementia praecox formulation). A diagnosis of schizophrenia functions, then, as an inviolable full 
stop, and a vanishing point for all other discourses. 
But the diagnostic process has a dual perspective. The diagnosis is ‘the opinion arrived at 
as to the nature of a disease’28 yet, in the form of the working diagnosis, it is also the assumption 
that allows the journey towards that point of arrival. In this respect, the diagnosis is not merely 
preliminary but also pre-emptive, presumptive and predetermining. The narrative of the disease can 
then be written in response to the predestinarian diagnosis. The disease is excavated for the scars 
that mirror the marks cast by the ur-diagnosis. If ‘a letter always arrives at its destination’29, so the 
diagnostic arrow always finds its mark.  
This is especially evident in Freud’s 1911 case study of Daniel Paul Schreber, ‘one of the 
most frequently discussed patients in medical history.’ 30  Schreber plays Hamlet 31  in the tragic 
history of schizophrenia, and his enigmatic and beguiling memoir constitutes a (contested) emblem 
of the condition. For Freud, ‘the wonderful Schreber … ought to have been made a professor of 
                                                
27 Mark Townsend, ‘Breivik verdict: sanity the issue at centre of Norway’s mass murder trial’, Guardian, 24 
August 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/aug/24/anders-breivik-verdict-sanity-
trial?intcmp=239> [accessed 06 January 2016] 
28 Black’s Medical Dictionary, ed. by Harvey Marcovitch, 41st edn  (London: A&C Black, 2005) p.196 
29 Jacques Lacan, ‘Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”’, eds John P Muller and William Richardson, The 
Purloined Poe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988) p.53 
30 Richard P Bentall, Madness Explained: Psychosis and Human Nature (London: Penguin, 2004) p.294 
31 It is a comparison he makes himself. Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, ed. and trans. by 
Ida Macalpine and Richard A Hunter (New York: New York Review Books, 2000), p.186 
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psychiatry and director of a mental hospital.’32 But then Freud reads Schreber primarily as an 
illustrative example of the universal applicability of psychoanalysis: 
He [Schreber] himself not infrequently presses the key into our hands … we have only to follow our 
usual psycho-analytic technique … and we find ourselves in possession of … a translation of the 
paranoiac mode of expression in to the normal one.33 
 
When applying a master-key of interpretation, naturally, ‘we find ourselves in possession of what 
we are looking for.’ 34  Without pre-empting the more detailed analysis of Freud’s reading of 
Schreber in chapter one, it is safe to state that the paucity of the Freudian key as an ‘explanation’ of 
schizophrenia35 is apparent in its core diagnosis of cause: paranoia as a neurosis of defence against 
latent, passive homosexuality.36 Contemporary with Freud’s analysis it was ‘calumny, to charge a 
man … with homosexuality’37. Now it is merely banal, and nonsensical. In Western Europe, the 
social stigma around homosexuality specifically – or expressions of object-libido more generally – 
vital to fuelling Freud’s posited repressive, defensive pathological paranoia, has diminished 
significantly. Schizophrenia endures.38  
 However, the diagnosis is in crisis, and the dialectic between psychiatry’s organised 
nosological responsive movements and the socio-cultural redefinitions of who and what might be 
permissible objects of mind doctoring is well expressed in David Pilgrim’s assertion that ‘DSM can 
be read as a revisable political manifesto for the psychiatric profession, as well as a scientific 
document.’39 The historic birthing tension between the Kraepelinian neurological progressive brain 
disease and the Bleulerean psychological, episodic, split mind remains. A quarter of a century has 
passed since Bentall at al declared – with irony – the concept of schizophrenia dead40 and, in a 
paper rigorously contesting the reliability and validity of the diagnostic term, concluded that: ‘[i]t 
                                                
32 The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence Between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung, ed. by William McGuire, trans. 
by Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974) p.311 
33 Sigmund Freud, ‘Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia 
Paranoides)’, in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, XII, trans. by James Strachey (London: 
The Hogarth Press, 1958) pp.1-88 (p.35) 
34 Freud, SE XII, p.35 
35 Freud diagnoses Schreber with paranoia, which ‘should be maintained as an independent clinical type’ from 
dementia praecox. However, as James Strachey notes, Freud increasingly conflated the two under the term 
paraphrenia. (Freud, SE XII, p.76) The DSM-5 with its removal of the paranoid subtype of schizophrenia has 
arguably performed a similar move.  
36 Freud, SE XII, p.4 
37 Freud, SE XII, p.43 
38 Indeed, this speaks to a central error of psychoanalysis: mistaking a socially informed behavioral ideology 
for something called the unconscious. As such, there can be no trans-historical anxiety about homosexuality, 
for example. Soviet semiotician Vološinov makes this point directly: ‘The content and composition of the 
unofficial levels of behavioral ideology (in Freudian terms, the content and composition of the unconscious) 
are conditioned by historical time and class to the same degree as are its levels “under censorship” and its 
systems of formulated ideology (morality, law, world outlook). For example, the homosexual inclinations of 
an ancient Hellene of the ruling class produced absolutely no conflicts in his behavioral ideology; they freely 
emerged into outwards speech and even found formulated ideological expression (e.g., Plato’s Symposium).’ V 
N Vološinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique, trans. by I R Titunik (London and New York: Verso, 2012) 
[1927] p.145 
39 David Pilgrim, ‘The survival of psychiatric diagnosis’, Social Science and Medicine, 65 (2007) 536–547, p.538  
40  Richard Bentall, H Jackson and David Pilgrim ‘The concept of schizophrenia is dead: Long live the 
concept of schizophrenia?’, British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27 (1988) 329-331 
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may be more realistic to accept that ‘schizophrenia’ is not a useful scientific category and that for all 
these years researchers have been pursuing a ghost within the body of psychiatry.’41  
 As this thesis will demonstrate, nothing has been exorcised. The haunting continues. 
 
  
                                                
41 R Bentall, H Jackson and D Pilgrim ‘Abandoning the concept of 'schizophrenia': Some implications of 
validity arguments for psychological research into psychotic phenomena’, British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27 
(1988) 303-324 p.314 
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Why semiotics?  
Idealism and psychologism alike overlook the fact that understanding itself can come about only 
within some kind of semiotic material (e.g., innerspeech), that sign bears upon sign, that consciousness 
itself can arise and become a viable fact only in the material embodiment of signs.42 
[T]he medical sign […] obviously refers to a signified; it is for this reason that it is a sign; there is a 
signified or, in any case, for several signs it is possible to postulate a signified; this signified is 
nosographic, it is the named disease which is given through the sign or signs; consequently we are 
indeed dealing, in the medical context, with an entirely orthodox sign from the point of view of 
composition, i.e., with a kind of two-faced unit, of which one hidden face, still to be discovered and 
to be named, is by and large the disease, and one exteriorized face, materialized, eventually 
fragmented into several signifieds, is to be constructed, interpreted, given a syntax, etc.43 
Before semiotics was semiotics, it was medicine. As semioticians Thomas Sebeok and Marcel 
Danesi (2000) note, ‘in its oldest usage, the term semeiotics was coined by Hippocrates […], the 
founder of Western medicine, to designate the study of particular types of forms – bodily 
symptoms.’44 Sebeok considers Galen, with his distinctive fusion of Platonism and empiricism to 
be ‘a subtle founder of clinical semiotics […] [and] the first “scientific” semiotician.’45 Famously, 
for Foucault, this medical semeiotics was a semiotics in name only and it was not until the 
epistemological and socio-historical shift – the épistème – of the European Enlightenment that 
medicine became semiotic; ‘a grammar of signs […] replaced a botany of symptoms.’46 Any thesis 
would be on shaky ground placing post nineteenth-century theories of semiotics into direct 
dialectic with pre-modern medical diagnostic and epidemiological texts and practices. However, in 
restricting itself to ‘schizophrenia’ – and by connotation modern, psychiatric accounts of ‘madness’ 
– this thesis places two socio-historically co-existent discourses into dialectic: whilst Charles 
Sanders Peirce was formulating his tripartite model of the sign in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century, Kraepelin was revising the sixth edition of his Psychiatrie to include dementia 
praecox; whilst Bleuler began using his new coinage of schizophrenia in lectures and papers from 
190747 at Burghölzli at the University of Zürich (culminating in the publication of Dementia Praecox, 
oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien in 1911), 48  Ferdinand de Saussure was expounding his theory of 
linguistic semiology not far away at the University of Geneva (running from 1907 to 1911, and then 
                                                
42 V N Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. by Ladislav Matejka and I R Titunik (London: 
Seminar Press, 1973) [1930], p.10 
43  Roland Barthes, ‘Semiology and medicine’ [1972] trans. by Richard Howard, in The Semiotic Challenge 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) pp.202-213 (p.205) 
44 Thomas A Sebeok and Marcel Danesi, The Forms of Meaning: Modeling Systems Theory and Semiotic Analysis, 
(Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2000), p.2  
45 Thomas A Sebeok, I Think I Am A Verb: More Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs (New York: Plenum Press, 
1986), p.52 
46 Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, trans. by A M Sheridan (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010) [1963], p.xx 
47 Bentall, Madness Explained, p.21. The arrival of Jung, and – by extension – psychoanalysis, at Burghölzli in 
1900 can be taken as the moment of inception for Bleuler’s associationist model of psychosis. Bleuler is 
explicit about this in the preface to his account of the ‘schizophrenias’: ‘An important aspect of the attempt 
to advance and enlarge the concepts of psychopathology is nothing less than the application of Freud’s ideas 
to dementia praecox.’ Eugen Bleuler, Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias, trans. by Joseph Zinkin 
(New York: International Universities Press, 1950) [1911], p.2  
48 ‘This work was completed in the summer of 1908’ (Bleuler, p.2) and published in German in 1911. The 
same year also saw the publication of Freud’s landmark study of Schreber. 
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posthumously published in 1916). 49 The self-same cultural, material conditions gave birth to the 
concept of ‘schizophrenia’ and the semiotic sign. Further, this thesis’ dialectic approach is 
established on what should steadily appear to the reader as a sound assumption: the 
conceptualisation, construction and communication of the ‘disease’ of ‘schizophrenia’ shares more 
territory with contemporary semiotics than with empirical medicine. 
 Before answering ‘why semiotics’ it is perhaps necessary to first ask ‘which semiotics?’ In 
the face of the historic Spaltung between the logical, mathematical semiotic philosophy of Peirce or 
the socio-cultural, linguistic semiology of Saussure, this thesis adopts a position that is, in the spirit 
of Thomas Sebeok, staunchly ecumenical. 50  In English-language cultural and literary studies, 
Saussure’s semiology and the model of the sign as an indivisible ‘two-sided psychological entity’51 is 
the better-known doctrine; the two sides being the signifier (a sign vehicle, comprising phonemes 
and morphemes) and the signified (the conceptual content of the sign that remains inexpressible 
directly without its unity with the signifier).52 Saussure, somewhat paradoxically, defined semiology 
as ‘a science which studies the role of signs as part of social life’53 and yet proceeded to rigorously separate 
out a linguistic object of study – the langue – and linguistic, individual psychological entities (the 
speaking and listening agents) from any social context. Similarly, in his absolutist division between 
synchronic and diachronic linguistics, he detaches the social from the historical. Vološinov provides 
a full Marxist rebuttal of this ‘abstract objectivism [… which] regards history as an irrational force 
distorting the logical purity of the language system.’54 For the purposes of this thesis, it suffices to 
raise the well-rehearsed Saussurean paradox identified by William Labov: ‘the social aspect of 
language [langue] is studied by observing any one individual, but the individual aspect [parole] only by 
observing language in its social context.’55 The hyper-abstractism and solipsism of the Saussurean 
model, where universal laws are (groundlessly) extrapolated from idiosyncratic experience, should 
remind any reader of the cosmology of Schreber, or the delusional belief systems of any 
‘schizophrenic.’ This thesis’ use of the Saussurean sign will be temperamentally Marxist, in that it 
will insist on re-integrating history with social conditions to provide a degree of contextual 
motivation to signification, in contrast to Saussure’s wholly arbitrary relation between signifier and 
                                                
49 Winfried Nöth, Handbook of Semiotics, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p.56 
50  Thomas Sebeok, ‘Ecumenicalism in semiotics’, in A Perfusion of Signs, (Bloomington and London: 
University of Indiana Press, 1977) pp.180-206 
51 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. by Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 1998) [1972], 
p.66 
52 This is a bare-bones, year-zero Saussurean definition. Frederic Jameson offers a succinct and valuable 
account of the post-structuralist Saussurean relationship between signifier and signified: ‘meaning is not a 
one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified, between the materiality of language, between a word 
or a name, and its referent or concept. Meaning on the new view is generated by the movement from signifier 
to signifier. What we generally call the signified – the meaning or conceptual content of an utterance – is now 
rather to be seen as a meaning-effect, as that objective mirage of signification generated and projected by the 
relationship of signifiers among themselves.’ Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), p.26 
53 Saussure, p.15 
54 Vološinov, Marxism, pp.58-63 
55 William Labov, Sociolinguistic Patterns (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), p.186 
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signified,56 and in that it will posit sign-production as an inherently collective act. This thesis will 
also be loosely post-structuralist in attitude, accepting the critique that the ‘fine streaks of rain’57 
attempting to bring some fixity on the ‘amorphous’58 planes of signifier and signified are indeed 
‘insubstantial’ 59  and cannot hold back the forces of ambiguity, which in fact are a necessary 
constituent dynamic in signification. 
Post-structuralist thought has been more generous towards Peirce and his semiotics.60 Any 
broad church of semiotics must take Peirce’s open definition of the sign as its methodological and 
philosophical foundation: ‘a sign […] is something that stands to someone for something in some 
respect or capacity.’61 However, Peirce is here describing only the sign as Representamen, quasi-
isomorphic with Saussure’s better-known concept of the signifier and only one element in Peirce’s 
tripartite sign, comprising Representamen, Object and Interpretant. The definition of the Object is easy to 
guess at and is similarly quasi-isomorphic with Saussure’s signified. The nature of the Peircean sign 
will be explored in more depth and detail through this thesis, but it is necessary before embarking 
to explain succinctly how Peirce offers a sign that is intrinsically more dynamic and mutable than 
Saussure’s, and consequently well-suited to the analysis in this thesis. 
The presence of the Interpretant within the Peircean sign is integral to one of the core 
benefits the semiotic method can bring to medical epistemology in general, and the epidemiology 
of schizophrenia specifically. It critiques and exposes the blind epistemology assumptions that 
Foucault’s analysis identifies and – by the nature of the semiotic perspective – creates a schism 
between supposedly ‘hard’ transcendent knowledge and facts, and mutable signification that is 
necessarily contingent on its temporal and material context(s). As Brands, Franck and Leeuwen 
note: ‘[t]he use of the semiotic approach can avoid universalist discussions about the objective truth 
of propositions.’62 Importantly, semiotics is concerned with meaning rather than truth. Truth is a 
metaphysical concept, and by nature tyrannically monological. It admits no alternatives by its 
definition. Conversely, signs (be it symptoms, diseases, texts or whole lives) can exhibit a 
                                                
56 ‘No one disputes the fact that linguistic signs are arbitrary.’ This thesis prefers to consider them under-
motivated or – as it may be that their socio-historical motivations are not instantly apparent, though 
nonetheless extant within the sign – inexplicitly or obscurely motivated. Mitigating the obscurity of signs is 
what this thesis means by complicity in the semiotic. Saussure, p.68 
57 Jacques Lacan, ‘The instance of the letter in the unconscious’, in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, 
trans. by Bruce Fink (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), pp.412/493-441/528 
(p.419/502) (Écrits page references are for English translation and French original: English/French.) 
58 Saussure, p.111 
59 Lacan, p.419/503 
60 In part, perhaps, because it does not like to acknowledge the extent of its debt to a nineteenth-century 
American logician. Derrida’s metaphysics of presence and denial of the transcendental signified are natural, 
logical sequelae to Peirce’s concepts of the Interpretant and the inherent recursive signification of his triadic 
sign. So, Derrida is rather underplaying things to state that ‘Peirce goes very far in the direction that I have 
called the deconstruction of the transcendental signified, which, at one time or another, would place a 
reassuring end to the reference from sign to sign.’ Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) [1967], p.49 
61 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Logic as semiotic: the theory of signs’, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. by Justus 
Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955) pp.98-119 (p.99) 
62  Martien Brands, Dorothea Franck and Evert Van Leeuwen, ‘Epistemology and semiotics of medical 
systems: a comparative analysis’, Semiotica, 132:1 (2000) 1-24, p.7 
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polyphony of meanings. Inherent within semiotics is a recognition that meaning is a collaborative 
product. No sign means without an input of signification from an Interpretant which is necessarily a 
fusion of a real socio-historical individual and their socio-historical context as a dynamic functional 
space. This is vital: the Interpretant is not merely a person receiving the sign, and semiotics is not a 
quasi-scientific reader-response theory. The Interpretant is a component of the indivisible sign. There 
is a reciprocal establishing relationship between the sign and its Interpretant.  
What does the semiotic approach entail, then? From the outset, do away with everything 
metaphysical, a category which includes all psychology of the unconscious or the unseen. Such 
metaphysics often come well disguised. The mind no more has binary switches for Universal 
Grammar63 or filing cabinets for the storage and retrieval of lexical items and semantic concepts64 
than it does orgone energy or a Nom du pére. Or divine rays or microchips for that matter.65 
Chomsky may be able to talk confidently of organs of the mind, as if they were more than an 
illustrative phantom of his imagination, but most ‘schizophrenics’ would learn to be more 
circumspect for fear of earning an unscheduled depot injection.66 There is nothing metaphysical, per 
se, in speculating about the theory of mind of a person, and how that might provide explanatory 
context for their actions or utterances, or have predictive power in relation to their response to the 
actions and utterances of others. But there is something metaphysical about misreading this 
heuristic fiction as mythic fact. (Fiction, in that whilst the other person, in position of addressee, 
most certainly has a mind, it will not be precisely that as imagined by the person in position of 
addresser, or vice versa.) Psychology strays into metaphysics, from the semiotic point of view, the 
moment it departs from what is materially recoverable from the form and content of the triadic 
sign. There is no reason to suppose the existence of unknowable, unseeable material, except for the 
purposes of intellectual convenience. When psychoanalysis dismisses auditory verbal hallucinations 
as the phantom of the super-ego, it sees its own deity in drag. 
Rather than discussing psychology and phenomenology, semiotics talks of subjects within 
a socius, of signs of all materialities, and most commonly, of language. Following Vološinov and Lev 
Vygotsky, this thesis adopts the attitude that language is a semiotic process of constructing subjects 
and indoctrinating them into a dominant, collective regime of signs. As Jean-Jacques Lecercle 
(2006) summarises: 
                                                
63 ‘We may think of UG as an intricately structured system, but one that is only partly ‘wired-up’. The system 
is associated with a finite set of switches, each of which has a finite number of positions (perhaps two).’ 
Noam Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: It’s Nature, Origin and Use (New York: Praeger, 1986), p.146 
64 ‘Think of your head as containing (inter alia) an arbitrarily large filing cabinet, which can in turn contain an 
arbitrarily large set of files, which can in turn contain an arbitrarily large number of memos.’ Jerry Fodor, 
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.94 (Advice: never think 
that.) 
65 It is no less fantastical to imagine a computer in the brain than a parent or a God. At least one can admire 
the florid audacity of psychoanalysis. 
66 Chomsky started talking about ‘mental organs’ in the 1970s and now prefers ‘cognitive organs.’ See Noam 
Chomsky, Language and Responsibility (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1979) for the former; for the latter, Noam 
Chomsky, ‘Of minds and language’, Biolinguistics, 1 (2007) 9-27. 
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Language is at once the expression and form of constitution of the human collectivity; it attests to 
the fact that among human beings, one never begins with the individual, but always with the socius, 
from which the individual emerges through a process of individuation which is a process of 
subjectivation by interpellation.67 
 
More recently, social semiotics has expanded the reach of semiotics by comprehensively 
transcending the linguistic or intentionally representational, and stripped the esotericisms from the 
discourse. Consider this concise account from Kress: 
‘Social semiotics’ […] rests on several fundamental assumptions: signs are always newly made in 
social interaction; signs are motivated, not arbitrary relations of meaning and form; the motivated 
relation of a form and a meaning is based on and arises out of the interest of makers of signs; the 
forms/signifiers which are used in the making of signs are made in social interaction and become 
part of the semiotic resources of a culture.68 
  
This cultural situatedness (which also subsumes within it a more localised, biological situatedness)69 
is an alternative to a psychologism that relies on unverifiable assumptions about minds (others and 
one’s own), or a phenomenology that reduces everything to introspection and relativism that petrify 
judgement. Yuri Lotman’s theory of the semiosphere, and the biosemiotic tradition of the Umwelt, 
both offer models of semiotics that ensure a critical detachment from truth, in favour of meaning 
generation, which does not have to fold back into a bootless, solipsistic ideology of the individual.70 
As the Teutonic term suggests, Umwelt has its conceptual roots in the psychologism and 
phenomenology of early twentieth century Europe, with its first proto-semiotic formulation 
coming with Jacob von Uexküll’s Umwelt und Innerwelt der Tiere (1909).71 Semiotic thinking, and the 
imperative to integrate the biological, the social and the phenomenological under one holistic 
theory of signification, has progressively refined this concept. Biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer 
(1996) posits the Umwelt as ‘patterns of interpretation’ that are trans-personal and dialectically 
adjusting, whilst enduring, through socio-historical contexts: ‘[t]he umwelt is the representation of 
the surrounding world within the creature.’72 All sign relations in this thesis will be interpreted with 
a sensitivity to the semiosphere which gives rise to them. 
This semiotic reading will proceed by two complementary processes: abduction and 
dialectic. The former term needs some glossing. Insofar as this thesis makes a partial (in both 
senses) descriptive account of ‘schizophrenia’ including its aetiology, cultural and medical reception 
and representations, and symptomatology from both the phenomenological and the objective 
perspectives, it tests its own hypotheses against qualitative samples and examples that by their 
                                                
67 Jean-Jacques Lecercle, A Marxist Philosophy of Language, trans. by Gregory Elliott (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p.195 
68 Gunther Kress, Multimodality: A Social Semiotic Approach to Contemporary Communication (Abingdon and New 
York: Routledge, 2010), p.54 
69 Biological situatedness is more localized but not more primary or foundational. It is doubly culturally 
situated; there is the cultural situatedness of the category of biological situatedness, and the cultural 
situatedness of the specific instance of biological situatedness. 
70 For an account of the semiosphere see Yuri M Lotman, Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Culture, 
trans. by Ann Shukman (London: IB Tauris, 2001) [1984] 
71 Jacob von Uexküll, Umwelt und Innerwelt der Tiere (Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1909) 
72  Jesper Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, trans. by Barbara J Haveland (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996) [1993], p.58 
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nature cannot be incontrovertibly assessed. Hence, it is a work of what Peirce would call ‘abductory 
induction.’ This, by his own reckoning, is but a well-reasoned fusion of ‘guess-work’ and ‘original 
suggestion.’73 As its other term, retroduction, more keenly suggests, it also entails a degree of 
reasoning backwards from evidence. Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok provide an amusing account 
of this process as practised by Peirce, Holmes and the diagnosing clinician, where reasonable 
guessing blended with astute observation of barely perceptible signs has all the appearance of 
‘extrasensory perception.’74 It is important to recognise that abduction forms a (perhaps the) central 
component of Peirce’s semiotic theory. What makes sign relations possible, and what distinguishes 
the human intellect (and sign-making powers) from that of other species, is the creative, disruptive 
and collaborative ability to guess brilliantly. 
The latter term of dialectics is easier explained, being a familiar intellectual method. It is 
perhaps well suited to an object of study so self-consciously and explicitly composed of dialectical 
forces as ‘schizophrenia’. In 1965, David Cooper called for ‘dialectic rationality’ as a strategy for 
engaging with schizophrenia, describing it as ‘a totalizing activity in which two types of unification 
are related: the unifying unification (the act of knowing) and the unified unification (the object 
known).’75 In 1997, psychiatrist Philip Thomas similarly posited dialectics as the means of both 
characterising and resolving contradictions within the epidemiological and sociological accounts of 
‘schizophrenia’, the phenomenological experiences of those living with a diagnosis, and his own 
‘schizoid’ status as ‘gaoler with a social conscience.’76 
Though there are few applications of semiotics to psychiatry, these have been potent 
contributions to the debate. In a 2003 paper, Stepan Davtian and Tatyana Chernigovskaya present 
semiotics as a depsychologised, non-reductive alternative account of the material claimed by mind-
doctoring and psychotherapy (and latterly neurology) as its exclusive purview. As such, it allows for 
a rephrasing of core questions, opening up to fresh and creative lines of inquiry a discourse that 
had long since fallen into circularity and echolalia. As they argue: ‘it is important to admit that there 
are no such mysterious inner causes, but only certain variants of behaviour that seem to be abnormal 
[…] [a] question like “what is the course for schizophrenia?” is a wrong question, as it has no 
reasonable answer.’ 77  Building on their recasting of an enigmatic, ‘impenetrable darkness’ as 
adjustments and biases in semiotic mechanisms that are subtle, complex, manifold but inherently 
and essentially the same – rather than more opaque, more dark, more pathological – as those in 
people without a diagnosis of schizophrenia, it is possible to frame psychosis as a web of 
attunements, sensitivities and signifying processes: 
                                                
73 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Abduction and induction’, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce pp.150-156 (p.153) 
74 Thomas Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok, ‘“You know my method”: A juxtaposition of Charles S Peirce 
and Sherlock Holmes’, in The Sign of Three, ed. by Umberto Eco and Thomas Sebeok (Bloomington and 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1983) pp.11-54 (p.44) 
75 David Cooper, ‘Two types of rationality’, New Left Review, 29 (1965) 62-68, pp.64-65 
76 Thomas, Dialectics of Schizophrenia, p.3 
77 Stepan Davtian and Tatyana Chernigovskaya, ‘Psychiatry in free fall: in pursuit of a semiotic foothold’, Sign 
Systems Studies, 31:2 (2003) 533-546, p.535 
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Thus, activity deficit becomes the motivating mechanism, the key factor in the development of a 
disorder being simultaneously its cause and effect. In this respect, a final semiotic equivalent of 
disease […] proves to be the simplification of a person’s world and behaviour, which is represented 
as a reduction in the number of perceivable signs (or olgosemia) and a decrease in the significance of 
signs in his life situations, their fragments and in the world as a whole (or hyposemia).78 
 
Chernigovskaya (2004) argues that the human brain functions as a sign-rendering organ for 
managing the welter of sensory chaos constitutive of the world. To succumb to this deluge of data 
is to experience the world with the mediating Umwelt intact, and to see it in all its hypersemic 
glory.79 Such ideas shall, of course, resurface throughout this thesis. 
That the meaning-making, cognitive and psychological processes underpinning the disease 
entity known as ‘schizophrenia’ could be defined as semiotic disorders, comprising hyposemic 
negative symptoms and hypersemic positive symptoms, seems a reasonable preliminary 
terminological paraphrasing of the problem. What is of note is, firstly, that fine calibrations of 
hyposemic and hypersemic interpretative tendencies are the discerning ‘judgements’ fundamentally 
constitutive of what is collectively endorsed as sanity.80 It is also worth adding that the semiotician 
is – like the ‘schizophrenic’ – prone to eccentricities and extremes of semiosis, either critically 
refusing the legitimacy of signs or ‘discovering’ (in truth, creating, for all signs are created qua signs 
from pre-semiotic material) signs, through the process of their ‘analysis’ and research.81 What the 
semiotician does intentionally, professionally and with social approval, the ‘schizophrenic’ does 
reactively, ‘pathologically’ and in response to and generative of social approbation.  
Schizomimesis is a process whereby the discourse of ‘schizophrenia’ adopts formal 
qualities that mimetically embody the disease symptomatology. This thesis shall explore this idea, 
by placing ‘schizophrenia’ – in all its cultural, phenomenological and medical representations – into 
dialectic with the theories of semiotics. Each chapter will attend to a different ‘symptom’ of the 
‘disease’ that can then be formally traced within the discourse and representational semiotic system 
itself. The five chapters are grouped under three sections. The first section deals with the disease 
concept, (re)conceptualising ‘schizophrenia’ as a mutable sign. Chapter one considers thought 
insertion and influence and the instability of signs in relation to diagnostics and aetiology. Chapter 
two examines the interplay between the disruptions in so-called ‘psychotic’ speech and the disorder 
in the clinical thinking about its diagnostic and epidemiological significance. In the second section, 
chapter three counterpoints the narrative theories and practice of illness writing with disturbances 
in ipseity and magical thinking. The third section analyses the structural similarities between 
                                                
78 Davtian and Chernigovskaya, p.541 
79  Tatiana Chernigovskaya, ‘Cognitive struggle with sensory chaos: semiotics of olfaction and hearing’, 
Semiotica, 150:1 (2004) 61-75 
80 Of course, the familiar cultural excuses are made for the deviant semiotic calibrations of children, those 
with a bio-genetic cognitive impairment and ‘geniuses.’ 
81 It is more than a coincidence of language that the semiotician and the ‘schizophrenic’ are both subjects of 
analysis. What distinguishes the two primarily are socially awarded statuses of authority, agency and 
autonomy. The semiotician wields analysis; the ‘schizophrenic’ suffers it. 
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hallucinations and delusions of reference and cinematic representations of psychosis (chapter four) 
and deictic relations in therapy, popular culture and society (chapter five). 
 The politics of this endeavour should be obvious. In labelling the meaning-making 
manoeuvres inherent in all semiotic cultural, epidemiological, linguistic and inter- and intra-
personal communications as ‘schizo’, this thesis belongs to the great emancipatory tradition of early 
and mid-twentieth century European political and cultural thought, whereby the most alienated 
figures of society – the impoverished, the ethnic minorities, the ‘mentally ill’ – are taken as 
emblematic of a humanity riven with the estrangements of capitalism. To universalise is not to 
belittle. To see absolute equivalence between the structures of thought and meaning labelled 
‘schizophrenic’ and those held as differently normal is to destigmatise, not to deny. To perceive a 
continuity, rather than disunity, between human subjects is to foster that very unity. And to see 
social, economic and historical superstructures as constructive of individual subjects is not fatalism, 
but an innervating humanism. Just as John Lennon was neither racist nor sexist to declare that 
‘woman is the nigger of the world,’82 so to see all people, societies and discourse as schizomimetic 
is to realise that those dismissed as mad are but zones of the greatest translucence, indispensible in 
the species-old mission of self-knowledge in the face of humanity’s collective opacity. 
 With journey and ultimate destination already laid before the reader, and with this thesis 
about to détour83 back to the preliminary question of diagnosis, the words of Derrida seem apposite: 
‘[s]ince we have already said everything, the reader must bear with us if we continue on a while.’84 
  
                                                
82 John Lennon and Yoko Ono, Woman is the Nigger of the World (Apple, 1972) 
83 Détournement is the dynamic spirit of ‘schizophrenic’, semiotic and – indeed – diagnostic maneouvres. As 
Guy Debord and Gil Wolman defined it: ‘Ultimately, any sign or word is susceptible to being converted into 
something else, even into its opposite.’ Guy Debord and Gil Wolman, ‘A User’s Guide to Détournement’, in 
Situationist International Anthology, ed. and trans. by Ken Knabb 2nd edn (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 
2006) pp.14-21 (p.20) 
84 Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ in Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London and New York: 
Continuum, 2004) [1972], pp.69-121 (p.71) 
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Chapter One: Prodromal signs of schizophrenia 
The question is whether the notion of objective, observer-independent existence holds for the use 
of conceptual analysis in different cognitive systems such as medical systems. Again the issue of 
context arises: is a concept such as a disease-category (originated from either nature or the mind) 
independent of its context, or is it shaped by the experience of illness?1 
 
But once the sign is constituted, society can very well re-functionalize it, and speak about it as if it 
were an object made for use: a fur coat will be described as if it served only to protect from the 
cold.2 
 
For Barthes, the medical symptom was la substance du signifiant. 3  Indeed, in semiotic terms, the 
clinical diagnosis – as opposed to a diagnosis underpinned by the epidemiological ‘fact’ of 
laboratory empiricism – can only be a discovery, or construction, of the signified from the matter 
(both form and substance to use Hjemslev’s terms) of the signifier. It does not, therefore, seem 
reasonable to take on faith Sebeok and Danesi’s assertion that the ‘symptom is a natural sign 
recognizable by virtue of the fact that its signifier is coupled with its signified inside the body’s 
morphology.’4 Or rather, if that description is accepted, then it is not possible to talk of psychiatric 
symptoms at all. 
Barthes’ concept of the sign as given above serves as a critique of the diagnostic term 
‘schizophrenia.’ The term itself was ‘constituted’ during the drive in the closing years of the 
nineteenth century to establish psychiatry as a scientifically valid medical field. Since its 
constitution, it has been continually re-functionalized, although differently by different social 
groups. For the DSM Task Force, schizophrenia is a biochemical disease of the brain of unknown 
cause. For social constructionist sceptics, it is a pseudo-scientific invention for endorsing social 
control and psychiatric science. For those living with a diagnosis, schizophrenia is the unyielding 
explanation for why they experience the world as they do. In the midst of the perpetual 
‘Manichean’ duel between biological psychiatry and social constructionism over the ontological 
status of ‘schizophrenia’, a semiotic reading can offer a contribution to the ‘muddier, non-
doctrinaire accounts of psychiatric diagnosis’ called for by Felicity Callard.5 
This chapter shall argue that there is a space in the critical discourse for a broad semiotic 
reading of schizophrenia, and will describe the scope and attitude of such an analysis. It will then 
apply this reading approach to the diagnostic terms attached to schizophrenia. Finally, it will 
examine the discourse around three persons from three different countries and centuries who have 
received contested diagnoses of schizophrenia: James Tilly Matthews, Daniel Paul Schreber and 
Anders Behring Breivik. This chapter will conclude by asserting that schizophrenia – as a diagnostic 
term – operates as a Saussurean sign of considerable definitional instability and – like Samuel 
                                                
1 Brands, Franck and Leeuwen, p.8 
2 Roland Barthes, Elements, p.42 
3 Roland Barthes, ‘Semiology and medicine’ 
4 Sebeok and Danesi, p.21 
5 Felicity Callard, ‘Psychiatry diagnosis: the indispensability of diagnosis’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 40 (2014) 
526-530, p.527 Of course, semiotics is doctrinaire, but just not those doctrines. 
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Beckett’s catatonic Mr Endon – ‘big blooming buzzing confusion of ground, mercifully free of 
figure.’6 
 Semiotics has not had much success so far in relation to medicine generally, nor 
schizophrenia specifically. Attempts to apply semiotics to illness have often met with cries of 
reductionism. What Sebeok called the ‘protracted nonage of clinical semiotics’ has, with the tenacity 
of an ice age, only lately shown signs of receding.7 Not least, this resistance to semiotics has been 
due to a misappraisal of what semiotics is. Too often, medical clinicians, researchers, theorists and 
assorted critical thinkers across the still-fledgling interdisciplinary space of medical humanities, 
dismiss semiotics as some kind of nomenclatural, reductionist join-the-dots. A diagnostic game of 
pin the tail on the donkey. This attitude endures in assertions that it is ‘impossible to conceive 
descriptive psychopathology as medical semiology.’ 8  But the semiotics of diagnosis is not as 
simplistic as this diagnosis of semiotics. 
  Occasional papers rehearse the case for semiotics in diagnosis. And a semiotics that is 
more sophisticated than that dismissed by medical anthropologist Arthur Kleinman as follows: 
Diagnosis is a thoroughly semiotic activity: an analysis of one symbol system followed by its 
translation into another … This interpretative bias to clinical diagnosis means that the patient-
physician interaction is organised as an interrogation.9 
  
John Nessa explicitly analogises the clinical encounter regarding diagnoses to Peirce’s triadic sign 
whereby ‘[t]he patient “is” the symptom, the doctor interprets it as a diagnosis, and they both refer 
to an object which is a disease.’10 Hoffmeyer draws the same comparison.11 Semiotics, in this sense, 
is a dialogic, polysemic process of meaning-making, suffused with complexities and ambiguities. 
The influence of the Vološinov and the Bakhtin school is obvious here.12 It is not fanciful to 
imagine clinicians grasping and applying this philosophical approach in their daily practice, as 
American MD John Burnum wrote just such a paper (1993), noting that rather than blinding 
medical practitioners to the possible reductionist tendencies in their scientific and therapeutic 
doctrines, the semiotic method could open them up to critical reflection: 
Semiotics warns us that if we are to minimize errors in interpretation, we must remember that 
medical signs are but symbolic, often ambiguous proxies of truth whose meaning, furthermore, is 
                                                
6 Samuel Beckett, Murphy (London: Calder Publications, 1993), p.138 
7 Sebeok, ‘Ecumenicalism’, p.190 
8 Pablo Ramos Gorostiza and Jaime Adan Manes, ‘Misunderstanding psychopathology as medical semiology: 
an epistemological enquiry’, Psychopathology, 44 (2011) 205-215, p.207 
9 Arthur Kleinman, The Illness Narratives (New York: Basic Books, 1988), p.16 
10 John Nessa, ‘About signs and symptoms: can semiotics expand the view of clinical medicine’, Theoretical 
Medicine, 17 (1996) 363-377, p.367 
11 Hoffmeyer, Signs of Meaning in the Universe, p.19 
12 Vološinov and Bakhtin do not often appear in the medical literature. For a novel, but isolated, account of 
how Bakhtinian appreciation of the social construction of sign relations, and the polyphonic, dialogic nature 
of the self can provide insights into the doctor-patient interaction see Raimo Puustinen, ‘Bakhtin’s 
philosophy and medical practice – toward a semiotic theory of doctor-patient interaction’, Medicine, Health 
Care and Philosophy, 2 (1999) 275-281 
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shaped by its contexts and whose interpretation lies at the mercy of inference and the experience 
and bias of the individual physician.13 
 
Kleinman has sincere humane intent when advocating the exclusion of semiotics from his cross-
cultural toolkit for reading illnesses (rather than semiotically pinpointing diseases).14 Artificially, given the 
rich cross-fertilisation between the disciplines of structural anthropology and linguistics, Kleinman 
seems to posit semiotic decoding of disease signs as a polar opposite to an empathetic reading of 
illness manifestations: ‘[d]iagnosis then becomes reductionist, the semiotic interpretation of ‘signs’ 
of disease as an entity or object out of “the blooming, buzzing confusion” of illness symptoms.’15 
Arguably, Kleinman does not mean to imply that a semiotic analysis is necessarily reductionist; this 
criticism he might reserve only for the carving out of a disease entity from a heterogeneous mass of 
illness symptoms. The reference to William James potentially undermines his argument. For James, 
the baby’s first tentative efforts to differentiate the ‘one great blooming, buzzing confusion’16 are 
essential in the construction of the individual mind.17 If this is reductionism, it is also existentially 
and functionally vital. 
 Certainly, Burnum’s account demonstrates that practitioners are able to apply a semiotic 
diagnostic reading that appreciates the ambiguity inherent in signs, the complexity inherent in 
human subjects and the influence of cultural and social context on both signs and subjects. Further, 
the translation between sign systems is – this thesis shall argue consistently – a part of all 
communication and narrative building. Diagnosis does not have to be an interrogation; if it does, 
then so too must understanding a ballet or ordering food in a country where you do not speak the 
language. 
Peter Sedgwick, in his Marxist critique of critical psychiatry Psychopolitics (1982), argues one 
of the defining strengths of RD Laing’s landmark text The Divided Self (1960) is that it ‘provides us 
with a stunning demonstration of what it means to understand patients as human beings rather 
than to classify them as instances of a disease.’18 As Kleinman after him, Laing reinstates the 
patient’s humanity and phenomenology in response to a traditionally reductionist semiotics of 
diagnosis, here epitomised by Kraeplin. Laing, not without playful irony, re-translates the responses 
from Kraepelin’s alleged exemplar of ‘catatonic excitement’ and thereby excavates an excoriating, 
                                                
13  John F Burnum, ‘Medical diagnosis through semiotics: giving meaning to the sign’, Annals of Internal 
Medicine 119:9 (1993) 939-943 p.940 
14 Arthur Kleinman, ‘Anthropology and psychiatry: the role of culture in cross-cultural research on illness’, 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 151 (1987) 447-454 
15 Kleinman, (1987), p.450  
16 William James, The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), p.462 
17 Indeed, Lysaker, Johannesen and Lysaker see a failure to be able to pull a solid, if temporary, self from a 
mass of competing selves as a potential route to schizophrenic psychic loosening, and make this point with 
the self-same reference. ‘Simultaneously, still other self-positions might be evoked without being directly 
solicited (e.g. self-as-lonely, self-as-misunderstood, etc.). If one failed to negotiate these switches, confusion 
could easily arise. Even a feeling of dissolution might take over if no stable position presented itself from 
which one could regard the emerging blooming, buzzing confusion.’ Paul Henry Lysaker, Jason K Johannsen 
and John Timothy Lysaker, ‘Schizophrenia and the experience of intersubjectivity as threat’, Phenomenology and 
the Cognitive Sciences, 4 (2005) 335-352 p.343 
18 Peter Sedgwick, PsychoPolitics (London: Pluto Press, 1982), p.74 
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coded attack by the patient on the clinician. Laing displaces Kraeplin’s ‘semiotic’ reading of the 
patient as a collocation of disease signs with his own interpretative translation of the supposedly 
incomprehensible and meaningless ‘schizophrenese’.19 From here Laing proceeds to define his own 
phenomenological reading approach as the Gestaltic inverse of the Kraepelinian clinical diagnostic 
interpretation: 
Now it seems clear that this patient’s behaviour can be seen in at least two ways, analogous to the 
ways of seeing a vase or face. One may see his behaviour as ‘signs’ of a ‘disease’; one may see his 
behaviour as expressive of his existence. The existential-phenomenology construction is an 
inference about the way the other is feeling or acting.20 
 
Hence, for Laing, Kraepelin’s poor semiotic reading of the patient’s disease is sufficient to 
characterise the semiotic approach as necessarily and always reductive. Laing’s true target – as 
Kleinman’s – was the dehumanising clinicalism that does not acknowledge the subjectivity of the 
‘schizophrenic’ and the validity of their expressions of their experience.21 Ironically, Laing’s analysis 
of Kraepelin’s mis-reading – or, perhaps better, mis-construing 22  – of his patient echoes 
Vološinov’s semiotic critique of the Freudian analytic encounter, which demonstrated ‘that Freud’s 
“dynamics” reflected the psychoanalytical session with its struggle and peripeteia – that social event 
out of which the patient’s verbal utterances were engendered.’23 Ironic, because Vološinov’s semiotic 
reading reveals the reductionism in Freud’s phenomenological psychology. No diagnostic reading 
method has the monopoly on reductionism, it seems. 
Both Kleinman and Laing make an error intrinsic in the history of schizophrenia, in seeing 
an unambiguous divide between a right and wrong interpretative stance. As neither the pure 
biological nor the unmediated psychological can provide a complete pathological picture, neither is 
it the case that phenomenological so-called empathy has a monopoly on non-dictatorial, exhaustive 
understanding of the patient in contrast to so-called hierarchical, reductionist semiotic dissection. 
Consider how Laing’s own reasoning implodes. He is correct to say that any diagnostic reading 
armed only with a deep knowledge of ‘the psychopathology of schizophrenia’ will not succeed in 
understanding the individual patient: 
Such data are all ways of not understanding him. To look and to listen to a patient and to see ‘signs’ 
of schizophrenia (as a ‘disease’) and to look and to listen to him simply as a human being are to see 
and to hear in as radically different ways as when one sees, first the vase, then the faces in the 
ambiguous picture.24 
                                                
19 This thesis’ choice of ‘schizophrenese’ as a term will be explained in the next chapter. 
20 RD Laing, The Divided Self (London: Penguin, 1990), pp.30-31 
21 Kraepelin’s approach to his patient projects onto him that very ‘lack of ontological autonomy’ (Laing, p.56) 
central to Laing’s conceptualizing of schizophrenia. In this way, Kraepelin renders his patient schizophrenic, 
simply by the process of denying his utterances meaning. Similarly, Laing’s phenomenological insights may 
not be describing the condition of experiencing schizophrenia so much as the condition of being diagnosed 
and thereby constructed as a Kraepelinean schizophrenic. 
22 And, of course, Kraepelin should see signs that support his disease conception, just as Laing sees signs that 
support his critical psychiatry, for in semiotics, it is the addressee who constructs the signs from the 
undifferentiated data received (the Jamesean ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’). ‘The inner constitution of the 
sign reveals the interest of the maker of the sign.’ Kress, p.65 
23 Vološinov, Freudianism, p.139 
24 Laing, p.33 
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Logically, the phenomenological reading – whether it produces either vase or faces – is no less 
reductionist than the semiotic reading. Neither renders the ‘ambiguous picture’ complete. By Laing 
and others, semiotics is conflated with Kraepelinian biologist reductionism. This is a dual fallacy. 
First, the two are in no sense the same methodology. It should not be the burden of this thesis to 
disprove this unjustified allegation of equivalence. Both Laing and Kleinman, very much in Laing’s 
wake, use semiotics as a descriptive metaphor for the biological approach. For them, or at least for 
their arguments, semiotics is merely a ‘medical semiotics (connecting signs and symptoms to an 
illness).’ 25  The signs are purely indexical in the sense of Peirce’s ‘second trichotomy’: iconic, 
indexical and symbolic.26  
The reductive equivalence suggested between semiotics and a medical semiotics of 
indexical signs should be suitably undermined by the observation that semiotics could just as easily 
be adopted as a metaphor for the phenomenological reading. This is because semiotics enters at the 
point at which the clinician (whether with an existential-phenomenological or a biological 
diagnostic intent) begins ‘to look and to listen’. In no sense does semiotics, as a methodology, 
proscribe what can and cannot be looked at or listened to. Secondly, and this is surely axiomatic, no 
methodology is inherently reductionist. Only if applied dogmatically to find a pre-supposed 
conclusion or applied to the exclusion of all other methodologies does it become so. Existential-
phenomenological approaches to schizophrenia prove no freer from the seduction of the 
interpretative master key than the biological-diagnostic approaches. Further, semiotics provides a 
unifying methodological structure that can encompass and synthesise these two – and the myriad 
other – modes of reading schizophrenia. Psychoanalyst David Olds recognises the ‘unifying, 
syncretic properties of semiotic theory’27 and sees the potential for ending the Cartesian dualism of 
body/brain versus psyche/mind in interpreting ‘the sign to be a concept basic to both biology and 
psychology, much as the inorganic molecule is to chemistry and the atom to physics.’28 Olds aims 
at: 
[A] plausible explanation of the mind-brain distinction, such that psychology and psychoanalysis 
have a firm foundation on a principle, operative throughout the living world, from the bottom to 
the top, from the molecule to the mind. The principle is that of semiosis, in which one thing can 
stand for another.29 
 
In this, Olds is very much of the biosemiotic tradition of Hoffmeyer, and adopts a holistic, post-
structuralist semiotics in keeping with that of this thesis. 
                                                
25 Lanin-Kettering and Harrow (1986), pp.15-16 
26 Pierce, ‘Logic as semiotic’, p.102 That psychosis itself is interpreted as an indexical sign in the medical 
semiotic psychiatric diagnosis, rather than as a condition in its own right, is given as a truism by Fischer and 
Carpenter: ‘Psychotic experience is to the diagnosis of mental illness as fever is to the diagnosis of infection – 
important, but non-decisive in differential diagnosis.’ Bernard A Fischer and William T Carpenter Jr, ‘Will the 
Kraepelinian dichotomy survive DSM-V?’, Neuropsychopharmacology, 34 (2009), 2081-2087, p.2081 
27 David D Olds, ‘A Semiotic model of mind’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 48 (2000) 497-
529, p.499 
28 Olds, p.500 
29 Olds, p.500 
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 Structural anthropologist Lévi-Strauss describes the structuralist approach as ‘the quest for 
the invariant, or for the invariant elements amongst superficial differences’30. His assessment could 
be a critique of the struggle to establish the epidemiology of schizophrenia: 
Science has only two ways of proceeding: it is either reductionist or structuralist. It is reductionist 
when it is possible to find out that very complex phenomena on one level can be reduced to simpler 
phenomena on other levels. For instance, there is a lot in life which can be reduced to 
physiochemical processes, which explain a part but not all. And when we are confronted with 
phenomena too complex to be reduced to phenomena of a lower order, then we can only approach 
them by looking to their relationships, that is, by trying to understand what kind of original system 
they make up.31 
 
Schizophrenia has certainly resisted reduction to a physiochemical explanation. Neither Laing nor 
Kleinman would disagree that the analysis of the ‘disease’ – allowing for the assumption that this 
categorising term is an appropriate one – should be (at least in part) conducted by an examination 
of the schizophrenic phenomena (in which would be included the life, utterances, gestures, clinical 
picture and so on, of the person with the diagnosis) that entails ‘looking to their relationships … by 
trying to understand what kind of original system they make up’. Inherent in Peirce’s trichotomic 
formulation of semiotics is Thirdness, the Interpretant contextual space within which the signs 
operate. Any sign – whether symbolic and therefore conventionally constructed or being, at least 
partially, natural – requires a system, specifically a community of users, to allow meanings to be 
generated and exchanged. As soon as sign systems are in play, the discourse becomes the natural, 
rightful terrain of semiotics. 
But is this justifiable or does this move fall under the accusation of ‘an arrogant 
“imperialism” on the part of semioticians’32 outlined by Umberto Eco? Eco stresses that semiotics 
is a reading approach and not an existential philosophy. To read and understand reality in this way 
is not to deny that reality exists:  
To look at the whole of culture as sub specie semiotica is not to say that culture is only communication 
and signification but that it can be understood more thoroughly if it is seen from the semiotic point 
of view.33 
 
Similarly, the contention of this thesis is not that schizophrenia is only communication and 
signification but that the semiotic point of view is untested, applicable and ought to provide if not a 
definitive understanding, then at least at novel one. There have been a few direct application of 
semiotics to schizophrenia. Notably, there was a mid-1980s exchange in the pages of Schizophrenia 
Bulletin in which James Harrod attempted a succinct, unifying call to arms drawing on recent papers 
by Chaika and Lambe (1985)34 and Lanin-Kettering and Harrow (1985).35 Harrod believed his 
analysis of the foregoing papers presented ‘evidence that schizophrenia, or at least one major type 
                                                
30 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning (New York: Schocken Books, 1979) p.8 
31 Lévi-Strauss, pp.9-10 
32 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p.6 
33 Eco, p.27 
34 Elaine Chaika and Richard Lambe, ‘The locus of dysfunction in schizophrenic speech’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
11:1 (1985) 8-15 
35 Illene Lanin-Kettering and Martin Harrow, ‘The thought behind the words: A view of schizophrenic 
speech and thinking disorders’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11:1 (1985) 1-7 
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of it, is neither a thought disorder nor a disorder of linguistic composition, but rather a semiotic 
disorder.’36 Neither of Harrod’s pairs of addressees were pleased with his attempt to reconcile their 
differing conceptualisations of the ‘disease’.  
Possibly the most sustained application of semiotics to psychiatric theory comes in 
Thomas Szasz’s 1961 polemic The Myth of Mental Illness, in which he aims ‘to provide a systematic 
semiotical analysis of a language form hitherto regarded as purely expressive – that is, of the 
language of certain bodily signs.’37 Szasz is mostly keen to prove that those claiming mental ‘illness’ 
are malingerers, shamming by dishonestly imitating genuine indexical signs of (‘real’ which for 
Szasz means ‘physical’) illness, using dissimulating iconic signs: ‘a hysterical seizure is an iconic sign 
of a genuine (organic) epileptic seizure.’38 Szasz’s semiotics is no better than his politics. Sedgewick 
offers an unsurpassable debunking of the latter as ‘the beleaguered politics of a capitalism that 
glorifies its own indifference.’39 In relation to Szasz’s crude semiotic reading, Victor Kuperman and 
Joseph Zislin (2005) provide an implicit, belated riposte by developing a far a more sophisticated 
semiotic taxonomising of psychiatric ‘diseases’ proposing a ‘new conceptual framework [that] will 
allow for explication and structural modelling of diagnostic decisions that the psychiatrist makes 
routinely.’40 
What, then, can the proposed dialectic between semiotics and schizophrenia contribute to 
an understanding of the ‘disease’? To return briefly to Barthes’ essay on semiology and medicine, 
this chapter will analyse attempts to generate a syndrome from a descriptive syntagm: 
It seems to me that a stable and repeated configuration of the same medical signs might be called, 
precisely, the syndrome, which would then be, linguistically, the equivalent of what is called the fixed 
syntagm, i.e., the group of stereotyped words which keeps returning conglomerated in the same way 
in various sentences, and which, consequently, though itself composed, strictly speaking, of several 
words – two, three, or four – presents absolutely the same functional value as a single word. 41 
 
By being conscious of this diagnostic process, and by extending the model of the syntagm beyond 
the disease descriptor (as syndrome term or diagnostic account) to the production within the 
biographical life of the subject experiencing the ‘disease’, some important discoveries are made. 
The episodic and remissive tendencies of bipolar depression in contrast to the chronic and 
progressive tendencies of schizophrenia (as asserted by psychiatry, that is) can be reformulated 
according to this model of the syntagm. Hence, the temporal (non)existence of the symptomatic 
syntagm is a core component of the differential diagnosis between schizophrenia and bipolar; a 
different shape in the syntagm acquires a different syntagmatic sign as diagnostic term. Similarly, 
the disease syntagm is not merely structured like language after the manner of the Lacanian 
                                                
36 James Harrod, ‘Schizophrenia as a semiotic disorder’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 12:1 (1986) 12-13 p.13 
37 Szasz, Myth, p.126 
38 Szasz, Myth, p.109 
39  Sedgewick, p.184. See all Chapter Six for a comprehensive dismantling of Szasz. The only flaw in 
Sedgewick’s argument is his revolutionary (mis)conviction that laissaz-faire anti-social individualism had 
passed its zenith and was in fatal decline. He was writing in 1982. 
40 Victor Kuperman and Joseph Zislin, ‘Semiotic perspective of psychiatric diagnosis’, Semiotica, 155:1 (2005) 
1-13, p.2 
41 Barthes, ‘Semiology and medicine’, p.208 
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‘unconscious’ 42 . Rather, it is structured through language. Repeatedly, it is only manifest in 
language, from voices heard, to accounts given and diagnostic criteria tabulated.43 Darian Leader 
writes of latent psychosis, and posits that it is prevalent but invisible.44 Entering into language is 
what makes psychosis visible, to the clinician, to the non-medical observer and to the subject 
experiencing it. Musical hallucinosis is by definition non-psychotic,45 despite being responsive to 
anti-psychotic medication 46  and despite a strong co-morbidity of musical hallucinations with 
auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) in people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.47 The prevalence 
of auditory verbal hallucinations over visual hallucinations might find a semiotic explanation in 
Sebeok’s assertion that inner speech codings are ‘at least partially anthroposemiotic’ whereas the 
coding system of vision is zoosemiotic.48 
 Holding these observations in place, as demonstrations that semiotic register and mode are 
integral to the pathology (or otherwise) of a psyche, this chapter will progress by asking how the 
diagnostic syntagm qua disease sign is constructed for ‘schizophrenia’ and whether this potentially 
‘dizzying circuit of signifier and signified’ 49  makes ‘schizophrenia’ a ‘limit-case’ 50  for medical 
semiotics. 
  
                                                
42 See Lacan, ‘The instance of the letter in the unconscious’ 
43 ‘Part of what happens when one goes crazy is that there is a grammatical shift.’ Mark Vonnegut, Just Like 
Someone Without Mental Illness Only More So (New York: Bantam Books, 2011), p.105 
44 Darian Leader, What is Madness? (London: Penguin, 2011) 
45 Hector A Colon-Rivera and Mark A Oldham, ‘The mind with a radio of its own: a case report and review 
of the literature on the treatment of musical hallucinations’, General Hospital Psychiatry, 36 (2014) 220-224 
46  David Mansoor and Linda Ganzini, ‘Musical hallucinations successfully treated with antipsychotic 
medications: three case reports’, Psychosomatics, 55 (2014) 191-193 
47 36% according to Tony H Nayani and Anthony S David, ‘The auditory hallucination: a phenomenological 
survey’, Psychological Medicine, 26 (1996) 177-189 
48 Thomas Sebeok, ‘Zoosemiotic components of human communication’, in The Sign and Its Masters, (Lanham 
and London: University of America Press, 1989) pp.35-60 (p.44) 
49 Barthes, ‘Semiology and medicine’, p.210 
50 Barthes, ‘Semiology and medicine’, p.211 
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Buonaparte’s talisman; constructing the sign of a sickness 
We told you that you were Buonaparte’s talisman, and that we would work him up to as high a pitch of grandeur by 
the possession of you, as we would fix you degraded below the common level of human nature.51 
 
DSM diagnosis fits well within the tradition of medical semiotics whereby symptoms, complaints and 
behaviours are qualified as signs or objective indicators of an underlying syndrome-like disorder. 
The prospective patient is thereby seen as a sender of signs of illness, which the diagnostician qua 
receiver needs to decode. For this decoding process to be successful it is crucial that the receiver 
possesses the code whereby the sign can be interpreted. In psychiatric diagnosis, as performed 
within DSM, the handbook with its list of disorders and criteria make up the code.52 
 
Historically, there has been considerable difficultly giving a name – a sign of a sign – to the disease, 
or diseases, or symptom constellation, or social behaviour that this thesis refers to as 
‘schizophrenia’. Semiotically, it might make sense that if a sign suffers instability on the side of the 
signified (the criteria of diagnosis; the epidemiological status and description of the disease) then 
this will cause a (fatal) rupture with the signifier. Further, it is necessary to observe that as well as 
being an object language in its own right, medical discourse is also a metalanguage; it is a language 
that describes the sign system of disease.53 
Words are not innocent. They are loaded with an accumulation of cultural prejudices, 
infused with a Vygotskyan mass of socio-economic histories and relations. When a study 
demonstrates that people are more inclined to use ‘stronger wording’ – adjectives and nouns – to 
communicate the ‘strongest impression of endurance’ when describing mental ill health, in contrast 
to a greater prevalence of softer, implicitly temporary possessives when speaking of physical ill 
health, this is only illuminating biases already entrenched in language.54 As Vygotksy concluded 
Thought and Language (1934): 
The word is a direct expression of the historical nature of human consciousness. Consciousness is 
reflected in a word as the sun in a drop of water. A word relates to consciousness as a living cell 
relates to a whole organism, as an atom relates to the universe. A word is a microcosm of human 
consciousness.55 
 
And what does that mean when the word in question, the sign in question, is: schizophrenia?   
 It is right to be cautious about attempts to enforce unilateral, discontinuous changes in 
conventional signs, which are by their nature collectively enshrined in dialectic relationship with the 
social conditions they describe. Such top-down acts of sign production are often fated to be 
ignored (Esperanto) or repudiated (when Kellogg’s briefly re-branded UK Coco Pops as Choco 
Krispies). In 2002, the name for ‘schizophrenia’ in Japan was changed from Seishin-Bunretsu-Byo 
                                                
51 John Haslam, Illustrations of Madness (London: Routledge, 1988), p.77 
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and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 85 (2012) 128-142, p.131 
53 This term is a highly imprecise way of attempting to capture the totality of symptoms, underlying organic 
events, surgical and pharmaceutical interventions, prophylaxes, visual explorations, blood and tissue testing 
etc. that comprise the medical ‘material’. 
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(mind-split disease) to Togo-Shitcho-Sho (integration disorder). Though a 2015 meta-study found that 
uptake of the new term in formal media and medical channels had proven successful, it noted that 
the same negative connotations and denotations (signifieds) endured with the new signifier.56 In 
effect, the sign remained essentially the same, despite a superficial change in the signifier. Jim Van 
Os makes a compelling argument for a complete reformulation of the disease entity as salience 
syndrome to effect not just a change in the levels of stigma experienced but to re-open to 
interrogation the foundational nosological principles and assumptions in the functionalization of 
the sign of schizophrenia. As Van Os observes, ‘the problem […] is that the way mental health 
professionals use and communicate about the term inevitably results in medical reification through 
behavioural pseudo-validation.’57 This communal reification is exactly how, as Vanheule states in 
the quotation above, the DSM comes to function as a semiotic code. Schizophrenia as a sign is a 
‘direct expression of the historical nature of human consciousness’, even if that history is, as for 
Stephen Dedalus, a nightmare from which many are trying to awake.58  
There is a problem with disease discovery. It is often a process of disease creation. Mary 
Boyle lays out the constructionist argument succinctly: 
It is unfortunate that the language of medicine tends to obscure the process of concept formation: 
when new patterns are suggested, we are apt to talk of ‘a new disease being discovered’. Constructs 
inferred from the patterns (for example, multiple sclerosis, AIDS, diabetes) then become, 
misleadingly, the “name of diseases” which people are said to “have”.’59 
 
Former chair of the DSM-IV task force, Allen Frances, has become a popular critic of the practice 
of ‘diagnostic inflation’60 regularly fretted about by psychologists, sociologists and the health pages 
of newspapers. (In semiotic terms, this can be expressed as a ‘sign-to-symptom transformation’ 
whereby the very same behaviour, as formalised in signs, is, without any change in the form of the 
sign, received as a constellation of symptoms. The polysemic signs of a person’s utterances, beliefs, 
appearance or emotions homogenise into the univocal monotony of a diagnosis.)61 Frances’ 2013 
unofficial companion text to the DSM-562 stresses that every revision of diagnostic criteria has to 
strike a balance between reliability and validity. For Frances, reliability (consistency of diagnosis) 
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has with this latest formulation of the diagnostic sign trumped validity (accuracy of the diagnostic 
class). This is the very point at which necessary, pragmatic disease invention gives way to unhelpful 
fiction. For Boyle, this anti-scientific insistence on ‘reliability’ in the diagnostic formulations of 
‘schizophrenia’ is one of the key mechanisms of its construction by the psychiatric profession. 
Rather than a problem of a recent over-expansion of the DSM’s diagnostic reach – as Frances sees 
it – Boyle presents this as a consistent self-justifying practice by psychiatry and one overtly in 
evidence during the revisions between DSM-III-R and DSM-IV.63 That the tipping point at which 
validity is sacrificed for reliability should occur for Frances only after DSM-IV may not be unrelated 
to the fact that he was chair of the DSM-IV task force. 
The early twentieth century nosological wrangling that took place over what is now widely 
termed ‘schizophrenia’ demonstrates that each re-naming was – to an extent – a re-construction. 
Kraepelin suggests that the greater portion of disagreement was over clinical descriptor (as 
signifier) rather than clinical description (as signified): ‘[t]he objections have been directed even 
more against the name than against the clinical conception.’ 64  Bleuler counters with a parallel 
section of his introduction justifying his proposed name change, and gives grammatical and 
expressive concerns as a major motivation, stressing the need for a disease term with an adjectival 
form for ‘[w]ithout such a new term, a thorough work on differential diagnosis would be hard to 
write and even harder to read.’65 Freud invoked a plague on both their houses: dementia praecox 
was ‘a particularly unhappy name’ whereas schizophrenia ‘appears appropriate only so long as we 
forget its literal meaning.’66 Yet Freud’s own attempts at terminological clarity sees him tie himself 
in a nomenclatural knot. Throughout his ‘Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account 
of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)’ (1911) and his paper ‘On Narcissism’ (1914), he 
performs an endless substitution of terms – paranoia, dementia paranoia, dementia praecox, 
paraphrenia, schizophrenia – betraying a certain conceptual uncertainty. This battle of and over 
words allows Kraepelin to assert, without obvious intentional irony, that for the condition ‘a name 
that as far as possible said nothing would be preferable.’67 
 Not that this thesis is a debate only about terms. Berrios, Luque and Villagrán are correct 
to warn against developing a ‘history of a word’: 
To say that a history of schizophrenia should be about what the word names as such is no answer 
for that will make it into a history of a word, which from the clinical point of view is the less 
important of issues: the central concern should be the history of the behaviours in question, 
whatever the names they have travelled under.68 
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The first chapter of Jung’s The Psychology of Dementia Praecox (1907) demonstrates that there are as 
many codifications of the ‘behaviours in question’ as there are terms. What the history of 
schizophrenia demonstrates is that it is in the nature of the sign to be insecure; the instability of the 
sign ‘schizophrenia’ being especially pronounced. Szasz, in A Lexicon of Lunacy (1993), offers up 
AIDS as an example of a real, discoverable disease in contrast to the invented or ‘coined’ 
conceptual construct of schizophrenia: 
To put it differently, real doctors (for example, pathologists) discover real diseases (for example, 
AIDS) by working on the human body; whereas fake doctors (psychiatrists) coin metaphoric diseases 
(for example, tobacco dependence), by working on a society’s vocabulary. I categorise the second 
group of maladies as metaphoric rather than literal diseases.69 
 
AIDS is a particularly poor choice here. As Boyle noted, ‘real’ diseases are also conceptual 
constructions and there were countervailing determining factors – social, political and 
epidemiological – that meant that the diagnostic and linguistic sign ‘AIDS’ had a period of semiotic 
turbulence.70 Within a decade, the sign of AIDS had settled; schizophrenia passed its centenary in 
2011 in a state of deep definitional uncertainty. 
Is there something in the nature of schizophrenia that makes its status as a sign inherently 
unstable? It might be argued that the lack of a clear organic anchor can be blamed. Does an 
examination of the development of the diagnostic term bear this out? The DSM wears the history 
of its construction boldly. The first edition from 1952 makes no secret of the bureaucratic 
pragmatism of its objectives. The move towards the creation of a standard classification of illness – 
begun internationally and in the US during the second decade of the 20th century – was intended to 
resolve the problem of ‘a polyglot of diagnostic labels and systems, effectively blocking 
communication and the collection of medical statistics.’ 71  Explicitly, the experiences of the 
psychiatric services of the US armed forces during the Second World War, and their working 
nomenclature, influenced the 1948 revision of the ICD, which itself was the final impetus to the 
DSM. As only approximately 10% of armed forces patients could be diagnosed, a process of 
disease invention began: 
No provision existed for diagnosing psychological reactions to the stress of combat, and terms had 
to be invented to meet this need. The official system of nomenclature rapidly became untenable.72 
 
Even within this overtly invented and descriptive nosology, the schizophrenic reactions (as they 
were termed) are ordered under the following subheading: ‘Disorders of psychogenic origin or 
without clearly defined tangible cause or structural change.’ 73  As disease construction, this is 
modest in the liberties it takes. 
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It is not hard to observe that nosology is ideological.74 The DSM-II (1968) approached this 
issue directly, with Ernest M Gruenberg, Chairman of the APA’s Committee on Nomenclature and 
Statistics acknowledging in the introduction: 
… that labels of themselves condition our perceptions. The Committee accepted the fact that 
different names for the same thing imply different attitudes and concepts. It has, however, tried to 
avoid terms which carry with them implications regarding either the nature of a disorder or its causes 
and has been explicit about causal assumptions when they are integral to a diagnostic concept.75 
 
The safety net to prevent against the diagnostic concepts becoming solely an expression of the 
ideological approach of the nosographers is there in Gruenberg’s intent to be ‘explicit about causal 
assumptions’. Almost as an a priori rebuff to later accusations of disease invention, the DSM and 
DSM-II were upfront about the constructed nature of this newly mapped territory. But this was no 
bulwark against the strength of conventionalised signs. Barthes’ quotation at the start of this 
chapter now appears as a warning: once the sign – the diagnostic category of schizophrenia – was 
constituted, it was then re-functionalized as ‘made for use.’ By extension, the causal assumptions 
were also accepted as ‘made for use’ and when they changed, the changed, reconstituted sign was 
re-functionalized again. 
 This is evidenced by the change in causal assumption and in the diagnostic sign between 
the DSM-I and DSM-II: 
Consider, for example, the mental disorder labelled in this Manual as “schizophrenia,” which, in the 
first edition, was labelled “schizophrenic reaction.” This change of label has not changed the nature 
of the disorder, nor will it discourage continuing debate about its nature or causes. Even if it had 
tried, the Committee could not establish agreement about what this disorder is; it could only agree 
on what to call it.76 
 
This appears naïve in the extreme. Across the connection of the sign – in this process, the act of 
diagnostically labelling collections of symptoms – changes on either side are purely dialectical. In 
other words, to change the label (the ‘signifier’ of diagnosis) is also to change the disease (the 
‘signified’), and thereby initiate a cycle of responsive changes. The change in the signifier and the 
loss of the ‘reaction’ element indicates shifts in the disease concept, as well as a change in the 
intellectual orthodoxy at the APA. The rise of the critical psychiatry movement was itself in 
dialectical relation with the rise of neo-Kraepelinian77 biochemical interpretive attitudes amongst 
the compilers of the DSM. By the time DSM-III was published in 1980, the enduring naturalisation 
of the sign – however re-constituted and however frequently – was represented within the 
compositional aims, which included: 
– avoiding the introduction of new terminology and concepts that break with tradition, except when 
clearly needed; 
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– reaching consensus on the meaning of necessary diagnostic terms that have been used 
inconsistently, and avoiding the use of terms that have outlived their usefulness;78 
 
Consensus, tradition and consistency are the core values espoused, whilst at the same time the 
DSM-III represented a complete conceptual overhaul of the American psychiatric tradition in 
general,79 and the concept of schizophrenia specifically. Biochemical rigour however could not 
rectify the instability in the sign of schizophrenia and the vastly extended entry on ‘Schizophrenic 
Disorders’ in DSM-III made the frank admission that ‘[t]he limits of the concept of schizophrenia 
are unclear.’80  Even on the question of the concept’s basic heterogeneity, the text exhibited a 
confusing equivocation: 
Although Schizophrenia is most likely a group of disorders of differing etiologies, common usage 
refers to “Schizophrenia” rather than the technically more accurate term, Schizophrenic Disorders.81 
 
The incongruence between ‘most likely’ to ‘technically more accurate’ illustrates the hopefulness 
that the APA’s motivating ideology of empiricism would discover (or be able to construct) the 
required proof of its own truthfulness. So uncomfortable with uncertainty were DSM-III and DSM-
III-R (1987) that they included a coding structure for ‘the various ways in which a clinician may 
indicate diagnostic uncertainty.’82 
With DSM-5, another marker of (undue) diagnostic certainty has been dropped. A 
lingering bias towards to Schneider’s First Rank Symtpoms (FRS) – stretching back to the 
International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia83– has been erased with the de-privileging of auditory 
hallucinations and bizarre delusions. Prior to DSM-5, sustained experience of either of these 
symptoms was sufficient to meet Criterion A, without any additional listed symptoms. Now, these 
symptoms are treated as any other listed under Criterion A. It is interesting to see that, in a culture 
highly sensitive to the encroachment of medicalisation on everyday life and behaviour, this revision 
ought to make diagnoses of ‘schizophrenia’ less likely, as the diagnostic bar is raised.  
Combined with the removal of the historic schizophrenic subtypes – with a pedigree 
stretching back to Kraepelin and Bleuler’s original formulations – DSM-5 offers a formalisation of 
‘schizophrenia’ that is arguably more circumspect and less precise. Counter-intuitively perhaps, a 
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paper published immediately prior to the DSM-5 but working with the pre-publication changes, 
found ‘that changes from DSM-IV to DSM-5 in the definition of criterion A symptoms should 
have little impact on caseness of schizophrenia, with less than 2% of patients with DSM- IV 
schizophrenia not meeting DSM-5 criteria because of these changes.’84  The lack of impact on 
caseness implies that DSM-5 lags clinical diagnostic practice, and is a descriptive (in contrast to 
prescriptive) nosology. In effect, the labels cannot overwhelm the driver of clinical necessity; as the 
DSM-I made clear, it was clinical pragmatism that pushed the very need for labels in the first place. 
During the preparation of DSM-5 two labelling innovations were considered: the creation 
of a diagnostic category for ‘high-risk states for psychosis’ and the introduction of a severity scale 
for symptoms. The former might be called pre-labelling, and though dropped from DSM-5, 
remains a considerable source of anxiety as a potentially well-meaning but harmful intervention.85  
In contrast, the symptom severity scale – which appeared but only within Section III ‘Emerging 
Measures and Models’ – is anti-labelling. Rather than the implicit absolutism of a tick-box criteria, 
which constructs diseases, and then builds patients to fit these definitions, severity scales are a 
clearer fit with clinical reality, where people present with symptoms that are both various and 
varying. Indeed, the chair of DSM-5’s Psychosis Working Group, William Carpenter, stated that 
‘[t]he proposed addition of psychopathology domains as symptom dimensions would have focused 
clinical and discovery attention on what is actually wrong with each individual patient in each 
diagnostic class.’ 86  Rather than any epidemiological reason, Carpenter offers a practical and 
industrial reason for not introducing these into the formal diagnosis: they might be open to 
financial abuse by insurers (or what Carpenter rather euphemistically calls ‘third party payers’).87 
Similarly, his phase ‘syndrome heterogeneity’ might be thought by some as a euphemistic attempt 
to address the fact that these historic diagnostic criteria do not describe ‘real’ diseases, nor are they 
the least-imperfect clinical approximation envisaged by the earliest DSM authors.88 This raises the 
question of whether, even as a pragmatic convenience, the label of ‘schizophrenia’ has outlived its 
purpose. 
These tensions within the diagnostic sign of schizophrenia cannot be explained away 
purely by the context of attitudinal changes at the APA, the evolving social responses to mental ill 
health or the growing body of scientific knowledge. From its first iteration, the DSM embodied an 
existential Spaltung, being caught with two irreconcilable but related purposes. On the one hand, it 
was to be a nomenclature, a lexicon of the diagnostic terms used descriptively in clinical situations. 
On the other, it was to be a statistical code, to assist in the tabulation of medico-scientific 
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information.89 In semiotic terms, the instability in the sign of schizophrenia denotes an instability 
within the semiological system of psychiatry, which in itself denotes a similar instability within the 
broader system of medicine. 
The APA certainly wishes to cordon off the diagnostic discourse of mental disorders. The 
‘Cautionary Statement’ in DSM-IV is a large ‘keep out’ sign, marking the discursive territory as the 
sole domain of its populating community of psychiatric clinicians and scientists: 
The specified diagnostic criteria for each mental disorder are offered as guidelines for making 
diagnoses, because it has been demonstrated that the use of such criteria enhances agreement 
among clinicians and investigators. The proper use of these criteria requires specialized clinical 
training that provides both a body of knowledge and clinical skills.90 
 
The epidemiological system, the diagnostic language, of schizophrenia operates as a Barthesean 
semiological system, where: 
[T]he language is elaborated not by the ‘speaking mass’ but by a deciding group. In this sense, it can 
be held that in most semiological languages, the sign is really and truly ‘arbitrary’ since it is founded 
in artificial fashion by a unilateral decision; these in fact are fabricated languages, ‘logo techniques’.91 
 
However, these deciding groups are themselves rooted within a socio-cultural context, naturally, 
and even their closely honed, professionalised sociological determination is itself a product of 
society: 
[T]he elaborations of deciding groups, namely the logo-techniques, are themselves only the terms of 
an ever-widening function, which is the collective field of imagination of the epoch: thus individual 
innovation is transcended by a sociological determination (from restricted groups), but these 
sociological determinations refer in turn to a final meaning, which is anthropological.92 
 
Semiotics then allows for – and indeed explains – the fact that the schizophrenic discourse qua sign 
is both a product of a rarefied clinical terminological discourse and also a recognisable product of 
the broader anthropological discourse. In effect, these three operate as a sequence of Russian doll 
metalanguages.  
 The politics of the ‘deciding groups’ is in a delicate dance with the strength of the 
diagnostic code and the stability (or otherwise) of its foundational signs. Turbulence in the deciding 
group translates to a disturbance in the code, and a weakening of the associative bonds within the 
sign. The diagnostic codifying consensus has been considerably shaken by the NIMH’s decision in 
2009 to establish its own conceptual framework for mental health disorders in the form of the 
Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project. This was a declaration of a new diagnostic year zero, 
with the construction of a nosology built around the ‘facts’ of neurology, as NIMH described it: 
‘new ways of classifying mental disorders based on dimensions of observable behaviour and 
neurobiological measures.’93 Definitional authority in this mental health regime is relocated from 
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the clinic to the laboratory. The object of observation becomes the brain rather than the behaviour. 
The epidemiological point of departure is ‘pathophysiology’ (as established through an analysis of 
the mechanical operations of the brain) rather than the distressed presenting individual, or the 
symptom cluster. As such, RDoC is recognisably part of neurology’s land grab at psychiatry’s 
‘ownership’ of mental health, as inscribed through the reproduction and dissemination of the 
DSM’s diagnostic criteria. It is interesting to observe that White, Rickards and Zeman (2012) 
believe the absence of a neurological nosology equivalent to psychiatry’s DSM poses one of the 
chief obstacles to integrating the two medical disciplines. 94  Very obviously under RDoC, 
‘schizophrenia’ as currently understood (or imagined) disappears, but all that critics of the DSM’s 
formulation(s) of ‘schizophrenia’ complain of endures: a positivist, deterministic medicalization of 
the human mind, in which (mostly unproven) brain science tautologically reinforces its own 
pathologising foundational inferences about inaccessible mental states, to establish an unjustified 
authority over the individual’s phenomenological experience.  
RDoC provides a clear example of psychiatric diagnosis as process of sign-production. 
Though re-orientating psychopathology under the spectra of five domains offers a break from the 
received history of diagnostic entities, it seems unlikely that ‘a deficit in Positive Valence’ has 
greater existential truth, or emotional resonance, for those in mental distress than ‘negative 
symptom of anhedonia’ or a diagnosis of ‘catatonic schizophrenia’.95 The continuous nature of the 
spectra of variations in each domain is rather undermined by the insistence that each is underpined 
by – ultimately discoverable – biomarkers. However, the biomarkers themselves are in turn perhaps 
undermined by being ‘neither highly sensitive nor specific’96 enough to function as markers except 
when agglomerated under polygenic risk scores (PRS), a recursion of signification that takes any 
reader further from the object of study and deeper into the play of signs of signs.97 More than 
anything, biogenetic codifications of ‘schizophrenia’ take something ‘[t]he community at large, the 
lay public, generally knows […] when it sees it’ 98  despite being intrinsically enigmatic and 
heterogeneous, and re-codifies it as unitary (or at least modular) and known, but in a language that 
detaches it from any lay use. It is only slight exaggeration to call this a theft of human experience, 
through the annexing codifications of a professional class. 
What can be gained from a closer examination of the sign itself? There is a danger of the 
diagnostic term and its attendant criteria becoming meaningless if either the signifier or the 
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signified gains unmanageable weight. A structuralist worldview can discursively and rhetorically 
drain entities (diagnoses, texts, ideologies, histories) of their intrinsic value. At the extreme end of 
this interpretive spectrum, radical constructionist arguments grow from the faulty premise that 
because form and content are dialectically related, one element can (or indeed should) be 
diminished as the by-product of the other. The greater, and more conspicuous, the theoretical 
edifice, the emptier it is. Conversely, if the reality (or the signified) remains solidly and stolidly 
irreducible, then any diagnostic and theoretical terminology (the signifier) is little more than a blunt 
iconic sign. Essentially, schizophrenia is only schizophrenia when it is apparent that it is 
schizophrenia: 
At the heart of the definition of schizophrenia is the coupling of a characteristic clinical picture with 
a distinctive course. As a concept of disease, that is entirely legitimate. As an approach to diagnosis, 
however, it contains more than a hint of tautology: schizophrenia, a disorder defined in part by a 
deteriorating course, can only be said with certainty to be present when signs of deterioration 
become apparent.99 
 
Such a self-reflective sign status is perhaps implicit in Bleuler’s diagnostic reference to ‘the 
schizophrenic mark of the bizarre.’100 Schizophrenia, in this regard, becomes the sign of itself. 
Boyle sees a similar ‘tautological’ error in Schneider’s assertion, in Clinical Psychopathology, 
that ‘symptoms of schizophrenia were phenomena “frequently found and therefore a prominent 
feature of schizophrenia.”’101 Boyle’s argument climaxes with the claim that overwhelmingly the 
clinical patterns discerned by Kraepelin and Bleuler ‘are virtually identical to descriptions of the 
infectious disorder called lethargica and its Parkinsonian sequelae’ as described by neurologist von 
Economo in 1917. But after the climax, the bathos. If Kraepelin and Bleuler were accurately 
describing a neuro-pathological discrete disease entity – which is certainly what Kraepelin believed 
himself to be doing – then it is difficult to see how Boyle’s critique of their disease discovery 
methodologies stands up. Indeed, Boyle herself says it ‘hardly makes sense’ to suggest that, though 
suggest it she does. It is inseparable from her suggestion that the dementia praecox/schizophrenia 
disease construct was erroneously inferred from clinical instances, some of which might have been 
better diagnosed as encephalitis lethargica. It seems obvious, from simple rationalist thinking as 
well as from this specific example, that organic neurological diseases can be parsed from broader 
clinical, descriptive syndromes without that verifying or refuting the epidemiological theory 
underpinning the syndrome. That some people diagnosed with dementia praeeox by Kraepelin 
actually had encephalitis lethargica does nothing to the status of dementia praecox qua disease 
syndrome. Undoubtedly, there remain biological diseases to be separated out from all mental 
‘illnesses’ as currently understood; the current neuroscience is far from complete. However, for 
Boyle, whether disease construction comes to accurately describe a biological pathological process 
or not, it appears to be a bad thing a priori. Except, of course, when it is a good thing. 
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 This is a step on the road to the monumental cynicism – touching on paranoia– 
demonstrated by those of a radical constructionist bent, such as John Read in his argument that this 
‘invention’ of Kraepelin102 and Bleuler ‘represents a continuation of the historical themes, of social 
control and harmful treatments, disguised by theories about help for defective individuals.’103 In 
Read’s analysis, psychiatry was in existential crisis at the turn of the nineteenth century and – both 
on the level of the discipline and of the individual professional careers – ‘urgently needed a 
discovery’ to match the earlier successful identification of syphilis as the neurological organic root 
of general paresis. 
 Both Boyle and Read were able to extract the readings they wanted from the diagnostic 
entity of schizophrenia. For the former, this was proof of a misguided, mistaken myth of disease 
discovery on the part of Kraepelin and Bleuler. For the latter, this was evidence of a plot on the 
part of psychiatry (perhaps in cahoots with significant capitalist interests) to exercise social control 
and to aggrandise themselves and legitimise their snake oil profession. However, whilst 
schizophrenia yields up these interpretations, it simultaneously undoes them. Boyle’s argument 
relies upon demonstrating that Kraepelin and Bleuler did collect clinical observations pointing to 
the discovery of new disease entity. Similarly, for psychiatry, schizophrenia has been a capricious 
talisman, legitimising and undermining the science at every turn. Peter Barnham identifies another 
seeming contradiction, that a critical analysis of the historical structuring conditions of 
‘schizophrenia’ and the specific ‘schizophrenic’ can lead back to (re)conceptualising ‘schizophrenia’ 
as an ‘illness’, albeit with a subtly altered sense of what constitutes illness: 
The paradox I shall enter is that it is only by rendering the schizophrenic fully social – that is, by 
extending our sense of community so as to grasp him as a historical agent – that we are able to 
understand both how he fails and why we are right to judge this failing to be a form of suffering, an 
illness.104 
 
As with Buonaparte’s talisman, there is a dynamic reciprocity within the sign of schizophrenia, be it 
the pendulum swings between Bleulerean psychodynamic or neo-Kraepelinian biochemical 
reductionism, 105  or its staging of the dialectical relationship between clinical and scientific 
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conceptions of the disease. Instead of an unambiguous Freudian master-key of interpretation, there 
is a more fluid interpretative relationship, a see-sawing on a pivot of definitional difference. But 
who was Buonaparte’s talisman?  
 38 
Duel; diagnoses 
Madness being the opposite to reason and good sense, as light is to darkness, straight to crooked, 
&c. it appears wonderful that two opposite opinions could be entertained on the subject: allowing 
each party to possess the ordinary faculties common to human beings in a sound and healthy state, 
yet such is really the fact: and if one party be right, the other must be wrong: because a person 
cannot correctly be said to be in his senses and out of his senses at the same time.106 
 
[S]ince I manifest their worst nightmare (systematical and organized executions of multiculturalist 
traitors), they will probably just give me the full propaganda rape package and propagate the 
following accusations: pedophile, engaged in incest activities, homosexual, pyscho, ADHD, thief, 
non-educated, inbred, maniac, insane, monster etc. I will be labelled as the biggest (Nazi-) monster 
ever witnessed since WW2.107 
 
Sanity is the judicious intolerance of difference. The quotation from John Haslam – apothecary at 
the Royal Bethlem Hospital from 1795 to 1816 – marks him out as an exemplary judge of reason. 
An arch-nosographer, Haslam is emblematic of the division of madness Foucault attributes to 
(what he terms) the classical age whereby: ‘[a]ll elements within it that were uncomfortably close to 
reason, and which threatened reason with their derisive similarity, were violently separated and 
rigorously reduced to silence.’108 In Foucault’s argument, the dialectical interplay between reason 
and madness during the Renaissance gave way during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a 
divisive silencing. To paraphrase Haslam, it was now no longer possible to live sometimes in the 
light and sometimes in the dark. 
 In his Illustrations of Madness (1810), Haslam has a dual target: madness – as embodied by 
Bethlem ‘incurable’ James Tilly Matthews – and apologists for madness – in this case, Matthews’ 
friends, relations and (especial beneficiaries of Haslam’s scorn) the doctors who testified to 
Matthews’ sanity during his habeas corpus suit the previous year. George Birkbeck and Henry 
Clutterbuck were the two MDs who – for a fee – examined Matthews and provided affidavits for 
the family to the effect that – according to Michael Jay’s 2003 account – ‘the result of such careful 
& repeated & unprejudiced examinations has been that the said James Tilly Matthews is not 
insane.’109 So it was that medical authority was found squaring off against medical authority, with 
legal endorsement of their diagnosis as the fought-for prize. This might seem a necessary process in 
these formative years of professionalised mind doctoring, set within the context of a prolonged, 
international (and often revolutionary) redefinition of the rights of man. However, such contests 
continue to be played out on the cultural stage. 
 Whilst sanity is perhaps consistently judicious, the judgements are inconsistent, 
consistently. No dispute exists regarding the objectively verifiably facts of Anders Behring Breivik’s 
                                                
106 Haslam, p.15 
107  Andrew Berwick, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence (London, 2011), p.1435 These are the 
publication details as they are presented on the pdf of the text claimed by Breivik as his own writing. Writing 
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108 Michel Foucault, History of Madness, trans. by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2009) 
p.170 
109 Mike Jay, The Air Loom Gang, (London: Bantam, 2003) p.86 
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actions on 22 July 2012, when the Norwegian ‘Justicular Knight Commander’110 killed 77 people in 
Oslo and on the island of Utøya. Within hours, the meta-narrative of this mass murder moved 
from being a story of ‘what and how’ to a story of ‘who and why’. Central to this narrative would 
be the question of Breivik’s sanity, and the interpretative light this would cast upon his act. The 
anxiety that his political analysis and related objective would be devalued by character assassination 
is expressed at several points in his ‘compendium’ 2083: A European Declaration of Independence: ‘the 
cultural Marxist / multiculturalist government will likely try to attempt to “assassinate my 
character” by labelling me as an “insane, inbred, pedophile111 Nazi loser”.’112 
 Breivik’s prediction was partially realised. An initial psychiatric report for the court 
delivered a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, as defined by ICD-10. In response to public and 
professional disquiet with this diagnosis, a second psychiatric report was commissioned and 
subsequently returned a different diagnosis: Breivik was neither psychotic at the time of 
examination nor at the time of the murders. Given that Breivik’s actions are uncontested, his own 
account of his motivation well documented and disseminated, his interviews with police, legal and 
medical authorities, and those of witnesses, recorded fully, and given that there exists for both 
psychiatric teams an uncontested (for the purposes of this assessment) set of diagnostic criteria, 
Haslam’s assertion that ‘it appears wonderful that two opposite opinions could be entertained on 
the subject’ seems truer in this instance than in the original. Ultimately, in this case, a legal process 
forced a decision on the patient’s mental health. Whilst the final verdict of the court concluded that 
Breivik was not psychotic at the time he committed the murders, this decision naturally had no 
ability retrospectively and literally to alter the patient’s earlier actions or utterances. Essentially, the 
verdict has taken the suite of symptoms displayed by Breivik – as detailed in both psychiatric 
reports, his own manifesto and all other accounts – and placed these firmly in the harsh light of 
sanity, by Haslam’s formulation. Since the factual narrative of the murders and the events leading 
up to it are agreed upon, the legal judgement dealt only with the interpretation of this narrative. 
Simply, it was the diagnosis of schizophrenia – and specifically the diagnosis qua critical reading – 
                                                
110 Berwick, p.1413.  
111 Throughout this thesis many narratives by persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia will be quoted 
directly. As it might be possible to define a schizophrenic narrative as a text written with a highly 
idiosyncratic subjectivity and without the benefit of benign editorship, these narratives will necessarily 
contain lexical and syntactical characteristics (or symptoms, as the characteristics of the mad are frequently 
labelled) that might be described as mistakes, mistaken, ungrammatical and so on. However, these texts will 
be quoted unsanitised. This is for two reasons. First, out of respect for the Freudian concept of parapraxis 
and the consequent desire not to destroy potentially rich seams of signification. Secondly, and conversely, to 
avoid adding further (or at least differing) meaning, as Roy Porter says of his editorial stance on a letter by 
James Tilly Matthews: ‘I have preserved its spelling and punctuation so as not to endow it with a spurious 
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included’. John Perceval, Perceval’s Narrative (New York: William Morrow, 1974), p.xxi 
112 Berwick, p.1380 
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that was on trial. This view is supported by the plan to establish a government committee to review 
the role of forensic psychiatrists in the Norwegian justice system: 
Grete Faremo, Norway’s justice minister … told Norwegian daily Aftenposten on April 13 the 
committee would have a “broad mandate” that would examine three key questions: What is sanity? 
What is the role of the forensic psychiatrist? And how do we take care of security when an insane 
man is sentenced?113 
 
Those three questions move sequentially from subjective experience (sanity), to professional 
medicine (forensic psychiatry) to the criminal justice system. 
As Haslam’s text did not illustrate the madness of his patient as efficiently as it undermined 
his own authority, similarly these psychiatric reports on Breivik have doubled back on their authors 
(and their authority). Momentarily leaving aside the vaulting ambition of this Norwegian 
governmental committee’s remit, note that the first question asks ‘what is sanity’ rather than ‘what 
is insanity’. The definitions are popularly understood to be context based. Hence, the following 
comment by Hanne Skartveit, political editor of Norway’s VG is not incomprehensibly 
contradictory: 
Anders Behring Breivik is completely mad. Otherwise he could not have killed 77 people. But he is 
not legally insane. He knew what he did. He knew it was wrong.114 
 
Skartveit’s position is that there exists (a minimum of) two separate contexts in which to view 
Breivik’s (and presumably the psychiatrists’ or anyone’s) sanity: the moral and the legal. It is 
possible to be ‘completely mad’ in one, without being ‘insane’ in the other.115 
 In the first psychiatric assessment of Breivik, grandiose delusions were at the centre of the 
diagnosis. These claims were not disputed either by Breivik or the second psychiatric assessment: 
Already at arrest 22 July, he gave the following remarkable statement: "We want a [sic] take power in 
Europe within 60 years. I am the Commander of Knights Templar Norway. Knights Templar of 
Europe was established in 2002 in London, with delegates from 12 countries. We are crusaders and 
nationalists."116 
 
In contrast to James Tilly Matthews, Anders Behring Breivik 117  was not the victim of but a 
participant in the machinations of a shadowy group of saboteurs. In the first psychiatric report, 
Husby and Sørheim interpreted Breivik’s claim to be the commander of a pan-European cabal of 
conspirators as the central component in his grandiose delusional system: 
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117 Considering Daniel Paul Schreber as well, it might be worth amending a famous pop cultural trope to 
read: serial killers have two names and assassins and schizophrenics have three. 
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[Breivik] believes that he by established right is the ideological leader of the organization Knights 
Templar, which has a mandate to be a military order, martyr organization, military judicial chair, judge, jury 
and executioner. He believes he has the responsibility of deciding who shall live and die in Norway. 
The responsibility is perceived as real, but burdensome. […] He compares his situation to historic 
war heroes such as Tsar Nicholas and Queen Isabella. […] that he can become the new regent in 
Norway after the coup and takeover of power. If he becomes the new regent, he will take the name 
of Sigurd II the crusader. He believes he has given five million kroner to the struggle. He thinks he may 
one day be responsible for the deportation of several hundred thousand Muslims to ports in North 
Africa. The phenomena are considered grandiose delusions.118  
 
Delusions have to be absolute, and – within their own subjectivity – absolutely truthful. Hence, a 
British newspaper headline can read ‘Anders Behring Breivik is lying, not delusional.’119 Truth is no 
guarantor of the existence of a firm dividing line between sanity and insanity. Rather, the concept 
of truth gets subsumed into the relativism of madness. Breivik’s defence lawyer Geir Lippestad 
might argue that terrorists claim the ‘right to kill’ because they have ‘seen a truth that no one else 
has seen.’120 However, a truth that is not shared by the majority might very crudely be considered 
the essence of a delusion. For this very eventuality, the DSM has an exclusion criterion: 
Clinicians assessing the symptoms of schizophrenia in socioeconomic or cultural situations that are 
different from their own must take cultural differences into account. Ideas that may appear to be 
delusional in one culture (e.g., sorcery and witchcraft) may be commonly held in another. In some 
cultures, visual or auditory hallucinations with a religious content may be a normal part of religious 
experience (e.g., seeing the Virgin Mary or hearing God’s voice.)121 
 
ICD-10 similarly warns that ‘special care should be taken to avoid false-positive assessments, 
especially where culturally or sub-culturally influenced modes of behaviour […] are involved.’122 
Therefore, the ‘commonsensical’ lay-truth as voiced by a survivor of the massacre on Utøya – ‘It is 
obvious that he is insane. You cannot kill 77 people and be sane’123 – is placed into relativistic 
balance with the defence suggestion that white supremacist terrorists constitute a viable sub-
culture124 in which belief in the truth of the threat of ‘Islamization of Norway’ legitimises (in their 
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moral framework) the murder of ‘extreme Marxists who wish to Islamize the country or who 
support multiculturalism.’125 
 The weapon of diagnosis invalidates the worldview of the recipient. The prosecuting team 
argued for the verdict of insanity for the transformative effect this would have upon Breivik, 
rendering him ‘incomprehensible … [and i]nstead of causing fear, a tragic picture is all we get of a 
young man who in his struggle to become something big has become part of a non-existent 
network that shall give him help to obtain this unobtainable goal.’126 All of Breivik’s boasts and 
neologisms of archaic pseudo-Christian potency are emptied of their strength when redefined as 
signs of pathology: 
The subject uses unusual terms such as established rights, sovereign, power of definition, 
responsibility, love of the (my) people, unique, pioneer and new regent related to descriptions of his 
own position. The terminology used is considered as an expression of underlying, grandiose 
delusions.127 
 
Breivik appears willing, if not exactly adept, at using this same medical terminology, metaphorically 
and in his defence: 
The answer is simple. A great many people suffer from cultural delusions, and need immediate 
medication, with the immediate introduction of cultural protectionism and the Nordic ideal.128 
 
Rather like Szasz’s iconic body signs, the most a diagnosis of schizophrenia can do at times is point 
and scream, ‘that way madness lies.’ 
 When faced with the dichotomy of sanity and insanity, schizophrenia resists. It is a 
penumbral state, and a place in which a subject can but only be both ‘in his senses and out of his 
senses at the same time.’ The consanguinity of interpretation along the model of the Saussurean 
sign – that ‘two-sided psychological entity’129 – is shattered in the schizophrenic exchange. The 
schizophrenic – the individual/text – is outside the ‘community of speakers.’130 To refer to Piercean 
semiotics, the core ‘genuine’ triad of the Representamen, Object and Interpretant 131  has been fatally 
undermined. This might be likened to Foucault’s gulf, intrinsic to his analysis of the re-orientation 
of sanity in relation to insanity during the Classical age: 
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Between the madman and the subject who notes ‘that man is mad,’ a gulf emerges, which is no 
longer simply the Cartsesian void of ‘I am not that man’, but is filled instead with the plentitude of a 
double system of alterity … The madman becomes relative, the better to be stripped of his powers: 
once that uncanny presence within, perilously close in the thought of the Renaissance, lurking in the 
heart of reason, he is now expelled to a different realm, where the danger he presents is disarmed. 
Doubly so, in that what he now represents is the difference from the Other in the exteriority of others.’132 
 
Insanity is its own injudicious tolerance. More, it is a tolerance of différance. There is no shortage of 
definitions of schizophrenia. As a semiotic sign, it embodies différance exquisitely. Beneath is a sea of 
heterogeneous symptoms, case studies, complexes, characteristics, clinical diagnoses, socio-medical 
theorems – be they neurological, psychological, sociological. On the surface jostles a panoply of 
terms, the popularity and credibility of each varying with the fashion of the age.  
Barthes summarises Lacan’s modification of the sign, whereby ‘signifier and signified have 
only a floating relationship and coincide only at certain anchorage points.’133 This same fluidity can 
be seen in the re-appropriations and re-readings of the sign of schizophrenia, both as diagnostic 
term and disease entity. Szasz may see schizophrenia as the sacred symbol of psychiatry but its 
epistemological status is far less stable than he would render it. From the very outset of 
Schizophrenia: The Sacred Symbol of Psychiatry différance threatens to dissolve Szasz’s argument: 
What is schizophrenia? What does the term schizophrenia mean? In its most elementary sense, we 
might say that schizophrenia is a word – an idea and a “disease” – invented by Eugen Bleuler134 
 
Szasz is unclear on whether he sees his two opening questions as different enquiries or dual 
iterations of a single, unified concern. Schizophrenia cannot be merely the meaning of the term. 
Even Haslam would concede that the concept requires as definitional opposite an agreed idea of 
‘reason and good sense’. Tritely, any statement on schizophrenia – or more precisely on what (if 
anything) constitutes schizophrenia – must also contain, however implicit, unvoiced and assumed, a 
statement (or set of statements) on what constitutes mental health. 
All illness, whether conceived in localised bodily terms or within a larger view of human 
functioning, expresses both a social value judgement (contrasting a person’s condition with certain 
understood and accepted norms) and an attempt at explanation (with a view to controlling the 
disvalued condition).135 
 
It is not psychiatry’s normativity that distinguishes it from ‘physical’ medicine, but that this 
normativity is on shakier socio-cultural ground. 
Haslam’s supposedly inviolable polarisation of madness and reason/good sense is rather 
collapsed when the apothecary falls victim to his own mental weakness for dry humour. 
Lambasting Birkbeck and Clutterbuck, Haslam wonders: 
How they could fail to detect his insanity is inexplicable, as his disorder was evident to all who saw 
and conversed with him; even his fellow-students derided the absurdity of his doctrine.136  
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This is a witticism too far. In his eagerness to assault and ridicule the two doctors, Haslam has 
placed himself on the same side of the debate as Matthews’ ‘fellow-students’, in other words, his 
fellow inmates of Bedlam. Where now is Haslam’s inviolable dichotomy between light and dark? If 
he is to insist upon it, either sheer numbers sway the disagreement and he and the ‘fellow-students’ 
of Bedlam are mad, and Matthews, Birkbeck and Clutterbuck – having the fewer diagnoses 
between them – are sane, or if Haslam’s sanity is to be considered above consideration, then it 
would appear – by being of one thought on this issue – there are many residents of Bedlam as sane 
as its apothecary. Neither conclusion could be satisfying to Haslam, and it is safe to assume that he 
would – on this point at least – waive the strict division he proposed so forcefully moments earlier. 
 Haslam accidentally demonstrates how the flow of rhetoric can undermine the weight of 
reason. Here is the simultaneous self-contradictory dynamic identified in the schizophrenic sign in 
the previous section. How does it map back onto one of Matthews’ symptoms (or rather, in 
Matthews’ assessment, one of the weapons of the Air Loom Gang, the name he gives to the 
conspirators magnetically influencing him and others) termed by Matthews ‘lengthening the brain?’ 
(Although through his text, Haslam too is implicated in this terminology). According to 
Haslam/Matthews – as it becomes increasingly difficult through the text to separate these voices – 
brain lengthening: 
[C]an cause good sense to appear as insanity, and convert truth into a libel; distort the wisest 
institutions of civilised society into the practices of barbarians, and stain the Bible into a jest 
book.137 
 
Both Roy Porter, in his introduction to Haslam’s text, and Jay identify this passage as an instance of 
Matthews deliberately satirising Bedlam and Haslam, and managing to encode this satire in 
Haslam’s supposed proof of Matthews’ insanity. The unrecorded intentions of long-dead 
individuals are neither satisfactorily retrievable nor of any great interest, but putting aside the 
question of authorial intent, it is simple enough to read this as ironic commentary on Haslam. 
Matthews’ narrative has infected Haslam’s, and distinctions between ‘good sense’ and ‘insanity’ – 
the incontrovertible shoring up of which was Haslam’s express political and medical intent in 
writing this account – have been fatally undermined in the process. Whether or not Matthews 
intended it, his description of ‘thought making’ (comparable to the later diagnostic concept of 
thought insertion) – in which he states ‘deception is practised among themselves as a part of their 
system; and there exists no honour, as amongst thieves, in the community of these rascals’138 – has 
been interpreted as a forceful critique of the administrative regime of Haslam, Dr Thomas Munro 
and surgeon Bryan Crowther.139 
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 As text, Illustrations of Madness gives the lie direct to Haslam’s dichotomy. From his 
rhetorical intermingling with the inmates of Bedlam onwards, Haslam’s narrative gets into ever-
greater proximity with Matthews’ voice. In representing Matthews’ representations of the members 
of the Air Loom Gang, the point of narrative origin vanishes. When employing the neologism 
‘assailment’, Haslam attempts a scholarly distancing exercise, glossing the word with a footnote: 
‘This term, which frequently occurs, and is not to be found in our dictionaries, either originates 
with Mr M or is extracted from the vocabulary of the pneumatic gang.’140 Haslam’s defence against 
the irresistible affects of diseased rhetoric – which primarily consists in implicating the narrative 
voice in the disease – is to make explicit that he is only quoting. However, Matthews himself – as 
recorded by Haslam – uses the same distancing technique; not only does Matthews present an 
overarching argument that the textual symptoms of his insanity are the interpolations of others (for 
what else are thought insertion and magnetic control, if considered literally, if not textual 
interpolations from another narrative?) but he also asserts that he is using ‘the technical language of 
the assailing gang’141. It is exactly this kind of distancing that Louis Sass identifies in schizophrenic 
patients: 
[I]t is difficult to square standard notions of poor reality testing with the fact that many 
schizophrenics who seem to be profoundly preoccupied with their delusions, and who cannot be 
swayed from belief in them, nevertheless treat these same beliefs with what seems a certain distance 
or irony. […] Rather than mistaking the imaginary for the real, they often seem to live in two 
parallel but separate worlds: consensual reality and the realm of their hallucinations and delusions.142  
 
If claims of quotation (willed or forcibly interpolated) are not enough to qualify Matthews as sane, 
then why should that courtesy be extended to Haslam? 
 Haslam’s and Matthews’ narratives progressively fuse. Though this might be more of a 
comment on the inconsistencies and imprecisions in punctuation of early nineteenth century 
printers, it becomes increasingly difficult to attribute sentences and phrases. When the cast of the 
Air Loom Gang arrive and their own idiosyncratic voices are dramatised within the text, these 
difficulties proliferate. Who is responsible for the proto-Dickensian colouring of each character’s 
dialect? Is it Haslam, the sane composer of a medical case study, or Matthews, the engrossed 
reiterator of his wild delusions, who encapsulates the class origins of Jack the Schoolmaster – 
giving him ‘ketch’143 for catch – or Sir Archy – with ‘yho’144 for you? And what conclusions can be 
drawn from the impossibility of definitively answering that question? 
 These increasingly synthesised narrative voices experience a similar problem with the 
neologisms originating from the Air Loom Gang’s highly novel activities. Matthews attempts to 
grapple with ‘sudden death squeezing: by them termed lobster cracking’.145 His effort to put clear textual 
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space between himself and their neologism, by providing his own less fanciful descriptor of sudden 
death squeezing, is swiftly undermined as he elaborates on the untranslatable sensation: 
In short, I do not know any better way for a person to comprehend the general nature of such 
lobster-cracking operation, than by supposing himself in a sufficiently large pair of nut-crackers or 
lobster-crackers.146 
 
Contrast this with Haslam – as the narrative voice – attempting an explanation of lengthening the 
brain: ‘[a]s the cylindrical mirror lengthens the countenance of the person who views himself in 
such a glass, so the assailants have a method by which they contrive to lengthen the brain.’147 In 
both instances, the narrative voice makes an attempt to move away from the ‘diseased’ element (the 
delusional neologism) through a metaphorical substitution, but is drawn back to a literal rendering 
of the supposed activity. There is an unavoidable concreteness to the neologisms. They can only be 
what they are. On a narrative level, Haslam performs the same move. He ultimately hands the text 
over to Matthews wholesale, and abdicates any authorial responsibility. He becomes an author 
redacted into an editor by his own subject matter. However, this is the only viable linguistic and 
semiotic vantage point from which to talk about madness: from within the very sign system of 
madness itself. 
Consider the difficulty in elucidating a highly elaborate and well-documented semiological 
system of schizophrenia: the ‘“miraculous structure”’148 of Senatspräsident Schreber’s Order of the 
World. This idiosyncratic, bizarre cosmology is a semiological system so inviolable that even God 
cannot contradict it without provoking profound consequences: 
“The Order of the World” is the lawful relation which, resting on God’s nature and attributes, exists between 
God and the creation called to life by Him. God cannot achieve what contradicts his own attributes and 
His powers in relation to mankind or, as in my case, to an individual human being who had entered 
into a special relation with him.149 
 
Schreber places these terms in speech marks to indicate that they belong to the ‘basic language,’ a 
neologistic ‘schizophrenese’ which he both revels in and recoils from. Schreber distances himself as 
the narrative voice of Haslam/Matthews did, describing the phrases (and their associated concepts) 
as ‘expressions which would never have occurred to me,’150 and by containing them with punctuation. Both 
the signifiers and the signifieds are ‘suggested … from outside.’151 Simultaneously, Schreber is very 
consciously constructing his Memoirs and therefore building the semiological system; he is both 
within and without it. 
 Schreber has considerable difficulty describing this system from his dual position, but to 
attempt an account from outside is impossible, as Dr Weber – the superintendent of Sonnenstein 
asylum where Schreber wrote his Memoirs – observes in a court report on Schreber: 
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[T]hey present a structure of ideas so fantastically elaborated and developed and so far removed 
from the usual trends of thought, that it is hardly possible to sketch them briefly without rendering 
their inner structure incomprehensible and impairing understanding of their specific meaning.152 
 
For all his other failings, Weber has insight to the argument of this thesis that the schizophrenia 
semiological system is an untranslatable langue. Access to its meaning requires immersion within its 
system. The next section will demonstrate how this system subsequently proliferated outwards into 
psychiatry’s discourse.  
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Influencing machines and alien control 
And so I believe I am not mistaken in expecting that a very special palm of victory will eventually be 
mine. I cannot say with any certainty what form it will take. As possibilities I would mention that 
my unmanning will be accomplished with the result that by divine fertilization offspring will issue 
from my lap, or alternatively that great fame will be attached to my name surpassing that of 
thousands of other people much better mentally endowed.153 
 
When you hear the sentence stem, you will have the experience that an engineer has composed and 
then inserted a short simple suitable ending to the sentence into your mind.154 
 
Schreber died incarcerated, in the depths of madness, and – if even recalled by his wounded psyche 
– these words must have rung hollow for him. Though an obscure incurable in his final psychotic 
period, few would contest that Schreber has attained – at least amongst historians of medicine, 
practitioners of psychoanalysis and psychiatric professionals with a taste for the narrative 
exuberances of schizophrenia – a ‘great fame’. Less apparent, but as true, is the realisation of 
Schreber’s other (and perhaps primary) victory: that offspring will issue from his lap. 
 Schreber is textually reproduced throughout the history of schizophrenia. The best-known 
account is Freud’s ‘Psycho-analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of A Case of Paranoia 
(Dementia Paranoides)’ from 1911, but Schreber’s litter can be found across contemporary papers. 
The most significant of these were: Otto Gross, the very first to use Schreber as a clinical example 
in 1904;155 Carl Jung, who refers to Schreber throughout his 1907 Psychology of Dementia Praecox; and 
Bleuler (1911), who only deploys Schreber as an occasional cameo in a crowd of clinical cases. 
 Historians of psychiatry Macalpine and Hunter brought Schreber to an English language 
audience in the 1950s, when the psychoanalytical and psychological therapeutics and theorising of 
schizophrenia were the most compelling argument in play, and prior to the advent of ‘critical 
psychiatry’, the development of psychotropic drugs and the rise of the biological approach of the 
neo-Kraepelinean school. For Macalpine and Hunter, Schreber epitomised schizophrenia, and was 
its perfect talisman, its best exemplar and at the same time a self-replicating cookie cutter for the 
psychoses: 
His autobiography has the advantage of being complete to an extent no case history taken by a 
physician can ever be: its material is not selected or subject to elaboration or omission by an 
intermediary between the patient and his psychosis, and between both and the reader. Every student 
therefore has access to the totality of the patient’s products. Indeed the Memoirs may be called the 
best text on psychiatry written for psychiatrists by a patient. Schreber’s psychosis is minutely and 
expertly described, but its context is – as Dr Weber explained to the court – fundamentally the same 
and has the same features as that of other patients. Schreber’s name is legion.156 
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Psychoanalyst and theorist Dalzell contests this in his 2011 contribution to the literature on 
Schreber. For Dalzell, the idea of a paradigmatic expert patient – a ‘best text’ – is contrary to the 
idiosyncratic nature of the psychoanalytic method: 
While Macalpine and Hunter can write that Schreber’s name is legion, and that they have listened to 
many Schrebers since studying his memoirs (M, pp.25-26), this runs counter to the psychoanalytic 
view that every subject is unique. If one psychotic patient could be taken to represent all psychotic 
patients, that would reduce psychoanalytic knowledge to a type of psychology in which subjects 
could be categorized on the basis of a number of salient features.157 
 
However, psychoanalysis is demonstrably a systematic, organising structure for interpreting (or for 
constructing signs of) the subject psyche. The following analysis of the influence of Schreber’s text 
upon the evolution of psychoanalysis, and especially Freud’s tripartite model of the mind, will argue 
that Freudian discourse became a schizo-mimetic ancillary to the Memoirs. 
Purely on a textual level, it might be asked if Macalpine and Hunter are referring to the 
same Memoirs considered by this thesis. Far from being complete, the Memoirs are elliptical, very 
literally in the case of the excised second chapter. By Schreber’s own account, the Memoirs stand as 
compromise between at least two different texts. The first is a redaction by a patient in a non- or 
less-psychotic state from notes made at the height of psychosis, which ‘show the reader that the 
content of my revelations was immeasurably richer than what I could incorporate in the limited 
space of the “Memoirs”.’158 The second text is a critical personal history and expertly constructed 
legal argument by a patient who has – in their own estimation, and in the eventual estimation of the 
law159 – passed through psychosis to the further shore of sanity. Inarguably, the material has been 
selected. Schreber says as much in his court appeal.160  Further, there has been both elaboration and 
omission. Finally, that Dr Weber’s assessment of Schreber as exemplary, which amounts to little 
more than a lofty assertion that the mad are all similarly mad, should be taken seriously as a critical 
recommendation of the Memoirs to students of psychiatry seems a double disservice to Weber and 
Schreber.  
Freud had considered the psychoses prior to his case study of Schreber in his two papers 
on the neuro-psychoses of defence (1894 and 1896). As the titles suggest, it is here that Freud first 
argues that psychosis is a defensive response by the ego, comparable to hysteria or obsessional 
neurosis but ‘a much more energetic and successful kind of defence.’161 In his formulation, ‘the ego 
has fended off the incompatible idea through a flight into psychosis.’162 The ego is preserved at the 
cost of having ‘detached itself wholly or in part from reality.’163 In his second paper, Freud details 
the case of Frau P suffering auditory hallucinations of whole passages from Otto Ludwig’s Die 
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Heiterethi. Freud suggests that this process fits into the repression dynamic exhibited by the hysteric 
or the obsessional neurotic, and concludes that ‘[i]n consequence of this censorship exercised by 
the repression the innocuous and idyllic passages, which were connected with the proscribed ones 
by contrast and also by propinquity’164 were returning as auditory hallucinations. This metaphoric 
substitution operates as an exchange in the Saussurean associative and Barthesian systematic axis of 
language.165 Effectually, each passage functions as sign within a ‘series of associative fields.’166 What 
is remarkable here is that the associative/systematic field is based on a syntagmatic association 
(propinquity) as well as a differential paradigmatic one (contrast). 
Freud sees the same two-stage process occurring within Frau P’s paranoid hallucinations 
and persecutory voices: first, there is a censorship, then, a metaphorical substitution. Freud noted 
that in Frau P’s auditory hallucinations, ‘the insulting allusion was generally deeply hidden; the 
connection between the separate sentences was disguised by a strange mode of expression, unusual 
forms of speech and so on.’167 For whatever reason, Freud does not consider the possibility that 
Frau P’s censorship is not always psychotic and defensive. Rather than censoring within the 
psychotic hallucination, she might possibly be adding the ‘quality of diplomatic indefiniteness’168 
during her analysis. This is unknowable, but should be held in mind. Regardless, Freud’s pre-
Schreber structure of the flight in psychosis outlines a defensive dynamic comparable to Bleuler’s 
loosening of associations. 
Jung’s construction of dementia praecox, as detailed in his 1907 The Psychopathology of 
Dementia Praecox, relies on three potentially problematic assumptions. The first is an analogous 
relationship between hysteria and dementia praecox throughout Jung’s description. Whenever there 
is doubt or an ellipsis in the clinical picture, material from the study of hysteria is imported to 
generate a meaningful connection within the new narrative. An observation or conclusion from the 
epidemiology of hysteria is interpolated and followed often by a refrain of ‘there is no reason to 
assume that this is not the case also in dementia praecox’.169 Any unique insights into dementia 
praecox thrown up by this analysis therefore are framed in terms of their difference from the 
clinical picture of hysteria, for example Jung’s belief that those with dementia praecox cannot be 
engaged in ‘emotional rapport’ with an analyst and therefore remain ‘uninfluenceable’ 170 . As a 
consequence of this assumption, Jung feels the need to make a second assumption and introduce 
an organic element to explain dementia praecox’s divergence from hysteria: 
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[T]he hysterogenic complex produces reparable symptoms, while the affect in dementia praecox 
favours the appearance of anomalies in the metabolism – toxins, perhaps, which injure the brain in a 
more or less irreparable manner so that the highest psychic functions become paralysed.  
 
Hence, it is the relative therapeutic success of the analysis of hysterics that prompts Jung’s 
hypothesis of a brain toxin being active in dementia praecox. That hysteria has vanished from the 
terrain of psychiatry might give biologically minded neo-Kraepelineans pause to think. Jung’s third 
assumption is the appropriateness of dream analysis as an interpretative method for dementia 
praecox.  
 The anxiety of influence hangs over Jung’s case study of B.St. in the final chapter of the 
text. Schreber’s pathology is etched on every page. Whilst these similarities might be fairly 
considered evidence of the existence of a discrete disease entity, it is worth a cautionary 
consideration that Schreber’s text may have exerted an interpretative reading tendency on Jung. 
Jung is clearly not wary of giving strong readings, and provided bold, definitive translations of 
B.St’s word associations from which he developed his consequent theory of her symptomatic 
‘power words’171. Consider: 
R.12, wood/cushion refers to her complaint that there are only hard wooden benches in the asylum; 
for her own use she wants upholstered furniture. (“I establish upholstered furniture.”)172 
 
After several such examples, Jung proclaims that ‘[w]ith few exceptions all the associations are 
thinly veiled expressions of complexes’. It might have been wiser to be more circumspect in 
drawing hard and fast interpretive conclusions from a text as potentially inscrutable as 
‘schizophrenia’. B.St. seems to offer a mocking, warning critique of this methodology, although as 
with the similar ironic commentary in Haslam and Matthews’ text, it is important to be wary of 
imposing intentionality: ‘(7) Master-key (stereotypy: “I am the master-key”): “The master-key is the 
house-key – I am not the house-key but the house – the house belongs to me.”’173 B.St. (or the 
text) seems almost aware that they are being moulded into a master-key for unpicking the clinical 
mystery of dementia praecox, and reasserts their autonomous, subjective identity. 
So intrinsic is Freud’s encounter with this ideal paraphrenic/schizophrenic174 that he is 
unable to explicate his theory of narcissism without grounding it in observations from his reading 
of Schreber. Indeed, it has compelled him to do so as he states: ‘[a] pressing motive of occupying 
ourselves with the conception of a primary and normal narcissism arose when the attempt was 
made to subsume what we know of dementia praecox (Kraepelin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler) under 
the hypothesis of libido theory.’ 175  Freud is now making an essential distinction between the 
neuroses (hysteria and obsession) and the psychosis of paraphrenia. Although both involve a break 
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with reality, neurotics, for Freud, retain ‘erotic relations to people and things … in phantasy’. 
Conversely, the paraphrenic ‘seems really to have withdrawn his libido from people and things in 
the external world, without replacing them by others in phantasy’. Freud identifies this as the causal 
root of paraphrenic megalomania so that the ‘libido that has been withdrawn from the external 
world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called 
narcissism.’ 176  As detailed in ‘On Narcissism’, the Freudian paraphrenic has ‘two fundamental 
characteristics: megalomania and diversion of their interest from the external world – from people 
and things’177. By interest, Freud means sexual interest and hence questions where the libido has 
been redirected to in the schizophrenic. Its detachment from exterior objects and fixation on the 
ego is what leads to megalomania. To an extent, Freud’s two characteristics are one, or at least 
represent the two sides of a perfectly balanced equation. 
 The next step in Freud’s reasoning is the extraordinary move. From this process, Freud 
infers the existence of a ‘primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences’178. 
Schreber’s florid paraphrenic narcissism has revealed to Freud a universal truth about the non-
pathological mind: the ‘original libidinal cathexis of the ego.’ 179  Prior to his encounter with 
Schreber, this underlying ego-libido was concealed by the neurotic parade of object-cathexes 
dancing through Freud’s analytic sessions. Freud is explicit about the fact that normal psychology 
can only be intuited, discovered or – troubling for a radical constructionist perhaps – constructed 
from the larger, more visible entity of the psychotic mind: 
Just as the transference neuroses have enabled us to trace the libidinal instinctual impulses, so 
dementia praecox and paranoia will give us an insight in the psychology of the ego. Once more, in 
order to arrive at an understanding of what seems so simple in normal phenomena, we shall have to 
turn to the field of pathology with its distortions and exaggerations.180 
 
At the root of central conceptual tenets of psychodynamic theories of the self is Schreber, as 
encoded in the text of his Memoirs. 
Schreber does not point the way towards the theory of primary narcissism only. The 
pressing question thrown up by this argument as to ‘why this damming-up of libido in the ego 
should have to be experienced as unpleasurable’181 leads Freud to relocate the Bleulerean psychic 
split at the existential core of the libido in the form of the antagonistic pairing of life and death 
drives to be explicated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). At the same time, ‘On Narcissism’ also 
sees the first, tentative description of the super ego: 
Delusions of being watched present this power in a regressive form, thus revealing its genesis and 
the reason why the patient is in revolt against it. For what prompted the subject to form an ego 
ideal, on whose behalf his conscience acts as watchman, arose from the critical influence of his 
parents (conveyed to him by the medium of the voice), to whom were added, as time went on, 
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those who trained and taught him and the innumerable and indefinable host of all the other people 
in his environment – his fellow men – and public opinion. 182 
 
It is no exaggeration to note that Schreber has reproduced himself through Freud’s text and 
become the template for his tripartite model of the mind, and the inspiration for the theory of dual 
nature of the libidinal drive. Schreber, in effect, rewrites Freud and psychoanalysis in his image.183 
This is the baseline of schizomimesis: the rhetoric and content of Schreber’s Memoirs – in which the 
subject is destabilised through interpolated imperatives from God, and a florid new cosmology and 
ontology of influences and sexual forces emerges – become the organising matter of the 
associationist psychology of the twentieth century, which itself returns to (re)order the 
psychopathology from which it was born. Schizomimesis then gives a history of psychiatry as a 
discourse of thought insertion proceeded expansively by a dynamic of influence:  
Supposing a psychopathology, the concept of schizophrenia was steadily widened to the point of 
imprecision, diffusion and over-inclusion … No such disorganisation would be acceptable in the 
diagnosis of any other medical condition. A disorder exists or it does not.184 
 
The diffuseness of the diagnostic, psychopathological sign of ‘schizophrenia’ reveals – through the 
application of the concept of schizomimesis – two fundamental ideas.  
The first of these is that the diagnostic sign is structured on the dynamic model of the sign-
productions of the supposed disease entity. Or more simply, attempts to describe the disease entity 
come to echo the characterising symptomatology constituent of the disease entity. This may occur 
through subtle or not-so-subtle direct influence, as seen in the exchange of ideas (explicit and 
implicit) between psychoanalysis and Schreber. This could be termed a schizomimesis of content. It 
may also occur through the diagnostic discourse enacting qualities (or symptoms) associated with 
‘schizophrenia’ in its process of constructing the disease sign, for example a delusionary (as in, 
unproven by empirical evidence) belief in a bio-genetic mechanism causing auditory verbal 
hallucinations or, as shall be explored in the next chapter, a symptomatic over-literalising of 
heuristic hypothetical concepts such as formal thought disorder. Vincent Crapanzano (1998) notes 
this schizomimetic process in relation to the contagious persecution of Schreber’s text, and its 
infection of the diagnostic reading method: 
Ironically, in the case of paranoia, whose systematicity is organized around a persecutor, the 
diagnostic reader, by the act of diagnosis, risks occupying the place of the persecutor. Such a reader 
comes to assume with respect to the text a fixed position (outside the text) that is supported by the 
conceptual apparatus – the diagnostics – that enabled the diagnosis in the first place.185 
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By schizomimesis, the diagnosed, through the manifestations and expressions of their symptoms, 
construct their diagnoses and their diagnosticians. 
Similarly, consider the second quotation at the opening of this section, taken from a 2015 
paper into the neurological activity associated with thought insertion (TI) and alien control of 
movement (ACM) by Walsh et al, for which the researchers had to simulate both symptoms in 
‘healthy’ (but ‘highly hypnotically suggestible’)186 participants. Participants’ brains were monitored 
by fMRI when having to complete a sentence stem. TI and ACM were simulated separately, with 
the participants being instructed that the sentence would be either mentally completed (TI) or 
physically written (ACM) for them by an external agent. The Engineer imagined for their 
experiment – as external origin for the TI and ACM – has surely stepped off the pages of 
Matthews’ account of the Air Loom Gang. An obvious problem with their simulation is that whilst 
their imagined Engineer does not actually (as claimed) mentally complete sentences or physically 
write them for the participants, the assertion that the Engineer will do that has itself genuinely 
come from an external source, and one with considerable authority: a team of neurologists at 
King’s College, London. This is surely the exact inverse of the experience in actual TI or ACM 
where any suggestive audio commentary or priming is intrinsic and simultaneous (rather than 
extrinsic and preliminary). The researchers are both blind to the (constructed) objective reality of 
the Engineer to the participants and also to the fact that their interpretations of the differences in 
brain activity (qua sign generated by the sign-producing fMRI) between the simulated TI and ACM 
and the control (without either) fail to account for the fact that, apparently, participants produced 
similarly completed sentences. This is important. If executive function is altered under the 
conditions of the simulated TI and ACM (and – in their argument – in the case of actual TI and 
ACM), how are the sentences completed? 
Schreber can shed some light on this. Walsh et al, in their conceptualisation of TI and 
ACM, must surely be drawing – either directly or indirectly through the influence of the Memoirs on 
the diagnostic discourse – on Schreber’s ‘writing-down-system’187 and ‘the system of not-finishing-a-
sentence.’188 The former is the process whereby an extensive textual syntagm that is partially, wholly 
or not at all isomorphic with Schreber’s notes and drafts for his Memoirs has been produced, 
containing or representing all of Schreber’s consciousness: 
Books or other notes are kept in which for years have been written-down all my thoughts, all my phrases, 
all my necessaries, all the articles in my possession or around me, all persons with whom I come 
into contact, etc. I cannot say with certainty who does the writing down. As I cannot imagine God’s 
omnipotence lacks all intelligence, I presume that the writing-down is done by creatures given 
human shape on distant celestial bodies after the manner of the fleeting-improvised-men, but 
lacking all intelligence; their hands are led automatically, as it were, by passing rays for the purpose 
of making them write-down, so that later rays can again look at what has been written.189 
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The ACM of the automatic writing-down-system is, in Schreber, inseparable from TI and 
depersonalisation, and all three are unified in the context of his ontological philosophy that 
representation is a falsification, or facile, ‘improvised’ recreation of an already destroyed reality.190 
Though not taking the idea to the existential extremes that Schreber does, it seems reasonable to 
agree that all representation is at least partially a falsification and one compelled by exterior forces. 
To return to Vološinov, all sign-production is a social act. The same is true of the socially enforced 
compulsion in finishing sentences. Schreber gives an account of being continually subjected to a 
version of the stem sentence test: ‘for years single conjunctions or adverbs have been spoken into 
my nerves thousands of times; these ought only to introduce clauses, but it is left to my nerves to 
complete them in a manner satisfactory to a thinking mind.’191 Schreber’s insight is that all stem 
sentences – regardless of the charade of an Engineer – contain within them a spectrum of potential 
TI; this is the compulsive force constituent of language. Schreber employs a whole range of 
different and superficially bizarre strategies to break from these compulsions: countering the 
semantico-syntactic logical completion in the stem sentence with an idiosyncratic alternative; 
distorting the stem sentence phonically; halting the syntagm with repetition; distracting himself with 
piano playing or poetry reciting. Aside from the schizomimetic echo of Schreber’s own 
experimental discoveries in Walsh et al, there is clearly an important point about language here: 
language interpellates its speaking subjects. This will be a central concern of the next chapter. 
To recapitulate, the first fundamental idea to come from this analysis of the diagnostic 
discourse is that the disease entity is formulated schizomimetically. It is, in fact, possible to explain 
why ‘schizophrenia’ qua nosological sign is schizomimetic in one sentence: unlike diagnostic signs 
generally, the symptoms of ‘schizophrenia’ connote rather than denote a disease; similarly, those 
sign relations ‘symptomatic’ of ‘schizophrenia’ are overly distinctively reliant on connotation over 
denotation for generating meaning. This shall be shown in the next chapter.  
 The second fundamental idea produced is the structural similarity between Saussurean 
semiotics and associationist, psychodynamic diagnostic theories of schizophrenia. Dynamically, 
these two conceptual systems might almost be describing the same entity. Saussure’s model of the 
psychic association intrinsic to the nature of the linguistic sign has a clear relation to the 
associations pathologically loosened in Bleuler’s model of schizophrenia. Saussure claims ‘the two 
elements involved in the linguistic sign are both psychological and are connected in the brain by an 
associative link.’192 For Bleuler, the loosening of associations is the primary and defining symptom 
of schizophrenia.193 It is the first of the fundamental symptoms listed in Bleuler’s text: 
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In this malady the associations lose their continuity. Of the thousands of associative threads which 
guide our thinking, this disease seems to interrupt, quite haphazardly, sometimes such single 
threads, sometimes a whole group, and sometimes even large segments of them.194 
 
The consequent disruptions to speech and writing are – in Bleuler’s epidemiological narrative – 
precisely that: consequent. The primacy of a meta-linguistic loosening of associations is made 
explicit in the text’s closing theoretical formulations of schizophrenia: 
We assume the presence of a process, which directly produces the primary symptoms; the secondary symptoms are partly 
psychic functions operating under altered conditions, and partly the results of more or less successful attempts at 
adaption to the primary disturbances.195 
 
Bleuler details, though without the semiotic terminology, how through a loosening of the 
associations constituent of linguistic signs (the words of a langue), schizophrenic speech re-
constitutes itself as an alternative langue rather than an alternative pathological parole operating 
according to the same nomenclatural key as non-schizophrenic speech (parole)” 
The striking words and phrases used by our patients can hardly be looked upon as empty shells but 
rather as shells which conceal a different content from the usual. Forel’s patient described the 
phenomenon very well: 
“I used some words in order to express a concept entirely different from the usual one. Thus, I 
blithely employed the word mangy to mean gallant. If I could not immediately find an appropriate 
word to express the rapid flow of ideas, I would seek release in self-invented ones, as for example, 
wuttas for doves.”196 
 
The patient, through a combination of ‘blithe’ re-employment of existing words and the creation of 
new ones, is creating their own idiosyncratic langue. As in the Saussurean model of the sign, the 
patient’s drive for neologisms is due to a perceived missing connection between signifier and 
signified; the ‘rapid flow of ideas’ (the signified) produces an entirely new sound (signifier). The 
neologism ‘wuttas’ does not purely substitute for ‘doves’. Rather, the word might be defined as how 
this individual, under considerable pressure to express themselves, refers hurriedly (and 
cathartically, in seeking ‘release’) to doves. As a sign, ‘wuttas’ does not just signify ‘doves’, which 
would be the linguistic translation. Neither does it just signify that the speaker has a condition 
called ‘schizophrenia’, which would be the medical semiotic translation. It does both, and also 
conveys both the phenomenological lived experience of the patient and a possible critique of the 
patient-physician exchange. But these meanings (and many others that could be drawn) are not 
guaranteed as there is no agreed community conferring conventionalised meaning on the sign. 
Whatever agreement on meaning that has occurred has done so in the mind of the patient only. 
According to Barthes, a langue for a community of one is not possible because the langue ‘is 
the social part of the language, the individual cannot by himself either create or modify it; it is 
essentially a collective contract which one must accept in its entirely if one wishes to 
                                                                                                                                         
disease (better, the disease construction produced) did not manifest symptomatically around associations. As 
ever, the method of diagnostic investigation – the nature of the diagnostic eye looking – constructs the 
clinical entity subsequently discovered and delineated.  
194 Bleuler, p.14 
195 Bleuler, p.461 [Italics in original.] 
196 Bleuler, p.150 
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communicate.’197 Yet what is the psychotic break if not a unilateral breaking of collective social 
contracts? Whatever a person’s theoretical background – social constructionist, biological 
empiricist, psychodynamic psychologist, linguist, critic – they must agree on this. Barthes’ account 
of the core semiotic concepts implicitly deals only with the non-psychotic198; it is the work of this 
thesis to extend these concepts to the psychotic. It does not seem inappropriate then to adopt 
Orwell’s maxim that a ‘lunatic was simply a minority of one.’199 There is a similarity here with 
Bateson’s well-known theory of the schizophrenic double bind, according to which the patient 
‘must live in a universe where the sequences of events are such that his unconventional communicational habits will be 
in some sense appropriate.’ 200  Bateson at al gave a ‘communicational theory of the origin of 
schizophrenia’201 drawing on Bertrand Russell’s theory of logical types. But the semiotic reading 
proposed by this thesis does not support Bateson’s conclusions that the schizophrenic difficulty in 
‘discriminating communicational modes either within the self or between the self and others’202 must necessarily 
come from conflicting communicational signals in the interaction between the schizophrenic and 
their parents (or more specifically, the main object of Bateson’s aetiological witch hunt, the 
mother). 
Bleuler’s warning not to misinterpret patients’ words as ‘empty shells’ illustrates the core 
error of diagnostic readings of schizophrenia. An entirely separate langue (qua ‘a social institution 
and system of values’203) with utterly novel, idiosyncratic sign associations – most probably formed 
through a speaking community of one – is being interpreted and translated as a parole, parallel and 
related to a non-schizophrenic parole. Heavy assumptions about shared conventional associations 
between signifier and signified are being made during earnest attempts to translate schizophrenese 
and all other phenomena of schizophrenia. Such a Laingian phenomenological empathetic exercise 
is noble in intent, if misconceived in practice.  
The thesis presented here is that there has never yet been a rigorous semiotic diagnostic 
account of schizophrenia. There are two important caveats to this assertion. First, the proposed 
semiotic analysis in no way relates solely to linguistics. Barthes is explicit on the ‘extra- or meta-
linguistic’ application of the concepts of langue and parole: 
                                                
197 Barthes, Elements, p.14 
198 Barthes suggests that the concept of the idiolect – a one-person dialect constructed from the individual’s 
linguistic habits – ‘would appear to be largely an illusion.’ Barthes retains the term to designate ‘the language 
of the aphasic who does not understand other people and does not receive a message conforming to his own 
verbal patterns.’ (Barthes, Elements, p.21) The schizophrenic langue proposed by this thesis is not an idiolect 
precisely because it is not – or at least not solely – restricted to language. Just as disordered speech is not a 
necessary diagnostic criterion, neither is it necessary for the argument that the schizophrenia can be analysed 
as a distinct langue. Instead, the argument is that schizophrenia operates across all sign systems, with the 
pathological emphasis varying from case to case. The question of ‘schizophrenese’ will be addressed in 
Chapter Two. 
199 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1987), p.182 
200 Gregory Bateson, Don D Jackson, Jay Haley and John Weakland, ‘Toward a theory of schizophrenia’, 
Behavioral Science, 1 (1956) 251-264, p.253 [Italics in original.] 
201 Bateson ‘Toward a theory of schizophrenia’, p.251 
202 Bateson ‘Toward a theory of schizophrenia’, p.252 [Italics in original.] 
203 Barthes, Elements, p.14 
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We shall therefore postulate that there exists a general category language/speech, which embraces all 
the systems of signs; since there are no better ones, we shall keep the terms language and speech, even 
when they are applied to communications whose substance is not verbal.204 
 
Barthes supports his assertion with analyses of a series of non-linguistic sign systems: the garment 
system; the food system; the car system and the furniture system. Whilst Bleuler is referring 
specifically to the speech of schizophrenics, this thesis applies the semiotic analysis to all sign 
exchanges, in relation to schizophrenia qua hypothesised (and thereby constructed) semiological 
sign system. Within this system will be included all the phenomena labelled as ‘symptomatology’ – 
represented both objectively (meaning in narratives exterior to the symptoms) and subjectively 
(through narratives constructed within, or at least in great proximity to, the symptom phenomena). 
This chapter has performed just such a semiotic reading of the diagnostic discourse.  
The second caveat is rather more complicated and strikes to the heart of this thesis and its 
conclusions. First, put aside the argument that schizophrenia in the totality of its phenomena 
represents a separate langue from non-schizophrenia. Instead, consider how the associations 
permitted within the semiological system of non-schizophrenia are much tighter than those of the 
schizophrenia system. To return to the example from Bleuler, a speaker (within the non-
schizophrenia system) cannot blithely use ‘mangy’ to mean ‘gallant’ nor substitute ‘wuttas’ for 
‘doves’ and have any expectation of being understood. However, this is not a statement about the 
inviolable, transcendental and eternal nature of the sign ‘doves’. Rather, it is a statement about the 
social contracts at play in the language of English in the early twenty-first century. Its semiotic truth 
is highly contingent on location in space and time. 
Conversely, within the schizophrenia semiological system posited by this thesis, the 
speaker can (and does) substitute ‘wuttas’ for ‘doves’. Therefore, this is clearly an acceptable shift 
along Saussure’s associative plane205 within the schizophrenia system.206 That is not to claim that 
any person with schizophrenia (or any person conversant with the schizophrenia semiological 
system) could therefore interpret ‘wuttas’ for ‘doves’ intuitively. The claim is only that such an 
associative substitution breaks no rules within this system. It might be given as a characteristic of 
the schizophrenia semiology system that a high proportion of associations simply have to be learnt, 
                                                
204 Barthes, Elements, p.25 In this thesis, unlike in Lavers and Smith’s translation of Barthes, the French 
originals – langue and parole – are retained to prevent any confusion. ‘Language’ and ‘speech’, when used, will 
not have this specific semiotic meaning. 
205 Barthes prefers to use ‘paradigmatic’ or ‘systematic’ instead of ‘associative’. (Barthes, Elements, p.59) Here 
the term ‘associative’ is used for the clear echo of Bleuler’s psychodynamic model of the schizophrenias. 
206 Readers might worry that this thesis rests on the assumption of the existence of one single coherent 
schizophrenia semiological system, and that by doing so, this thesis repeats the diagnostic reading errors 
already documented whereby a theoretical reading approach constructs something, and mistakes its own 
invention for a novel discovery. Szasz levels exactly this criticism at Kraepelin and Bleuler in Schizophrenia: The 
Sacred Symbol of Psychiatry (1988). However, this thesis is not making a pretence at discovery. Rather, it 
deliberately aims at constructing a schizophrenia semiological system as an object of semiotic analysis. The 
analysis and the constructed system are intended to be tools to aid understanding, by ordering information 
and allowing for new insights. 
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rather than intuited, just as the forms of the irregular être or the potential movements of chess 
pieces must. 
The non-schizophrenia semiological system is more associatively restricted than the 
schizophrenia system. These rules are historically and culturally determined. (It is easy to imagine 
that ‘mangy’ might one day be a synonym for ‘gallant’.) Similarly, the syntagmatic ‘combinative 
constraints’207 of the schizophrenia system are freer than in the non-schizophrenia system. Any 
example of ‘schizophrenese’ – with its distinctive gaps within or seemingly meaningless additions to 
the constitutive chains of reasoning, grammar and even individual words – might support this 
argument. Remaining with Bleuler’s text, ‘the insertion of a long hui-sound between pairs of 
words,’208 the metonymic exchange of ‘an hour for grandfather clock because of the relation of the 
clock to the hours of the day’ or compound or condensed neologisms such as ‘lie-truths’ or ‘cage-
weather juice’209can all be read as instances of movements on the syntagmatic axis of language that 
are characteristic of the schizophrenia system.210 Again, the greater combinative constraints in the 
non-schizophrenia system are the product of the community of speakers – situated in time and 
space – using the langue.211 
 The non-schizophrenia semiological system (enclosing all other systems: linguistic; verbal 
but non-linguistic; aural but not verbal; gestural; physical but not gestural, and so on) must 
necessarily be a carved out, refined and therefore subsidiary entity – to be termed parole – existing 
wholly within (although temporally after – except in the co-temporality of the schizophrenic and 
non-schizophrenic) a less rigidly associative primordial semiotic soup, and let this be termed the 
langue.  
Obviously, this structure can be described by Kleinman’s earlier employment of James’ 
account of the baby making sense of the world. Non-schizophrenic associative sign system(s) are 
an entity pulled out of the ‘big blooming, buzzing confusion’ of a pre-existing and encompassing 
schizophrenic looser associative sign system. This is not to valorise the schizophrenic langue any 
more than it is to valorise Saturn to note its enormity, variety and size in contrast to Venus. Neither 
is it to deride the schizophrenic langue as more primitive, any more than the greater age and weaker 
structural cohesion of the great grey gas giant makes Saturn in some way more primitive than 
Venus. That the matter constituent of Venus was once as disparate and disjoined as that of Saturn 
does not suggest any normative value judgement of primacy for one, nor the obverse of refinement 
                                                
207 Barthes, Elements, p.69 
208 Bleuler, p.149 
209 Bleuler, p.152 
210 It should be remembered that although the examples provided are all verbal, the argument relates to all 
possible phenomena within the schizophrenia and non-schizophrenia semiological systems. 
211 The words ‘speakers’ and ‘langue’ are here being used ‘extra- or meta-linguistically’ as discussed above with 
reference to Barthes, Elements, p.25. 
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for the other.212 Of course, the distress of the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia might be 
metaphorically expressed as that traumatic difficulty of Saturn attempting to hold itself in Venus’s 
orbital relation to the sun. The reason this metaphor should be avoided is that it is clearly open to 
the abuse of misinterpretation that allows for the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia to be 
de-humanised. That there are differences between Venus and Saturn, or between those with and 
without a diagnosis of schizophrenia, is obvious – without any further comment on what those 
differences might be – yet from the perspective of the Milky Way, the solar system is one entity. 
That directly speaking across langues is necessarily impossible is no deterrent. Semiotics will 
provide the mediating metalanguage. The untranslatability of ‘schizophrenia’ is fuel to such an 
attempt, as Lotman observes: 
The deeper the abyss of untranslatability between two languages, the more acute is the need for a 
common metalanguage to bridge the gap between them by creating equivalences.213 
 
Bridging the linguistic gap with a tentative offer of a metalanguage will be the business of the next 
chapter. 
  
                                                
212 Another better analogy might be the letters ‘f’ and ‘s’ in the English lexicon. Once conjoined, ‘f’ now has a 
certain primacy in at least two systems: the etymological and the alphabetical. However, one would be hard 
pushed to squeeze a normative value judgment out of this primacy. 
213 Lotman, Universe of the Mind, p.37 
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Chapter Two: Impenetrability! 
 ‘Impenetrability! That’s what I say!’ 
 ‘Would you tell me please,’ said Alice, ‘what that means?’1 
 
Q Why did you call an instrument … a Calibene? 
A I imagined that word; I tried hard to find a name that could not mean any other instrument.2 
 
From birth, the clinical portrait of schizophrenia has been rooted in an assumed equivalence 
between thought and speech. The train of thought is the train of speech, meaning Kraepelin can 
unquestioningly assert that ‘[i]ncoherence in the train of thought … is usually noticeable in the 
conversation of the patients.’ When a patient remarks that ‘[l]ife is a dessert-spoon’3 there is no 
clinical need to pick over the semantics. Life, verifiably, is not a dessert-spoon; the sentence does 
nothing other than function as a clear sign of the illness. It is incoherent as language but entirely 
coherent as symptom. Bleuler gives a more detailed account of the ‘unknown language’ of 
schizophrenia: 
[A] complete word-salad which is entirely unintelligible … The utterly inconceivable combination 
both as to grammar and content creates the impression of an unknown language. […] New words 
are often coined for the whole language, so that we may have an “artificial language,” as one of our 
patients called it … it may be shown that identical words are always used to express certain 
concepts. For the most part, however, the “artificial language” seems to be the product of the 
moment, and is soon replaced by another.4 
 
Schizophrenia – often but not always, as both Kraepelin and Bleuler note – offers up an ‘unknown 
language’ and this – in lieu of methods of reading the thoughts and minds of the patients directly – 
becomes the clinical object of study for insight into a posited underlying disorder (of thought, and 
of health). 
The Kraepelinean equivalence of thought and speech disorders – whereby the latter is no 
more or less than the discernable, recordable, measurable manifestation of the former – has been 
challenged by those working in linguistics.5 Elaine Chaika’s notable 1974 paper – ‘A linguist looks 
at “schizophrenic” language’ – divides thought and speech disorders into two separate objects of 
analysis:  
If language is not necessary to abstraction and generalization and if it does not necessarily affect 
cognitive behaviour, then misuse of language does not, in itself, prove impairment in thinking.6 
 
                                                
1 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass (Harmondsworth: Puffin, 1962) 
[1865 & 1872] p.275 
2 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, p.37  
3 Kraepelin, p.56 
4 Bleuler, pp.155-156 
5 An exception to this rule of equivalence occurs in Kraepelin’s own taxonomy with the last clinical form 
described: confusional speech dementia. ‘[W]hat distinguishes our patients here, is the sense and 
reasonableness in their behaviour and in their actions, which compels us to the assumption that this is a case not 
so much of a severe disorder of thought but much rather of an interruption of the connections between train 
of thought and expression in speech.’ (Kraepelin, p.180) Interestingly, this separation of thought and speech 
is enough to lead Kraepelin to propose that this clinical form may be a ‘peculiar form of disease which is 
indeed related to dementia praecox but is yet not essentially the same.’ (p.180) 
6 Elaine Chaika, ‘A linguist looks at “schizophrenic” language’, Brain and Language, 1 (1974) 257-276, p.258 
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Yet the Kraepelinean approach endures in the DSM-III and beyond.7 DSM-IV explicitly states that 
clinical assessments of a patient’s thought depend on observations of their speech: 
Disorganised thinking (“formal thought disorder,” “loosening of associations”) has been argued by 
some (Bleuler, in particular) to be the single most important feature of Schizophrenia. Because of 
the difficulty inherent in developing an objective definition of “thought disorder,” and because in a 
clinical setting inferences about thought are based primarily on the individual’s speech, the concept 
of disorganized speech (Criterion A3) has been emphasized in the definition for Schizophrenia used 
in this manual.8 
 
Nancy Andreasen, who sat on the DSM-III advisory committees for ‘Psychotic Disorders’ and 
‘Mood Disorders’, and then on the DSM-IV Task Force and ‘Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic 
Disorders Work Group’, provided a pre-emptive explanation of the DSM-III’s (re)thinking and 
taxonomising of thought disorder in a pair of papers in 1979. In the first paper, Andreasen detailed 
the 18 proposed definitions that constitute the hypothesized ‘subtypes of thought disorder.’9 The 
second paper roadtested the subtypes for their diagnostic utility. 10  To further historicise 
Andreasen’s taxonomy – intended for clinical use – it is worth noting that, as Catherine Mackenzie 
states in a paper from 2000, ‘[w]ell into the 1970s, interest in acquired language disorders was 
almost exclusively focused on aphasia. When attention turned to […] schizophrenia […], it was 
inevitable that assessment tools were borrowed from aphasiology.’11 There was then an urgent need 
– both clinically and epidemiologically – for new analytical structures specific to schizophrenia that 
could be used to characterise speech disorders. 
Although Andreasen, in-keeping with a neo-Kraepelinean skepticism towards anything 
with a whiff of psychologizing, 12  explicitly acknowledges that ‘thought and language are not 
perfectly correlated’ and advocates a change in language, favouring the term ‘disorganized speech’ 
to ‘thought disorder’, this casual synonymity is treated as nothing more than a terminological 
wrinkle that can be gently ironed out. However, the thinking behind the terminological knot is 
                                                
7 It is worth placing this within the historical context of the DSM’s – and schizophrenia’s – developmental 
trajectory, discussed in the previous chapter in more detail. For much of the first half of the 20th century in 
the US (and to a far lesser extent in Europe), the aetiology, treatment and diagnostic conceptualization of 
schizophrenia was heavily informed by psychodynamic theories. In crude terms, Bleulerean associationist 
psychology was the pre-dominant theoretical underpinning of formulations of schizophrenia. The problems 
in reliability and validity of the diagnostic definitions exposed by WHO’s International Pilot Study in 
Schizophrenia and the US-UK diagnostic study conducted (RE Kendell, JE Cooper and AG Gourlay, A.G. 
‘Diagnostic criteria of American and British psychiatrists,’ Archives of General Psychiatry, 25 (1971) pp123-130) 
in the early 1970s provoked a reaction against this model of schizophrenia and hence ‘Kraepelin and 
Schneider are discovered, and the obscurantist period gives way to the new gospel of biological psychiatry.’ 
(Berrios, Luque and Villagrán, p.115) For a version of history as written by the victor, see Nancy Andreasen, 
‘The American concept of schizophrenia,’ Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15:4 (1989) 519-531 
8 DSM-IV, p.276 
9 Nancy Andreasen, ‘Thought, language and communication disorders I. Clinical assessment, definition of 
terms, and evaluation of their reliability’, Archives of General Psychiatry, 36:12 (1979a) 1315-1321, p.1316 
10 Nancy Andreasen, ‘Thought, language and communication disorders II. Diagnostic significance’, Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 36:12 (1979b) 1325-1330. Amongst its conclusions, the paper’s assertion that positive 
‘thought disorders’ indicate ‘mania’ and negative ‘thought disorders’ indicate schizophrenia might be 
considered a straightforward begging of the diagnostic question. 
11 Catherine Mackenzie, ‘The relevance of education and age in the assessment of discourse comprehension’, 
Clinical Linguistics &Phonetics, 14:2 (2000) 151-161, p.152 
12 ‘[O]utdated associationist psychology’ as Andreasen so dismisses it. (Andreasen, 1979a, p.1316 and 1979b, 
p.1329) 
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perhaps almost as tangled. Andreasen claims that, in the spirit of Kraepelin, the definitions and the 
proposed scale for measuring thought, language and communication13 avoid Bleulerean speculation 
about the unknowable internal system of the mind and refocus the diagnostic assessment on a 
verifiable, observable clinical entity: 
Because in a clinical situation, thought disorder is almost invariably inferred from observation of the 
patient’s speech and language behavior, the definitions were written to describe speech and language 
behaviors commonly seen in psychiatric patients without any attempt to characterize the underlying 
cognitive processes unless they were reported by the patient.14 
 
Whilst this claim is no doubt sincere, it is surely accidental sophistry. To suggest that a set of 
definitions to account for a supposed clinically identifiable entity called ‘thought disorder’ (or even 
merely ‘disorganized speech’), which serves as a key diagnostic criterion for schizophrenia and 
related psychotic disorders make no ‘attempt to characterize the underlying cognitive processes’ is 
simply factually wrong. In the context of conceptualizing schizophrenia as a neuropsychiatric 
illness, there is a macro-narrative characterization of the sufferer’s underlying cognitive processes, 
in which Andreasen’s taxonomy and the diagnostic criteria play an obvious role.  
To give a specific example, Andreasen’s third definition is entitled: ‘Poverty of Content of 
Speech (Poverty of Thought, Empty Speech, Alogia, Verbigeration, Negative Formal Thought 
Disorder)’. The account says that interviewers may find ‘that the patient has spoken at length but 
has not given adequate information to answer the question’ and ‘may characterize the speech as 
“empty philosophizing”.’15 This suggests a certain degree of implicit characterizing of the patient’s 
cognitive processes. By 1986, Andreasen explicitly classified some of these observable subtypes of 
disorganized speech as cognitive disorders: ‘The concept of thought disorder comprises only those 
disorders in which thinking alone seem aberrant: poverty of speech (aberrant because thought 
seems not to occur) and illogicality (aberrant inferential processes).’ 16  That laconicism – and 
Andreasen defines poverty of speech as such – or abstention from conversation should be 
interpreted, without any other corroborating or complementary neurological, biochemical or 
cognitive diagnostic test, as evidence of cognitive disorder seems tyrannical. Whilst the term 
‘thought-language-communication disorders’ appears an improvement on a misguided ‘unitary’17 
conception of ‘formal thought disorder’ (as inferred exclusively from language behaviours), the 
tripartite structure bears very little interrogation when used to disjunctively categorise sub-types. By 
what logic does Andreasen place ‘poverty of speech’ within the cognitive disorder leg of the tripos, 
but then order ‘poverty of content of speech’ – which she also terms ‘negative formal thought 
disorder’ – within the communicative disorders?18 Within a year, perhaps marking the changing 
                                                
13 Which, in a later paper, is given the rather deliciously punning initialism of TLC. Nancy Andreasen, ‘Scale 
for the assessment of thought, language and communication (TLC)’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 12:3 (1986) 473-482 
14 Andreasen (1979a), p.1316 
15 Andreasen (1979a), p.1318 
16 Andreasen (1986), p.474 
17 Andreasen (1986), p.473 
18 Andreasen (1986), pp.473-474 
 64 
fashions for understanding the relationship between language and thought, and between negative 
and positive symptoms across DSM-III, DSM-III-R and DSM-IV, Andreasen switched to using 
‘alogia’ (defined, rather confusingly in relation to her earlier, above-quoted categorization, as 
‘poverty of speech and content of speech’19) and ‘positive formal thought disorder.’20  
The purpose of this critique is not to Whigishly poke fun at arguably linguistically naïve 
attempts to create analytical tools for describing and understanding schizophrenic speech. 
Andreasen – and many others before and since – was making a pragmatic attempt at responsibly 
and scientifically using schizophrenic speech as if it were the true object of the analysis: the posited 
disordered thought. All the while, such researchers have acknowledged that schizophrenic speech is 
not disordered thought, but merely the best available pragmatic approximation, rather in the way 
that all physicists will agree that Newtonian physics is essentially wrong, but makes useful, usable 
predications about the world nonetheless. There are three problems though. First, the speech-
thought relationship is far too complex to allow these assumptions of simple correlation. Second, 
from reading the epidemiological literature, it seems the pragmatic reading of speech as if it were 
thought often melts and blurs into believing these concepts are interchangeable. Third, as a 
consequence of these two problems, these analyses of schizophrenic speech do not generate useful 
predictions or insights into schizophrenic speech let alone any underlying thought disorder. 
As of 2005, Andreasen’s TLC scale remained the ‘standard account of schizophrenic 
language’ and ‘a foundation for subsequent research and clinical practice,’ 21  including the 
development of Liddle’s22 simplified eight-symptom Thought and Language Index (TLI). Although 
                                                
19 Nancy Andreasen, ‘The diagnosis of schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 13:1 (1987) 9-22, p.15 
20 See also: Nancy Andreasen and Michael Flaum, ‘Schizophrenia: the characteristic symptoms’, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 17:1 (1991) 27-49 and Nancy Andreasen and William Carpenter Jnr, ‘Diagnosis and classification of 
schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 19:2 (1993) 199-214. 
 Prior to settling on these terms, Andreasen also proposed ‘dysphasia’ (for disordered speech, 
language and communication, which – she argues – constitute a disordered thought process) and ‘dyslogia’ 
(for disordered thought content). As words, they sound more at home in tables of rhetoric, brushing up 
against anaphora and aposiopesis (of which there is plenty in case studies of ‘formal thought disorder’). 
(Nancy Andreasen, ‘Should the term “thought disorder” be revised?’, Comprehensive Psychology, 23:4 (1982) 291-
299) 
21 Michael Covington, Congzhou He, Cati Brown, Lorina Naçi, Jonathan McClain, Bess Sirmon Fjordbak, 
James Semple and John Brown, ‘Schizophrenia and the structure of language: the linguist’s view’, Schizophrenia 
Research, 77 (2005) 85-98, p.89 
22 Peter Liddle, Elton Ngan, Stephanie Caissie, Cameron Anderson, Alan Bates, Digby Quested, Richard 
White and Rowena Weg, ‘Thought and language index: an instrument for assessing thought and language in 
schizophrenia’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 181 (2002) 326-330. Whilst Liddle et al define their TLI in (partial) 
opposition to the TLC, and instead as a refinement of Johnston and Holzman’s Thought Disorder Index 
(TDL), it is very clearly in the intellectual tradition of the TLC for the purposes of this thesis as it exhibits the 
following characteristics: a lack of theoretical clarity as to the extent of difference or relation between thought 
and speech; aesthetic, subjective judgments given the basis of objective scientific measurements (e.g. the 
definitions of three of the symptoms as ‘peculiar word use, peculiar sentence construction and peculiar logic’ 
p.326); the tautological relationship between the interdependent definitions of schizophrenic speech acts and 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia (as identified by Schwartz, see footnote 32). The TLI represents a step 
forward in recognizing that two of the speech phenomena tied to the diagnostic characterization of psychotic 
formal thought disorder ‘are not specific to psychotic illnesses’ (p.327), although on what basis this decision 
has been made about ‘perseveration’ and ‘distractibility’ and not ‘poverty of speech’ or ‘peculiar word use’ is 
not explained. 
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Andreasen was not directly involved in the development of DSM-5, her co-author on her 1993 
paper on the diagnosis of schizophrenia, William Carpenter Jnr, headed the Psychotic Disorders 
Working Group, and her influence endures. The problem of the pragmatic maneuver described 
above is that it often has a contrary effect to that intended: it confuses rather than clarifies the 
object of study. Any gain from a pragmatic assertion of speech-thought correlation – and it is not 
clear that there is much gain anyway – is certainly more than offset by the recurring need to 
highlight and re-examine (and sometimes reformulate) the assumptions about speech, thought and 
the relationship(s) between the two. The validity of using disordered speech as an unequivocal 
signifier of the signified of disordered thought, and therefore positioning it as a master signifier of 
schizophrenia, was – according to the consultation website – interrogated during the revision and 
consultation process for DSM-5.23  
Unfortunately, the revised text appears to pack more ambiguity into fewer words in a 
dedicated section entitled ‘Disorganized Thinking (Speech).’24 In contrast to the DSM-IV’s factual 
statement that – for good or ill – inferences about thought are, in ‘a clinical setting … based 
primarily’ on speech, DSM-5 favours a vague opening statement: ‘Disorganized thinking (formal thought 
disorder) is typically inferred from the individual’s speech.’25 This very inference is the foundational 
cornerstone for the existence of this posited ‘disorganized thinking (formal thought disorder)’. 
Where – anywhere – is the evidence or even the theoretical framework or the useful experiential 
results that justify this inference? It may well be a wrong inference, and even if there is disorganized 
thought and disorganized speech (these terms are, despite the context, not scientific ones by any 
measure) why should there be a causal relationship between the two, in either direction? Indeed, 
why should there be any direct relation between the two at all?  
The DSM-5’s brief description concludes by suggesting that ‘[l]ess severe disorganized 
thinking or speech may occur during the prodromal and residual periods of schizophrenia.’ 26 
Curiously, whilst perhaps intended as unambiguously conjunctive, this ‘or’ raises the disruptive 
spectre of a contradictory disjunction. Are disorders of thought and speech the same thing, in the 
collective mind of the APA? Is one the necessary consequence of the other? Or is disorganized 
speech simply a reliable clinically observable correlate of disorganized thought? If speech and 
thought are different manifestations of the same mechanism, then this disjunctive ambiguity 
suggests – perversely – that the APA are not wholly convinced of the fact. Contrariwise, the APA 
might have absolute clarity in their thinking on this question, and believe disorganized speech does 
                                                
23 It is a nice irony that those least likely to care about the content of any speech by ‘schizophrenics’ are most 
likely to consider FTD as the pre-eminent diagnostic sign of ‘schizophrenia’. Slater and Roth, biologists who 
vehemently reject all psychotherapies and ‘talking cures’ for psychosis, consider FTD as schizophrenia’s 
‘diagnostic sign of the first order.’ Eliot Slater and Martin Roth, Clinical Psychiatry, (London: Bailliere Tindall 
and Cassell, 1977), p.316 
24  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (Washington DC: American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), p.88 
25 DSM-5, p.88 Rhetorically, this sentence sounds like a straw man proposition, in which the word ‘typically’ 
contains the implied meaning ‘mistakenly.’ However, no counter-proposition follows. 
26 DSM-5, p.88 Emphasis added. 
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not necessarily and always mean disorganized thought, but the unruly ironies of language have 
undermined this assertion in the very act of its being made: the muddy speech muddies the inferred 
thought.27 
DSM-5 continues:  
Rarely, speech may be so severely disorganised that it is nearly incomprehensible and resembles 
receptive aphasias in its linguistic disorganization (incoherence or “word-salad”). Because mildly 
disorganized speech is common and nonspecific, the symptom must be severe enough to 
substantially impair effective communication.28 
 
Again, the reasoning appears confused and contradictory. Mild disorganized speech is ‘common 
and nonspecific’ and only when sufficiently severe to ‘impair effective communication’ does it 
become a pathological sign of schizophrenia. However, the previous sentence suggests – assuming 
a rough parity between the concepts of ‘nearly incomprehensible’ and ‘substantially impair effective 
communication’ – that such instances occur ‘rarely.’ 
 This posited thought/speech hybrid seems to re-appear under the ‘Associated Features 
Supporting Diagnosis.’29 Here, the DSM-5 lists ‘language function’ amongst a series of ‘cognitive 
deficits’: 
Cognitive deficits in schizophrenia are common and are strongly linked to vocational and functional 
impairments. These deficits can include decrements in declarative memory, working memory, 
language function, and other executive functions, as well as slower processing speed. Abnormalities 
in sensory processing and inhibitory capacity, as well as reductions in attention, are also found. 
Some individuals with schizophrenia show social cognition deficits, including deficits in the ability 
to infer the intentions of other people (theory of mind), and may attend to and then interpret 
irrelevant events or stimuli as meaningful, perhaps leading to the generation of explanatory 
delusions.30  
 
The distinctions simultaneously erected and dismantled by this account are perhaps unhelpful. 
Presumably – given the earlier statements in DSM-5 and DSM-IV regarding inferences about 
thought – the majority of the testing and assessment of these ‘common’ cognitive deficits are 
speech or language based, at least partially. 31   It is almost tautological to note that ‘language 
                                                
27 The intellectual error of unquestioningly conflating speech and thought is (wittily) identified by Eugen Bär 
as being more appropriately characteristic of the patient than the psychiatrist: ‘[b]y simply identifying thought 
and language disorders, psychiatric researchers commit that very logical type crossing that they discover in 
their patients.’ Eugen Bär, ‘Semiotic studies in schizophrenia and senile psychosis’, Semotica, 16:3 (1976) 269-
283, p.277 
28 DSM-5, p.88 
29 DSM-5, p.101 
30 DSM-5, p.101 
31 This presumption is not unsupported. Keefe and Fenton – in a paper tentatively proposing cognitive 
deficit as a diagnostic criterion for schizophrenia – discuss the lack of formal tests for cognition. Inevitably, 
in the clinical setting at present, any assessment of a schizophrenia patient’s cognition will be both informal 
and language mediated. Keefe and Fenton note that formal cognitive testing is part of the curriculum of 
clinical psychologists and neuropsychologists but not of psychiatrists, nurses and social workers. It should be 
no surprise that ‘[i]nterview-based assessments of cognition have been historically unreliable,’ as they often, 
by necessity, involve asking ‘whether patients have difficulty remembering names, concentrating well enough 
to read a newspaper or book, being able to follow group conversations, and handling changes in daily 
routines.’ Richard Keefe and Wayne Fenton, ‘How should DSM-V criteria for schizophrenia include 
cognitive impairment?’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33:4 (2007) 912-920, p.916 
Keefe, Poe, Walker et al (2006) gives a summary of four different cognition tests employed clinically 
to assess people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. In all, the tasks – with very few exceptions – either 
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function’ is decremented within a constellation of cognitive deficits inferred from poor language-
based responses;32 the decremented ‘language function’ is the clinically verifiable object from which 
the supposed ‘social cognitive deficits’ are inferred. When language is both the object and medium 
of much (if not all) the assessment, it is hard to understand how the result might pertain to 
anything other than language. This something called ‘language function’ – which remains unglossed 
but terminologically distinct, to the APA, from ‘speech’, ‘thought’ and the posited ‘speech/thought’ 
hybrid – might be a synonym for Chomsky’s language competence, and therefore is also itself 
inferred rather than observed. Clearly, this ‘language function’ cannot relate to Chomsky’s linguistic 
performance, as performance is dependent – in part – on memory, processing and attention, which 
are all listed separately.33 For even more obvious reasons, in a diagnostic account of schizophrenia, 
‘language function’ cannot refer to an organic neurological mechanism. 
Clearly, the DSM revisions have taken place without any serious engagement with linguists. 
This is hardly surprising, but why does it matter? It matters because this strikes to the very heart of 
the diagnostic group of schizophrenias. In DSM-5, ‘disorganized speech (e.g. frequent derailment 
or incoherence)’ appears as Criterion A3 in the diagnostic criteria for ‘brief psychotic disorder’,34 
‘schizophreniform disorder’35 and ‘schizophrenia’,36 and is referenced but not directly quoted in the 
criteria for ‘schizoaffective disorder’. Therefore, the current diagnostic importance of disordered 
speech as an unproblematic – though qualified – indication of ‘disorganized thinking’ stands at 
odds with an older body of evidence from linguistics that questions: the ‘unstated assumption that 
thought disorder is isomorphic to speech disorder;’37 that speech disorders in schizophrenics can 
                                                                                                                                         
directly test language skills (for example, a semantic fluency test) or are assessed through language (for 
example, a digit sequencing task to test working memory that requires the patient to give their responses 
verbally). See Richard Keefe, Margaret Poe, Trina Walker, Joseph Kang and Philip Harvey, ‘The 
Schizophrenia Cognition Rating Scale: An interview-based assessment and its relationship to cognition, real-
world functioning, and functional capacity,’ American Journal of Psychiatry, 163 (2006) 426-432 and Joseph 
Ventura, Steven Reise, Richard Keefe, Lyle Baade, James Gold, Michael Green, Robert Kern, Raquelle 
Mesholam-Gately, Keith Nuechterlein, Larry Seidman and Robert Bilder, ‘The Cognitive Assessment 
Interview (CAI): development and validation of an empirically derived, brief interview-based measure of 
cognition,’ Schizophrenia Research, 121:1 (2010) 24-31. 
32 The tautology established by the interlinking of a diagnosis of schizophrenia and schizophrenic speech, 
whereby each defines the other, has been known to psycholinguistics for many decades. Steven Schwartz 
recognized ‘that independent definitions of speech deviance and schizophrenia are necessary if we are to 
avoid circular reasoning when studying speech-disturbed schizophrenics.’ Steven Schwartz, ‘Is there a 
schizophrenic language?’, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5 (1982) 579-626, p.615 
33  Schwartz – in pulling together research from 1960s and 1970s – concludes that psychotic speech 
demonstrates a failure in Chomskyan performance but not a disease of competence: ‘[s]chizophrenics’ speech 
is disturbed, but their language competence appears intact.’ (Schwartz, p.588) Given that – with the current 
state of knowledge – it appears as though schizophrenic psychosis is episodic, whereas changes in neuro-
anatomy are not, it seems commonsensical that psychosis should affect performance (within the timeframe of 
the psychotic episode) but not any underlying competence. But it’s a standing question whether or not 
Chomskyan language competence exists outside linguistics. 
34 DSM-5, p.94 
35 DSM-5, p.96 
36 DSM-5, p.99 
37 Ann Phillips Hotchkiss and Philip Harvey, ‘Linguistic analyses of speech disorder in psychosis’, Clinical 
Psychological Review, 6 (1986) 155-175, p.155  
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provide reliable insights into concomitant thought disorders; 38  that schizophrenic speech is 
disordered syntactically, grammatically or semantically; 39  or that such a thing as schizophrenic 
speech even exits.40 
Does the impenetrable linguistic sign have to be an indicative symptom of schizophrenia?41 
For Chaika, unprovoked and unglossed neologisms remain necessarily symptomatic of deviant 
behaviour, as ‘[e]ven if the patient were deliberately coining new words, this behaviour would have 
to be considered bizarre, as one normally explains to others what a new word means.’42 Chaika 
argues in several papers and her monograph Understanding Psychotic Speech: Beyond Freud and Chomsky 
(1990) that a distinct form of speech exists that is peculiar to people in psychosis. Although 
revisited and revised repeatedly in different publications, Chaika’s central thesis persists, and is well 
summarised in the opening section of Understanding Psychotic Speech: 
Paraphrasability is a hallmark of normal speech production. It is part of the essential character of 
language. Every normal utterance can be paraphrased. The paraphrase may not be as beautiful as 
the original or as succinct, but it can convey the same meaning. All psychotic utterances cannot be 
paraphrased.43 
 
This contention will be returned to later in this chapter. However, at this point it is sufficient to 
state that Chaika’s resistance to paraphrasability, in relation to supposedly ‘deviant’ speech, can 
legitimately be read as paraphrasal with the concept of the impenetrable linguistic sign. Chaika is 
unwilling to restrict her observation to the diagnostic entity schizophrenia, and so – mostly – talks 
of psychotic speech. 44  Also, Chaika very clearly claims that this psychotic speech – to use 
Saussurean terms – is a parole rather than a langue: ‘there is schizophrenic speech, but not a 
schizophrenic language.’45 In response to Chaika (1974), Fromkin (1975) explicitly questions the 
existence of a distinctive or ‘unique’ schizophrenic speech. In Fromkin’s contrasting account, these 
                                                
38 Victoria Fromkin, ‘A linguist looks at “A linguist looks at ‘schizophrenic language’”’, Brain and Language, 2 
(1975) 498-503 
39 Sherry Rochester and J R Martin, Crazy talk: a study of the discourse of schizophrenic speakers (New York: Plenum, 
1979) Rochester and Martin also note that ‘clinicians seeking to describe language use in schizophrenia have 
not noticed the inferential states of their own descriptions’ (p.3) and that therefore – and mistakenly – 
‘language is treated as an epiphenomenon to information processing’ (p.16). 
40 Roger Brown, ‘Schizophrenia, language, and reality’, American Psychology, 28 (1973) 395-403 
41 Part of what is meant by ‘impenetrable’ here is that it does not yield to explanation or interpretation as a 
sign of underlying verifiable neuro-biological disease. The linguistic signs of the aphasic can be ‘penetrated’ 
by a matching of speech act (signifier) onto a physical lesion (signified). In Peircean terms, the disorganized 
speech of the aphasic is an indexical sign of brain damage, whereas the disorganized speech of a 
schizophrenic is a symbolic sign, the signified (or object) of which is severed, absent, unfixed or hyper-
variable depending on the Interpretant. This conforms with the commensensical – if not especially informative 
– account of schizophrenic impenetrable signs as lacking any clear, socially acknowledged and reasonably 
consensually established meaning. 
42  Chaika (1974), p. 262 Chaika’s assertion here seems very unsafe. Rarely do people, deliberately and 
consciously, at least outside academia, coin new words. When they do, this behaviour is striking – if not 
‘bizarre’ – whether they gloss or not. 
43  Elaine Chaika, Understanding Psychotic Speech: Beyond Freud and Chomsky (Springfield: Charles G Thomas, 
1990), p.6 
44  Subsequently, Chaika returned to using the term ‘schizophrenic speech.’ Elaine Chaika, Linguistics, 
Pragmatics and Psychotherapy: A Guide for Therapists (London: Whurr, 2000) 
45 Chaika, Understanding Psychotic Speech, pp.51-52 
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instances of language do not signify a ‘bizarre’, deviant or pathological psychology. Rather, they 
signify universal truths – as in states of affairs – about all human speech: 
If the characteristic features singled out by Chaika are unique, then they are unique to the class of 
human speakers. This is not to deny the existence of schizophrenia, but merely to point out that the 
examples of schizophrenic speech do not show such speech to differ wildly from that of 
nonschizophrenics.46 
 
This opens up a greater question then left unaddressed by Fromkin. Rather than asking what 
linguistics and the collective knowledge of language can do to explain these impenetrable linguistic 
signs of schizophrenia, it is possible to ask: what can these impenetrable linguistic signs of 
schizophrenia do to explain linguistics and language? 
 What exactly is the impenetrable sign, and can its properties be described? Consider the 
Calibene from Foucault’s extensive ‘dossier’47 on a murder in rural Normandy in the early 19th 
century. To summarise the case, a young man, Pierre Rivière, murdered his mother, brother and 
sister, and exhibits various behaviours that those interested in retrospective diagnosing could use to 
support a diagnosis of schizophrenia. These include: disorganized speech; poverty of speech; 
disorganized behaviour; flattened and inappropriate affect; paranoia; religiosity not (wholly) 
culturally appropriate; grandiose delusions (especially about the significance of his murders); 
delusional suicidal ideation (he finally cuts his own throat, convinced that he is already dead). 
Amongst the various testimonials and legal papers compiled by Foucault, Rivière is described by 
one witness as burying and then exhuming an ‘instrument’: 
For nearly two years, Rivière worked in his loft, using a knife and some small tools he got from the 
neighbours and some pieces of wood whose use one could not guess at; however my children told 
me that it was a little like a gun; Rivière named this instrument “Calibine.”48 
 
In terms of a signified, the sign is apparently empty. The account drips mystery, and the riddle is 
wrapped tight in an enigma given the doubled lack of signified: not only does the instrument lack 
meaning but the tool used to construct it has a use that not only is not known but cannot even be 
guessed at. More confusingly, it is not clear whether these inexplicable ‘pieces of wood’ are the 
same as the instrument being crafted. If so, this may prove a valuable property of the impenetrable 
sign: it is a sign that constructs itself. The account continues: ‘[h]e went one day, followed by the 
village children, and buried it in a meadow. Two or three months later he went, again followed by 
children, and dug it up again.’49 Another valuable property: the impenetrable sign survives death.50 
Rivière’s own description of the instrument in his confessional memoirs – written 
paradoxically to both explain and to damn him – is strikingly different. Here the ‘calibene’ is a 
restless indeterminate product of transcendental imagination:  
I also wanted to distinguish myself by making completely new instruments, I wanted them to be 
created in my imagination. I resolved first to make a tool to kill birds such as had never before been 
                                                
46 Fromkin (1975), p.503 
47 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, p.x 
48 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, p.31 
49 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, p.31 
50 This return is most probably disbarred from being Freudian by virtue of being literal. 
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seen, I named it “calibene,” I worked on it for a long time on Sundays and in the evening, and 
finding that it did not succeed as I had expected, I went and buried it in a meadow and later I dug it 
up again and it is still on the floor in one of the houses. I had also resolved to make an instrument 
to churn butter all by itself and a carriage to go all by itself with springs, which I wanted to produce 
only in my imagination.51 
 
The instability on one side of the sign infects the other; the signifier wavers between Calibine and 
calibene. The impenetrable sign appears simultaneously as incontrovertible evidence (though of 
what?) and inconvenient alibi. Philippe Riot notes that the impenetrable sign is unruly in its wild 
significations. It will not kowtow to the sanctioned discourse and so must be excised by those who 
fear the repercussions of its equivocal and unreliable generative powers: 
The “calibene,” … disappeared from the bill of indictment; the reason is that in Rivière’s memoir 
the “calibene” is mentioned alongside “an instrument to churn butter all by itself and a carriage to 
go all by itself with springs, which I wanted to produce only in my imagination” (p.103). What 
emerges from this conjunction is not the cruelty of Rivière’s ideas, but their “bizarre character”;52 
 
The sign of culpability exculpates. Exhibit A for the prosecution is also the cornerstone in the case 
for the defence. The calibene is meant to function as a clear sign of Rivière’s murderous nature, but 
it operates – simultaneously and contradictorily – as a sign of his madness; similarly, his enigmatic 
and ambiguous confessional account was proposed by the prosecutors as a means of indicating his 
guilt, but serves also as his mitigation. Both the calibene and the account – mysterious and 
indefinable – operate as impenetrable signs without fixed meaning. As discussed earlier with 
reference to the Breivik case, the schizophrenic sign exhibits high re-purposiveness: as a mark of 
guilt, it exonerates as it condemns. 
 The impenetrable sign disappears and returns at the same time, as the Cheshire cat’s grin, 
that ‘most curious thing,’53 is sign of both presence and absence (whether that be of a cat, of 
meaning or of sanity). In this, the impenetrable sign has the quality of residue. The 
Calibine/calibene is raised throughout the legal documents relating to Pierre Rivière as a clear 
indicator of either his mental ill health or his murderous, cruel nature. In Chaika’s terms, whilst the 
Calibine/calibene may be impossible to paraphrase, it is remarkably easy to re-purpose. Enigmatic 
and endlessly reinterpretable, it is the ideal emblem of Rivière’s act. Yet it also occludes and is 
occluded by the act. The cat vanishes into its smile; Rivière vanishes into his calibene, which in turn 
vanishes into the act. Foucault analyses the instrument as emblematic of the function of the written 
memoir: 
The murder would rather appear to be a projectile concealed at first in the engine of a discourse 
which recoils and becomes unnecessary in the propulsion discharging it. We might well call this 
mechanism the mechanism of the “calibene”.54 
 
Foucault attests that the text/calibene is, by the time it is produced, unnecessary as the murder has 
already been actuated in reality. The mechanism becomes only commentary. 
                                                
51 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, p.103 
52 Philippe Riot, ‘The parallel lives of Pierre Rivière’, in I, Pierre Rivière, pp.229-250 (pp.241-2) 
53 Carroll, Alice, p.90 
54 Foucault, I, Pierre Rivière, pp.202-3 
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 Impenetrable signs will then yield to a determined reading. Foucault vanishes the calibene. 
Humpty Dumpty wields definitional strength – ‘[w]hen I use a word … it means just what I choose 
it to mean – neither more nor less’55 – to destroy the untranslatable hardness56 of the Jabberwocky. 
In his hard reading of one patient’s text,57 Bleuler resembles no one so closely as Humpty Dumpty, 
proceeding through a blend of assumptions, assertions and even occasional admissions of 
uncertainty: ‘“139 waiting-years,” is not at all clear’;58 ‘“mome” I’m not certain about that.’59 
 This comprises a crude summary of clinical responses to the impenetrable signs of 
schizophrenia: extirpate or re-inscribe. This chapter will present a different reading strategy, 
drawing on the semiological implications of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, and the especially his 
collaborative ‘assemblages’60 with Felix Guattari. These impenetrable signs operate as ‘absurd, or … 
impossible objects’61 as described by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense (1969). As Deleuze observes: ‘[t]heir 
denotation … cannot at all be fulfilled; nor do they have a signification, which would define the 
type of possibility for such a fulfilment. They are without signification, that is, they are absurd.’62 
Reading impenetrable signs requires respecting their autonomous absurdity as a positive presence. 
Deleuze is keen to stress that absurdity is not an absence of sense, but rather a form of sense that 
does not operate within the bounds of denotation and signification. It is very important here to 
describe Delueze’s ‘circle of the proposition’ developed from Stoic philosophy and employed 
throughout The Logic of Sense, and which will inform the argument of this chapter.63 Delueze posits 
this circle joining ‘three dimensions’ 64  of denotation, manifestation and signification, and has 
particular, semi-technical definitions for each. For the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to 
loosely approximate denotation with a form of pure reference, concerned with truth statements 
about reality, and roughly equivalent to – but not strictly isomorphic with – Peircean indexical and 
iconic signs. Contrastingly, Deleuze’s signification is conceptual meaning and connotation. A far 
broader church than denotation, it comprises the ground and conditions for truth statements, and 
– again – stands roughly equivalent to Saussure’s sign, a foundation stone of meaning. 
Manifestation, more simply, is the inter-personal instance of communication or utterance. It is the 
narrative self or the voice that speaks, and maps imprecisely onto the concept of deixis in this 
thesis. But for Deleuze, these dimensions are insufficient without a fourth a priori dimension: 
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56 ‘[T]here are plenty of hard words there’ Carroll, Alice, p.276; ‘Who’s been repeating all that hard stuff to 
you?’ Carroll, Alice, p.278 
57 Bleuler, pp.154-155 
58 Bleuler, p.155 
59 Carroll, Alice, p.278 
60 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi 
(London: Continuum, 2004) [1980] p.4 
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(London: Continuum, 2004) [1969] p.41 
62 Deleuze Logic of Sense, p.41 
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‘sense, the expressed of the proposition […] an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the 
surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition.’65 So it is that this thesis 
can talk of impenetrable signs with incommunicable and undecipherable meaning, imperceptible 
and intangible interlocutors, implausible and irrational reference and yet being imbued with sense. 
 Before embarking on this reading, a word of warning. Postmodernist rhetoric can be 
beguiling in its showy vacuity and runs the risk of having all the insubstantial quasi-illuminative 
potency of a firework display. Catherine Prendergast in a 2008 article sharply critiques Deleuze and 
Guattari (as well as Lacan and Jameson) for being seduced by the ‘rhetorical exceptionalism of 
schizophrenics’66 and calls for an analysis that will ‘rescue schizophrenia from these metaphoric 
entrapments.’67 This chapter intends to provide that very rescue. 
  
                                                
65 Deleuze Logic of Sense, p.22 
66  Catherine Prendergast, ‘The unexceptional schizophrenic: a post-postmodern introduction’, Journal of 
Literary Disability, 2:1 (2008) 55-62, p.57 
67 Prendergast, p.58 
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Schizophrenese; a semiotic of self-expression 
‘I’m was a Catholic Church annulment’68 
 
‘Structurally deviant speech is a symptom in and of itself and, as such, must be analysed in its own 
right.’69 
 
Coined in Robbins (1963),70 schizophasia is a term of variable currency to ‘refer to the language 
systems of schizophrenics.’71 The suffix is derived from the Greek for speech, and so the word 
perhaps more closely means ‘schizophrenic speech’ rather than ‘language systems’. Given that it is a 
central aim of this thesis to construct a semiological sign system of schizophrenia, and a central 
contention that this system rests on a conception of schizophrenia (in all its sign manifestations) 
that is analysed as an independent langue – with its own grammar and vocabulary – rather than a 
deviant parole related to another, non-pathological langue, the term ‘schizophasia’ is unsuited to this 
verbal semiotic. 72  Instead, the term ‘schizophrenese’ will be used for three highly appropriate 
reasons. First, the suffix ‘–ese’ is most commonly used to denote languages rather than speech acts. 
Secondly, these language titles are also homonymously titles for discrete populations defined by 
one, all or some combination of geography, culture, political state or ethnicity. Thirdly, 
‘schizophrenese’ is a neologism, with more than a hint of anarchic, satirical comedy. These reasons 
combine to form a pleasing aesthetic effect, as schizophrenese connotes both geopolitical authority 
and bathetic self-deprecation. 
The term is drawn – perhaps surprisingly – from Szasz’s A Lexicon of Lunacy (1993), where 
it is used with some derision to emphasize his oft-expressed article of faith that the mentally ill are 
malingers using unorthodox means to communicate their inability or unwillingness to engage in 
(capitalist) productive life. Szasz mocks psychiatry’s wilful refusal to grant schizophrenese the same 
legitimacy the discipline (over-) enthusiastically grants its own ‘scientific-sounding’73  diagnostic 
lexicon: ‘psychiatrists regard the view that schizophrenese is a language like a foreign tongue, rather 
than the manifestation of a disease like delirium, as patently false.’74 Within semiotics, there again is 
no contradiction. Schizophrenese is a language comprising signs, organised within a grammar 
(which in turn is only a series of sign conventions). This definition holds true whether the signified 
content of the language delineates a pure biological disease entity or a complex and audacious act 
of shamming.  
Lecercle, in his 1990 monograph The Violence of Language, demonstrates the invalidity of 
Szasz’s distinction by his observation that ‘[t]here is always something grammatical about delirium, 
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there is always something delirious about language.’75 In this, Lecercle is building on his concept of 
délire, a Deleuzean concept of a manic, contagious ‘surfeit’ of meaning.76 For Lecercle, delirium is a 
form of relationship between a speaker and their text, and one in which the former is subordinate 
to the latter. Lecercle argues that all langues operate in a creative but threatening tension with 
excluded material, of which nonsense and psychotic texts are prime examples. This material 
Lecercle terms the ‘remainder’ and he defines it as follows: 
I shall no longer treat language as a scientific object, susceptible of a comprehensive description in 
terms of system and coherence, i.e. in terms of Saussure’s concept of langue. There is another side to 
language, one that escapes the linguist’s attention, not because of his temporary failure or failings, 
but for necessary reasons. This dark side emerges in nonsensical and poetic texts, in the 
illuminations of mystics the delirium of logophiliacs or mental patients. 
 
Lecercle arguably introduces unnecessary and unclear additional terminology and concepts. At 
times, he suggests that this ‘remainder’ – which he conflates with a Lacanian Lalangue and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s rhizome – is external and oppositional to the langue. At other stages, he appears to 
conceptualise the ‘remainder’ – on its Freudian return – as a now (and perhaps always?) 
internalised, innate force that gives the langue its constitutive power, in contrast to a sterile, stable 
Chomskyean coding competence: ‘Saussure’s langue is not a stable object, but a locus for the 
struggle of contradictory forces, a partial cosmos incessantly striving to emerge out of a 
fundamental chaos.’77 Accepting this dynamic quality of the langue enables this thesis to respect the 
spirit of Lecercle’s ‘reminder’ whilst jettisoning the term itself as unhelpful baggage. 
The source of this dynamism within langue is – as might be expected from a Marxist 
account – the agon of class struggle. As detailed in the introduction, Lecercle’s Marxist theory of 
language is a central influence of this thesis. This chapter adopts a similar philosophical, political 
position, but prefers to refer to a mechanism of (non)complicity between interlocutors rather than 
agon. This shall be seen throughout the current chapter. Language, unlike material capital and 
power, is not so pliant and predictable a weapon in class struggle, as Lecercle’s ‘remainder’ suggests. 
Its ambiguities and ellipses makes it unstable terrain for agon and forces speakers and listeners into 
sometimes unpredictable and unwanted relations of complicity or non-complicity with others, and 
even with themselves. The binarism implied by agon is unnecessarily restrictive. Language offers a 
rhizomatic struggle along multiple planes, with moments of complicity (or not) at each nodal point. 
Hence, complicity is the chosen term. 
 Indeed, Lecercle himself gives a good definition of what is meant by complicity when 
discussing the national identity myth of languages: ‘A language is now not a dialect equipped with 
an army […], but a dialect promoted to the status of a language because an imaginary community 
has decided to find its unity in it or base its unity on it.’ 78 It is this complicity that, as the next 
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 75 
section will argue, is frequently refused those termed ‘schizophrenic’ and this exclusion is 
constitutive of their language schizophrenese.  
 The linguistic analysis of psychotic speech is not a new endeavour, and a debate played out 
during the 1970s and 1980s between those who believed speech could be used reasonably to infer 
the state of a patient’s thought79 and those who disagreed. Academic and clinical interest in close 
readings of psychotic speech appears to have weakened over the past two decades. As theories of 
illness narrative have gained ground, and as people with psychosis have been increasingly more 
likely to find published self-expression as authors and memoirists rather than data within a study, 
there has been a noticeable shift from structural analyses of language towards theories of self and 
narrative. 80  Within language studies itself, the high structuralism of the mid-to-late twentieth 
century has given way to a renewed fascination with phenomenology. This might be understood in 
the twin contexts of the pendulum swings of academic fashion and a socio-cultural climate that 
increasingly prizes examinations of individual agency – epitomised in this field by personal stories 
of recovery – over universalising accounts of macro-structures. Added to this, the advancements in 
neuroimaging and neurochemistry have shifted attention from the structural linguistics of speech to 
the bio-mechanics. For many researchers, the form of speech is a matter of physical rather than 
textual anatomy. A further – but not final – element is the decreased incidence of psychotic speech 
due to two unrelated factors: the better identification of discrete organic brain illnesses previously 
presenting as schizophrenia, and more efficacious anti-psychotic medications. It may well be the 
case that research and diagnostic theory lags practice in this regard. Whilst schizophrenese might be 
interpreted as a diagnostic sign of underlying pathology in universities and academic journals, in 
clinics it is a sign of patient non-compliance with or the biochemical unsuitability of a specific 
medical regimen.  
 The systematic, 18-subtype account of schizophrenese developed by Andreasen has 
already been analysed in the previous section. What other taxonomies are worth examining? Chaika 
(1990) offers a comprehensive critical linguistic anatomy of ‘psychotic speech’, itemising the speech 
deviancies as: ‘gibberish; neologisms; opposite speech and other erroneous retrievals of words; 
glossomania; rhyme and alliteration inappropriate for the context; intrusive errors; word salad and 
other syntactic disruptions; perseveration and other repetitions.’81 This is surely more an anatomy 
                                                
79 Ilene Lanin-Kettering and Martin Harrow, ‘The thought behind the words: a view of schizophrenic speech 
and thinking disorders’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 11:1 (1985) 1-7 
80  For some examples of phenomenological analyses of schizophrenic life narratives, see A Pejlert, K 
Asplund and A Norberg, ‘Stories about living in a hospital ward as narrated by schizophrenic patients’, Journal 
of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 2 (1995) 269-277, Tracey Mould, Lindsay Oades and Trevor Crowe, 
‘The use of metaphor for understanding and managing psychotic experiences: a systematic review’, Journal of 
Mental Health, 19:3 (2010) 282-293. Such illness narratives are the subject of the next chapter. Ethnographies 
and other qualitative accounts focusing on service-users narratives of their experience and emotions have 
superseded the de-personalised, de-psychologised dissections of speech, for example John Aggergaard 
Larsen, ‘Understanding a complex intervention: person-centred ethnography in early psychosis’, Journal of 
Mental Health, 16:3 (2007) 333-345. 
81 Chaika, Understanding Psychotic Speech, p.7 
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of Chaika’s critical reading and its foundational assumptions (one might be tempted to say 
prejudices); Chaika’s analysis is underpinned by moral and aesthetic normative values that this 
thesis rejects. From the outset, Chaika – in rejecting the conceptual unity of disorganized speech 
and disorganized thought – cannot, logically, distinguish schizophrenense from other speech acts 
on the basis of underlying pathology or speaker intentionality (frustrated or realised). Formally, 
when speech is analysed in isolation from utility as measured against intentionality or thought, the 
analysis becomes a matter of aesthetic judgement. This is very apparent in Chaika’s distinction 
between poetic and schizophrenic language innovations: 
Witticisms, good prose, and artistic language in some way elucidate a message in a memorable or 
aesthetic manner. In contrast, schizophrenic “unusual” word choices rarely have any such 
relevance.82 
 
This demonstrates some obvious problems with a formal distinction based on aesthetics. By 
Chaika’s own admission, these are not two exclusive categories. That schizophrenic word choices 
‘rarely’ qualify the text as witty, ‘good’ or ‘artistic’ is surely another way of saying that on some 
occasions, they certainly do. As might be expected from an academic linguist, ‘witticisms, good 
prose, and artistic language’ are not seen as contestable terms deserving of qualifying speech marks 
in the way that ‘schizophrenic “unusual” word choices’ are. 
 As with most appeals to inviolable and absolute concepts – aesthetic-moral goodness in 
this case – Chaika’s argument is driven by an unexamined belief in a ‘natural’ linguistic order. It is 
only in relation to this good, natural order that something can be defined as ‘deviant’. Chaika 
manages to hold a position that simultaneously agrees with and contradicts that of Humpty 
Dumpty. Contra Deleuze, Chaika makes an essentialist distinction between Carroll’s nonsense – 
epitomised in the ‘Jabberwocky’ poem – and the psychotic utterances of the mentally ill: ‘the ability 
to produce this kind of nonsense is part of one’s natural linguistic ability.’83 However, Chaika adds 
that this naturalism is prescriptive, and that the community of speakers can intuitively distinguish 
when nonsense – as a product of natural linguistic ability – has over-expanded the meaning of 
words, and created speech that is unacceptable: 
One cannot take a word and use it to mean anything else. The hearer has to be able to expand the 
meaning of the word(s) used and it is part of our normal linguistic baggage both as speakers and 
understanders that we recognise when the extension has snapped.84 
 
Natural and normal are synonymous in Chaika’s analysis, naturally. 
 This philosophical model of language is not just an affront to Humpty Dumpty’s ‘glory’. 
Even the DSM-5 is circumspect about this level of linguistic totalitarian imperialism. Under its 
description of schizophrenia, the manual warns in relation to the criterion of ‘disorganized thinking 
(speech)’: ‘[t]he severity of the impairment may be difficult to evaluate if the person making the 
                                                
82 Chaika, Understanding Psychotic Speech, p.6 
83 Chaika, Understanding Psychotic Speech, p.58 
84 Chaika, Understanding Psychotic Speech, p.113 
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diagnosis comes from a different linguistic background than that of the person being examined.’85 
In a section entitled ‘Culture-related Diagnostic Issues’, the DSM-5 explicitly acknowledges that 
cultural relativism is a necessary diagnostic consideration: ‘the assessment of disorganized speech 
may be made more difficult by linguistic variation in narrative styles across cultures. […] If the 
assessment is conducted in a language that is different from the individual’s primary language, care 
must be taken to ensure that alogia is not related to linguistic barriers.’86 Socio-historic barriers to 
inter-personal communication cannot be pathological signs, and no language (langue) and no speech 
act (parole) operates outside a socio-historic context nor – if recorded or observed, directly or 
indirectly – without an extent of inter-personal communication (successful or not; intentional or 
not).87 
 Rochester and Martin (1979) explicitly implicate the listener in any discourse failure, and 
identify the characterisation of schizophrenese as incomprehensible as being a dialogic product of 
an attempted exchange between listener and speaker, and not a transcendental and innate quality of 
the speaker’s speech: ‘to make a statement about incoherent discourse is really just to make a 
statement about one’s own confusion as a listener.’88 The DSM-5’s caveat is an attempt to parse 
schizophrenese, separating contextual incoherence from inherent incoherence. However, in 
Rochester and Martin’s analysis, it is precisely at this contextual and pragmatic level – rather than at 
a syntactic or lexical level – that schizophrenese89 differs from the language of the clinician or 
researcher: ‘the distinction between TD [thought disordered person with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia] and other speakers is at a highly developed level of language use – and not at the 
level of word salad or neologisms or speech blocking.’90 To extract from this a principle of the 
semiotic of schizophrenese: schizophrenese is a langue that, when incoherent to non-schizophrenese 
listeners at the level of discourse, retroactively makes its lower-level linguistic components into 
impenetrable signs.  
In this feature, schizophrenese operates in exactly the opposite way to all other langues, 
when unknown by the listener. If someone with no knowledge of Mandarin encounters Mandarin 
text, the basic linguistic components – phonemes and morphemes – are impenetrable without a 
change in the listener’s language competency. Syntactical structures – clauses and sentences – are 
then impenetrable because of the impenetrability of the phonemes and morphemes. Indeed, the 
listener may not be able to even identify phonemes, morphemes, clauses or sentences from 
                                                
85 DSM-5, p.88 
86 DSM-5, p.103 
87 Indeed, adopting a dialogic model of the self and Vygotskyan conception of verbal thought as, in part, an 
internalization of external, inter-personal speech, it follows that thought as inner speech is intra-personal 
communication with strong similarities to inter-personal communication. 
88 Rochester and Martin, p.3 
89 Of course, Rochester and Martin do not use these terms. They identify three linguistic communities: 
thought disordered schizophrenics, non-thought disordered schizophrenics and normal (i.e. people without a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia). They adopt ‘thought disordered’ as a terminological convenience, rather than an 
article of aetiological faith. 
90 Rochester and Martin, p.173 
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amongst a mass of phonetic data (or visual data if reading). Something similar – though more 
limited in effect – occurs in schizophrenese when the speaker uses neologisms. This familiar model 
of textual (im)penetrability can be characterised as positive, constructive, bi-directionally linear and 
accumulative. In other words, some knowledge of the phonemes and morphemes will enable the 
listener to decode (at least partially) the clauses and sentences. A knowledge of the grammar, can – 
by the same linear movement but in the opposite direction, hence bi-directional linearity – enable 
the listener to decode (at least partially) the phonemes and morphemes. Additionally, paralinguistic 
features, such as context or supplementary non-verbal signs, will support decoding. Always, the 
langue’s penetrability is positive, constructive and accumulative; more knowledge (at whichever 
linguistic or paralinguistic level) will – with the obvious, partial exceptions of homonyms in all their 
forms – lead to greater penetrability. Accepting this, it is then possible to describe schizophrenese 
as being negative, deconstructive, non-linear and dissipative in terms of textual penetrability. Here 
then is a more rigorous, semio-linguistic account of Bleuler’s loosened associations. 
Rochester and Martin reference semiotician Winfried Nöth’s account of ‘the illusion of 
coherent discourse’91 generated by the speaker of schizophrenese. In Nöth’s analysis, coherence is 
threatened at the level of ‘the more extended semantics of the clause, sentence, or discourse unit’92 
(to use Nöth’s terms) and therefore the speaker performs compensatory cohesive manoeuvres ‘on 
the basis of lexicogrammatical forms; and then […] on the basis of intimation contours or 
rhymes’ 93  (to use Rochester and Martin’s). Nöth notes that paradigmatic, homophonic and 
paraphonic associations are used as substitutive linking devices where syntagmatic and semantic 
associations are expected: 
These [linking devices] include paradigmatic associations in which words are related in terms of their 
lexical meanings but do not follow syntactically, homophone associations (e.g., meat and meet) in which 
textual coherence is simulated through similar sounds but does not occur at the level of meaning, 
and paraphone associations in which phonetically similar words are used in adjacent clauses/phrases 
(e.g., I was a glass bowl / I didn’t say grass in the hole either/).94 
 
This can be summarised very simply using Saussure’s two axes of association: schizophrenese 
involves moves along the paradigmatic access when moves along the syntagmatic access are 
expected. 
How does this principle assist in listening to schizophrenese? The quotation at the start of 
this section – ‘I’m was a Catholic Church annulment’ 95  – was taken from Herbert and 
Waltensperger’s three-year study of the spoken and written narrative texts of a person with a DSM-
II diagnosis of chronic schizophrenia, paranoid type. The only commentary Hebert and 
Waltensperger provide on the sentence is that it is one of several examples of ‘another agrammatic 
                                                
91  Winfried Nöth, ‘Disturbances of associations in schizophrenia’, Orbis, 26:2 (1978) 163-187 quoted in 
Rochester and Martin, p.179 
92 Nöth in Rochester and Martin, p.179 
93 Rochester and Martin, p.178 
94 Nöth in Rochester and Martin, p.180 
95 Herbert and Waltensperger, p.86 
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type, that is a noncoordination of appropriate verbal elements.’96 They diagnostically read this as a 
pathological ‘reanalysis of I’m as a first person singular pronominal subject marker’ which is 
indicative of the speaker’s tendency to be ‘extremely egocentric.’97 Despite including it within the 
quotation, they make no comment about the final three words – ‘Catholic Church annulment’ – 
presumably more because it does not fit with the diagnosis they were providing than because they 
consider it ‘normal’ speech.  
A series of paradigmatic associations are taking place when a listener might expect a 
syntagmatic association. The first example is the most obvious: ‘am’ is followed by ‘was.’ Here are 
two alternatives along the paradigmatic axis appearing as a syntagmatic step. It is easy to dismiss 
this as a typical verbal slip, yet it forms the first of a series, although it is the only absolute 
exchange. There is a clear syntagmatic association between ‘a’ and ‘Catholic’ and again between 
‘Catholic’ and ‘Church.’ However, within the context of the larger semantic unit, this demonstrates 
a bias or drift along the paradigmatic axis: substituting ‘Catholic’ for ‘Catholic Church.’ Again, the 
link between ‘Catholic Church’ and ‘annulment’ is not purely syntagmatic nor a direct movement 
along the paradigmatic axis. A ‘Catholic Church annulment’ is an identifiable semantic unit of 
English, with a clear literal meaning. It does not seem unreasonable to identify a further 
paradigmatic drift here, provisionally at least, with ‘Catholic Church annulment’ operating as a 
metaphorical emphasis of the fact that the subject ‘was’ and therefore is no longer a Catholic. 
Rather than egocentricity, the message might be decoded as anxious ambivalence about the 
possibility of renouncing Catholicism (‘I’m was a Catholic’) and a compulsive, reiterative attempt at 
reconciling this with the emphatic aesthetic strength of ‘Catholic Church annulment.’ The sentence 
could then be plotted across the two axes of language as in figure 2.1. 
 
                                                
96 Herbert and Waltensperger, p.85 
97 Herbert and Waltensperger, p.86 
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 A similar method of analysing schizophrenese is applied in Rosenbaum and Sonne’s 
Lacanian psycholinguistic monograph, The Language of Psychosis, published in Danish in 1979, the 
same year as Rochester and Martin (though not appearing in English until 1986). Rosenbaum and 
Sonne identify a bias along the syntagmatic axis, implicitly building on a dichotomy established by 
Roman Jakobson, which characterises the syntagmatic axis as metonymic in contrast to the 
metaphoric paradigmatic axis. Jakobson summarises his influential polarity in this way: 
The development of a discourse may take place along two different semantic lines: one topic may 
lead to another either through their similarity or their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the 
most appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second …98 
 
Jakobson’s expansion of Saussure’s syntagmatic and paradigmatic polarity is developed through an 
analysis of two separate aphasic disorders: the similarity disorder and the contiguity disorder.99 This 
distinction echoed earlier neurological investigations that divided aphasia into the Wernicke-type 
aphasia and the Broca-type aphasia, named for the areas of the brain affected. Jakobson’s account 
of aphasia links the neurological, linguistic and clinical modes of understanding the two aphasias. In 
                                                
98 Roman Jakobson, ‘Two aspects of language and two types of aphasic disturbances,’ in On Language, ed. by 
Linda Waugh and Monique Monville-Burston (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) 115-133, p.129 
Jakobson went even further in his attempts to map neuro-anatomy and linguistics in his final monograph, 
Brain and Language: Cerebral Hemispheres and Linguistic Structure in Mutual Light (Colombus: Slavica Publishers, 
1980) written with Kathy Santilli. 
99 Jakobson (1995) As noted earlier (see footnote 11), with reference to Mackenzie (2000), clinical linguistics 
was born from – and remained dominated by – aphasiology. 
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this structure, Wernicke’s area (neuro-anatomic object), a paradigmatic axis deficit (linguistic 
theory) and problems selecting words (clinical symptom) are all grouped as different manifestations 
or ways of formulating the same aphasia; Broca’s area, a syntagmatic axis deficit and problems 
combining words comprise the other. Although there is some on-going academic debate about this 
model of the aphasias, Jakobson’s work remains foundational and pertinent. 100  However, for 
Jakobson it is neither an aphasia of metaphor nor an aphasia of metonymy that characterises 
schizophrenese, but ‘an abandonment of deixis,’ which he identifies in the poetry and reported 
speech of Hölderlin.101 
 Rosenbaum and Sonne also characterise schizophrenese as being in a deictic crisis, which 
then sends the speech into a free fall along the metonymic axis: 
The speech becomes metonymically substitutive […] metonymies abound; they are both semantic and 
syntactical in nature; and they play on a number of linguistic paradigms (such as numerical order, 
morphological endings, and so on).102 
 
Here, then, is a syntagmatic bias to counterbalance the paradigmatic balance already identified. 
Rosenbaum and Sonne argue that the deictic grounding of the schizophrenic is obliterated: 
The various kinds of deictic failure in language is what we here describe as the breakdown of the 
boundaries between discourse and enunciation. When this occurs the times, places, persons, and 
circumstances of the enunciation become diffuse, unstable and replaceable entities.103 
 
The proliferation of chains of signifiers constructed according to ‘metonymic slidings that 
characterize the whole form and appearance of schizophrenia,’ 104  is then a re-constitutive, 
reparative strategy to re-establish a deictic stability and re-ground the schizophrenic, through the re-
planting of the enunciation matrix of I/you/here/now, in the symbolic order. 
 The Lacanian metaphysics accounting for the underlying pathological mechanisms are 
highly disputable, but Rosenbaum and Sonne provide plenty of clinical evidence – from transcribed 
interviews with schizophrenics – to support their assertions about the instability of the first, second 
and third persons within schizophrenese, and the relationship between this instability and the 
impossibility of the speaker and listener locating themselves in a shared space-time. Rochester and 
Martin notice something similar in speakers who are unable to establish referential chains 
throughout their speech, and that the ‘[r]epetition of nominal groups […] means that the original 
                                                
100 For example, see a recent discussion in Aphasiology 24:3 (2010) 363-394, comprising a lead paper by 
Alfredo Ardila (‘A proposed reinterpretation and reclassification of aphasic syndromes’), three commentaries 
by Hugh Buckingham, Andrew Kertesz and Jane Marshall, and a final response from Ardila. All four note 
that developments in neurology – specifically improvements in functional imaging technology – have made 
earlier naïve mappings of linguistic symptoms on to neuro-anatomy highly contestable. This observation 
coheres with conclusions put forward in this chapter regarding the neurological characterizing of 
schizophrenese. 
101 Roman Jakobson and Grete Lübbe-Grothues, ‘The language of schizophrenia: Hölderlin’s speech and 
poetry’, in Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal Time, ed. by Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1985) pp.133-140 (p.139) 
102 Bent Rosenbaum and Harly Sonne, The Language of Psychosis (New York: New York University Press, 
1986), pp.64-65 
103 Rosenbaum and Sonne, p.52 
104 Rosenbaum and Sonne, p.83 
 82 
presentation of a participant is not followed by a phoric group that refers back to it …’ 105 
Syntagmatic bias has forced out the metaphoric identification essential for establishing a consistent 
self through the space-time of the text, and also of the context. To clarify, schizophrenese – in 
these instances cited – keeps the grammatical identity of nominal groups (be they first, second or 
third person) instable. The phoric referential link between occurrences of the nominal is severed, so 
each appearance is ‘as new.’ Rosenbaum and Sonne identify a speaker who puns on you/they – 
which are phonically indistinguishable in Danish, De/de – destroying the deictic stability of the 
speech. Rather than engage in their subsequent metaphysical wonderings about things that by 
definition are unknowable, such as the (dis)integrative state of a person’s unconscious, it is 
sufficient for this thesis to note that this disruptive, anti-deictic force is present within the Danish 
language itself, specifically the pun on De/de. 106  Language provides the material of its own 
disintegration. Could it be that the existential deictic uncertainty inherent in being a human subject 
has encoded itself in language, as a social product, and that this uncertainty is then dialectically re-
inscribed in the interlocutory subjects that language produces? 
 Modelling the syntagmatic bias is difficult, not least as Rosenbaum and Sonne’s interviews 
are English translations of Danish originals, and the muddying of the linguistic waters when 
moving between two languages is sufficiently obvious for the DSM-5 authors to have noticed it, as 
observed earlier. In their own modelling, Rosenbaum and Sonne note the extended runs along the 
numerical and geographical syntagms in the following speech: 
[T]he state has done very good work, they have discovered the hundred thousand million times 
million three hundred things on the bottom of the Silkeborg Lakes, in the Zealand Lakes and the 
North Sea, and up in the rainbow, they had looked up into the clouds […] down in, down in caves 
[…] under Øster Søgade there they have beated three hundred, eight, eight thousand, um, three 
hundred things, or one hundred, three hundred things down with sexual … big sexual organs …107 
 
This is modelled in figure 2.2 below. It is notable that the syntagmatic bias is so great that no 
significant progress can be made along the syntagmatic chain of the text itself; syntax turns vertical. 
                                                
105 Rochester and Martin, p.181 
106 This is Crapanzano’s ‘interlocutory collapse’ but as a nascent quality of the language, there to be adopted 
by the linguistic subject. This is only half the story, of course. The linguistic subject is – as a matter of this 
thesis’ ideological position – subjectivated by language, rather than some free individual prior to or outside 
language. So, the possibility within language for this ‘interlocutory collapse’, this deictic shock or – more 
plainly – this pun, is the creative constraint or expressive shortcoming (indicative of and formed by socio-
historical conditions) that brings this subject into being, and defines those ‘psychological’ states it can have 
(for there is no having without expressing, for the speaking subject). Crapanzano describes ‘interlocutory 
collapse’ as ‘a dramatic shrinkage of the pragmatically constituted distance between interlocutors that 
precludes any creatively responsive interlocution. It occurs when an addresser so identifies with an addressee, 
or vice versa, that they become one.’ Interlocutory collapse is, very clearly, already a coded presence, a threat, 
within the Danish pronoun De/de, and one which parole can combat with some success through pragmatics 
(and the materiality of context) but that langue has no defence against except for futile rules of grammar. 
Crapanzano, p.747 
107 Rosenbaum and Sonne, p.80 
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It might be that the syntagmatic bias, which sees the text rocketing up and down number 
scales, soaring into clouds and then plunging to subterranean depths, demonstrates a metonymising 
of some very simple metaphors. It would not be particularly taxing on the imagination to offer a re-
inscriptive interpretation of these emphatic, accumulative, up and down motions, and expansions 
and contractions of size resolving on ‘big sexual organs.’ However, the separation between the 
present thesis (as listener) and the schizophrenic speaker is so great and so varied – comprising 
three decades, two languages, two countries – and the text so partial and mediated, that any 
interpretive reading would be barely less reductive and fictive than this parodic Freudian reading. In 
the next two sections, this thesis will examine recent examples of schizophrenese elicited 
specifically for this analysis.108 
 Before turning to this analysis, it is necessary to mention Janusz Wróbel’s Language and 
Schizophrenia (1990). Wróbel describes his semiotic account of schizophrenic language as building 
on the work of Anna Gruszecka who ‘states that the misunderstanding with the schizophrenic 
comes not from a malfunction of the common language in schizophrenia, but from the different 
function of the linguistic system in schizophrenia.’ 109  The analysis of (all) components of the 
                                                
108 Interviews were conducted through the community mental health teams under the Leeds and Yorks 
Partnership Foundation Trust (LYPFT), and at a survivor-led crisis centre in Leeds. Additionally, transcripts 
from interviews conducted by the University of Birmingham have been incorporated with permission. For a 
full acknowledgement, see the opening notes to this thesis.  
109 Janusz Wróbel, Language and Schizophrenia (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1990), p.12 
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schizophrenic semiological sign system as an independent langue – distinct and separate semiotically 
from semiological sign systems of the non-schizophrenic – is an overriding ambition of this thesis. 
This chapter is concerned with mapping, modelling and inferring applicable conclusions from the 
linguistic system, as independent langue, here termed schizophrenese. Wróbel’s monograph 
represents the only other comprehensive attempt at this second process, and requires some 
analysis. 
 Wróbel builds on the conceptualisations of deictic destabilization in Rosenbaum and 
Sonne, and Rochester and Martin, and also concludes that this is at the base of the distinctive 
schizophrenic langue: 
The schizophrenic split of mind manifests itself in language by the destabilization of the main 
element (I) of the primary elements of reference. This causes the destabilization of the remaining 
elements (here, now). The identification of the primary elements of reference of the deictical level (I) 
with the secondary elements of reference (he) (I = HE) provokes the translocation of the remaining 
elements of reference. Instead of the state HERE – there, NOW – before or after, there is a situation in 
which HERE = THERE, and NOW = BEFORE and AFTER. 
[…] 
The exposure of the sender (I) causes the expressive function to come to the foreground in the 
schizophrenics’ utterances; it is not subordinated to the referential function and even hinders the 
latter’s realization.110 
 
As with Rosenbaum and Sonne before him, Wróbel makes an (unhelpful) appeal to metaphysics 
for the prime mover of the conceptual shift that results in the creation of schizophrenese. Instead 
of Lacanian theory, for Wróbel this transcendental is a phenomenological big bang, which he terms 
‘schizophrenic illumination.’111 Wróbel employs a triadic structure of an external reality (Re), an 
internal conceptual world (Se) and language (Sa), which relates clearly to both Lacan’s triad of the 
real, the imaginary and the symbolic, and the Peircean triad of Object, Interpretant and 
Representamen.112 (Additionally, there is some conceptual overlap between Wróbel’s Se and Sa and 
Saussure’s signified and signifier.)  
Wróbel contends that after schizophrenic illumination, the schizophrenic has a de-
conventionalised relationship with reality, free from the accumulated socialised associations and 
rituals of the wider community. This is not a change in reality itself, but in the conceptual world 
(Se) erected by the self to mediate the reality (Re). When the schizophrenic reapplies this – altered – 
conceptual world (Se) to reality (Re), it generates an altered reality (Re I) for the schizophrenic. 
Simultaneously and conversely, the obscured and supplanted external reality (Re) is internalised by 
the schizophrenic and experienced as a hostile and alien new conceptual world (Se I). Gradually, 
the schizophrenic develops a new language that more accurately expresses the novel 
phenomenological experience of the schizophrenic (this langue exhibiting all the features discussed 
so far in this chapter in relation to schizophrenese). Finally, ‘the characteristic, conventional 
                                                
110 Wróbel, p.40 
111 Wróbel, p.107 
112 Peirce, ‘Logic as semiotic’, p.99 
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relationship between Sa and Re disappears. The sign becomes the reality, and the expressed word is 
materialized (Sa is identified with Re I).’113 
There are two comments to make about Wróbel’s account relating to its (relatively implicit) 
causal model. Firstly, it does not seem necessary – when so many people labelled as schizophrenic 
in the UK are chronically impoverished, un(der)employed, members of marginalised ethnicities, 
habitual users of cannabis, victims of (sexual) trauma, or some blend of these – to posit some 
mystical ‘schizophrenic split of mind’ as the aetiological point of departure. Why scratch around for 
unproven intangible causes when there is an abundance, almost an embarrassment, of material 
candidates to hand? To counter-posit that the schizophrenic split begins in the social locus rather 
than the neurological or phenomenological locus, thereby precipitating the deictic crisis, has the 
one key advantage that it is empirically verifiable that the social split occurs.114 Second, this thesis is 
highly sceptical of any account that introduces a transcendental deus ex machina, rather than an 
explanation (or motivating mechanism) that can be logically inferred (if not precisely proven) from 
a rigorous semiotic modelling of the object verifiably available for study. This object, as these two 
sections have striven to demonstrate, is schizophrenese texts, and not any pre-supposed 
transcendental, be it neo-Kraepelinean ‘thought disorder,’ the Lacanian Unconscious or 
‘schizophrenic illumination.’ In studying these texts, this thesis will avoid any attempts to categorize 
as deviant, peculiar or regressive material that is surely better understood as (self) expressive.  
  
                                                
113 Wróbel, p.115. This paragraph is a tight summary of Wróbel pp.107-115. 
114 Granted, it could be argued that the social split may be wholly a product of the manifestations of the 
schizophrenic pathology. Obviously, psychosis negatively impacts a person’s socio-economic orientation. 
But, this thesis argues that the so-called ‘schizophrenic split of mind’ is a response to a deictic crisis whose 
origins are social and material. Of course, the infinite regress continues with a counter-theory that there is a 
‘schizophrenic’ innate, biochemical susceptibility to translating a socio-economic split into a psychological 
one. And from there, one again counters that any susceptibility might be slowly acquired through experience 
or have an epigenetic source, or both. And ‘off it goes on’. If origins are arbitrary, then this thesis chooses 
one for the deictic crisis that is, if not incontrovertibly accurate, observably real: the social rupture. (Samuel 
Beckett, The Unnamable, in Trilogy (London: Calder Publications, 1994), p.293. The quotation is appropriate to 
describe the aetiological history of ‘schizophrenia’ which, like the voice of Beckett’s deconstructed narrator, 
offers up a text that is ‘[r]uminative, madly undoing each clause as it lurches forward’. Ian Miller and Kay 
Souter, Beckett and Bion: The (Im)Patient Voice in Psychotherapy and Literature (London: Karnac Books, 2013), 
p.192) 
 86 
A new model of communication as compromise and complicity; when codes collide 
/if snow is made with peanut butter then dogs are animals/ […] One laughs because even though 
one realizes that the situation is unthinkable, one understands the meaning of the sentence. One 
feels fear because, even though one realises that the situation is possible, one does not like to accept 
such an alarming semantic organization of one’s experience. The sentence appears to be ridiculously 
or tragically meaningful insofar as its meaning conflicts with the meaning-rules we possess. Its 
meaning is unacceptable not because it is incomprehensible but because – if so accepted – it implies 
the restructurization of our codes.115 
 
David never told anyone about the code, which first entered his awareness at the conference. In his 
perceptions, feelings, and thoughts, the code gradually influenced everything except for the use of 
words per se - influenced telepathy, facial expressions, gestures, postures, and intensity, pitch, rate, 
rhythm, and pauses of speech … Eventually, all aspects of his life came to be influenced by the 
code. Ordinarily unimportant information from external reality took on new dimensions for him.116 
 
How does language speak? Like schizophrenia, language is treated as if understood. Language is 
idealised into a stable, observable, rule-bound and rational entity, in much the way the diagnostic 
diktats of the DSM and other psychiatric nosologies attempt to do with schizophrenia. 117 
Communication, as the word demonstrates, hinges on a process of sharing. Interlocutors share 
context and code, which in turn facilitates the exchange of discrete bundles of meaning or 
signification. It is a specific instance of sharing dependent on an established environment of 
sharing. Schizophrenics, and schizophrense, are outside this mutuality. The method of crossing 
between these bounded zones of mutuality, these linguistic communes, is translation: the 
transmuting of a message from one code to another. How, then, to translate between 
schizophrenese and other langues? Roberta Payne, a person with lived experience of schizophrenia 
who has made a career of studying and teaching literature in European languages, conceptualises 
schizophrenia as ‘a disease of translation’118 and her articulation of the (im)possibility of using 
words, as the only tools available, to translate untranslatable experiences across an ineffable divide 
in signification and reference poses a standing challenge to linguistics: how can communication 
bridge this gap? Payne proposes metaphor as mechanism, though is ambivalent about its chances 
of success: ‘(Being in a whirlwind is not a very good metaphor for that experience, but I have 
trouble finding words to describe it.)’119 Metaphors are not precision instruments. They impart 
something closer to Deleuzean ‘sense’ than any rigidly fixed meaning. 
                                                
115 Eco, p.64 
116 David Zelt, ‘First Person Account: The Messiah Quest’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 7:3 (1981) 527-531, p.530 
117  As social constructionist critiques of psychiatry’s nosological drive to ‘fix’ schizophrenia tell of a 
motivating professional self-interest – mental illness’ existence justifies the mental health industry – so 
Deleuze and Guattari observe that idealizing language into structural invariants ‘is what allows linguistics to 
claim a basis in pure scientificity, to be nothing but science.’ As argued in the previous chapter, just because 
the spectra of experiences encompassed by the term ‘schizophrenia’ are ill-accounted for and ill-explained by 
psychiatry’s diagnostic nosologies, it does not follow that mental illness (psychosis, schizophrenia, madness, 
or whatever preferred sign …) does not exist. Similarly, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, although the 
idealized, homogenous langue is a self-serving fiction of a linguistics anxious to be a pure science, that does 
not mean that language does not exist. (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plataeus, p.102) 
118 Roberta Payne, ‘First person account: schizophrenia and creativity’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40:6 (2014) 1187-
1188, p.1188 
119 Roberta Payne, ‘First person account: my schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 18:4 (1992) 725-728, p.727 
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Semio-linguistic analysis offers a means of modelling acts of schizophrenese 
communication and translation, and this thesis will apply Jakobson’s model to these exchanges in 
order to discern the inter-code mechanics in operation. Jakobson is an appropriate choice of 
theoretician, enjoying the position of patriarch within ‘clinical linguistics’. His Child Language, 
Aphasia and Phonological Universals – published in German in 1941 and English in 1968 – casts a long 
shadow over analyses of communication disorders.120 In a 2011 paper on the history of clinical 
linguistics, Michael Perkins notes that Jakobson’s structuralist observations established a ‘focus on 
the inherent rule-governed nature of atypical speech and language [which] is still a guiding principal 
in clinical linguistics today.’121 Jakobson’s model of communication, mapping six functions on to 
six factors of language, and reproduced below as figure 2.3, provides a very simple and direct 
explanation for the emotional, aesthetic judgments that schizophrenese provokes in listeners 
(addressees, in Jakobson’s terms).122 Jakobson’s model, though intended for use in linguistics, only 
has an implicit influence rather than explicit presence in the contemporary field. The model is more 
commonly cited in literature studies as a key schema for assessing and problematizing the category 
of literature or the literariness of any text. A typical Jakobsonian, structuralist definition of literature 
might be any text in which the poetic function is predominant. 
                                                
120 For instance, the book is referenced throughout Twenty-First Century Linguistics as a foundational text, 
suggesting it is anticipated to remain relevant for the indefinite future. No later works by Jakobson are 
mentioned, however. (Twenty-First Century Linguistics, ed. by Anne Cutler (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2005).) 
121 Michael Perkins, ‘Clinical linguistics: its past, present and future’, Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics, 25:11-12 
(2011), 922-927, p.923 It is telling of the decline in research into psychotic speech acts and their form, 
content and structure (in comparison to the rise of research into neurological explanations for psychotic 
speech) that in nearly 30 years Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics has not published one single paper exclusively on 
schizophrenic and/or psychotic speech. (Except for one retracted paper: Ahmad Abu-Akel, ‘Phoricity as a 
measure of Clozaril’s efficacy in treating disorganized schizophrenia’, Clinical Linguistics & Phonetics, 13:5 
(1999) 381-393.) 
122 Based on the models described in Roman Jakobson, ‘The speech event and the functions of language’, in 
On Language, 69-79. See especially Figure 4.1, p.73 and Figure 4.2, p.77. 
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When the code is inaccessible to the addressee, the metalingual function of communication ceases 
and the dependent referential and conative functions are subsequently blocked or dramatically 
altered. Depending on how much of a shared code the addressee believes to have with the 
schizophrenese addresser, the referential and conative functions will increase or decrease 
relationally. It may be that the addressee believes they share more of the code with the addresser 
than they do, and then they will experience the communication as performing its metalingual 
function, but ‘failing’ on the referential and conative function. This can be expressed by altering 
Jakobson’s communication model as seen in figure 2.4 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 
Jakobson’s six features and functions of the speech act 
Addresser 
(Emotive) 
Message 
(Poetic) 
Addressee 
(Conative) 
Context 
(Referential) 
Contact 
(Phatic) 
Code 
(Metalingual) 
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 In the most extreme example, when communication has entirely failed, the addressee has 
been wholly unable or unwilling to engage in the code of the schizophrenese message. Whether 
wilfully denying or simply being incapable of recognising the schizophrenese code, the metalingual 
function folds into the phatic function as the impenetrable (to the disconnected addressee) code 
can stand only as an iteration of its presence: code is reduced to the materiality of the act of 
contact. The core concept here is one of the complicity (or otherwise) of the addressee, and how 
this presence (or absence) distorts the communicative act unrecognisably. Addressee complicity 
rather than Chomsky’s supposed competence on the part of the addresser is the determinant of 
successful communication. Very simply: the non-complicit addressee can hear only a welter of 
signifiers that all cohere on one discernible signifier, which is the sole presence of impenetrable 
speech, expressible as Sz Sa (phatic = metalingual). Consequently, without access to the code, and 
without the action of the metalingual function, the context (or signified) of the message is 
absolutely unavailable to the addressee for connoting from. Instead, the associated referential 
function is reflected back onto the addresser and conflated with the emotive function. This can be 
summarised as just one signified, which is that someone is speaking, expressible as Sz Se (emotive 
= referential). Further, by refusing to access the code and therefore by refusing the possibility of an 
objective context to the message, the message and addresser are reduced to a referential function 
that is only the emotive function. In terms of functional behaviour, the addressee – as the right-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 
Six features and functions of the ‘failed’ schizophrenese speech act 
Message 
(Poetic) 
Addressee 
(Conative) 
Context 
(Referential) 
Contact and Code 
(Phatic and metalingual) 
Code  
(Metalingual) 
Addresser and Context 
(Emotive and Referential) 
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hand side suggests – is able to connote from the reduced message as they receive it from the 
addresser. The message is reduced to the point that it is producing merely a text that signifies only 
that there is a speaker. In this way, it is able to ‘only’ be experienced as Andreasen’s ‘empty 
philosophising’, as mentioned in the opening section of this chapter. 
 If it is accepted that the code of schizophrenese is not directly accessible to the addressee, 
what kind of model of communication can be proposed? Figure 2.5 below offers a suggestion. 
 
An immediately obvious criticism of this model is that, without a shared code, there is no certainty 
of a shared context (and vice versa). This bifurcating of the sign is represented by the presence of 
two codes and two contexts. If it is accepted that the code is socially constructed within a 
‘permanently dynamic synchrony’123 and that – as it produces a heterogeneity of codes – there is 
always a meta-level at which separate codes (individual langues or systems) can also become inter-
related subcodes (paroles),124 then this model demonstrates how communication between different 
langues is possible. It is, though, dependent on both (or all) participants playing the cooperative 
game of complicity; literally, agreeing to understand in advance of actually understanding. 
Communication of all kinds therefore relies on complicity and abduction.  
                                                
123 Roman Jakobson, Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal Time p.6 
124 A view implicit in Jakobson’s assertion: ‘Language is a system of systems, an overall code which includes various 
subcodes.’ Jakobson, ‘Sign and system of language’, trans. by B Hrushovski, in Verbal Art, Verbal Sign, Verbal 
Time, pp.28-33 (p.30)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 
Six features and functions of the ‘successful’ schizophrenese speech act 
Addresser 
(Emotive) 
Message 
(Poetic) 
Addressee 
(Conative) 
Context 2 
(Referential) 
Contact 
(Phatic) 
Code 2 
(Metalingual) 
Context 1 
(Referential) 
Code 1 
(Metalingual) 
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Imagine the model working to describe an exchange between a monolingual addresser and 
a bilingual translator as addressee. Code 1 – the code of the addresser – is simple: a langue, call it 
English. Code 2 – the code of the addresser, who is fluent in, say, both English and French – is 
slightly more problematic. It is not that English and French exist as two separate codes within the 
addressee. If so, the translator would be no more able to translate within their own head than one 
monolingual English speaker could communicate with one monolingual French speaker. Rather, 
the addressee has a code that – amongst many other things – maps125 together the languages, which 
are two not especially closely related codes (now, subcodes). It follows that as Code 1 does not 
equal Code 2, for a fixed message, Context 1 cannot equal Context 2. Hence the phrase ‘lost in 
translation.’ This is without a consideration of any of the purely formal qualities (if such ‘purely 
formal’ qualities actually exist) related to the poetic function of the message that remain 
untranslatable. Arguably, these are not ‘purely formal’ qualities, because aesthetic appreciation (or 
otherwise) creates a conceptual referential for the poetic function. 
That figure 2.5 rather than figure 2.3 represents ‘successful’ communication between 
langues – be it between English and French or schizophrenese and English – is surely 
unproblematic. However, this thesis goes one step further and proposes – by dropping down a 
level within the multi-system structure of languages – that figure 2.5 stand as a permanent revision 
to figure 2.3 in all communicative acts. This thesis’ analysis of schizophrenese therefore has this 
broader insight for semiotics: each code – even within the same langue – has sufficient idiolectic 
content and form that it can never be asserted that Code 1 (addresser’s code) = Code 2 (addressee’s 
code), or to return Peirce’s terminology, any fixed Representamen may generate different objects 
when in triadic relation with any Interpretant. Communication is reliant on a mutual, non-neurotic 
and unconscious acceptance of the gap between two contexts and two subjects (regardless of 
whether one, none or both have a psychiatric diagnosis). Subjects have to avoid being neurotic 
about the fact that this gap necessarily always exists, and its dimensions are unknowable, and much 
of the ‘success’ of the communication is generated through complicity on the part of the addressee, 
rather than clarity on the part of the addresser. 
In Universe of the Mind (1990), Lotman – of the semiotic school at University of Tartu in 
Estonia – gives ‘artistic translation’ as one of the processes through which a text is a meaning-
generating mechanism.126 Rather than language functioning as the closed Sausurrean circuit of 
transmission, Lotman posits the addresser and addressee (Lotman uses the terms transmitter and 
receiver) working with ‘different codes c1 and c2 which overlap but are not identical’ or rather ‘a 
plural space of codes c1, c2, c3 … cn, and each of them is a complex hierarchical construction 
                                                
125 ‘Mapping’ is a very dissatisfactory spatial metaphor to use; in some ways, these codes are no more mapped 
onto each other than salt and pepper are mapped onto each other when added to a soup. Here is a hint of the 
‘never innocent’ metaphor of the spatial model in structuralist analyses feared by Derrida. Jacques Derrida, 
‘Force and signification’, in Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001) pp.1-35 
(p.19) 
126 Lotman, Universe of the Mind, p.14 
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capable of generating a set of texts in equal degree corresponding to it.’127 As a consequence, one 
transmitted message can potentially generate a far larger number of received messages. This 
capability to generate more messages is dependent on a quantum of untranslatability within the 
original message; the reader should be reminded here of Chaika’s description of the 
unparaphrasability of psychotic speech mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
Separately, Lotman redeploys Jakobson’s model to demonstrate the nature of internal 
speech, which he terms ‘autocommunication’ and where the addresser and addressee are the same 
person. He gives examples from Russian literature of (literary) subjects entering into introspective 
reveries or enciphered self-communication, but the similarity between his account and what – 
potentially – occurs within schizophrenese is striking. In Lotman’s account, an a-semantic, 
syntagmatically constructed secondary code interacts with the natural language code (the code used 
for simple transmission communication): 
If, for instance, we stare at the pattern of the wallpaper or listen to abstract music, we ascribe 
meanings to the elements of these texts. The more the syntagmatic organization is stressed the freer 
and more associative will be our semantic connections. So the ‘I-I’ text has a tendency to build up 
individual meanings and to take on the function of organizing the disordered associations which 
accumulate in the individual consciousness. It reorganizes the personality who engages in 
autocommunication.128 
 
It is hard to remember that Lotman is not giving an account of schizophrenese, so well does the 
description fit. In schizophrenese, as in non-pathological autocommunication, two codes are 
operating at the same time on the one message, which reflects back on the subject and thereby 
creates a split within the subject. Though semiotics does not talk about hypothetical constructs like 
‘mind’ or ‘psychology’, if this semiotic model is re-imported into the DSM’s terminology of 
disordered thought and speech, it is clear that it is the disordered speech (disordered because 
operating according to a hybrid of codes, at least one of which is inaccessible to all addressees, 
including the addresser-as-addressee) which then creates the disordered thought (in Lotman’s 
account, this is the bifurcated subject of ‘I-I’ communication). 
In contrast to Wróbel’s thesis, this Lotmanean model needs no intervening transcendental 
element. In Lotman’s literary examples, the interposing secondary codes are the rocking of a boat 
(from Tyutchev’s ‘Dream Boat’) or a storm in Eugene Onegin. A neuroscientific study into the 
etiological root(s) of schizophrenia might not ask why one percent of human beings experience this 
creative interference from an additional code or codes dis-conducive to the simple transmission of 
a message with a second party or the endurance of an unfragmented self, but rather ask why the 
other 99 percent do not experience it more often. 129  This semiotic model has considerable 
                                                
127 Lotman, Universe of the Mind, p.14 
128 Lotman, Universe of the Mind, pp.28-29 
129 It is very important to stress that ‘creative’ here means only that it creates a new message and/or subject i.e. 
the impenetrable speech act of schizophrenese or the newly synthesized self, incorporating self-as-addresser 
and self-as-addressee. It most emphatically does not mean to suggest that the secondary code is a source of 
(quasi)poetic inspiration, anymore than the interruptions of traffic from the street or the thump of a 
neighbour’s sound system ‘inspire’ when derailing a PhD candidate’s writing. However, it is the case that the 
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explanatory power when applied to the symptoms of schizophrenia. Thought insertion and 
auditory hallucinations, for example, are different translations of the enigmatic, subject-disordering 
introjection of the secondary code into autocommunication. The internal speech is disrupted by the 
secondary code – which could be as mundane as a dripping tap – which changes the message being 
communicated internally. The attribution of volition and an external agency to these creative 
disruptions is absolutely in keeping with the human consciousness’ way of experiencing and 
explaining the world, and the sine qua non of every superstition, magic and myth from the Garden of 
Eden to Mystic Meg. It is worth noting that if this theory is correct, and schizophrenia is a disease 
of speech, that neither means that speech has to be recognisably disordered (which is – as argued 
earlier with reference to Andreasen and Chaika, amongst others – an aesthetic-moral judgement) 
nor that the symptoms be restricted to speech (or its supposed unobservable shadow: thought). A 
sensitivity to intruding secondary codes can, as mentioned above, be an explanation for symptoms 
not immediately obviously connected with speech acts (or rather semiotic (de)coding acts). 
Distractedness, thought insertion, delusions of reference, paranoid delusions – amongst others – 
are explainable as the products of a secondary code making internal speech ripe with unfamiliar 
meaning(s), and by extension making the internal speaking subject unfamiliar to, and fundamentally 
different from, itself. 
An argument against this theory would be that the interrupting secondary code is no less a 
transcendental, metaphysical invention than Wróbel’s schizophrenic illumination or the Lacanian 
fractured self. But these codes can be very practically and empirically identified within 
schizophrenese. Consider this passage from a paper by Perkins (1994): 
A further type of recurrent perseveration is ‘intrusion’, defined by Wallesch (1990: 145) as ‘lexical 
items that intrude formally adequate into otherwise correct productions’. In the following sample, 
where a schizophrenic patient is describing a picture, if the repeated portions shown in italics are 
‘filtered out’ the remaining language appears relatively normal: 
Some-farm houses - in a farm yard – time -with a horse and horseman - time where - going 
across the field as if they’re ploughing the field – time -with ladies – or collecting crop time 
work is - coming with another lady - time work is - and where - she’s holding a book – time - 
thinking  of things - time work is - and time work is where - you see her coming time work is on 
the field - and where work is looking towards other people and time work is where the lady-
another lady is - looking across to the gentleman - thinking of time with him and where work is 
- where her time is where working is and time thinking of people and where work is and where you 
see the hills - going up - and time work is - where you see the – grass - time work is - time work is 
and where the fields are - where growing is and where work is. (Allen, 1983, cited in Frith and 
Done, 1990)130 
                                                                                                                                         
poetic function both manifests the impact of a secondary code within its own message, as well as serving as 
the secondary (untranslatable) code in the generation of subsequent messages. Glibly, then, all poetic writing 
is schizophrenese, but not all schizophrenese is poetic. Here, poetic means that two things have occurred. 
First, it is a text in which – as Jakobson describes it – the poetic function of speech is primary, amongst the 
six functions. Secondly, in accordance with Lotman, it is a text that generates several meanings; it is generated 
– in part – by an untranslatable secondary code, and similarly remains – in part – untranslatable, or (which is 
the same thing, only more precise) severally translatable, generating more texts and meanings. 
130 Michael Perkins, ‘Repetitiveness in language disorders: a new analytical procedure’, Clinical Linguistics & 
Phonetics, 8:4 (1994) 321-336, p.324 
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Lotman’s a-semantic, syntagmatically constructed secondary code can be reasonably inferred from 
the identifiable presence of additional textual elements within the message. What Perkins resists, 
and Lotman does not (but then, he is dealing with poetic texts and not schizophrenese taken from 
clinical records), is the new semantic associations – the textual generative creativity – that the 
intrusive secondary code provokes. Perkins – in keeping with the clinical attitude discussed at the 
close of the first section of this chapter – prefers to excise any textual manifestations of the 
secondary code. He wants schizophrenese without that which makes it schizophrenic: he wants 
only the residue of the ‘relatively normal.’ 
 What Perkins might ‘filter’ is arguably the most pertinent information. No codes are 
arbitrary. Even Tyutchev’s and Puskin’s secondary codes are motivated by aesthetic and thematic-
symbolic concerns. Such filtering, despite the scientific rhetoric, is nothing more sophisticated than 
turning a deaf ear. An interruptive secondary (and perhaps tertiary and further codes) can be 
discerned in the speech of an interviewee with lived experience of psychosis. The interviewee refers 
to ‘back in the day’ eight times, and uses reasonably synonymous phrases – ‘back in the past’; ‘get 
back into it’; ‘I can’t go back’ – on four other occasions. Despite the interviewer’s questions being 
almost entirely orientated towards the present and focussed exclusively on voice-hearing (rather 
than a diagnosis or a medical regimen), the interviewee’s supernumerary codes draw the discourse 
towards the past, and a reiteration of how ‘it’s mad.’ (The interviewee uses this phrase eight times 
too. In contrast, the interviewee uses the word ‘voices’ only six times, despite the interviewer 
introducing the word on 12 occasions. Tellingly, the ‘voices’ are most often an ‘it’ for the 
interviewee. ‘They’ is usually reserved to refer to people who are, possibly dishonestly, claiming not 
to hear ‘it’.) In response to a question from the interviewer as to whether the interviewee believes 
that they too can hear the voices, the interviewee’s speech is entirely submerged in these other 
codes. 
Yeah yeah. I don’t want it on them what I’ve got like, but they should be able to man, but it’s just 
lies man, it’s a complete lie like man, it’s all fucking bullcrap like. It’s like they want to be a part of 
this big fucker, this big story and that man and then it’s like, I sit there and think yeah everybody 
does it, I shouldn’t have done that back in the day like, but I done it innit, but you sit there and you 
think, you try to say I should never have done it like, but then the part comes to you thinking well 
you’ve done it so like you’ve got to live with it anyway so like, that’s the way it goes innit. It’s mad 
man, it’s mad.131 
 
Filtering out the reiterative phrases in the interviewee’s speech as mindless perseveration would 
remove a discursive current that swells and breaks over the repetition of the word ‘done’. Though 
opaque, the interviewee’s supernumerary codes generate a sub-text focussing on a rupture in the 
past with a friendship group, for which the interviewee (ambivalently) believes himself culpable.132  
This reading may be wrong, and is certainly speculative, but an attempt at reading the 
codes seems more productive and humane than silencing them like so much psychotic white noise. 
                                                
131 Interview transcript 
132 Though the interview transcripts are fully anonymised it seems unavoidably apparent, within the language, 
that the interviewee is male. The subject is immanent in language. 
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Consider this concluding answer of the interview, in response to the question ‘do you feel in 
control of your voices?’: 
Not in control, this is the way I think; I used to be a fighter man, I reckon fighting’s in my blood 
and that innit, but I reckon yeah, that they think they’re harder than me, so I think I’m harder than 
them innit, you know what I’m saying. I’ve had fights with my mates and that yeah, but I reckon it’s 
getting too dangerous man, I was getting too dangerous man, because I was keeping myself fit at 
them times innit, riding my bike, like shadow boxing, boxing with my mates, you know what I’m 
saying like and I get into shape easy for some reason, it’s mad man, it’s mad.133 
 
Although initially taking the interviewer’s verbal prompt, the interviewee’s ‘they’ does not seem to 
refer to ‘voices’ for long (or indeed at all, for how could he physically fight voices?) and the 
discourse turns to the ‘mates’ for whom he became ‘too dangerous’. Note, he equates his self with a 
dangerous situation: ‘it’s getting too dangerous man, I was getting too dangerous.’ The situation and 
the subject are blended through these codes. Questions about personal experience turn to answers 
about social interactions. Though the interviewee might mean ‘shadow boxing’ and ‘boxing with 
mates’ as two discrete activities from his former fitness routine, these function as convenient 
metaphors for the two codes at play in the interview. On the one hand, the interviewer wants to 
understand the interviewee as in a duel with themselves, ‘shadow boxing’: ‘do you feel in control of 
your voices?’ But on the other hand, the restricted code, at the heart of what the interviewee seems 
to be trying to communicate, is one of some social dispute in the material world: ‘boxing with 
mates.’ The irony is that the secondary text emerges within the sanctioned discourse and leaves the 
speaker of schizophrenese caught in the conflict between codes: linguistic shadow boxing. 
Of course, in speaking schizophrenese, an interlocutor is not only speaking schizophrenese. 
The interviewee in this analysis is speaking schizophrenese and English. The relationship between 
these two codes is that of any two codes: they are interwoven into the parole of the speaker, as ‘lines 
of inherent variation’ rather than two atomised langues.134 Deleuze and Guattari, developing Labov’s 
study of the speech of Black Americans in New York, suggest that when a speaking subject – 
according to a linguistic description – is said to be shifting continually between two supposedly 
homogenous invariant codes, then the flaw is not in something called the speaker’s ‘performance’ 
(let alone their ‘competence’) but in the ‘abstract distinction’ between the codes.135 For Deleuze and 
Guattari, languages are best conceived as being in ‘immanent continuous variation’ and displaying a 
‘generalized chromaticism.’ 136  To subtract out schizophrenese English from Standard English 
would be as wrong-headed a theoretical approach as conducting an art appreciation class by 
attempting to separate out great paintings into their pure originary pigments. Language is a clash of 
codes, and the difference between schizophrenese and the ‘standard’ langue is not an absolute one. 
Rather, each enjoys differences of intensity. The supernumerary interruptive codes constitutive of 
schizophrenese are further constitutive of the ‘standard’ or non-pathological langue. Or, put 
                                                
133 Interview transcript 
134 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.103 
135 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.103 
136 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.108 
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differently, the interruptive creative clash of codes that conspicuously characterises schizophrenese 
is present, subtly, in all langues. For langue to be a usable term any more, it must be acknowledged 
that each langue is heterogeneous, and an amalgam of, not an abstraction from, its myriad paroles. To 
use Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, schizophrenese is a minoritarian code in relation to the 
majoritarian code of the ‘standard’ langue, according to their distinction between: ‘the majoritarian 
as a constant and homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and the minoritarian as a 
potential, creative and created, becoming.’137 Schizophrenese, therefore, is a necessary component 
within any language, and illustrates, by the bold visibility of its utterances, the creative clashes that 
generate and evolve the ‘standard’ major language. Schizophrenese as an object of study allows for 
the observation of the construction and nature of both language and ‘schizophrenia’. 
Positing schizophrenia as a semiotic disease of speech, observable structurally in 
schizophrenese, requires some clinical supporting evidence. Published in 2011, two related papers 
on South African ‘schizophrenic bilinguals’ (as the papers refer to them) draw on a line of research 
– evident in the DSM-5’s anxious acknowledgement of second language problems quoted earlier – 
which suggest that the language (code) used by the patient affects the diagnosis received. The first 
paper by Smit, Conradie and Schoeman raises just that concern, noting that ‘whether the patient is 
interviewed in his or her L1 or L2 might affect the accuracy of the diagnosis.’138 The paper strikes 
on an important contradiction. Initially, the authors repeat the grand claims about speech 
documented throughout this chapter: ‘the language of the schizophrenic patient provides insight 
into interpersonal relationships, the organisation of the mind on a perceptual and cognitive level, as 
well as the mind’s capacity for concentration and attention.’139 Yet immediately afterwards, Smit, 
Conradie and Schoeman note that there is considerable research demonstrating that bilingual 
schizophrenics exhibit different language symptoms in their two languages. The implicit argument 
– which Smit, Conradie and Schoeman do not make – of these two epidemiological ‘facts’ is that 
bilinguals have different capacities for concentration and attention, different perceptual and 
cognitive organising structures and even different interpersonal relationships depending on which 
of their languages they use. This seems far-fetched, to say the least. The differing manifestations of 
schizophrenese qua symptom depending on the language seems more easily explained by the theory 
that it is a product of one code (for example, the subject’s L1 or L2) fusing with another code (or 
codes); a change in L1 or L2 is a change in one of the component codes of the new hybrid code, 
and therefore the hybrid would be different itself. But what about schizophrenese qua disease 
vector? 
In the second 2011 paper, Theron, Conradie and Schoeman’s pragmatic linguistic 
assessment of four bilinguals, presenting differently in their two languages, comes to a paradoxical 
                                                
137 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.117 
138 Mathilda Smit, Simone Conradie and Renata Schoeman, ‘A grammatical analysis of the spontaneous L2 
English use of schizophrenic bilinguals compared to typical bilinguals’, South African Linguistics and Applied 
Language Studies, 29:4 (2011) 505-513, p.506 
139 Smit, Conradie and Schoeman, p.505 
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conclusion. Although, on a pragmatic assessment, there was no significant measurable difference 
between the extent of schizophrenese spoken, Theron, Conradie and Schoeman stress that there 
were distinct factual inconsistencies. Essentially, participants gave different responses to the same 
questions. For the researchers, this is considered a product of disordered thought: 
In short, the factual inconsistencies observed seem to be due to characteristics of schizophrenic 
thought rather than characteristics of schizophrenic language […]; the fact that Mr C, for example, 
has more insight into illness and a more accurate perception of reality when speaking in his L2 than 
when speaking in his L1 cannot be captured by linguistic analyses of his speech. 
 
The assertion of the inability of linguistic analytical tests to ‘capture’ the language difference 
between L1 and L2 does not necessarily mean that it is thought and not language that is disordered.  
Smit, Conradie and Schoeman provide a complementary conclusion. The schizophrenic 
bilinguals made phonological, syntactical, lexical and morphological errors typical of non-
schizophrenic L2 speakers, but made semantic errors that were atypical both in terms of frequency 
and type, meaning, essentially, that those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia often said ‘mad’ things. 
(This is hardly a surprising revelation as the four research participants were selected for speaking 
schizophrenese.) Smit, Conradie and Schoeman make a pointed qualitative distinction between the 
semantic deviancies of their control group (‘simply a bit unclear’) and the schizophrenic group 
(‘completely nonsensical’).140 From this, Smit, Conradie and Schoeman assert – with reference to 
Brown (1973) – ‘that because schizophrenics experience the world differently than non-psychotic 
people and their ‘understanding of the world is reflected in semantics’, semantics should be the 
locus of language-related problems in schizophrenia.’141 However, an understanding of the world is 
not merely ‘reflected’ in semantics, but constructed through it. Rather than adopting the dominant 
phenomenological bias, a semiotic analysis does not prioritise the individual and psychological, but 
rather the social and the structural. In semiotics, if ‘schizophrenics experience the world differently’ 
this is the result of a pre-existing (not necessarily schizophrenic) code (which obviously will be a 
composite of codes) acting on the subject as addressee. Strangely, the phenomenologist thinks 
everyone exists in their heads; they don’t, they exist in the world. The phenomenologist then has a 
model of schizophrenia as ‘in there’, when schizophrenia is patently ‘out here’. To paraphrase 
Polixenes, that experience which various linguists, phenomenologists and psychiatrists say adds to 
semantics, is an experience that semantics makes.142 To say schizophrenia is a disease of speech, is 
to make a claim that the coding of language (the langue of schizophrenese) is always the disease 
vector and the instance of speech (the parole of schizophrenese) is sometimes an observable 
symptom. Resolutely, vector and location is not the same origin. Language, and all semiosis, must 
be secondary to social conditions, and the individual subject is created through participation in the 
dominant semiotic. Though this clear line of progression must, in part, be a convenient 
                                                
140 Smit, Conradie and Schoeman, p.509 
141 Smit, Conradie and Schoeman, p.511 
142 ‘[T]hat art / Which you say adds to nature, is an art / That nature makes.’ William Shakespeare, The 
Winter’s Tale, in The Alexander Text of William Shakespeare: The Complete Words, ed. by Peter Alexander (London 
and Glasgow: HarperCollins, 1951), IV. 4. 91-92 
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simplification (to the point of fiction) for the sake of developing this argument, the model is of 
social conditions first, semiosis second and the subject (as semiotic product) third. When looking 
for a cause of the speaker of schizophrenese’s reliance on a minoritarian semiotic, the answer must 
be in the world, and not in language nor in phenomenology, as Wilma Boevink details in her 
personal account in the Schizophrenia Bulletin: 
I don’t think that abuse itself is a strong cause for psychosis. It hurts, but it is rather simple. I think 
that the threat and the betrayal that come with it feed psychosis … That excuses the offender and 
accuses the victim. And forces the child to accept the reality of the adults. That forces the child to 
say that the air is green, while she sees clearly it is not green but blue. That is a distortion of reality 
that is very hard to deal with when you’re a child.143 
 
As Hoffmeyer observes, speech is the moment of alienation and rupture. It is the locus qua product 
of ‘disease’ not a first rank symptom: 
[A] fresh form of alienation, a split between the analogic reality of experience and the digital reality 
of language, came into being at the heart of the semiosphere. The spoken word has endowed the 
semiosphere with its very own self-referential vertical semiotic system. A new code duality has 
emerged and with it the dynamic basis for a totally different kind of evolution: cultural history.144 
 
It is a failure of complicity, and a violent assertion of an erroneous code, on the part of 
interlocutors of power that creates this minoritarian semiotic of schizophrenese. Reader, be 
complicit from here on.  
 
  
                                                
143  Wilma A Boevink, ‘From being a disorder to dealing with life: an experiential exploration of the 
association between trauma and psychosis’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32:1 (2006) 17-19, p.18 
144 Hoffmeyer, pp.111-112 
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Lacan in the lavatory; the signifier in the signified 
Before I was arrested at gunpoint, I drove by a glass picture frame shop which read “You’ve Been 
Framed” … of course, I believed it was a message for me alone ... for murders I was going to be 
framed for. […] Months later I was court ordered to the State Hospital. The word “ladies” on the 
restroom, was a message I was going to LA (Los Angeles) and would be murdered there … I had 
many delusions, hallucinations about torture, rape, murder … many religious thoughts and 
delusions (I am agnostic now) …145 
 
A little boy and a little girl, brother and sister, are seated across from each other in a compartment 
next to the outside window that provides a view of the station platforms going by as the train comes 
to a stop. “Look,” says the brother, “we’re at Ladies!” “Imbecile!” replies his sister, “Don’t you see 
we’re at Gentlemen.”146 
 
Why should the syntagmatic oscillation between ‘LA’ and ‘Los Angeles’ need no time and no 
explanation to understand, whereas that between ‘ladies’ and ‘LA dies’ or even onwards to ‘goes to 
LA and dies’ be considered pathological? Is there a grammatical explanation, or is something 
linguistically permissible purely because of its frequency within the semiological system? 
Undoubtedly (and indeed, by brute force of logic), utterances of LA qua sign (signifying Los 
Angeles) outstrip utterances of ladies qua sign (signifying a woman’s fatal visit to Los Angeles).147 
Even on the basis of phonemes, there is no way to the ladies (let alone to the lady dying) that does 
not involve a thoroughfare through LA. What distinguishes the initialism for the Californian city 
from, say, the sixth interval in the octave can only be context.148 What makes LA acceptable as an 
abbreviation of Los Angeles, in contrast to the unacceptability of ‘ladies’ as an abbreviation of ‘goes 
to LA and dies,’ is a certain predictability borne of socio-linguistic convention.149 This convention 
itself is an accumulative product of context. Therefore, the question is not: what about a person’s 
                                                
145 Written correspondence from a US-based respondent. 
146 Lacan, p.417/500 
147 Though utterances of ladies qua sign signifying ‘women’ or sign signifying ‘women of a certain social 
status’ or sign signifying ‘a toilet for women’ must all conversely outstrip utterances of LA qua sign signifying 
‘Los Angeles’, and indeed all signs signifying that city. 
148 In a written text, that is. Phonetically, LA (elle-lay) is nowhere near la, though they find a bridge in the lay 
of ladies. 
149  Sometimes it is not that the speaker of schizophrenese has practised a syntagmatic or paradigmatic 
movement outside the social norm, but rather that they exhibit a certain over-sensitivity to associations. So, 
when an anonymous correspondent to the Schizophrenia Bulletin says ‘I would not buy Trix cereal, because it 
was associated with prostitution in my mind, but I bought a lot of Cheerios to make my day happier,’ the 
former association may be wholly different from the socially endorsed connotations of Trix, but the latter is 
only an over-investment in an association no doubt consciously chosen by the producers of Cheerios. The 
name Cheerios is intended to convey feelings of positivity. The TV adverts, then and now, show people 
having their day made happier by eating Cheerios for breakfast. If it is madness to believe the messages of 
marketing, it is a madness that corporates and governments spend ever more millions of pounds on each 
year. (Over-sensitivity is perhaps over-normative; it is a greater sensitivity.) (Anonymous, ‘First person 
account: behind the mask: a functional schizophrenic copes’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 16:3 (1990) 547-549, p.548) 
It is worth considering, when reading this section on esoteric words, that brand names are model examples. 
Where they differ from the neologisms and idiosyncracies of schizophrenese is that, with money and power 
behind them, they have become conventionally accepted. However, they neither denote nor connote 
precisely, except in relation to themselves as a brand. Cif, Snickers, Ugg, Virgin, Diesel – popular culture is 
distinguished from the semiotic of psychosis primarily by the complicity of those receiving its 
communications. It is also worth knowing that the association between Trix cereal and prostitution is hardly 
evidence of pathological thought. Eddie Murphy made the exact same joke on the Johnny Carson show in 
January 1982. From the sound of laughter, it appears that the audience had no difficulty with this connotative 
leap. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1TKGtai7og> [accessed 30 January 2016] 
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language competence, language performance, neurology, psychology, mind, or soul, makes them 
read ‘ladies’ for ‘goes to LA and dies?’ Rather, it is: what about their context makes them read it so? 
The idiosyncratic utterance of the ‘schizophrenic’ cannot, reasonably, be read detached 
from the context of the idiosyncratic utterer. The utterer of schizophrenese is – to use Walter 
Redfern’s succinct appraisal of Jean-Pierre Brisset – ‘typical, mainly, of himself.’150 To conceive of 
schizophrenese as some trans-historical, trans-individual system existing a priori to its speakers is as 
wrongheaded as to marvel at the remarkable coincidence that all of the world’s handful of 
Sentinelese speakers happen to live in isolation on the same Andaman Island in the India Sea. 
Schizophrenese’s development as a minoritarian code must be a product of social conditions; 
conditions which it, in turn, dialectically informs.  
‘The word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence’;151 the words of schizophrenese 
are, in microcosm, the skirmish between an ideology (or assemblage of ideologies) and their most 
alienated products. As Vološinov adds: 
‘[A]n encounter between the organism and the outside world […] is not a physical one: the 
organism and the outside world meet here in the sign. Psychic experience is the semiotic expression 
of the contact between the organism and the outside environment. That is why the inner psyche is 
not analysable as a thing but can only be understood and interpreted as a sign.152 
 
Accepting the ideological nature of the word, and accepting ‘nonsense as a word which says its own 
sense,’153 it follows that precisely that which eludes demarcation by the properties and categories of 
denotation, manifestation and signification is the ideological position of the psychotic. Of course, 
schizophrenese should be outside conventions of denotation, when its speakers find their truth 
statements about the world to be frequently rebutted, by other speakers or by new irreconcilable 
truths. Similarly, schizophrenese is outside the conventions of signification, when its speakers are 
excluded from the social exchanges and structures productive of the patterns of meaning. And of 
course the speaker is outside the conventions of manifestation when unheard or unheeded, and 
when their speech brings incarceration, sedation and a further invisibilising. Prosaically, speakers of 
schizophrenese find themselves legally, medically and socially defined by words they may not 
accept, recognize, understand or have even heard. In the looking-glass land of their empirical 
testing of language, they may have found ‘health’ to mean something more like ‘politics’, ‘care’ to 
mean something more like ‘coercion’, ‘community’ to mean ‘isolation.’154 When their realities are 
                                                
150  Walter Redfern, All Puns Intended: The Verbal Creation of Jean-Pierre Brisset (Oxford: Legenda, European 
Humanities Research Centre, University of Oxford, 2001), p.8 
151 Vološinov, Marxism, p.13 
152 Vološinov, Marxism, p.26 
153 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.80 
154 As Betty Blaska wittily writes in the Schizophrenia Bulletin of being labeled a ‘CMI’: ‘At the outset, I’d like to 
say that if we can be called CMIs — chronically mentally ill — then they, the mental health professionals, can 
be called MHPs. If we must be relegated to a three-letter acronym — and basically stripped of our identity 
and individuality — then they too can be lumped into one pot.’ (Betty Blaska, ‘First person account: what it’s 
like to be treated like a CMI’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 17:1 (1991) 173-176, p.173 
Also, to see an unintentionally amusing example of the majoritarian discourse overwriting the 
minoritarian, see the first person account by ‘Elizabeth’, a 10th grader, whose simple prose describing, 
 101 
invalidated, small wonder they say the world no longer exists. When their words are measured as 
diagnostic symptoms, no surprise that they suppose their bodies have emptied and evaporated. If 
they have been abused through language, language itself has absorbed some of the abuse. To 
reform language and to speak it is not just an act of resistance, but one of restoration. 
What mechanisms are enacted on words – as on the speakers of these words – within 
schizophrenese? Words, as signifiers, expand outwards, through perseveration and palilalia, or pack 
inwards, as portmanteaus.155 Kraepelin observed how words were broken down lexicographically 
by ‘the affected use of hyphens’ and texts would stutter through ‘the recurrence of single parts.’156 
The signifieds concertina too. Moeze M Lalji, a Ugandan refugee living in the UK, composes 
poems as simple acrostics. Sometimes, the unpacked signifier brings a sequence of unpacked 
signifieds that seem – to the addressee – apposite, causal and inherently related to the signifier being 
decomposed, as in his poem ‘TONY BLAIR’: 
TONY BLAIR 
T= Talk to Bush 
O= Only to Rush into Decisions 
N= Never Has This Country Ignored Its Government and People 
Y= You and Bush Have Created An Ocean Full of Tears 
BLAIR 
B= Brother Hood of Man in United Nations 
L= Left It To One Side 
A= Always Britain Has A Tradition of Evolutions 
I= Ignoring History We Are All in Tears 
R= Respect for Britain We Want Back in Evolution157 
 
This consanguinity of signification is often called aesthetics. Usually – at least within the field of 
literary studies, and within ‘high-brow’ popular culture – the greater, and more sophisticated, 
idiosyncratic and archaeological the exegesis required to establish this consanguinity, the more 
refined the aesthetics of the original text. Yet, in other apparently opaque examples of Lalji’s 
poetry, the associations are there to be made, if the addressee can be complicit in the 
communication. It is not hard to refer this back to the woman seeing messages in signs on shop 
                                                                                                                                         
without self-conscious analysis, some difficult experiences, is firmly re-interpreted by editorial headings 
cramming this life under different diagnostic criteria: interpersonal functioning; impairment in goal-directed 
activity; hallucinations; thought disorder etc. When ‘Elizabeth’ says ‘[s]ometimes I laugh too much’, the 
paragraph gets headed up ‘affect’. (Anonymous, ‘First person account: schizophrenia with childhood onset’, 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 20:4 (1994) 587-590, p.588 
155 One correspondent to the Schizophrenia Bulletin gives an account of ‘schizophrenic’ thinking that seems 
borrowed wholesale from Carroll’s aetiology of the portmanteau word. The schizophrenic thought: ‘to think 
two separate thoughts so closely together that they appear almost as one thought, and things that usually send 
the schizophrenic person into conflict can exist simultaneously.’ (Patricia J Ruocchio, ‘First person account: 
fighting the fight – the schizophrenic’s nightmare’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15:1 (1989) 163-166, p.165) The 
nonsense portmanteau: ‘For instance, take the two words ‘fuming’ and ‘furious’. Make up your mind that you 
will say both words, but leave it unsettled which you will say first. Now open your mouth and speak. If your 
thoughts incline ever so little toward ‘fuming’, you will say ‘fuming-furious’; if they turn, by even a hair’s 
breadth, towards ‘furious’, you will say ‘furious-fuming’; but if you have that rarest of gifts, a perfectly 
balanced mind, you will say ‘frumious’.’ (Lewis Carroll, The Annotated Snark: Hunting of the Snark 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962) p.42) 
156 Kraepelin, p.58 
157 Moeze M Lalji, Schizophrenia and Multiculturalism Poems for Charity (Chipmunkapublishing, 2008), pp.44-45 
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fronts and toilet doors to understand that those speaking schizophrenese suffer from an excess, 
and not a deficit, of communicational complicity. They are too aesthetic in their use of language, not 
– to repeat the old slur – too concrete.158 
For Delueze, nonsense, which is defined as ‘that which, as such as it enacts the donation of 
sense, is opposed to the absence of sense,’ 159  seems a perfect conceptual model for 
schizophrenese.160 And the structural base component of nonsense is the esoteric word, a word 
that circulates and triggers irreconcilable and paradoxical series of connotation and denotation. 
Delueze states that ‘[t]he esoteric word in general refers at once to the empty square and to the 
occupant without a place.’161 The empty square is the signifier and the occupant without a place is 
the signifieds. This formulation can be explicated with an example from transcripts of interviews 
with people with lived experience. When a speaker of schizophrenese refers to ‘my etheric ovary’,162 
the signifier is in a relationship to some sense, but outside the (more) easily describable mechanisms 
of denotation (as reference) and connotation (as signification or meaning). 163  Without a fixed 
signified or without even a changeable but tangible range of interlocking, shared systems for 
signification, the signifier sits as an empty square. Reciprocally, the sense, which is unable to enter 
into the utterance or text through the regular signifying and referral mechanisms, is excluded but 
lurks like Banquo as the occupant without a place. What needs to be remembered, and will be 
stressed throughout this section and in the conclusion is that this is true for all language, not just 
nonsense or schizophrenese. As Schreber’s psychology threw up general truths, for Freud at least, 
about all psychologies, so does schizophrenese throw up general truths, for Delueze at least, about 
all language. 
In truth, the esoteric word is only the linguistic variant of a larger, general semiotic entity: 
the esoteric sign. Esoteric images abound in these interviews. When one interviewee as part of the 
interview process submits a camera film for development, there is on the film a literal blank image, 
the product of an attempt to capture an image of the source of the interviewee’s daily distress, an 
aggressive neighbour: ‘It’s weird you know, let’s put it this way, took a picture of the hallway; the 
camera seemed to work properly, took a picture of the lady next door and the camera didn’t work!’ 
One interviewee produced an esoteric word-image, a rebus (see figure 2.6). In glossing this, the 
                                                
158 See Karl Goldstein, ‘Methodological approach to the study of schizophrenic thought disorder’, in Language 
and Thought in Schizophrenia: Collected Papers Presented at the Meeting of the APA, May 12, 1939, ed. by J.S. Kasanin 
(New York: Norton & Co., 1964), pp.17-40. Indeed, ‘concrete’ thinking is a preoccupation (and 
presumption) of all eight of the papers collected in this volume. 
159 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.83 
160 And, of course, for Delueze sense and schizophrenia were intrinsically, conceptually linked. Though The 
Logic of Sense mostly skirts around it, there is one series (‘Thirteenth Series of the Schizophrenic and the Little 
Girl’) explicitly dedicated to schizophrenia, and the text explores ideas that find their further elucidation (and 
sometimes contradiction or frustration) in Delueze’s later two-volume Schizophrenia and Capitalism with 
Guattari. 
161 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.55 
162 Interview transcript 
163 It must be stated that this is not to claim that to describe either denotation or connotation is ‘easy’; merely, 
easier. A hierarchy of ease of description has surely appeared in the reader’s mind descending from reference 
through meaning to sense.  
 103 
conventionalized meaning (the socially familiar connotations) of ‘hell raiser’ are subverted, as the 
speaker of schizophrenese pulls rank on their (linguistic) signs in the manner of Humpty Dumpty:  
That’s heaven. That’s what I’m in, that’s what I mean … hell raiser. I’ve been risen from hell, and 
gone, and been, raising up into heaven and then it says rest in peace, it’s a boat but it’s from Satan, 
the boat. It’s not from God. So it’s like, it’s evil, very evil boat. And I don’t know which one it’s 
going to be. Where I’m going to end up. Am I going to end up in the paradise part where the 
flowers are and the skipping rope? Or will it be the evil boat where I get tortured for the rest of my 
life. Is it going to be, is it going to be a death where I don’t kill myself or is it going to be a death 
where I kill myself and I’m going to be tortured for the rest of my life.164 
 
The interviewee – who in the same interview gives a description of their personal life of alcohol 
use, drug use and sexual activity reasonably congruent with the conventional connotations of the 
term ‘hell raiser’ – has employed the esoteric rebus to displace agency (and thereby perhaps 
culpability) to an unspecified other. It is not the I as narrative subject that raises hell, but rather 
another that raises the I from hell. Note, it is not even that the subject has risen from hell but has 
(agrammatically or ‘psychotically’)165 ‘been risen.’ As an impenetrable rebus, this sign is rich in sense 
and converging, irreconcilable and irresolvable lines of signification. The textual exegesis, in the 
proliferating style of schizomimesis, only widens and slackens the net of connotation. The flowers 
of heaven seem explicable on their own, but less so when integrated with the term ‘hell raiser’ 
(regardless of which definition of the term is being adopted, for surely the flowers of heaven are 
neither the person raised nor the other doing the raising). To incorporate the ‘skipping rope’ is 
harder still. Not least because the image seems uninterpretable as a skipping rope: it has no handles, 
it is seemingly attached to the ground on the left of the picture and, perhaps most importantly, 
plants would probably be the very worst skippers in existence. Taken as one whole rebus, rather 
than two separate ones, there is a distinct echo between the tombstone-as-sails and the graveside 
flowers set against a tombstone. (It is surely as much tombstone as it is skipping rope. And are 
those not daisies being pushed up, rather than flowers just jumping up?) In this, and in myriad 
other ways, this esoteric rebus makes sense but no fixed, univocal and unequivocal meaning.  
                                                
164 Interview transcript 
165 For what is ‘psychosis’ if not a grammar, with concomitant lexicon? This thesis is predicated on the idea 
of psychosis as a semiotic. 
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Figure 2.6 
The esoteric rebus 
 
The esoteric word, like any word, should only be viewed in context, where it begins to 
make sense if not exactly have meaning.166 The opening passage of Andrew Voyce’s account of a 
five-year period of living homeless and medication free, The Durham Light and Other Stories (2009), 
shows how sense expands and thickens with context; as context broadens out the text, sense 
reciprocally (or antagonistically) penetrates into it. Signification, signs as molecularised meaning, 
separate out – as the molecules do in the transition from a solid to a liquid – as the syntagm is 
lengthened and contextualized. Between these ever-greater gaps – these loosened (or at least 
lengthened) associative bonds between the signifying molecules – ever more sense infuses. This 
expansion is easy to trace in Voyce’s text. The first ‘story’ in the book is entitled ‘The Durham 
Light.’167 The title resists immediate, clear meaning. There is a signifying drag, as ‘light’ appears 
momentarily as a noun. Instead, it is an adjective that has metonymically excised the noun 
‘infantry.’168 The adjective phagocytically destroys the signifier and absorbs the signified within its 
                                                
166 These terms are used in their Deleuzean sense. Meaning is the product of signification. Sense is an 
atmospheric quality that surrounds and suffuses texts (events, lives, organisations, societies etc.). For 
Delueze, nonsense has sense, but not always precise meaning. This distinction strikes to the heart of the 
many different attempts to understand and unriddle ‘psychotic’ speech, from various disciplines and medico-
social groupings: sympathetic listeners discern a sense behind, or buried within, the ostensibly meaningless or 
meaning-deficit ‘mad’ words of the ‘lunatic’. 
167 Though catalogued as stories, the separate sections of the text are not discrete entities and many have no 
narratives as such. All are interrelated meditations on Voyce’s experiences of psychosis, reflecting and 
refracting the same moments or ideas or beliefs, but with different emphases or from different angles. 
Formally, the text adopts the structure of the ‘kaleidoscope of schizophrenia’ that it takes as its content. 
Andrew Voyce, The Durham Light and Other Stories (Brentwood: Chipmunkapublishing, 2009) p.8 
168 One is reminded of Artaud’s narrative subject in his early novella The Nerve Meter (1922), who says ‘I am 
vacant by the stupefaction of my tongue’ and performs this double vacancy of signifier and signified by 
blanking out the central noun when describing the relationship between (his) words and his self: ‘All the 
terms in which I chose to think are for me TERMS in the literal sense of the word, that is, true terminations, 
borders of my mental   , of all the states to which I have subjected my thinking.’ Antonin 
Artaud, The Nerve Meter in Selected Writing ed. by Susan Sontag, trans. by Helen Weaver (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1988) pp.79-90 (p.83) 
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now-modified sign structure. Such usurpations are common in language, and swiftly the former 
adjective is accepted as a noun in the currency of the parole and thence to the langue. There is scant 
confusion when people speak of catching the late-running eight-oh-five, picking up a takeaway or 
ordering a pint of Old Brewery. The ambiguity, the hesitation with the Durham Light, in contrast 
to when discussing the ‘big bad’ in genre television, is nothing to do with grammar and everything 
to do with familiarity. 169  As with ‘LA’ and ‘ladies,’ convention ensures clarity of signification; 
esotericism undermines it.170 
 After the title, Voyce begins to talk elliptically about the Durham Light. (The capitalization 
serving as an instant lexical signifier that this is A Very Important Noun.) 
It became apparent to me whilst I was homeless for five years that a tactical move had occurred 
involving the Durham Light. My primary context was of course the coming of the Soviets (the five 
homeless years were 1986-1991). It was obvious that the British state had collapsed. I had no 
contact with any agency or arm of the British state except the DHSS where I obtained £4.77 a day 
no fixed abode (NFA) rate dole money. Previously, I had quite a lot of contact with the British 
state: – tax department, government offices, hospitals etc. – so it was obvious that the British state 
had collapsed. 
 
To an addressee not actively complicit, the opening sentence is opaque. The reference to a ‘tactical 
move’ and in the passive past (‘had occurred’) simultaneously erects and then dissipates an 
antagonistic agent in relation to Voyce; the Durham Light is agency as spectre, with all the ghostly 
associations that brings. Voyce’s attempt at establishing meaning, with his ‘primary context,’ is 
more successful for any addressee who already knows (or has intuited) that the Durham Light is a 
light infantry regiment. The shift to discussing geo-politics disturbs any smooth line of signification, 
as does the counter-factual positioning of the ‘coming of the Soviets’ explicitly in the years of 
glasnost perestroika and the highly visible decline and dismantlement of the USSR.  
Only by placing the Durham Light within the context of Voyce’s material, socio-historical 
condition can its sense, if not its meaning, become readable. Abruptly released from pre-
Thatcherite state apparatuses (‘tax departments, government offices, hospitals etc.’) as a result of 
the post-1979 renegotiation of the social contract and retrenchment of social support services, 
Voyce’s belief in the collapse or even the disappearance of Britain is easily explicable. Voyce is 
aware of the context-dependent nature of meaning in relation to his experiences. He has a section 
entitled ‘The Political Context’ and sees the story of his life: 
From Keynesian full employment and assured futures, to economic breakdown, to having money 
and buying things, to the end of the crisis of the Cold War, my fortunes seemed to lead me naturally 
to identify with the times. Not family, work, sport or any other story. I seemed to fit in with the 
                                                
169 For a discussion of the ‘big bad’ in the ‘Buffyverse’ see Kevin K Durand, ‘It’s All About Power’ in Buffy 
Meets the Academy: Essays on the Episodes and Scripts as Texts, ed. by Kevin K Durand, (Jefferson, North Carolina: 
McFarland & Company, 2009) 45-56. 
170  Clearly, these uncommon syntagmatic decisions are the result of individuals playing an idiosyncratic 
language game, or playing the collective game of language but with a faulty application of the rules. Hence, 
there is no shared community who could endorse the coding that ‘mentioning “America” could be taken to 
mean “Am Erica,” i.e., a coded reference to someone who thinks he’s a woman.’ Anonymous, ‘Language 
games, paranoia, and psychosis’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 37:6 (2011) 1099-1100, p1099 
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large social and political factors that I lived with.171 
 
Though literally wrong and though – in this context that is no true context – the Durham Light qua 
sign does not seem to mean much, or anything, yet the text in its totality makes (a kind of) sense. 
So, the Durham Light, the esoteric phrase, becomes infused with sense whilst remaining 
disconnected from a strict signification. 
The esoteric word does not have to be as apparent as an ‘etheric ovary’ or an 
idiosyncratically expanded ‘ladies’ sign. Consider the textual disruption caused by the fluctuations in 
signification around the neutral pronoun ‘it’ as it circulates through this interview excerpt. The 
esoteric word as a site of a sequence of substitutions undermines the certainty, whilst always 
keeping alive the possibility, of clear reference, broader meaning and fixed deictic relations: 
For me, it’s [smoking marijuana] my cure. Taking the edge away. Taking the pain away that I’ve 
been carrying all my life. And sometimes I need it to make me feel good. And I wish people 
understand where I’m coming from and then they’ll know what it’s like to be me and to live this hell 
that I’m living and that’s why I put ‘hell hell hell is cool and hot’. Well, it is cool and hot. Takes that 
pain away. The edge. Even though it’s freaky writing. And I love it. ‘cos this is me. […] So even 
though hell is cool and hot for me, that’s me.172 
 
The ‘it’ in question begins as an unproblematic reference to smoking marijuana, to soften an ‘edge’ 
(which might be the ‘edge’ or ‘pain’ of schizophrenic symptoms or of childhood sexual abuse, or of 
both, as two manifestations of the same signified). By the time the interviewee says ‘it is cool and 
hot’, ‘it’ has become both smoking marijuana and hell (in fact, a triple hell). With the final sentence, 
the third signified hell has been folded into this tripartite sign: ‘that’s me.’ 
 In a sense, contrary to the claim earlier, schizophrenese has not vanished, but only become 
invisible. The esoteric words, or the fluctuations in the signifying processes of the sign, (re)appear 
slowly, like traces on a bathroom mirror emerge in the steam. When, early in an interview, a person 
with lived experience of schizophrenia introduces a terminological disjunction in denotation – a 
specific separation in the order of the signifiers that connotes (rather than denotes) some 
un(der)specified separation in the order of the signifieds – a readerly response is to smooth over 
the supposed crease in the expression: ‘I think what I mean is that their [the voices] consciousness 
has gone into my mind and they’re talking to me, and the fact that they’re a strong consciousness 
has made my mind weak.’173 It is no great effort to be complicit in this utterance, and to read 
‘consciousness’ and ‘mind’ as synonymic. Indeed, it is less of an effort than to do otherwise. 
 As the interview progresses, however, the interviewee continues to make this understated 
distinction between their ‘mind’ and the ‘consciousness’ of the voices. This almost imperceptible 
                                                
171 Voyce, pp.54-55 A similar but far more explicit, detailed and dialectical interweaving of geo-politics and 
psychopathology can be seen in Gordon McManus’ analytical memoir From Communism to Schizophrenia and 
Beyond, (London: Whiting & Birch, 2012), co-authored with Dr Jerome Carson. The next chapter of this 
thesis will continue the analysis of signification-generation in ‘psychosis’ at the narratological level, where – as 
this reading of The Durham Light demonstrates – the processes operating at the level of the word, phrase and 
sentence naturally continue to self-propagate and disseminate. 
172 Interview transcript 
173 Interview transcript 
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split in the denotation, whereby in absolute literal terms, to denote ‘mind’ is (at least trivially and 
indistinctly) different from denoting ‘consciousness’, is the originary point for a line of connotation 
that widens through a dialectical exchange with an increasing rupture in the denotation. The 
esoteric word ‘etheric’ starts to circulate through the interviewee’s speech, as an emblem of and 
vehicle for the incomprehensible sense of what is being said: 
The voices say they are emptying my etheric mind, etheric engineering so that my mind becomes 
simple. As energy beings, we are, that’s etheric, etheric is the energy part of us, so what they’re 
trying to do is empty out all my energy from my energy being. And also, see our mind’s a collection 
of thoughts, things that we’ve studied and things that we’ve learned and energy that we were born 
with, and what they’ve done is they’ve gone into my mind and taken it, like broken my etheric mind 
up and taken it.174 
 
Retrospectively, this sense casts back some connotative meaning onto the distinction in denotation. 
The referent of denotation (‘mind’) has connotations of agency and rational personality; as a 
‘collection of thoughts, things that we’ve studied and … energy that we were born with’ it is an 
accumulative product of the individual’s life. Conversely, ‘consciousness’ is a blank, raw awareness; 
it is the uttering subject devoid of all biography, history, body or identity.175 It is pure voice, and in 
seeking to manifest, it drains ‘etheric’ mind from the voice-hearer. 
 Is it plausible and persuasive to construct a theoretical edifice on what could be dismissed 
as a verbal habit or characteristic agrammaticism? Such reading is certainly more in the province of 
the Freudian than the clinician. Indeed, part of what constructs linguistics as a science (in the minds 
of linguists) is a tradition of prejudice, from Saussure through Chomksy and beyond, that entails 
the exclusion of the real mistake from the rarified object of study. Such apparently telling errors are 
the reddest intellectual meat to other disciplines. Sometimes, schizophrenese texts yield up 
seemingly simple parapraxes, that provoke deterministic, diagnostic readings easily. When this 
interviewee shifts into the present tense, at a moment that seems grammatically and semantically 
inappropriate, it is no difficult task to psychoanalyse this ‘slip’ as admissible evidence in some 
therapeutic interrogation of the unconscious: ‘If I didn’t defer from university, my life would have 
taken a different path. If I didn’t trust these people, my life would have taken a different path.’176 
Obviously, the analysand here – so says the analyst – remains within the moment of their bad 
decisions. And this reading only becomes more obvious when put in the context of their voices, 
which continually criticise them for these decisions.177 Obvious, but also surely (and still obviously) 
                                                
174 Interview transcript 
175 ‘[R]ather, it designates exactly what linguists, referring to Oxford philosophy, call a performative, a rare 
verbal form (exclusively given in the first person and in the present tense) in which the enunciation has no 
other content (contains no other proposition) than the act by which it is uttered.’ Roland Barthes, ‘Death of 
the Author’ in Image Music Text, pp.142-148 (pp.145-146) 
176 Interview transcript [emphasis added] 
177 ‘Look at what you’ve done, your family the impact of you and the decisions you’ve made have impacted 
upon your family.’ If schizophrenese – as seen in Laing’s reading of Kraepelin’s dialogue with a patient in the 
previous chapter – and interpolation of voices, as reported by voice-hearers, is a triangulation through which 
hard-to-deliver (or hard-to-receive) messages are transmitted, then it is interesting to see within this reported 
speech a further triangulation. Grammatically, the voice-hearer’s text (albeit presented as the interpolation of 
their voices) cannot directly link the subject with the ‘impact’ upon the family. The first attempt breaks down, 
 108 
wrong. For the textual subject is neither caught within the past, nor is the past eternally returning, 
at least not returning in the way imagined by psychoanalysis, in the way that a misaddressed letter 
returns, unaltered as an object travelling between the fixed points of a triangle: person at point A; 
the unconscious/the postal system; person at point B.178 Rather, in the words Delueze, what this 
constitutes is: 
[A]n eternal return which is no longer that of individuals, persons, and worlds, but only of pure 
events which the instant, displaced over the line, goes on dividing into already past and yet to come. 
Nothing other than the Event subsists, the Event alone, Eventum tantum for all contraries, which 
communicates with itself through its own distance and resonates across all of its disjuncts.179 
 
And what, here, is the Event but psychosis itself? A psychosis that echoes through all the swerves 
of the narrating subject. Not only does it appear as double explanation for the parapraxes – that the 
‘thought disorder’ of the psychotic makes them prone to such erroneous speech acts and failures in 
linguistic performance180 and that psychosis is the repressed truth pushing for expression – but it is 
the impact (on the family, on the narrating subject) and the context for the bad decisions that 
caused the impact (deferring university, hanging out with a toxic social group) as well as the 
consequence of the impact (a derailed life, a troubled psyche). As a true Deleuzean Event, this 
psychosis can resonate in any direction, without heed to causality, corporeality or temporality. 
Further, psychosis is constitutive of the narrative subject. The esoteric sign is also the psychotic 
event. This is surely the sense to read into the account by a correspondent to the Schizophrenia 
Bulletin remarking of ‘the sentence extraordinaire’ that ‘invaded my consciousness that stayed there 
for years and often stamped its way into my reason to be.’181 
 The trauma of psychosis (which may or may not be the aetiological trauma prior to 
psychosis) violates the fixity of deictic relations constitutive of communication. When another 
interviewee recounts an instance of voice-hearing, consistency of tense is lost as the ever-present 
                                                                                                                                         
losing the connective ‘to’: ‘Look at what you’ve done, your family.’ The second attempt is fatally ruptured, 
syntagmatically: ‘the impact of you […] upon your family’ is split asunder by a triangulation between the 
voice-hearer (the ‘you’ object but also the speaking subject), the impacted family and the decisions. When 
‘decisions you’ve made’ erupt into the sentence, it is they, and not the voice-hearer, that takes the active form 
of the verb, that ‘have impacted’, and reach a syntactical resolution with the object, the sufferer of the impact, 
the family: ‘the decisions you’ve made have impacted upon your family.’ Culpability for the impact is 
displaced onto the medium (the decisions) for the impact, rather than on the originating agent (the subject). 
The means becomes the motive, of sorts. Or to use Deluezean terms, the Event or wound pre-exists, and 
brings about the conditions for its own actualization. It is difficult at this point not to think of the murderous 
triangulation machine formed by Roger, the lever and ‘Piggy a bag of fat.’ William Golding, Lord of the Flies 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1996) p.221 
178 Even if point B is, in fact, all points from point A onwards. For, even in this model, ‘eternal’ only means 
‘from now, for a period of time.’ 
179 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p. 201. There is an error here, for Delueze means not ‘individuals, persons, and 
worlds’ but ‘persons, worlds and God(s).’ For in his semiological system, ‘self is the principle of 
manifestation [deixis], the world is the principle of denotation [reference], and God the principle of 
signification [meaning].’ The terms favoured by this thesis are included in square brackets. Delueze, Logic of 
Sense, p.200 
180  In one simple conflation of terminology, it is easy to demonstrate how neurological psychiatry, 
intentionalist speech act theory and transformational-generative grammar are all the same warden pulling a 
shift on different cell blocks. 
181 Antoinette Rosa Ganim, ‘First person account: the delusion girl – diary of a schizophrenic’, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 13:4 (1987), 737-739, p.737 
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Event is re-staged in the telling: 
I was, for this one I was in the bathroom, that one I was in my room, the first one I was in my 
room and the second time I was in the bathroom and then the third time I was in the front room, 
so wherever I am in the house they started. Like they're starting on me now that I'm remembering 
them, just doing the entry. I went to have a relaxing sit down in the front room and the voices are 
saying “Get up, get up”.182 
 
Like an incantation that brings up the devil, to tell is to experience, and the moment of utterance, 
the textual now, and the reality around it shared with the interviewer is in a glitching co-existence 
with the moment uttered, the then: ‘wherever I am […] they started … I went to have a relaxing sit 
down […] and the voices are saying […].’ If this analysis begins to sound rather too esoteric itself, 
with talk of devils and incantation, that points to a flaw in the argument. It is not that the language 
calls out a mystical entity – call it devils, or voices, or schizophrenia – but that so-called mystical 
entity is absolutely and entirely a product of language. There is no way to not enact and to not hear 
the voices when speaking of them, for a voice – whether heard by many or heard by one, whether 
produced by a voice box, a ‘Dictaphone,’183 a divinity or neuropathology – is never more nor less 
than a voice. To remember the voice is to re-hear the voice, and to re-hear the voice is for the voice 
to be speaking, for speaking is only ever the moment of speaking. The voice-hearer, regardless of 
the details of how and in what way they hear voices, is always in the Event of voice-hearing, when 
they hear them, and when they remember or speak of hearing them. 
 The voices appear first and then acquire pronouns. They take them as a linguistic necessity. 
Observe how they progress from a focalized, depersonalized (or pre-personalized) state of pure 
voice – ‘the voices were going to make you drop it’; referring to themselves as ‘you’ the interviewee 
                                                
182 Interview transcript 
183 One interviewee feels, by turns convinced and unconvinced, that the voices he hears are produced by 
Dictaphone. Again, the moment of voice-hearing and the deixis of the utterance about the moment are in 
tension. The interviewee is – many years after the event – still unsure about a gift of a Dictaphone from a 
friend, wondering whether it was, as claimed, to help him compose raps, or to play an extended, torturous 
and retributive practical joke by plaguing him with disembodied voices and ‘they’re actually like lying to me.’ 
When the interviewee then refers to the Dictaphone in the room for the purpose of the interview, the status 
of his claim is unclear: ‘[n]ot like now, you’ve blatantly got one, you’re not lying to me, you know what I’m 
saying.’ It has (at least) a dual meaning. Along one line of signification, the interviewee is saying that he does 
not have some irrational fear of Dictaphones and is not worried when one is being used openly for a clear 
purpose, as in the interview.  
Along another line of signification, which is not an alternative but a wholly co-existent line, the 
interviewee is stating that the interviewer is open about voices and acknowledges them. The ‘lying’ of the 
interviewee’s friends consisted of them claiming they could not hear the voices, and that they were non-
existent, when they could, in his opinion, hear them as well as he. That the interviewee applies the same 
phrase, but in the negative, to the interviewer – ‘you’re not lying to me’ – connotes his recognition that the 
interviewer, as can be seen from the full transcript, has assiduously avoided any assertion that the voices 
might not be real (though, naturally, nor has the interviewer confirmed their objective existence). In 
contradistinction to the interviewee’s friends – long gone, broken with over their ‘lying’ about the voices – 
the interviewer actively wants to discuss the voices. The interviewer is ‘blatantly’ not in on the lie to pretend 
the voices do not exist.  
There is, of course, a third line of signification (and maybe many, many more): the interviewee may 
feel he has rumbled the interviewer in the process of lying, and is simultaneously ending the deceit and 
remonstrating. Such elements unavailable in a transcript, such as tone, gesture, volume and facial expression, 
would weight one line of signification over another. But, in doing so, they would not eliminate the other 
lines, which would remain, albeit in a diminished intensity. 
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adopts the voices’ deictic position, but leaves it unvoiced – through a fusion with the interviewee’s 
first person singular position (‘I’m going to push’) until they reach a full realization in the first 
person plural of their complete characterization: 
Then I was making some honey water for myself and the voices were going to make you drop it, so 
sometimes if I'm carrying something like a drink, a drink of water or some water, my thoughts will 
start off like ‘It's going to drop’ and, it'll get like, if I'm holding it like, the thought will be like ‘Oh 
it's going to drop, I'm going to push your arm’ or something like that. […] Like, they're not going to 
do it but my arm was just going to move. The voices ‘We're going to make you drop it’ and the 
voices ‘We're going to get you’[.] 
 
That this linguistic procedure, in the uttering, mirrors the voices’ increasing agency, presence and 
influence over the interviewee, in the event being uttered, is no coincidence, because these are one 
and the same thing. 
 This is not to say that psychosis is the hearing of voices. In fact, the argument is more to 
the contrary: the hearing of voices is a language effect of a psycho-social trauma or Event. The 
hearing of voices is, in some cases, clearly secondary. To an extent, voices may only come into (full) 
being when recounted for another listener. In this, voices operate like (Peircean) signs: they require 
the third figure of the Interpretant, and their tripartite relations of Thirdness are irreducible to a 
collection of relations of Secondness. The voices, then, are a sign created in the semiotic act. This 
stands whether the Interpretant position is occupied by an external other – the interviewer – or is an 
internal figure in a mentally voiced semiotic exchange. This would explain why, instinctively, an 
interviewee, when asked how they knew a particular ‘command hallucination’ came from a 
particular male voice, did not respond by saying that it sounded like that particular voice rather than 
their own. Instead, they addressed the content of the voice’s speech and replied: ‘Because it’s stuff 
that I would never think.’ The content of the utterances of voices pre-exists, and necessitates the 
existence of the voices. It has been established earlier that to disregard voice-hearing as a 
meaningless symptom of pathology is wrong-headed, but to search for meaning within a materiality 
or personality of the voices is mistaken too. The voices are a sign vehicle for the hearer to 
experience their content. Granted, some of that content may be communicated through the 
manifestation of the voice, but the manifestation is – by absolute semiotic necessity – a posteriori to 
the content. This is certainly Descartes in reverse, or inside out: ‘There is something to speak, 
therefore I speak, therefore I am.’184  
Undoubtedly, this process of manifestation is the sense (if not the meaning) of one 
interviewee’s claim that the voices have taken ‘etheric energy’ from their mind, ‘taken my mum 
from sprit and my grandmother from spirit.’185 For a second interviewee, a voice lays claim to a 
particular celebrity identity and thereby ‘is’ that person: ‘the guy said he was Nick Margerrison, so 
basically that he was him, you know what I mean, yeah.’186 Another interviewee makes a disjunction 
between the voices as heard and ur-voices, that are actively adopting these voices in order to 
                                                
184 This argument will be developed further in chapter five. 
185 Interview transcript 
186 Interview transcript 
 111 
vocalize: ‘Man, they use voices from back in the day, the voices like of a, like mates or girlfriend 
that I had back in the day or something like that. They just use them against me and that like man, it 
gets you wound up and that.’187 Interestingly, this reveals that ‘voices’ itself is an esoteric word, 
hiding in plain sight. Though one of the signifieds that it generates is of voices (real or not, heard or 
not, voiced or not, etheric or just a mate’s), this does not exhaust the esoteric word, and is just one 
possible line of signification, itself spawning a multitude of further lines. But the esoteric word 
‘voices’ is a signifier forced to approximate at an incommunicable sense: there is a ‘that’ which pre-
exists the voices. What might that inexpressible be? 
 Here, Kristeva’s dual-modality model of language, as initially outlined in her 1974 doctoral 
thesis La Révolution du langage poétique, can prove useful. The expressible domain of the signifier, 
where signification (both connotation and denotation, for Kristeva) can occur, is conceptualized as 
le symbolic, where meaning is constituted according to socio-historically constructed laws. This 
signification is not merely linguistic, but encompasses all semiotic relations. Similarly, these 
structuring laws are not merely legal, and not merely explicit and standardized, but also 
idiosyncratic, contradictory and implicit. Everything that might be understood by the term 
semiotics or semiology would fall into le symbolic, whilst the other modality, confusingly called le 
sémiotique, is the domain of unconscious signifieds, comprising bodily instinctual drives. These two 
domains are distinguished by co-dependent signifying processes that are in permanent dialectic. 
Putting aside the metaphysics of an unobservable unconscious or unquantifiable drives, 
Kristeva’s model has explanatory power when analyzing the relationship between signifiers and 
                                                
187 Interview transcript. On the recurrence of the third person plural pronoun, it is worth noting a 2015 study 
of word use that took 77 first-person accounts from the Schizophrenia Bulletin as its data set, using mood 
disorder accounts from the Anxiety and Depression Association of America website as a non-psychotic 
control. Observing an increased incidence of ‘they’ in the accounts written by people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, the authors suggested ‘this is consistent with the externalizing bias observed in cognitive 
neuroscience studies of patients with schizophrenia. It may also reflect a shift in people with schizophrenia 
towards thinking of self as other.’ Leaving aside whether these two conclusions might be either different 
formulations of the same thing, or mutually contradictory, it is hard to see what other grammatical resource is 
available to a person speaking of voice hearing other than the third person plural pronoun. Necessarily, then, 
any attempt to communicate the experience of voice hearing becomes performative of an externalizing bias 
and/or a thinking of self as other, by the constraints imposed by the English language. S K Fineberg, S 
Deutsch-Link, M Ichinose, T McGuinness, A J Bessette, C K Chung and P R Corlett, ‘Word use in first-
person accounts of schizophrenia,’ The British Journal of Psychiatry, 206 (2015) 32-38, p.35 
The same paper also described how those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia spoke less of ‘ingestion’ 
and more of ‘religion’, thereby demonstrating the ‘external bias’ further. Quite how a thoughtful meditation 
on a personal relationship with God (in addition to a social relationship to a synagogue and a philosophical 
intellectual relationship with Judaism) as seen in Schizophrenia Bulletin 22:1 (1996) might show ‘less self-focus’ 
(Fineberg et al, p.35) than a person describing how they regulate their anxiety by watching what they eat is not 
immediately, intuitively clear. Interestingly, the Jewish account-writer’s language exhibits a distinctly Jewish 
resonance, as the rhetoric, syntax and tone – and not merely the content – serve to interpolate the narrative 
subject as an observant Jew. Consider how one sentence echoes both the archaic grandiosity of English 
language translations of Jewish Scripture, as well as the, by turns defiant and defensive, well-worn response to 
the Shoah: ‘I must thank him [author’s father] for undergoing such an ordeal and to him I must say, “Never 
again.”’ To a Vygotskyan, this reads more like an internalizing than externalizing bias. (Anonymous, ‘First 
person account: social, economic and medical effects of schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 22:1 (1996) 183-
185, p.185) 
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signifieds in schizophrenese.188 Underpinning Kristeva’s le sémiotique is an instable, heterogeneous 
and infinite syntagam: the semiotic chora. Stripping away the references to sphincters and wombs, 
the chora appears as a mass of raw phonic material that can give rise to subjectivating positions, 
signs and codes: ‘Neither model nor copy, the chora precedes and underlies figuration and thus 
specularization, and is analagous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm […] We emphasize the regulated 
aspect of the chora: its vocal and gestural organization is subject to what we shall call an objective 
ordering which is dictated by natural or socio-historical constraints.’189 There are two important ideas 
to take from this. First, that the chora ‘that “precedes” symbolization is only a theoretical supposition 
justified by the need for description.’190 Secondly, it is a theoretical supposition that does away with 
any possibility of schizophrenese (or any minoritarian langue) as ancillary, secondary, diminished, 
deficient or disordered in relation to some majoritarian langue. With the chora in place as a 
theoretical construct, with different langues developing from varying social relations and physical 
realities acting on the shared raw material, disordered language or FTD can go the way of all 
prejudices dismissed as ableist in the field of disability studies. Schizophrenese is a linguistic 
codification of different, and perhaps more easily discernable, relationships with the inexpressible 
welter of signifieds that underpins all semiotics. 
The emergence of the voices, their attainment of a form of expression191 (an identity) and 
their interpolation into the discourse with the assignment of a pronoun matches Kristeva’s concept 
of the thetic phase which establishes the positions constitutive of the ‘realm of signification’ or le 
symbolic:  
We shall call this break, which produces the positing of signification, a thetic phase. All enunciation, 
whether of a word or of a sentence, is thetic. It requires an identification; in other words, the subject 
must separate from and through his image, from and through his objects. This image and objects 
must first be posted in a space that becomes symbolic because it connects the two separated 
positions, recording them or redistributing them in an open combinatorial system.192 
 
Not only does this, in the case voice-hearers at least, allow for a replacement of the phrase 
‘psychotic break’ with its connotations of irrevocable damage and medical other-ing with ‘thetic 
phase’, but it also re-emphasises that something conceptualized as a symptom of underlying neuro-
                                                
188 As Guattari says, Kristeva imports a Chomskyan ‘innateism of universals’ into the chora and reduces 
‘linguistic semiologies’ to a question of subjects, rather than social structures. ‘In order to be delivered from 
the personological polarities of communication, we must refuse to be imprisoned by the hypothesis of a self-
enclosed signifying unconscious subjectivity.’ Félix Guattari, The Machinic Unconscious, trans. by Taylor Adkins 
(Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011) [1979], fn.20, p.335  
 Indeed, Kristeva essentially outs herself as a Chomskyan, albeit one that has reversed through 
Freudian psychoanalysis. Hers is a generative grammar of the unconscious. See Julia Kristeva, ‘The Speaking 
Subject’, in On Signs, ed. by Marshall Blonsky (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) 210-220. 
189 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. by Margaret Walker (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1984) [1974], pp.26-27 
190 Kristeva, Revolution, p.68 
191  In terms of the signifier and medical semiology, this is the moment when the wholly subjective 
phenomenological experience of the symptom gives way to the communicable object of medical enquiry in 
the form of the sign. As Barthes says: ‘the symptom corresponds to the substance of the signifier, the sign 
belongs very broadly to the form of the signifier.’ Barthes, ‘Semiology and medicine’, p.206 
192 Kristeva, Revolution, p.43 
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biological dysfunction (hearing voices) can be explained fully as a socio-linguistic phenomenon: an 
idiosyncratic calibration with the dominant symbolic order. This thesis is keen to avoid mystifying 
metaphysics. This idiosyncratic calibration with the dominant symbolic order is nothing more 
baffling than, for example, the disjunctive disempowerment experienced by a victim of childhood 
sexual abuse whose account and testimony is repeatedly denied, as described by Wilma Boevink at 
the close of the previous section. 
 Ultimately, this analysis returns to the opening quotation from Lacan, in which the 
different signifiers – the signs on male and female toilets – reintegrate into and thereby alter that 
signified. Schisms in the domain of the signified, by which is meant tangible interpersonal, socio-
historical events as experienced by Boevink and the rejection of their subsequent discourse, provide 
the conditions for the esoteric signifiers characteristic of schizophrenese (but present within all 
codings). That these esoteric signifiers then serve to recapitulate such schisms is but the completion 
of the dialectical circle. Schizomimetically, the esotericism of schizophrenese infects the diagnostic 
discourse. There is no thought disorder within schizophrenese as acute as that in the diagnostic 
discourse about schizophrenese. Similarly, ‘schizophrenia’ – as this and the previous chapter 
illustrates – is clearly an esoteric word. The inexpressibility of its meaning, in exquisite tension with 
the palpability of its sense (for who ever failed to recognize madness without ever understanding 
it?), disrupts all nosological attempts to stabilize its denotation into diagnostic validity or its 
connotation into diagnostic reliability. 
Schizophrenese throws down a challenge not just to resistant interlocutors, unable or 
unwilling to find moments of complicity, but to the disciplines of linguistics and psychopathology. 
It offers a semiotic which is markedly different, but different in a fundamentally similar way. The 
utterance in schizophrenese makes sense of the ‘schizophrenic’ experience (the Deluezean Event of 
psychosis). This sense, though, not only cannot be rendered in strict, fixed meaning, but actually 
makes sense through a disruption of ‘standard’ modes of signification, reference and deixis. Yet, in 
an important reflexive point, schizophrenese’s difference is similar to other languages, in their 
realities as a mass of heterogeneous, conflicting paroles united around an always-idealised langue. The 
esoteric word, the temporally displaced moment, the blurred spatial relations between interlocutors, 
and the twisting, self-defeating ambiguities of signification all comprise the necessary constitutive 
elements of speech as a process operating at the liminal meeting place between internal, so-called 
psychological semiological systems and external, social semiological systems. 193  As Barthes 
observes: ‘[s]emiologically, each connotation is a starting point of a code (which will never be 
reconstituted), the articulation of a voice which is woven into the text.’194 Small wonder, then, that 
                                                
193 ‘So-called’ psychological because this thesis holds, in the tradition of Vygotsky and Vološinov, that the 
individual consciousness, as construct and producer of its external and internal speech, is always a socio-
historically and inter-subjectively constituted entity. The ‘internal’ and ‘external’ here might be better 
understood as ‘unvoiced’ and ‘voiced.’ Though, this naturally raises the thorny question of a distinction 
between ‘internal’ voices that may appear, to the subjective self, as ‘voiced’ or as ‘unvoiced.’ 
194 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. by Richard Miller (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) [1973], p.9 
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schizophrenese proceeds through connotation rather than denotation. The polysemy of words and 
the polyphony of the narrative self demonstrate that the potentiality of schizophrenese, the 
manifestation of the ‘psychotic’ communicative (as emblematic of the socio-economic) position, is 
a product of language and signification, and of the exact same coding mechanisms and raw semiotic 
material (chora) as any and all other languages. 
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Into the semiotic chora; away from metaphysics and materialism 
Schizophrenics come to us, then, always already de-centered. Authors in every way un-authorized, 
they are entirely without essence, quintessentially Derridean.195  
 
Bitch is washing her hands. We can say a lot more but we don’t want to.196 
 
Whether or not the point is proven that schizophrenia is a disease of speech, it is certainly beyond 
doubt that it is not solely a disease of speech. The speech of schizophrenics, like all speech, operates 
within the context of a gesturing body; it is a somatic text.197 A biosemiotic reading of patients – 
which incorporates the sign generation of the speaking body into a heterogeneous text with the 
linguistic signs of their speech – would offer considerably more insight to clinical assessments of 
cognitive function than an analysis of the decontextualized, disembodied speech. Andreasen noted 
the vital embodiedness of speech in her papers describing the TLC: ‘[i]f deprived of the patients’ 
gestures, facial movements, and intonational patterns, however, raters are likely to misunderstand 
and misinterpret portions of what is said and to overestimate the severity of thought disorder.’198 
As James Goss, building on McNeill’s Growth Point theory notes: ‘[c]overbal gestures convey 
information that either reinforces the content of speech or provides complementary information 
that is related to, but different from, what is in speech.’199 Goss continues: 
These are also two opposing semiotic, analytic speech versus imagistic gesture. The meaningful 
shapes and motions that arise in gestures constitute imagistic thought that is global and synthetic, 
where the whole determines the meaning of the parts. In contrast, spoken language is analytic, 
segmented, and operates from the bottom up as linguistic units are combined linearly and 
hierarchically into meaningful constructions. These two opposing semiotic modes exist in an 
unstable relationship that is resolved dialectically through the semantic and temporal integration of 
speech and gesture. Analytic speech and imagistic gesture must be coordinated to form one 
coherent utterance through the unpacking of GPs [growth points].200 
 
This biosemiotic model and the embodiment (and by extension social embeddedness) of speech is 
a ground zero of pragmatics and is fundamental to this thesis. 
 This chapter’s analysis of schizophrenese has drawn on the deictic disturbance portrayed 
variously by Rochester and Martin, Rosenbaum and Sonne, and Wróbel, and then reflected these 
findings back onto the linguistic and semiotic theories of Peirce and Jakobson, and the 
philosophical writings of Deleuze and Guattari in particular. However, conceptualisations of the 
relationship between the body and schizophrenese, in avoiding shattering upon the jagged Scylla of 
(post)Lacanian psychoanalytic metaphysics, have become caught in the whirling Charybdis of 
neurological materialism. In the current prevailing research, schizophrenese is only aetiologically 
pertinent as a symptom directly relating to underlying neuro-structures and neuro-functions, to be 
                                                
195 Lee R Edwards, ‘Schizophrenic Narrative’, The Journal of Narrative Technique, 19:1 (1989) 25-30, p.28 
196 Interview transcript 
197  Perkins lists ‘gesture and gaze’ alongside neurobiology, social context and memory as influences on 
communication disorders to be accounted for within the developing discipline of clinical linguistics. (Perkins, 
p.926) 
198 Andreasen (1979b), p.1329 
199 James Goss, ‘Poetics in schizophrenic language: speech, gesture and biosemiotics’, Biosemiotics, 4 (2011) 
291-307, p.296 
200 Goss, pp.297-298 
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metaphorically represented by the sign products of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
the imaging of blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal changes or positron emission 
topography (PET). 
 As Slaby and Choudhury (2012) argue, there is a need for a critical neuroscience that 
integrates the registers of the social and the neural into a holistic dialectic model: 
[A] critical neuroscience [must] work out […] how to overcome the gap between social and neural, 
how to develop conceptual vocabularies and frameworks that overcome this stark distinction, and 
how to empirically study phenomena […] with a view of the situated brain and nervous system. This 
goal would take as a premise that the brain and nervous system are nested in the body and 
environment from the outset and that their functions can only be understood in terms of the social 
and cultural environment.201 
 
Whilst the technology and insights of neuroscience have advanced considerably over the past 30 
years, the linguistic characterisations of symptom as object of study remain in suspended animation. 
When working with a conceptualisation of schizophrenese as ‘positive FTD’ comprising ‘looseness, 
peculiar word usage, peculiar sentence constructions, and peculiar logic’ 202  and a supposed 
schizophrenic ‘deficit in […] paralinguistic or pragmatic abilities including the interpretations of 
metaphors, understanding of jokes, sarcasm, or emotional prosody,’203 researchers Whitney and 
Kircher (2009) are working with assumptions and prejudices that – in research terms – are 
positively antediluvian (despite their ghostly haunting of the DSM-5). In rooting their meta-study’s 
conceptualisation of the object of study in such unproven (or positively disproven) assumptions, 
Whitney and Kircher are studying an unreal object and then mapping it to techno-imagistic 
representations of a material reality. 
 It would be unfair to dismiss these studies as the new phrenology, as the instability or non-
existence of the speech objects is captured in the contradictory and inconclusive results produced 
through the functional and structural analyses of the brain. Whitney and Kircher find insufficient 
proof to support a direct mapping from symptom (FTD) to function (aberrant temporal activation 
patterns) to structure (reduced superior temporal gyrus). They would be no more successful if they 
had attempted to map Schreberian rays onto neuro-functions and structures. Similarly, a meta-study 
trying to analyse the relationship between the right hemisphere and ‘non-literal language’ 204 
conceptualised as a ‘heterogeneous linguistic entity of speech forms that go beyond the literal 
meaning of the words and requires the ability to process more than the literal meaning of an 
utterance in order to grasp the speaker’s intention [which] includes metaphors, proverbs, idioms, 
irony, sarcasm, and metonymy,’ is chasing a phantasm. The words ‘go beyond’ and ‘more than’ are 
                                                
201 Jan Slaby and Suparna Choudhury, ‘Proposal for a critical neuroscience’, in Critical Neuroscience A Handbook 
of the Social and Cultural Contexts of Neuroscience, ed. by Suparna Choudhury and Jan Slaby (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2012) pp.29-51 (p.33) 
202 Corin Whitney and Tilo Kircher, ‘Language lateralization in patients with formal thought disorder’, in 
Language, Lateralization and Psychosis, ed. by Iris E C Somer and René S Khan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) pp.169-180 (p.168) 
203 Whitney and Kircher, p.170 
204  Alexander Rapp, ‘The role of the right hemisphere for language in schizophrenia’, in Language, 
Lateralization and Psychosis, pp.147-156 (p.147)
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indicative of a spatial and quantitative measuring of the meaning of words that has no grounding in 
observable language acts. The supposed schism between literal and non-literal meanings is a blunt 
re-importing of the very crude cerebral bilaterality that recent neuroscience has nuanced and 
problematized. Would Rapp know if he was being literal or figurative when responding to a 
question about his health with ‘I’m fine,’ and how can the role of social context and addressee in 
defining the literalness of speech act be plotted against his linguistic football pitch schema, let alone 
against the (still) mysterious functions and structure of the brain? In both the Saussurean 
conventionalised linguistic sign and the Peircean symbolic (and also mostly in the iconic) sign, there 
is an inherent metaphoric component in the very association of signifier with signified. Indeed, 
Peirce’s general theory of the sign, that it ‘is something that stands to someone for something in 
some respect or capacity’ gives all signs (and therefore all words, phrases and discourse) a 
fundamentally metaphoric nature.205 
 There is neither reason nor means for this thesis to challenge the generalised assertions of 
neuroscience regarding schizophrenia, of which Razafimandimby et al’s conclusion is typical: 
‘results suggest that reduced leftward lateralization for language is stable over time and may 
correspond to an abnormality of language-related brain organization in schizophrenic patients.’206 
But there are two important criticisms to propose. First, neuroscience does not understand (nor 
wants to understand) the structural and functional nature(s) of the speech it purports to study. 
Indeed, in extremis, neuroscience invents a more stable, easily classifiable but essentially false object 
of study in an unrecognisably neutered and reduced representation of speech or language, 
advancing the reductionist Chomskyan trend to make the creatively chaotic, polyphonic social 
dynamic of language a sequence of pulses and flows in a disembodied brain. Secondly, despite the 
well-known responsive plasticity of the brain (the discovery of which is one of the foremost 
cultural successes of neuroscience), neuroscience now assumes a linear, one-way causal relationship 
between brain structure and form, and schizophrenic symptoms. 
 In its ultra-materialism, neuroscience stumbles into metaphysics, with its construction of 
an idealized, hyper-delineated and defined language, and its metaphorical ‘mapping’ onto equally 
idealized, hyper-delineated and defined structures and functions of the brain. Predominantly, this 
marriage of metaphysics and materialism is mediated through technologically generated 
representational image metaphors, and equally metaphorically inflected language-based cognition 
and communication tests. In this, neuroscience falls foul of the trap Kristeva posits as at play 
within literary signification: 
                                                
205 Peirce, ‘Logic as semiotic’, p.99 
206  Annick Razafimandimby, Olivier Maïza and Sonia Dollfus, ‘Functional imaging studies on language 
laterialization in schizophrenia patients,’ in Language, Lateralization and Psychosis, pp.133-146 (p.141) It is also 
worth noting that the schizophrenic brain is most often conceptualized as being deficient – with reduced, or 
decreased leftward lateralization – when presumably a positive construction – with increased, greater 
rightward lateralization – would be an equally truthful expression. This matches the linguistic-diagnostic 
tradition of characterizing schizophrenese as deviant, peculiar, empty, meaningless etc. This also seems to 
lend some neuro-anatomical support to Carroll’s ‘perfectly balanced mind’ productive of portmanteau words.  
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[I]nstead of following denotative sequences, which could lead, from one judgement to another, to 
the knowledge of a real object, literary signification tends toward the exploration of grammaticality 
and/or toward enunciation. Mimesis is, precisely, the construction of an object, not according to 
truth but to verisimilitude.207 
 
In place of a metaphysics of materialism, this thesis asks: what can be logically inferred from the 
close semiotic analysis of schizophrenese? The Kristevan semiotic chora – if filtered of some of its 
Lacanian excesses – has been shown to be heuristically successful in the previous section, and 
serves logically as a pre-existing mass of signifying potential from which social (in Kristeva’s terms 
le symbolic) and subjective (in Kristeva’s term le semiotique) codes can be generated. Such an analysis 
suggests that the structure and function of the brain (and their metaphoric renderings) are the 
dialectically established traces of idiosyncratic formations of the chora. If schizophrenese – as 
socially constructed code employed by a semiotically constructed subject in specific speech acts 
(internal and external) – pre-exists any individual brain (as it surely must today), then the 
schizophrenic brain and function, in addition to the speaking subject, must be constructs of that 
language as one of many potential (and overlapping and interacting) systems forming out of the 
chora. 
 This thesis has consequential implications for the aetiology of schizophrenia, in the light of 
ever-unsuccessful attempts to establish a genetic, or viral, environmental or other exogenous cause. 
If language – and specifically a schizophrenese langue code – is the (or a) disease vector, then it has 
to have developed dialectically with a (genetically encoded) sensitivity to disruptive secondary 
codes. Chicken-and-egg speculations of primogeniture are pointless here, not least as 
schizophrenese – as any code or langue – is diachronically dynamic. Instead, it is worth considering 
the radical and idiosyncratic research of Timothy Crow into the aetiology of schizophrenia. Crow 
has built a thesis over several decades that presents schizophrenia as an evolutionary genetic 
development coincidental with the ‘birth’ of homo sapiens and the ‘big bang’ of language competence 
and brain lateralization. An early Crow paper noted the possibility of a ‘virogene’ contributor to 
schizophrenia, whereby a viral sequence is integrated into the human genome, whilst broadly 
arguing against a viral component in schizophrenia’s aetiology.208 The (evidenced) schizophrenese 
langue and the (posited) genetically determined sensitivity to secondary codes (and the subsequent 
synthesising of schizophrenese) could plausibly have developed in a similar way. 
 Of greater significance is Crow’s hypothesis regarding the interwoven evolution of 
language and psychosis. For Crow, language ‘[a]s the characteristic that is associated with the 
success of the species … is a correlate of the universality of psychosis.’209 (Crow is, here, referring 
very specifically to the uniform prevalence of schizophrenia(s) across geographies, ethnicities and 
                                                
207 Kristeva, Revolution, p.57 
208 Timothy Crow, ‘A re-evaluation of the viral hypothesis: is psychosis the result of retroviral integration at a 
site close to the cerebral dominance gene?’ British Journal of Psychiatry, 145 (1984) 243-253 
209 Timothy Crow, ‘The ‘big bang’ theory of the origin of psychosis and the faculty of language’, Schizophrenia 
Research, 102 (2008) 31-52, p.37 
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economies.) Crow’s linking of the nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia to language is in accordance 
with the argument of this chapter: 
To the objection that language abnormalities are not always a feature I propose the answer that they 
are not only present but integral to the core syndrome – that the nuclear symptoms themselves are 
abnormalities of language – specifically that these symptoms are anomalies of the transition between 
thought and speech (ie production) and between speech (perception) and meaning.210 
 
Crow roots this in the unique cerebral torque of homo sapiens. Crow has explicitly mapped the four-
quadrant structure of the brain onto Saussure’s semio-linguistic theory, whereby Broca’s area is the 
signifier-producing area and Wernicke’s the signifier-perceiving area, and each is linked across the 
hemispheric divide with a non-dominant quadrant filled with mirroring signifieds.211 Of course, 
Derrida’s reservation about seductive spatial metaphors is relevant here. It is simply too early in 
neuroscience or semiotics to say in what literal way a hemispheric quadrant could be the physical 
location of signifieds. It is safer to locate signifieds where they are observable (through their 
signifiers): in human culture and interactions. As a functional model though, Crow’s torque sits well 
with the theory of schizophrenese presented in this chapter.212 
 
Broadly, this thesis agrees with the inter-relatedness of genes, neuro-anatomy and function, socio-
historical conditions and language, but stresses the primacy of socio-historical conditions and 
language – chronologically and causally, individually and collectively. Again, this thesis takes the 
position that language, in all its heterogeneity, is a social product. 
Whilst Crow searches for an aetiological, genetic narrative, this thesis gives a synchronic, 
observable account. Additionally, with reference to the semiotic chora, this thesis argues that rather 
than language and schizophrenia being born through the same – genetically determined – 
speciation event, language (which always contained this schizophrenese) pre-exists schizophrenia at 
both the level of the individual and the species. Rather than there being a genetic change which 
allowed a language-use ‘big bang’, language was the epigenetic origin of the change. It is outside the 
                                                
210 Crow (2008), p.38 
211 Timothy Crow, ‘The nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia reveal the four quadrant structure of language 
and its deictic frame’, Journal of Neurolinguistics, 23 (2010) 1-9 
212 Figure taken from Crow (2010), p.5 
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scope of this thesis to prove this, but it seems a reasonable theory, as other primates (and other 
species) have demonstrable language-acquisition skills, and as pre-linguistic indexical and iconic 
semiotic codes are meaningfully interpretable by (perhaps all) non-linguistic organisms, and that the 
conventionalised symbolic code of language surely developed from indexical and iconic codes.213 
That schizophrenese may be the epigenetic locus and vector of schizophrenia might be supported by 
the earlier quoted studies on bilinguals, or by Louis Wolfson’s therapeutic retreat from his mother 
English (and his mother) in Le Schizo et les langues (1970) and Ma mère, musicienne, est morte de maladie 
maligne mardi à minuit au milieu du mois de mai mille977 au mouroir Memorial à Manhattan (1984). 
In conclusion, schizophrenese is an observable langue. Whilst it is misguided to read 
schizophrenese parole as indicative of the pathological state (or otherwise) of an unobservable set of 
thoughts, a mind, psychological state or psychoanalytical transcendental bundle, these paroles can be 
used to form a speculative account of the langue. The langue itself – it has been argued – is an 
important aetiological locus of the ‘disease’, rather than simply a symptom. Additionally, it is a 
vector for the ‘disease’. Schizophrenese is not aberrant or deviant language but – as demonstrated – 
it is simply a collection of possible codes within an even larger range of codes constitutive of 
semiotics. (As mentioned, this chapter has focussed purely on language, but the following chapters 
will turn to other semiotics.) Schizophrenese itself is a permanent feature of language in its raw 
form – the semiotic chora – and this is another sense in which schizophrenia is a ‘disease’ of 
language. Schizophrenese does not function in isolation. All codes are culturally co-authored, even 
in their most idiolectic elements. This does not mean that the code is easily accessible to all within 
the social relations that produced it. Often, the code is deliberately constructed to be inaccessible to 
some co-authors. This is the essence of the secret minoritarian language: to create an alternative 
refuge from the majoritarian orthodoxy or oppression. Subjects might be genetically predisposed to 
a sensitivity to the secondary code interruptions discussed, and – though this is harder to quantify 
at this stage – ‘psychologically’ predisposed to a sensitivity to the fracturing impact on the subject 
of the secondary code’s interpolations into internal speech (as self-narrativising act). However, 
semiotics does not allow for a psychological element not reducible to genetics and social 
environment. Rather, what is called the ‘psyche’ or the ‘self’ is a constructed narrative, prone to 
deconstruction, reconstruction, degrees of translation and excision. It is to this narrative self that 
this thesis now turns. 
  
                                                
213 Something like this: a primate would point at a predator (an indexical sign); a primate hears the scream of 
another primate attacked by a predator (an iconic sign); a primate learns to point at a predator and scream (a 
symbolic sign). So language begins. For Crow, it is mate recognition rather than predator avoidance that is 
the core functional purpose of language. See Timothy Crow, ‘Precursors of psychosis as pointers to the Homo 
sapiens-specific mate recognition system of language’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 173 (1998) 289-290 and 
Timothy Crow, ‘Did Homo sapiens speciate on the Y chromosome?’ Psycoloquy 11 (001) (2000) 
<http://www.cogsci.ecs.soton.ac.uk/cgi/psyc/newpsy?11.1> [accessed 13 February 2016] 
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II 
TEXT 
Recovery and life writing 
 
Loss of self and bizarre thinking 
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Chapter Three: Death of the Memoirist 
Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all 
identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.1 
 
He apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as a pure event. To 
the extent that events are actualized in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: ‘My 
wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.’2 
 
Stories are increasingly a symptom of illness. Describing such stories as ‘a recognizable genre of 
popular culture,’ 3  sociologist Arthur Frank argues that storytelling is a therapeutically useful 
response to a life interrupted by illness. In his formulation, ‘[d]isease interrupts a life’4 and leaves 
the individual a ‘narrative wreck.’5 This wrecked self is then reconstructed through the telling of the 
illness story, a story in which ‘the self is being formed in what is told.’6 Although it would be an 
oversimplification of Frank’s theory to dismiss it as writing oneself well, that certainly forms a part 
of the process: ‘[s]tories have to repair the damage that illness has done to the ill person’s sense of 
where she is in life, and where she may be going.’7 
 Frank develops a schema of four different body types8 – disciplined, mirroring, dominating 
and communicative – and three different narrative structures – restitution, chaos and quest. The 
individual body is supposed to manifest itself through its story, in accordance with one of these 
narrative structures, and this story-body is then to function as testimony to be witnessed by others, 
both in specific contexts – the medico-clinical, the familial – and in general socio-political ones. 
Frank is clearly indebted to Kleinman (amongst others) and builds on Kleinman’s less mystical 
concept of the illness narrative as iterated in The Illness Narratives: 
The illness narrative is a story the patient tells, and significant others retell, to give coherence to the 
distinctive events and long-term course of suffering. The plot lines, core metaphors, and rhetorical 
devices that structure the illness narrative are drawn for cultural and personal models of arranging 
experiences in meaningful ways and for effectively communicating these meanings.9 
 
Kleinman’s clarity belies a certain naivety regarding communication and narrative. The illness 
narrative is simply so much pathological content bundled up into an expressive, signalling narrative 
that then yields itself up for reconstruction by the clinician. As Kleinman describes: 
                                                
1 Roland Barthes, ‘Death of the Author’, p.142 
2 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.169 
3 Arthur W Frank, The Wounded Storyteller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p.69 
4 Frank, p.56 
5 Frank, p.55 
6 Frank, p.55 
7 Frank, p.53 
8 This terminology might (rightly) cast doubt on the applicability of Frank’s theory to mental ill health. 
However, by ‘body’ Frank seems to mean the physical instance of the person. All events and illnesses are 
therefore bodily. Hysterical mutism or dysmorphophobia are bodily illnesses as generative of a body-self 
story as cardiomyopathy or the loss of a leg. Frank says he is adopting the concept from Kleinman (Frank, 
p.169) who defines it as ‘an organic part of a sacred, socio-centric world, a communication system involving 
exchanges with others (including the divine)’ (Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p.11) The question of the body will 
be addressed in the following section of this chapter. 
9 Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p.49 
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To fully appreciate the sick person’s and the family’s experience, the clinician must first piece 
together the illness narrative as it emerges from the patient’s and the family’s complaints and 
explanatory model; then he or she must interpret it in light of the different modes of illness 
meanings – symptom symbols, culturally salient illness, personal and social contexts.10 
 
Though the process of ‘piecing together’ might be an arduous and unattractive one, it is posited as 
an unproblematic possibility. Any ambiguity around meaning can ultimately be puzzled out. 
Despite having the best of intentions – narratively, clinically, humanely – Rita Charon 
arguably falls into this error in Narrative Medicine (2006), her manifesto for ‘medicine practiced with 
these narrative skills of recognizing, absorbing, interpreting, and being moved by the stories of 
illness.’11 Her passionate insistence that ‘we must be prepared to comprehend all that is contained 
in the patient’s words, silences, metaphors, genres, and allusions’ relies upon the possibility of a 
reader – clinician/diagnostician/critic/detective – capable of unriddling any and all texts, provided 
they have but the will. In such a catechistic discursive landscape, each question necessarily comes 
twinned with an answer of absolute perfection. Always, the solution takes the form of a reading – 
an ever-better, ever-deeper, ever-fuller reading: 
Listening and watchful clinicians must become fluent in the tongues of the body and the tongues of 
the self, aware that the body and the self keep secrets from one another, can misread one another, 
and can be incomprehensible to one another without a skilled and deft translator.12 
 
This is worryingly Messianic. The translator need only, after their ‘skilled and deft’ deep reading, 
call out ‘Rise, take up thy bed, and walk. And immediately the man was made whole.’13  
Charon is not ignorant of contemporary theories of narrativity and subjectivity; she 
certainly is not shy about making occasional mention of her PhD in English.14 Whilst recognising 
the influence of structuralist, post-structuralist and deconstructionist literary theories on notions of 
the self – at least as constructed by written narrative – Charon’s theoretical acceptance of the 
notion of ‘a fragmented “postmodern” self who realizes that he or she reflects all the 
discontinuities and ambiguities in the culture’15 evaporates the moment she attempts to apply her 
narrative and close reading skills in a clinical context. In an apparently not deliberately comic 
passage, Charon lauds how her ‘readerly powers of interpretation and imagination’16 allowed her to 
divine that a patient’s slow, painful death by cancer was a sorry occasion for sufferer, relatives and 
healthcare professionals all. Seemingly, reading fiction transforms people into godly empaths: 
                                                
10 Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p.49 
11 Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.4 
12 Charon, p.107 
13 The Bible, Authorized King James Version with Apocrypha, ed. Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997) John 5. 8-9. Such rhetoric is used in the cornerstone text of the US 
schizophrenia recovery movement. ‘Recovery is the urge, the wrestle and the resurrection. Recovery is a 
matter of rising on lopped limbs to a new life.’ (Patricia Deegan, ‘Recovery: the lived experience of 
rehabilitation’, Psychosocial Rehabilitation Journal, 11:4 (1988) 11-19 p.15) Deegan’s language constitutes the 
person with schizophrenia as both Jesus and the lame simultaneously; it is no longer physician but patient, heal 
thyself! 
14 For example, Charon p.146 or p.195. Charon’s thesis was on Henry James, which suggests a patience and 
meticulousness no doubt invaluable in clinical settings. 
15 Charon, p.73 
16 Charon, p.146 
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‘[b]ecause I have learned to be a close reader, I can follow the plight of this man and his wife, the 
urgency of their need, and the affective response of his caregivers to their suffering.’17 Again, 
Charon talks of ‘decod[ing] the complex secrets,’ ‘piece[ing] together’ and ‘crack[ing] the codes,’ 
and translating an ‘obliquely and fragmentarily reported’ narrative into a rich, complete – and by 
implication determinist – truthful narrative of the illness. Aesthetically, critics might feel that 
Charon has mostly translated the impactful laconicism of the case notes into the rather purple 
melodrama of her self-congratulatory text.18 
 This thesis has already argued that a form of translation error is taking place in the way that 
schizophrenia is being read. Using a Saussurean semiotic model, this thesis has suggested that 
schizophrenia should be interpreted as a distinct langue rather than a highly idiosyncratic instance of 
parole. This thesis has further demonstrated that language – schizophrenese or not – is 
schizomimetic, containing and manifesting the ‘symptomatology’ of ‘schizophrenia’. The work of 
this chapter will be to critically interrogate the idea that schizophrenia can be rendered in what 
might be termed an illness narrative and then decoded – be that Frank’s witnessing, Kleinman’s 
interpreting or Charon’s translating – to deliver up static, actionable clinical or pathological insights, 
a therapeutic blueprint for ‘repair’ (Frank) or ‘coherence’ (Kleinman). In doing so, this chapter will 
address problems of both narrative and the self. The key texts discussed will be Lori Schiller’s The 
Quiet Room (1994), Ken Steele’s The Day the Voices Stopped (2001), Pamela Spiro Wagner and Carolyn 
Spiro’s Divided Minds (2005), Elyn Saks’ The Centre Cannot Hold (2007), Anthony Scally’s Eyebrows and 
Other Fish (2007) and Henry’s Demons (2011) written by Henry and Patrick Coburn. All selected 
memoirs are authored or co-authored by people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (or related 
diagnosis, such as schizo-affective disorder in the case of Lori Schiller). These memoirs will be 
supplemented by three corpora of texts each claiming to offer direct access to first-person voice, 
and thereby, the illness experience of people living with a diagnosis: the first-person accounts 
published in the Schizophrenia Bulletin regularly since 1979;19 the publications of self-proclaimed 
‘mental health publisher’ Chipmunkapublishing; 20  and accounts from the Hearing Voices 
                                                
17 Charon, p.146 
18 As a serendipitous side note, the patient in question had what Charon calls ‘a history of schizophrenia’ 
(p.144). The patient is administered psychotropic medication on 22 October, so that by 28 October, he has 
relinquished active self-destruction (by jumping out of the window) for passive self-abnegation (lying in bed 
and wishing he could die), and is therefore restored to good mental health. Two different (and contradictory) 
narratives of the mental health intervention suggest themselves from this fragmentary vignette. The first 
might be called the moral imperative of psychiatry, which insists the patient serenely and sanely squares up to 
death rather than fleeing out the window. The second might be the humanitarian imperative, which insists 
that the patient be empowered to die with as much dignity and as little distress as is therapeutically possible. 
19  Providing, in part, the ‘in-depth textual reading’ Angela Woods notes is absent from the literature. 
‘Rethinking “patient testimony” in the medical humanities: The case of Schizophrenia Bulletin’s first person 
accounts:’ Journal of Literature and Science, 6:1 (2013) 38-54, p.39 
20 Chipmunkapublishing might be generously described as a costly and unsuccessful route for people with 
lived experience to become ‘published’ authors. In effect, the publishing house is a print-on-demand self-
publishing business. There is no inherent problem with this type of business, but Chipmunkapublishing 
charge over the odds and then proceed to sell a range of expensive, dubious ancillary services including 
workshops in marketing and neuro-linguistic programming ‘cures’ for psychosis. Worse, this receives Arts 
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Movement. These readings will be further supported by material generated from field research 
undertaken as part of this thesis. Ultimately, by placing schizophrenia memoirs and structuralist 
semiotic narrative theory in dialectical play, this chapter will offer some conclusions on what form a 
‘schizophrenia’ narrative might take, what theories of the narrative self can tell us about 
‘schizophrenia’ and what ‘schizophrenia’ can tell us about the narrative self. 
 ‘Schizophrenia’, with its delusions, its distortions of time, its disruption and diminishment 
of the self, poses an obviously greater challenge to this narrative therapeutic practice than terminal 
cancer or chronic pain. It is an illness that, as part of its symptomatology, disrupts narrative, and 
particularly any narrative-of-self. As Paul and John Lysaker (2006) note: 
Schizophrenia is often characterized by profound diminishments in the ability to experience and 
represent one’s life as an evolving story ... Beyond merely disorganized or implausible 
communications about facts, affects, thoughts and any of their contexts, these diminishments are 
intimately involved in disability and anguish and a sense of self that radically lacks depth and 
richness.21 
 
Kleinman, addressing hypochondriasis, claims that it ‘creates a reversal of the archetypal medical 
relationship in which the patient complains of illness and the physician diagnoses disease. Rather, in 
hypochondriasis the patient complains of disease … and the doctor can confirm only illness.’22 
Schizophrenia, with its early association with hypochondria, goes further and denies the dichotomy 
of illness and disease.23 As a disease, schizophrenia is known only by its illness form. As the DSM-
IV-TR states: 
No single symptom is pathognomonic of Schizophrenia; the diagnosis involves the recognition of a 
constellation of signs and symptoms associated with impaired occupational or social functioning.24 
 
Schizophrenia conceptually rejects Kleinman’s primary establishing terms; as a ‘constellation of 
signs and symptoms’ there is perhaps no discrete disease entity holding them within orbit. In 
Kleinman’s terms, there is in schizophrenia no disease at all, only illness(es). In narrative terms, 
there may be a form but no content, and that form – to build on Lysaker and Lysaker’s description 
– is the very collapse of narrative and the narrative subject. 
                                                                                                                                         
Council funding. In terms of editing, the texts appear to have received at most a cursory read through. 
Sometimes, not even that. This is useful for the purposes of this research as – without the usual mediating 
influence of editors and ghostwriters – the texts are entirely the product of the person with lived experience. 
But, for the authors paying Chipmunkapublishing, the process is counter-productive. Chipmunkapublishing 
books only exist notionally. They are rarely available in bookshops or university libraries. Even the British 
Library has a bare handful of the thousands of books on their back catalogue. Rather than getting the voices 
of the mentally ill heard, Chipmunkapublishing just extorts them and ghettoizes them; few are read or sold. 
21 Paul Lysaker and John Lysaker, ‘A typology of narrative impoverishment in schizophrenia: Implications for 
understanding the processes of establishing and sustaining dialogue in individual psychotherapy’, Counselling 
Psychology Quarterly, 19:1 (2006) 57-68, p.57  
22 Kleinman, Illness Narratives, p.195 
23 ‘Most incurable hypochondriacs are schizophrenics whose delusions are primarily concerned with their 
own bodies … Some genuine paranoiacs may perhaps also be hypochondriacs with delusions concerning 
their own health.’ Bleuler, p.288 Kraepelin also mentions the hypochondriacal nature of schizophrenic 
delusions in his taxonomic account of dementia praecox, within its description of the key psychic features of 
the illness (p.26), and also by ascribing hypochondriacal concerns to his clinical forms of simple depressive 
dementia (p103), agitated dementia (p.124), catatonia (p.134) and paranoid dementia gravis (p.157). 
24 DSM-IV-TR, p.299 
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 David Roe and Larry Davidson (2005) issue a defiant call for a ‘new story’ of the 
schizophrenic narrative. For them, these symptomatic narrative difficulties make the need for 
therapeutic narratives greater: 
It has been on the basis of the perception that people with schizophrenia become totally absorbed 
into their illness and thus lose touch with reality, that both narrative and self have been negated, 
leaving behind nothing more than an ‘empty shell’ of a person. Not only has this perception been 
shown to be false, it also has the effect of further abandoning the person to the illness, dismissing 
rather than inviting narrative.25 
 
On the surface, Roe and Davidson appear to welcome the ambiguities of narrative, and suggest 
these add to its potential curative properties, in contrast to less tolerant ‘accepted discourse or 
reason’ by which they mean the less flexible discourses of medical authority, illness prognosis or 
seemingly bulletproof statistical statements about suicide rates, unemployment and recurrence in 
schizophrenia: 
[T]he emerging self may contain the changes and vicissitudes associated with living with the illness 
while simultaneously preserving a contradictory sense of the person’s former life and projected 
future. While accepted discourse or reason would not be able to tolerate such opposing views 
existing side by side, narrative is flexible enough both to survive and to contain the apparent 
contradictions between self and illness.26 
 
However, such an approach, this chapter will demonstrate, can swiftly move from a valiant effort at 
emancipation to a tyrannical determinism. Although Roe and Davidson recognise that the re-
constructed post-illness self may not exactly resemble the self prior to schizophrenia’s ‘major 
interruption,’27 they only explicitly allow for the possibility that it would necessarily be a self that is 
different and better: ‘narrative is one of the few tools that enable the person to weave back together 
a sense of who she is that both incorporates and yet extends beyond who she used to be prior to 
illness and who she has become due to illness.’28  
There are many assumptions underpinning this approach. First, whilst acknowledging that 
the pre-illness and post-illness selves may not be identical, both are imagined to have a degree of 
fixity. This is evidently wrong, and is linked to a second assumption: the mistaken adoption of 
Frank’s (already dubious) interruption metaphor. A broken back resulting from a car crash might 
be an interruption to a life narrative,29  but no diagnostic or therapeutic discipline – be it the 
medico-neurological, the psycho-dynamic, the spiritual, the social constructionist, or a mixture of 
these – can point decisively to a point of interruption that constitutes an obvious break with the 
pre-existing life narrative or the pre-existing narrating self. Contrast this conceptualisation with the 
model of psychosis as a Deleuzean Event discussed in the previous chapter. As the quotation at the 
opening of this chapter demonstrates, the process of narration necessarily smooths any interruptive 
                                                
25 David Roe and Larry Davidson, ‘Self and narrative in schizophrenia: time to author a new story’, Medical 
Humanities, 31 (2005) 89-94, p.90 
26 Roe and Davidson, p.93 
27 Roe and Davidson, p.93 
28 Roe and Davidson, p.93 
29  Though, how quickly might it be incorporated seamlessly into any narrative to become apparently 
inevitable? ‘Driving like they always did, it’s amazing they did not crash sooner.’ 
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break into its unifying structure: once in the position as narrative subject, these illness narrators 
were indeed born to embody their wounds. This point will be proven in relation to those illness 
memoirs analysed within this chapter. The third assumption is the uncontested constructive and 
constitutive power of narrative. Roe and Davidson claim that: 
The process of narrating suggests there is a narrator, an active agent, a self, authoring a new story. 
The process of authoring the story, in turn, helps to consolidate and integrate a sense of self.30 
 
Yet what is schizophrenia if not evidence of how the processes of narrative and authoring can 
serve to dilute the agency of the narrator and disintegrate a sense of self? Charon notes the 
‘disruptive’ nature of narrative, ‘creating chaos out of linearity,’ 31  but ultimately sees these 
disordering impulses as being merely another form of order, and still appropriate for co-opting as 
tools in her decoding reading mission. 
It is important that this thesis does not fall into the aimless suspicion detailed by Ann 
Jurecic’s Illness as Narrative (2012), and become the product of another of the ‘literary scholars who 
value complexity over utility.’32 Jurecic rightly observes that the hermeneutics of suspicion has 
seduced critics into lofty dismissals of illness memoirs and illness narrative theories, and that this 
casual contempt is emblematic of a situation whereby ‘contemporary critics have become alienated 
from ordinary motives for reading and writing.’ 33  In plain language, this chapter will employ 
‘sophisticated or knowing’34 reading theories precisely to demonstrate a point highly pertinent to 
‘ordinary motives for reading and writing’: that these memoirs, and the illness narrative theories 
that often legitimise and promote their production, propagate myths – about the nature of the self, 
about the nature of ‘schizophrenia’ and about the nature of narrative – that are unhelpful and 
potentially harmful. 
At heart, these illness narrative theories briefly outlined all contain pernicious assumptions 
and barely concealed ethical judgements. Frank, for example, explicitly idealises the communicative 
body type over the others in his schema: 
Finally, because my objective is an ethics of the body, I am mixing three ideal types with one 
idealized type. My typology seeks to be normative not in a descriptive sense but in a prescriptive one. 
I want to show how the communicative body distinguishes itself from other body types. By 
specifying the communicative body as the undertaking of an ethical task, I hope to orient an ethics 
of the body.35 
 
As with any ethical system, there is an implicit model of unethical body (or ‘body-self’ or ‘narrative-
self’) behaviour: a refusal to communicate. A similar judgement can be seen in Frank’s three 
narrative types. The chaos narrative is a failure – if not an exact outright refusal – to communicate: 
In the chaos narrative, consciousness has given up the struggle for sovereignty over its own 
experience. … Thus just as the chaos narrative is an anti-narrative, so it is a non-self story. Where 
                                                
30 Roe and Davidson, p.94 
31 Charon, p.219 
32 Ann Jurecic, Illness as Narrative (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), p.12 
33 Jurecic, p.3 
34 Jurecic, p.3 
35 Frank, pp.51-52 
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life can be given narrative order, chaos is already at bay. In stories told out of the deepest chaos, no 
sense of sequence redeems suffering as orderly, and no self finds purpose in suffering.36 
 
Frank proposes merely to pity the chaotic non-self (although the word he uses is ‘honor’). 37 
Though he talks of recognising the chaos narrative, he still considers it a ‘pit.’38 Whilst he argues 
against denying, or refusing to witness, chaos narratives, or against any forcible corralling of the self 
out of a chaos narrative through a strong, re-inscribing psychotherapy, his conceptual structure 
necessarily presents the quest narrative as the ultimate good, which ‘speaks from the ill person’s 
perspective and holds chaos at bay.’39 
 Frank’s model of the communicative body on a quest narrative echoes the individualistic, 
consumerist values of late capitalism and post-modernity more overtly present in the recovery 
movement, which developed in the US in the last decade of the twentieth century and is now 
enjoying considerable success in the UK. Turner-Crowson and Wallcraft (2002) link the recovery 
movement explicitly to a ‘burgeoning “consumer empowerment” movement’ and ‘the emergence 
of strong consumer organisations.’40  Turner-Crowson and Wallcraft itemise recovery’s defining 
themes,41 which constitute an unsurprising blend of: non-deist spirituality and faith (‘finding and 
affirming the spiritual dimension as a means of access to life’s deeper meaning’); rugged individualism 
and self-reliance (‘[t]aking personal responsibility for one’s life’); a dissatisfaction with producer-led 
provision of healthcare and a disdain for professional expertise in contrast to the experience and 
intuition of the layman (‘the importance of hope … having been told by mental health professionals 
that prospects for recovery were slim or even non-existent’); a preoccupation with status (‘[c]hanging 
other people’s expectations’); a view of society comprising only small collective units (‘a support system, 
including family, peers and other friends’); self-aggrandizement and the insistence upon an heroic 
life-narrative of improvement and amelioration (‘[p]ersevering through pain, struggle’). From 
inception until 2005, with occasional hiatuses, the Schizophrenia Bulletin first person accounts’ 
prefatory blurb described correspondents as ‘consumers of mental health care.’42 (It was some years 
later when correspondents themselves started using the term to add to the ‘validity’ of their 
experience, and the opinions they formed as a consequence.)43 
                                                
36 Frank, pp.104-105 
37 Frank, p.109 
38 Frank, p.110 
39 Frank, p.115 
40 Judy Turner-Crowson and Jan Wallcraft, ‘The recovery vision for mental health services and research: a 
British perspective’, Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal, 24:3 (2002) 245-254 p.245 
41 Turner-Crowson and Wallcraft, pp.246-247 
42 Not that they were interested in any old ‘consumers’. The blurb advised clinicians to encourage ‘articulate 
patients, with experiences they believe should be shared’ to submit. It is no surprise that so few floridly 
psychotic accounts make it through such gatekeeping. See Woods (2013) for an analysis of one that slipped 
through.  
43 ‘I wished to establish my credentials as a consumer, a parent, and a professional to make certain points 
with validity.’ Barbara A Turner, ‘First person account: the children of madness’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 19:3 
(1993) 649-650, p.649 
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A 2008 literature review of the UK recovery movement concludes with an account of the 
ideological incompatibility of individualistic recovery and collective healthcare: 
[I]t is virtually inconceivable that statutory health care providers will ever fully embrace the recovery 
paradigm that involves self-management and has choice, hope, freedom and autonomy at its core. 
Furthermore, these values are extremely difficult to measure in a system that resolves around targets 
and outcomes. While there may be workers within the system that genuinely subscribe to recovery 
principles, they will struggle to practise according to those values in a system that pays only lip-
service to a philosophy that is very dependent upon human values and beliefs.44  
 
It is evident that ‘human values and beliefs’ must necessarily be individual; there can be no 
collective values and beliefs. The same implicit ideological stance can be seen in Professor Dr 
Michaela Amering’s preface to a 2009 collection of first person accounts from the Heaving Voices 
Movement calling for a (distinctly US consumer) model of healthcare predicated on a conception 
of the patient as empowered actant: 
Self-determination and individual choice of flexible support and opportunities, promoting 
empowerment and hope, and assistance in situations of calculated risk are the new indicators of the 
quality of services. In contrast to a deficit model of mental illness, recovery-orientation includes a 
focus on health promotion, individual strengths, and resilience.45 
 
The central problem with the recovery movement is that it is a narrative by definition written by 
the victors. It is one of Romme’s diktats: ‘stop being a victim and become a victor.’46 As G Thomas 
Couser notes, this is a problem intrinsic to the genre, for ‘autobiography as traditionally conceived, 
with its inherent valorization of individualism and autonomy presents its own barriers to people 
with disabilities.’47  It posits narrative subjects who are inherently empowered – with sufficient 
financial and educational capital – and thereby capable of actively re-moulding their healthcare. In 
place of the callous vicissitudes of rudderless fortune, the discourse emphasises moral strength, 
with actants operating within vacuums, free from the influences of social or economic forces, and 
exercising absolute control over the cast and boundaries of their world. 
 There are some fundamental problems with the moral and political ethos of proponents of 
various recovery movements and illness narrative theories, and these are reproduced and writ large 
in schizophrenia illness memoirs. The focus of these movements, these clinician-theorists and these 
patient memoirists is on ‘recovery’ but the prefix is troubling. Should illness narratives aim for a 
return to a previous state? In what sense is this possible? This manoeuvre, it will be shown, is based 
on an unhelpful contradiction. First, there is the assumption that a healthy, pre-illness self exists 
(and this is differently conceptualised with varying degrees of stability, unity and tangibility). 
Second, narrative attempts to reconcile the illness self with the pre-illness self, and the attempts at 
recovery (and a restoration of an idealised former state of mental health), require a series of tactical 
                                                
44 S Bonney and T Stickley, ‘Recovery and mental health: a review of the literature’, Journal of Psychiatric and 
Mental Health Nursing, 15 (2008) 140-153, p.150 
45 Professor Marius Romme, Dr Sandra Escher, Jacqui Dillon, Dr Dirk Corstens, Professor Mervyn Morris 
(eds.), Living With Voices: 50 Stories of Recovery (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS Books, 2009), p.i 
46 Romme et al, p.4 
47  G Thomas Couser, Signifying Bodies: Disability in Contemporary Life Writing (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2009), p.45 
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compromises. Accurate, or otherwise, prodromal prefigurements of the illness self are either 
discovered or written into the pre-illness self. As Alison Yung and Patrick McGorry (1996) noted 
with reference to post-recovery accounts of schizophrenia prodromes: 
Recall may be affected by a long delay between changes first occurring and obvious psychotic 
symptoms developing … It may also be influenced by “effort after meaning,” which refers to 
patients and families looking for an event that seemed to start all the changes and dating their 
histories from that point.48 
 
In so far as narratively recovering oneself is a process of remembering oneself, this therapeutic 
recovery mission is highly susceptible to long-established problems related to memory, especially 
the ‘effort after meaning’ illustrated by Frederic Bartlett in a well-known series of memory 
exercises. 49  Such a process of recovery thereby fundamentally alters that which is supposedly 
recovered. It is recovery as the staging of the impossibility of recovery. 
 This is not to play word games with the very ‘real world’ business of people suffering with 
the symptoms of psychosis looking for therapeutic relief from storytelling. Rather, this semiotic 
analysis will contribute to better reading and writing strategies to improve this process, thereby 
answering Jurecic assertion that ‘critics need other options, interpretive approaches that enable 
them to assemble meaning in the face of life’s fragility.’ 50  The hopeful enthusiasm of illness 
narrative theories, and their therapeutic potential, is highly seductive. Who could not be buoyed by 
the following account, and believe a useful curative tool or coping mechanism has been found for 
persons with a diagnosis of schizophrenia? 
Such narratives of how sequential processes and patterns affect the course of psychiatric disorder 
can provide insights into its pathogenesis. These insights reveal that although disability may be 
pervasive, initially tenacious and disheartening, it can be overcome in part or whole by creating a 
map that illuminates a pathway to emerging ability and generates a hopeful landscape in which 
recovery may be more readily imagined, encouraged and realized.51 
 
But consider what a grotesque misreading must be taking place when the above can be presented, 
without irony, as an interpretive response to Gogol’s ‘Diary of a Madman’ (1834).52  
What kind of map for successful navigation from madness could Gogol’s tale possibly 
offer? Titular madman Poprischin’s only pathway is ever-further and deeper into his delusional 
world; what he recovers is his fantasy, where he is the king of Spain. When immersed in his 
                                                
48 Alison Yung and Patrick McGorry, ‘The prodromal phase of first-episode psychosis: past and current 
conceptualizations’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 22:2 (1996) 353-370 p.355 
49 Frederic Bartlett, Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932) 
50 Jurecic, p.4 
51 David Shiers, Alan Rosen and Ann Shiers, ‘Beyond early intervention: can we adopt alternative narratives 
like ‘Woodshedding’ as pathways to recovery in schizophrenia?’, Early Intervention in Psychiatry, 3 (2009) 163-
171, p.164 
52 A similar paper compares Anton Chekov’s short story ‘The Black Monk’ to a narrative elicited from a 
person diagnosed with schizophrenia. Broadly, and with good intentions, the authors repeat the unjustified 
belief, based on a tenuous etymological link, that an education in the ‘humanities’ can make clinicians more 
humane. For their part, humanities scholars often attribute Chekov’s insight into the human malady to his 
medical training. This paper shies away from bold conclusions, offering seemingly meaningless ones instead: 
‘much more theoretical work is needed to put medical humanities, literature and medicine on a sound 
empirical footing.’ A A Kaptein, J J E Koopman, J A Weinman and M J Gosselink, ‘ “Why, why did you have 
me treated?”: the psychotic experience in a literary narrative’, Medical Humanities, 37 (2011) 123-126, p.126 
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psychosis, Poprischin can dismiss his psychiatrist as the Grand Inquisitor and is protected, by his 
delusions, from the ‘helpless rage’53 of his imprisoners. When the reality of Poprischin’s situation 
penetrates through to his consciousness, his distress grows in response: ‘Good God, what are they 
doing to me? They’re pouring cold water over my head! They won’t listen to me or come and see 
me. What have I done to them? Why do they torture me so?’54 Having plummeted to the very 
depths of delusion, Poprischin experiences a sudden clarity and confidence of thought, and a self-
assuredness (where the self is assured by the narrative it tells itself) which might be taken as signs of 
a successful illness narrative, were they not actually the very manifestations of his madness: ‘The 
path ahead is clear: everything is as bright as daylight. I don’t really understand why, but before this 
revelation everything was enveloped in a kind of mist.’55 Strangely, the theory and the practice of 
illness narratives do not seem to allow for the fact that in a first-person narrative anosognosia and 
recovery may be indistinguishable. Only by greater retreat into his delusions does Poprischin find 
respite from the sorrows of his condition; an ominous omen for what a recovery narrative might 
mean for schizophrenia.  
                                                
53 Nikolai Gogol, Diary of a Madman and Other Stories, trans. by Ronald Wilks (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1972), p.40 
54 Gogol, p.40 
55 Gogol, p.34. The ‘revelation’ in question is that the human brain is situated not in the skull but borne on 
the wind from the Caspian Sea. Perhaps this is what Charon means when she claims ‘illness also gives searing 
clarity about the life being lived around it.’ (Charon, p.97) 
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The body semiotic; the body schizophrenic 
Apparently Arab scholars, when speaking of the text, use this admirable expression: the certain body. 
What body? We have several of them.56 
 
I was simply sectioned again, detached from my real self, observing what was being done to me in a 
third-person perspective. When I said this to my psychiatrist after being rescued from the top of a 
multi-storey car park, he dismissed my comment by saying that ‘you certainly communicate your 
distress clearly.’ It was not even my own distress – I was totally separated from myself, not knowing 
what action I was taking, let alone considering how to ‘communicate’ to others. I was unaware of 
myself, and my psychiatrist was unaware of me. What he chose to see was nothing but the 
symptoms alone.57 
 
Frank’s schema of body types and Kleinman’s definition of the body as ‘a communication system 
involving exchanges with others’ provoke three important questions, the first two being inquiries 
for qualitative research and the third being a matter of conceptualization. To what extent do people 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia identify with the idea of being ill? To what extent do they identify 
that illness with their body? What concept of the body is appropriate for this thesis? The last of 
these questions will be addressed first, and then narratives produced by people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia will be analysed for the points of intersection between ‘illness’, ‘body’ and ‘self’. 
Can the body be conceptualized semiotically? Eco builds on Hjelmsev’s model of planes of 
expression and content, giving the definition that ‘a sign is always an element of an expression plane 
conventionally correlated to one (or several) elements of a content plane.’58 Within this model signs – 
or sign-functions as the term adopted by Eco – are generated when these two planes of expression 
and content correlate through a code. In this thesis, the body can be taken as space of 
manifestation for the expression plane, which in coded correlation with content – in this case, 
medico-diagnostic knowledge of the body – throws up a series of signs, which exist along the 
liminal surface of intersection between the two planes. To take a contentious claim, enlarged lateral 
ventricles in the brain constitute a sign of schizophrenia. This is but one possible sign that can be 
generated from this segment of the expression plane that is the semiotic body. For example, the 
same enlarged ventricles might – complementarily or contradictorily – be a sign of conduct 
disorder or some other mental illness. Beyond straightforward differences of diagnosis, the 
enlarged lateral ventricles might be a sign of the dominance of neurological methods for explaining, 
describing and defining behaviours and/or temperaments.  
Moving to a different register, this signifier – or sign-vehicle in Eco’s formulation – can 
also correlate with different signified content to construct a sign of a subject’s location in time and 
space. Having enlarged lateral ventricles – as a possible form of the expression plane manifesting 
on the body – means you are not living in Ancient Rome or Medieval Iceland, as no such way of 
segmenting the expression plane to create such expression forms upon the body existed then and 
                                                
56 Roland Barthes, The Pleasure of the Text, trans. by Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975) [1973] 
p.16 
57 Clara Kean, ‘Silencing the self: schizophrenia as a self-distrubance’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 35:6 (2009) 1034-
1036, p.1034 
58 Eco, p.48 
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there. There was neither the equipment nor the practice of performing such a scopic act – so the 
expression form could not reasonably exist as a thing to be seen – nor was there the conceptual 
landscape for the content form of the sign, until brain anatomy was elucidated by Renaissance 
investigators, notably Da Vinci, da Carpi and Vesalius.59 (And without the existence of the content 
form or expression form, the content substance and expression substance – the variables out of 
which the specific forms are drawn – could not exist either.) 
All of these different signs require different codes to correlate different contents to the 
same form from the expression plane, this expression form being a sign-vehicle or signifier. These 
codes differ not just if you are a lover or a clinician approaching a body – are the flushed checks to 
become a sign of love or of fever – but if you are Bleuler or Kraepelin. This is the semiotic of the 
body at its most basic, and the model of this basic unit of the liminal body sign is shown in figure 
2.1. The segmenting process operating on the planes of expression and content to form the 
manifesting sign-vehicle and the particular coded content correlate are schematized in figure 2.2. 
  
                                                
59  Ali Oguz Tascioglu and Ayse Beliz Tascioglu, ‘Ventricular anatomy: illustrations and concepts from 
antiquity to Renaissance,’ Neuroanatomy, 4 (2006) 57-63 
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It has to be considered that the expression form or sign-vehicle – in this example, enlarged 
lateral ventricles – is itself part of a larger (potentially infinite) chain of sign-vehicles, which form 
what might be termed a centrifugal sign chain of the body.60 The sign-vehicle of enlarged lateral 
ventricles generates the sign-function of schizophrenia. Leaving aside the concern that the body in 
question must already have been attached to a diagnosis of schizophrenia to have been subject to 
the investigation generating this sign-function, as brain scans are not conventionally the route to a 
diagnosis, this sign-function of schizophrenia can then become another sign-vehicle.  
For example, it might be the sign-vehicle of the content ‘evidence in support of the theory 
that lateral ventricles are enlarged in persons with schizophrenia’ creating the new sign-function of 
this evidence. This sign-function then becomes a sign-vehicle for the further content ‘lateral 
ventricles are enlarged in persons with schizophrenia.’ This subsequent sign-function may then be a 
sign-vehicle for the content ‘evidence in support of the theory that neurology can delineate 
schizophrenia.’ Of course, by now the chains are splitting in a way best described as ‘arborescent.’61 
In truth, there are multiple intersecting and diverging chains, so this model is but an arborescent 
abstraction from the rhizomatic mass. 
This chain demonstrates materially Peirce’s ‘infinite semiosis’;62 it can continue indefinitely 
and perhaps infinitely, and such chains draw the line of signification away from the body as liminal 
sign and point of manifestation and into the history of medicine, the writings of clinical theory and 
the diagnostic discourse. Similarly there are centripetal sign chains of the body performing an 
infinite regress in search of a final Interpretant. These centripetal sign chains offer up signification as 
history, causality and biochemical and cellular investigation. So, the enlarged lateral ventricles are 
not just the sign-vehicle of schizophrenia, but are also the sign of intraventricular haemorrhages 
and infarcts. These haemorrhages and infarcts themselves are the sign-vehicle of that sign, but also 
the sign of birthing difficulties, and so on.63 It should be noted that whilst these might appear as 
causal chains, these chains of signs are no such thing, as they instead denote a narrative of causality. 
                                                
60  These terms ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ are not perfect, and ‘interior’ and ‘exterior’ may be more 
appropriate and accurate according to some criteria. The starting point in the body semiotic is the basic unit 
of the observable body sign, operating at the surface of the body, and here termed the liminal body sign. 
Therefore as there is no distinct centre – indeed, there most certainly is no final Interpretant to be reached 
travelling along the centripetal chain – but only the liminal point of intersection between a surface (the basic 
location of the expression function) and a gaze (the basic location of the content function), ‘interior’ and 
‘exterior’ are more technically appropriate. However, ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ are favoured as they 
convey a sense of the direction of sign-function generation – whether it is centripetally towards the cellular or 
centrifugally towards the social. (Although, the cellular – and all levels of the body semiotic – comprise 
cultural units coded by convention.) Further, ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ work regardless of the liminal 
intersectional starting point, as – in the current example – the enlarged lateral ventricles are already – in 
another sense – interior to the body. 
61 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.17 
62 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. by Charles Hartshone and Paul Weiss, 6 
vols (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931-35), 1.339. 
63 This neuropathological model is taken from GW Roberts, ‘Schizophrenia: a neuropathological perspective’, 
The British Journal of Psychiatry, 158 (1991) 8-17. However, this is not being offered here as a meaningful 
account of the aetiology of schizophrenia, merely as pertinent exemplary material of signification for 
inputting into this body semiotic. 
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There is no burden of truth placed on this narrative, beyond that it is possible to think that it could 
be true, which is why it is helpful to distinguish between a causal chain – which is not the matter of 
semiotics – and a chain of signification that can denote a narrative of causality. Signs do not denote 
an objective reality, but rather only denote other signs that may or may not actually exist, but can be 
expressed and therefore made to exist within the sequence of signification. Eco terms this the 
referential fallacy: ‘[e]very time there is a lie, there is signification. Every time there is signification 
there is the possibility of using it in order to lie.’64 Hence, the inclusion of a pink unicorn within a 
causal chain relating to schizophrenia might pose problems; within a chain of signification, it does 
not. 
Through the action of these centripetal and centrifugal chains, the body semiotic exhibits 
what Eco calls, after Peirce, ‘unlimited semiosis […] the continual shiftings which refer a sign back 
to another sign or string of signs.’65 This structure is presented in figure 2.3. 
                                                
64 Eco, p.59 
65 Eco, p.71 
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The difference between this semiotic body and the value-laden body types offered by 
illness narrative theorists, such as Frank, should be highly apparent. Abstract diagrammatics are 
important in the theory of semiotics, for challenging the received power structures enforced 
through assemblages of content and expression as if ‘heaven-sent.’ As Guattari notes: ‘[c]ontent and 
expression are not attached to one another by virtue of the Holy Spirit […] instead, there are 
components of semiotization, subjectification, conscientialization, diagrammatism, and abstract 
machinisms.’66 But these diagrams are of no use within medical humanities without demonstrable 
applicability. Does the body semiotic produce novel analytical results when placed in dialectic with 
the body schizophrenic? Consider this passage from Divided Minds (2005), a memoir written by 
monozygotic twins, one – Pamela – suffering from chronic psychosis, and the other – Carolyn – a 
private-practice psychiatrist. Here Carolyn gives a description of an inpatient at Newton Hospital in 
2000: 
A pudgy middle-aged woman wanders nearby, head swaddled in a dark wool scarf. She wears two 
sets of old glasses and several sweaters layered under a heavy coat. Two paper bags dangle from 
handles around her wrists, and she clutches to her chest a canvas Stop & Shop bag, overflowing 
with books and papers. I watch her for a moment as she mutters to herself and gesticulates with 
wild, yellowed fingers, the movements snaking and purposeless, as she paces back and forth. I’ve 
seen this before on inpatient psychiatric units. Instinctively, I diagnose tardive dyskinesia, TD, the 
late-onset movement disorder caused by years of antipsychotic medication. Though mild 
sometimes, with only subtle finger twitching, it can be disfiguring with uncontrollable writhing of 
the torso, arms, face, and hands.67 
 
The ‘wild, yellowed fingers’ appear as the signifier or sign-vehicle of the liminal body sign. Rightly, 
this is a sememe – a composite semantic unit – of which ‘movements snaking and purposeless’ 
forms a contributory, glossing componential unit or seme.68 At least some of the ways in which the 
yellowed fingers are wild is that they perform movements snaking and purposeless. Carolyn 
actuates a coding correlation between content – which she herself is contributing – and the sign-
vehicle of the ‘wild, yellowed fingers’ to construct this liminal body sign of tardive dyskinesia. 
 Carolyn describes this coded correlation as ‘instinctive’ but the body semiotic prefers the 
broader term ‘culturally conventionalised.’ Of course, a code does not have to be widely recognised 
as a cultural convention – in the way that the shaking of hands is coded as a sign of agreement or 
of greeting – in order to qualify as culturally conventionalised. A traditional medical semiotics 
whereby ‘wild, yellowed fingers’ translates as an unproblematic, stable and absolute diagnostic sign 
of tardive dyskinesia represents a coding correlation well-known to a sizable minority culture, and 
which might be designated the diagnostic corpus of knowledge and mode of practice in US 
                                                
66 Guattari, p.45 
67 Pamela Spiro Wagner and Carolyn S Spiro, Divided Minds (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2005), pp.273-274 
68 It is not the words in the text themselves that form the seme. Rather the seme is that semantic unit within 
the phrase ‘wild, yellowed fingers’ that then receives its explicit articulation in the clause ‘movements snaking 
and purposeless.’ ‘Explicit articulation’ is a non-semiotic, commonsensical concept. Semiotically, ‘movements 
snaking and purposeless’ is the sign-vehicle for many signs, one of which is the seme also contained within 
‘wild, yellowed fingers’. Whether there is an immutable, irreducible entity of content to that seme, which 
makes it possible to say that the same seme is reoccurring within the semantic content of these two linguistic 
signs – or lexemes – is a core semio-philosophical question for this thesis but to discuss it any further in this 
footnote would truly be a movement snaking and purposeless. 
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psychiatry circa 2000. Here the body semiotic offers up a centrifugal signification chain, which can 
then be used to open an analysis of the culture (or cultures) productive of such a code. Similarly, 
there is a corresponding centripetal signification chain, digging into the pharmacological actions 
generative of the ‘wild, yellowed fingers’ that could provoke analysis of the same object.  
Without following those lines of analysis here, it should suffice to observe how the body 
semiotic neatly and concisely demonstrates the following not-unknown – though sometimes 
overlooked – qualities of diagnosis: it is a culturally rather than empirically defined act; as such it 
speaks of a set of cultural conditions rather than bodily ones; the conventionalised coding has a re-
inscriptive effect on the expression form – ‘wild, yellowed fingers’ – superimposing the content 
form, so that the diagnostic observer ‘sees’ tardive dyskinesia rather than ambiguously polysemic 
expression; the cultural convention is highly naturalised, to the exclusion of both other codes and 
questions about the provenance of the code. 
To return to the text, there is a narrative jolt coming, as Carolyn continues: 
I look around for Pammy … Some of the staff look familiar and I nod a silent greeting … I’m not 
really listening [to the TD sufferer] and avert my eyes to discourage further conversation … The 
head nurse approaches. I try to catch her eye to ask her where to find Pammy.69 
  
Of course, Carolyn has been playing the part of the Prefect of Police in Poe’s ‘The Purloined 
Letter.’ That the TD sufferer Carolyn is trying to avoid seeing is also the twin she is actively 
searching for is a ‘mystery … a little too plain’70 for the construction of any narrative tension or 
aesthetic effect, and also a ‘little too self-evident’ for Carolyn to find acceptable. Her account 
continues with a description of how Pamela might be wrongly read by ‘other people’ whereby she 
‘looks like the kind of crazy lady who lives in cardboard boxes on the sidewalk … On subways, she’s 
the kind of person who makes people nervous, one of those nameless, faceless street beggars who 
stumble about talking nonsense to themselves.’71 Emphasis has been added to demonstrate how 
Carolyn naturalises the sign of madness, possibly to make a political point; Pamela moves from 
‘looking like’ madness to ‘being’ it. 
 As a passage in an illness narrative, this misreading episode is perhaps a fiction to 
dramatise the tragedy of schizophrenia: 
To the rest of the world she is not a brilliant, compassionate, incredibly talented poet and writer. 
Other people don’t see her in their aunt, or sister, their next-door neighbour laid low by an 
incurable illness. To the rest of the world she isn’t my twin; to the rest of the world she is nobody – 
she is an eccentric, fat, crazy, lumpy-purse-waving beggar.72 
 
The body semiotic allows for a plainer, plaintive cry from the illness memoirist: ‘you’re using the 
wrong code! Read me for who I am!’ However, there is a problem with Carolyn’s rhetoric. It is not 
only ‘the rest of the world’ who misread Pamela as ‘nobody’ instead of ‘twin’. This is obviously the 
mistake Carolyn herself has made. But it is not the case that Carolyn has read ‘crazy’ when she 
                                                
69 Wagner and Spiro, p.274 
70 Edgar Allan Poe, ‘The Purloined Letter’ in Selected Tales (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.250 
71 Wagner and Spiro, p.274 
72 Wagner and Spiro, pp.274-275 
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should have read ‘person laid low by an incurable illness.’ Rather, Carolyn so over-inscribed Pamela 
with her medico-diagnostic code that the clinical entity of ‘person laid low by an incurable illness’ 
obliterated the familial entity of ‘twin’. In semiotic terms, Carolyn’s reading error is the more grave 
than that of those she is criticising. The signs generated by the ‘other people’ reading Pamela are 
not mutually exclusive (if not exactly complementary); the same person can read Pamela according 
to two different codes and thereby produce the sign of ‘bag lady’ and the sign of ‘person laid low 
by an incurable illness.’ Carolyn’s coding – the cultural turned instinctual – is ‘a sort of Procrustean 
bed’73 that produces the sign of ‘anonymous mental health patient’ which is incompatible with the 
sign ‘twin’ or even the sign ‘Pamela.’ 
 The liminal body sign has become a space in which the person – twin, Pamela – has 
vanished, and illness has overwritten itself.74 
  
                                                
73 Poe, p.257 
74 The schizophrenic body semiotic makes no distinction between signs of illness and signs of cure. The 
obesity and shakes (tardive dyskinesia) that are, as Carolyn observes, signs of the use of anti-psychotics 
become also signs of the underlying illness that would ‘necessitate’ the use of such anti-psychotics. So, the 
signifying chain works as follows: the sign-vehicle of obesity and shakes conveys the content that the body in 
question has engaged in long-term use of anti-psychotics; this new sign (the use of anti-psychotics) then 
becomes the sign-vehicle for the next quantum of content in the signifying chain, that the body in question 
has psychotic episodes. Therefore, signs of cure are read as signs of illness. Lori Schiller, in her memoir co-
written with Amanda Bennett The Quiet Room (New York: Warner Books, 1994), demonstrates this conflation: 
‘In a family – and a world – that valued thinness and saw fat as a failure of will, how could I explain that the 
medications had taken over my body the way the Voices had taken over my brain? How could I walk around 
with this sign of my illness stamped on every line of my body?’ (p.227) Of course, such conflations occur in 
many (perhaps all) illnesses. The plastic cast becomes the sign of the broken leg; the electrolarynx, the sign of 
the cancer. This phenomenon is obviously more pronounced in cases of mental illness, as these (often) lack 
visible physical manifestations. Hence, the cure has a blank slate upon which to inscribe its signs. 
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I am illness 
Hospitals are necessary. Meds are necessary. […] Meds have become an extension of my mind. If I 
don’t take them, I will not survive.75 
 
“I’m a schizophrenic are you?” I looked up and it was one of the service users I had seen around 
the hospital. He sat down on the chair opposite me and there was a small low table between us. 
“Well are you?” I thought about using my standard reply of ‘allegedly’ but then felt I needed to 
educate him. Educate not in a condescending way but I didn’t really want him to refer to himself as 
a ‘schizophrenic’ and certainly not to introduce himself as one. “The doctors say I have 
schizophrenia but schizophrenic is not something I would call myself.”76 
 
In this exchange, Anthony Scally – a memoirist with a diagnosis of schizophrenia – is demonstrably 
pushing against the formulation of schizophrenia as an exclusively ‘I am’ illness. Estroff (1989) 
provides a succinct account of this illness structure: 
Having schizophrenia includes not only the experience of profound cognitive and emotional 
upheaval, it also results in a transformation of self as known inwardly, and of person or identity as 
known outwardly by others. Schizophrenia, like epilepsy and haemophilia, is an I am illness, one that 
is joined with social identity and perhaps with innerself, in language and terms of reference. A 
comprehensive account of schizophrenia would include the person, the subject, the self that both 
has and is this (or these) disorders. To study the subjective experience of schizophrenia, we must 
identify and know the subject.77 
 
The description allows for greater complexity than the term at first suggests. The subject ‘both has 
and is’ schizophrenia.78 Semiotically, schizophrenic narratives are presented with a conundrum: if 
the subject identifies with the illness, then what narrative of recovery is available? Elyn Saks in The 
Centre Cannot Hold (2007) recounts a friend’s warning to write her memoir anonymously so as to 
avoid being reduced to ‘the schizophrenic with a job.’79 Her response comprises two questions: ‘Is 
that who I am? Is that only who I am?’80 Estroff poses this problem: 
We are not ourselves in some profoundly cultural and symbolic way when we are sick and injured. Yet, 
of course, we are. The implication is that we reject the dysfunctional self of sickness as not me, as 
                                                
75 Susan S Salsman, ‘First person account: the best medicine’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29:3 (2003) 615-616, p.616 
76 Anthony Scally, Eyebrows and Other Fish (Brentwood: Chipmunkapublishing, 2007), p.138 
77  Sue E Estroff, ‘Self, identity, and subjective experiences of schizophrenia: in search of the subject’, 
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15:2 (1989) 189-196, p.189 
78 The foundational dialectic between this grammar and stigma was discussed briefly in the previous chapter 
in relation to Reynaert and Gelman. 
79 Elyn Saks, The Centre Cannot Hold (London: Virago, 2007), p.308 Louis Sass investigates the implications 
for self-identity and self-narration of the different monikers for schizophrenics, both in the introduction to 
his Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature and Thought (New York: Basic Books, 
1992) and in his more recent paper ‘“Schizophrenic person” or “person with schizophrenia”?: An essay on 
illness and the self’, Theory & Psychology, 17:3 (2007) 395-420. He critiques the shift in terminology from 
‘schizophrenic’ to ‘person with schizophrenia’, arguing that it serves to accidentally diminish or deny 
insightful, accurately and useful truths about the illness: ‘‘[s]chizophrenic person’ or a ‘person with 
schizophrenia’? No answer will be quite right, it seems to me; perhaps the best answer is to say: both. Here, 
as in other psychiatric illnesses, the relationship between self or person and illness is complex, ambiguous, 
even paradoxical. Yet one thing is clear: no single model, and no single way of speaking, of the relationship of 
illness to person can do full justice to the complexities of what is surely one of the most paradoxical of all 
psychiatric conditions: schizophrenia. To the extent that the ‘person with schizophrenia’ formula excludes the 
implications of ‘schizophrenic person’, and invokes a standard, deficit-oriented conception of all that is 
‘schizophrenic’ in a patient’s being, it is likely to blunt our clinical acuity, and also to foster oversimplified 
models in scientific research on pathogenesis as well as treatment.’ Sass (2007) pp.410-411 
80 Saks, p.308 
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other than a familiar and claimed self. This is all well and good if illness or injury is temporary, and 
we can return to reclaim ourselves.81 
  
The narrative of self recovery must – given the narrative reality of an altered, ill and pre-recovery 
self – therefore be a narrative of self annihilation. These narratives construct an ill self, and then 
obliterate it; in essence this is the narrative of the scapegoat. 
 Overtly influenced by Barthes, Charon provides an account of the ‘delicate pact’ of 
intersubjectivity that lies at the heart of narrative, the telling and reading of stories: ‘[a]ssuming 
genuineness in the transaction, the speaker is revealing deep and unknown truths, not only by the 
words chosen but also by the forms, the diction, the metaphors adopted in the course of telling a 
tale.’82 Yet this ‘genuineness’ is a textual effect. The only measure practicably applicable is the very 
text that created the speaker/author. Theories of illness narrative make a profound error in 
believing that the textual authenticity can be extrapolated out into the biography or pathological 
reality of the author, as the name on the spine of the book. Several of the illness memoirs 
considered in this chapter immediately give a blunt, materialist riposte to such wild hope by being 
wholly or partially ghostwritten. As Couser observes ‘with the help of a collaborator, questions then 
arise as to the agency, authority, voice, and authenticity of the self-representation.’83 
 In The Quiet Room, Lori Schiller, the biographical patient – the ill self and speaker about to 
reveal ‘deep and unknown truths’ – is frank about her reliance on the memory of others in 
constructing her memoir. In her opening note, she describes her friends, family and attendant 
medical professionals as a hive mind for her text: 
[T]hese people serve as my memory … I have turned the telling of these periods over to people 
whose memories are clearer than mine … In the interests of accuracy, we tried to interview as many 
people involved with my life, my illness, my treatment as possible.84 
 
There is a commonsensical argument for this as good practice. It is the forensic approach of the 
police inspector or the investigative journalist: interview all the witnesses, weigh up their stories, 
eliminate the inconsistences and strike at the truth. Only in this way is a crime solved and a mystery 
uncovered. But as an attempt to represent the experience of psychosis, this approach is self-
defeating. Schiller conflates the process of cure with the ability to reproduce an acceptable narrative 
of her illness: 
As I get better, my ability to remember accurately and to distinguish fact from fantasy improves … 
The only place where my memory still conflicts in any substantial way with external evidence is in 
my recollections of the events at Lincoln Farm.85 
                                                
81 Estroff, p.191 
82 Charon, p.53 
83 Couser, p.32 
84 Schiller and Bennett, unpaginated ‘Author’s note and acknowledgements.’ It is interesting to note the use 
of the singular. Whilst, perhaps as a result of pugnacity on the part of a literary agency, the ghost-writing 
Bennett has an author credit on the book-as-commodity, the text – as a narrative of recovery – has to be 
owned wholly by Schiller to be an authentic-seeming confession from the depths of psychosis. The singular 
author’s note switches between the singular and plural first-person pronouns but Bennett is an invisible 
presence at most throughout the narrative. After all, what value is there in a confession written by another 
person?  
85 Schiller and Bennett, unpaginated ‘Author’s note and acknowledgements’ 
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Part of Schiller’s ‘very personal journey’86 is to accept that her experience of reality is wrong, and 
much of this – to judge by these prefatory remarks – has been pre-emptively excised. There are 
only the barest traces of her psychosis within the text. Most often, these appear as evidence of their 
own invalidity.  
Consider Schiller’s impassioned rejection of the terms ‘psychotic’ and ‘hallucinations.’ This 
operates on three levels. First, it is a refusal to be defined as sick or dangerous: ‘I wasn’t a Psycho-tic 
woman with a butcher knife.’ 87  Secondly, it is a defiant insistence of her own authentic 
phenomenological self-experience: ‘Hallucinations meant that you were seeing something or 
hearing something that didn’t really exist. But when I heard the Voices screaming at me, they were 
real.’88 These first two levels communicate several valuable ideas worth rehearsing continually in the 
public discourse around schizophrenia: a person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia can find much 
to object to in cultural representations of others with their diagnosis;89 within psychosis, delusions 
and hallucinations have a phenomenological reality90 that demands recognition in both social and 
clinical settings. 
 The third level upon which the passage operates, though, subtly undermines these ideas. 
For this is psychosis performed, not psychosis experienced. And the performance is written from 
the perspective of cure.91 Schiller says: ‘I knew they [the medical staff] were trying to trick me, 
trying to torment me into madness. I knew they could read my mind and hear all that the Voices 
were saying about them.’92 Just as Gulliver is the unreliable narrator par excellence, whose declared 
‘absurd … Project … of reforming the Yahoo Race’93 vanishes within his narrative along with his 
underlying misanthropic Houyhnhnm prejudices, so too does the dual temporal perspective of illness 
memoirs such as Schiller’s disappear, along with their underlying agendas and assumptions. 
Remembering that this text is itself the authorised, authentic history of Schiller’s illness, as made 
clear by the remarks on memory in the opening note, then the paranoid fears about the medical 
staff must necessarily be a performance rather than genuine. A text prefaced by one of these self-
same medical professionals, and bookended by panegyrics to the efficacy of clozapine is predicated 
on the basis that medical professionals are to be trusted (as the real) over the Voices (the delusion). 
Schiller makes this opposition explicit when she is tempted into nostalgia for her receding auditory 
                                                
86 Schiller and Bennett, Doller in her foreword 
87 Schiller and Bennett, p.90 
88 Schiller and Bennett, p.90 
89 Such representations are dealt with in detail in Chapters Four and Five. 
90 Though it is worth restating Sass’ observation, quoted in the previous chapter, that these beliefs are treated 
with a ‘certain distance or irony’ by the schizophrenic. (Sass, Paradoxes, p.20) 
91 The self constructed from the narrative perspective of cure always gets the last word, redefining the past 
self. Consider this opening: ‘The difficulty is to write clearly about an unbelievable something that occurred 
10 years ago. It is recalled in my mind as unrelated images and imaginings, like a half-remembered dream. 
Ten years ago, apparently, I was out of my mind, yet until recently I had no idea that was the case.’ 
Anonymous, ‘First person account: birds of a psychic feather’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 16:1 (1990) 165-168, 
p.165 
92 Schiller and Bennett, p.90 
93 Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.xxxvi 
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hallucinations: ‘I was choosing my sick Voices over a healthy reality. I must really be crazy!’94 
Schiller’s sensational, shocking description of brutally beating the family dog to death – her original 
‘sin’95  – is unsurprisingly revealed to be a symptom of her psychosis: ‘[i]t isn’t true. It never 
happened.’96 It is as if Laing’s one solid contribution to the understanding of psychosis never 
happened: what is the phenomenology of psychosis if not a postcard from that peculiar terrain 
where the never-happened can still be true? 
That the schizophrenic narrative – from the microcosmic individual delusions through to 
the sweeping themes of death, persecution and sin – cannot be ‘true’, is the clinical judgement of 
the eponymous Quiet Room, which makes its appearance halfway through the text. A solitary 
confinement cell, the Quiet Room is initially symbolic of medical authority against which Schiller 
increasingly revolts. Whilst others found that the Quiet Room ‘made them feel safe from whatever 
was tormenting them,’97 for Schiller it is a place of torture, in which she paces like a caged animal. 
By excluding all other possibilities and all other human contact, the Quiet Room either traps her 
with her psychosis or offers a different oppression, institutional tyranny: ‘If the Quiet Room was 
successful in stripping me, for the time being, of my Voices, then the silence itself became 
overpowering. If not, then there I was, all alone with my tormentors.’98 
 Unyielding reality is not a good thing within the narrative when it offers no hope of cure. 
The ‘stiff scholarly’99 doctor who ‘broke in’ to a discussion between Schiller’s parents and staff at 
Payne Witney Clinic with a fatalistic definition of Schiller’s illness lectures the Schillers that ‘[i]t 
would be better for both of you if you faced the facts.’100 When the ‘facts’ mean irreversible, 
irresistible illness, then psychosis is a mere narrative practice for life, as Schiller concludes: ‘I still 
equated taking medicine with being sick. If I stopped, I thought, I’d get well.’101 However, when the 
‘facts’ become the facts of cure, then the phenomenological truth of psychosis cannot be 
accommodated within the narrative. This re-encoding of the narrative operates within the narrative 
as simple indoctrination. Schiller is gradually trained – through a ‘monotonous chant’102 resonant of 
cultish brainwashing – to accept the Quiet Room: ‘[t]his time everyone talked to me over and over 
again. The Quiet Room isn’t a place for punishment, they said, and it isn’t your enemy.’103 Schiller’s 
acceptance of the therapeutic benefit of the Quiet Room transforms it to a place of solace. Upon 
discharge from New York Hospital, Schiller is ceremonially awarded a copy of the psychiatric unit’s 
                                                
94 Schiller and Bennett, p.263 
95 Schiller and Bennett, p.9. And it is an original sin that is certainly more amenable to Schiller’s teenage self, 
her narrating/composing self, her ghostwriting partner and her authenticating committee of relatives, medical 
professionals and friends, then the original sin that is elided in accounts of her ‘summertime fling’ (p.6), to be 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.  
96 Schiller and Bennett, p.9 
97 Schiller and Bennett, p.148 
98 Schiller and Bennett, p.148 
99 Schiller and Bennett, p.69 
100 Schiller and Bennett, p.70 
101 Schiller and Bennett, p.171 
102 Schiller and Bennett, p.224 
103 Schiller and Bennett, p.224 
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‘universal passkey.’104 In an institutional environment where ‘keys made the sounds of freedom and 
control,’105 Schiller is now rehabilitated to the point of being – symbolically – welcomed onto the 
side of control.  
The object of control has been obscure throughout the text. Unequivocally, The Quiet Room 
has presented a narrative of battle. The metaphorical register is established firmly by Schiller’s 
therapist, Jane Doller, in the foreword. According to Doller, Schiller’s account is of ‘her battle with 
schizophrenia’ in which she ‘didn’t fall victim’ but managed to ‘face the illness head-on’ with a 
‘curing arsenal’ and employ her ‘willpower and determination [to] … conquer her own illness.’106 
What is more, Schiller shares the hero role with another player: ‘Our hopes for the future of many 
mentally ill patients lie largely in a whole range of new drugs now under development.’ 
Susan Sontag’s famous essay Illness as Metaphor warned that using the ‘language of 
warfare’107 to describe cancer and its treatment allows for any and every brutalisation of the patient 
qua Ben Suc108 in the military campaign against the illness. A similar process is at work with 
schizophrenia; memoirists like Schiller are measured by the expectations of a heroic narrative that 
prefers to write its protagonists into a coffin well-decorated with medals than into the troubled, 
compromised life of the conscientious objector. In the last chance saloon of a trial period with 
(then) experimental drug clozapine, her parents discuss the possible risks and rewards of the 
treatment: 
“You’ve got no choice but to try this drug,” Marvin chimed in. “If it kills her – well, maybe 
she’s better off dead.” 
When I heard what we had said, I was horrified. How could any parents say that about 
their child? But I thought about it and realized that we meant it. If this drug didn’t work, then 
maybe she really was better off dead.109 
 
In this narrative of self-annihilation, if the hero is the drug, then villain of the piece is the narrating 
self (as ill self). By vigorously pursing the annihilation of the ill subject – which is the subject as 
illness – and by positively identifying with the method of control in the ordering metaphor of the 
Quiet Room, conducted against the backdrop of perpetual war – ‘my own fierce battle – that I 
know now will never end’ – Schiller is able to declare at the close of the narrative that: ‘[she] had 
won the victory over [herself]. [She] loved Big Brother.’110 
 Claire Berman, co-writer of Ken Steele’s posthumously published memoir The Day the 
Voices Stopped (2001), offers the same narrative in her closing acknowledgements. She codifies Steele 
according to a highly familiar cultural narrative: ‘Once upon a time there was a man named Ken 
Steele … He was an American hero.’111 A simple narrative structure once again presents itself: the 
                                                
104 Schiller and Bennett, p.259 
105 Schiller and Bennett, p.259 
106 Schiller and Bennett, unpaginated foreword 
107 Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor & Aids and Its Metaphors (London: Penguin, 1991), p.65 
108 Sontag, p.67 
109 Schiller and Bennett, p.248 
110 Orwell, p.637 
111 Ken Steele and Claire Berman, The Day the Voices Stopped (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p.257 
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hero is the cured-self and the villain is the ill-self. It is important to note that the villain is not the 
illness itself, but the self-made-ill. The hero destroys the villain. That very victory is indeed what 
makes him or her a hero. There is no doubt within this narrative structure as to what is bad and 
what is good. However, whilst hero and villain are as opposed as day and night, they are within the 
same superstructure: the self. Therefore, the hero has to destroy an iteration of their self. This 
internal battle is not just the preferred narrative structure for the story of the American hero, but 
also for that of the illness narrative, and that of the experience specifically of schizophrenia, and 
many other stories besides: an internal conflict between irreconcilable elements of an inharmonious 
whole. The narrative demands an end where harmony and unity are restored. Berman’s Steele faces 
the dilemma of all American heroes, none greater than Superman who confronts his ill-self in a 
junkyard and destroys it so that he might live, cured. 
 
Figure 3.1 
The mythic image of the recovery movement112 
 
Frank articulates the danger inherent in narratives of heroic (re)birth: ‘[t]he risk of quest stories is 
like the risk of Phoenix metaphor: they can present the burning process as too clean and the 
transformation as too complete, and they can implicitly deprecate those who fail to rise out of their 
own ashes.’113 A remarkable example of this narrative insistence can be seen in a first person 
account from the Schizophrenia Bulletin. This anonymous account culminates with the subject being 
reconciled both to (a Christian) God and to the psychiatric medical treatment being pushed on her 
(incarceration and anti-psychotics), and concludes with a self-solving epiphany blending the 
religious and the pharmaceutical salvations under the metaphor of disease as battle to be fought 
and riddle to be solved: ‘I was numb with joy. The pieces to the puzzle had finally come together.’ 
However, after this walk into the sunset comes a postscript that gently destroys the entire mythic 
narrative edifice: ‘Note: Problems arose after my discharge that required a more lengthy 
                                                
112 Superman III, dir. by Richard Lester (Warner Bros., 1983) 
113 Frank, p.135 
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hospitalization.’114 Of course, after the heroic ending to the ‘battle’ and after the ‘puzzle’ has been 
solved and God and meds have been taken into the heart, the subject needs to hide behind the 
euphemistic contingent ‘problems’.115 It is an article of (American mythic) faith that the hero always 
wins in his (and the hero is always a he, even when he is biographically a she) duel with his sick 
self.116  
Structurally, The Day the Voices Stopped pursues this narrative of self-annihilation, but Steele 
– as a narrative figure – is perhaps more resistant to the hero role than Berman is aware. Within the 
text, a self qua illness is steadily constructed characterised by persistent demonic voices urging 
suicide. On Steele’s admission to Manhattan State Hospital, the voices deliver a clinical judgement: 
‘Unless you kill yourself, you will live like this – an animal – for the rest of your life, with us as the only people who 
talk to you … You have to kill yourself, Kenny. There is no other way.’ 117  The voices themselves are 
exorcised from the text with the appearance of risperdone. 
 The voices offer Steele an over-determined narrative of self-destruction. Every event, 
every person, every conversation is the trigger and justification for suicide. In effect, the voices are 
presenting a life narrative to Steele: the narrative of a victim of schizophrenia. Although Steele 
does, at one point, manage a narrative riposte, it could not be further from the self-(re)constructing 
narrative theorised about by Frank, Charon and others. In Metropolitan State Hospital, Steele hears 
a series of ‘souls’ or ‘ghosts’118 who provide a narrative balm which functions as an escape from – 
rather than a return to – the self: 
The voices of these storytellers were not threatening. They never ordered me to hurt myself, never 
yelled or screamed. Like the characters I met in books, they provided respite from the evil voices – 
perhaps because their narratives had nothing to do with me and I could lose myself in the imaginary 
worlds that they painted for me. Over the years, they would reappear in my life at different times 
and in various places. Unlike the evil voices, they were always welcome.119 
 
These stories are not therapeutic tools that return and re-inscribe the self; they are diverting fairy 
tales, distanced, separate and ‘nothing to do’ with the ill self. They are not a place for 
(re)discovering the self but a narrative space in which the ill self can ‘lose’ itself. 
The assertion of agency is integral to Steele’s narrative of recovery, and agency seems more 
important than action itself. When abandoned in Denver, Steele takes some refuge from the voices 
                                                
114 Anonymous, ‘First person account: a pit of confusion’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 16:2 (1990) 355-359, p.359 
115  Rather than guns and God, it is meds and God: ‘I believe my condition improved because of he 
combination of Risperdal and my religious faith.’ Marcia Murphy, ‘Grand rounds’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33:3 
(2007) 657-660, p.659 One correspondent even suggested, ‘Joan of Arc has proven the perfect role model for 
how to live with faith as a schizophrenic patient.’ Aaron Reina, ‘Faith within atheism’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 
40:4 (2014) 719-720, p.720 It is interesting to see that, like all genres, illness writing has become increasingly 
self-referential. Murphy’s account is not about her illness but – recursively – about the story of her illness, 
contributing her account to a ‘Grand rounds’ event for teaching medical students.  
116  Patricia Ruocchio writing of her own experiences genders her ‘schizophrenic individual’ as a man, 
‘Fighting the fight – the schizophrenic’s nightmare’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15:1 (1989) 163-166 
117 Steele and Berman, p.58 
118 Steele and Berman, p.93 
119 Steele and Berman, p.94 
 149 
in alcohol. Alcohol quietens the voices and allows Steele to experience his suicidal ideation120 as 
belonging to him, and thereby making it a ‘serious option.’121 Similarly, when Steele voluntarily 
admits himself to hospital, what makes the medical encounter morally good (in contrast to 
obviously bad and traumatic instances of forced admission) is not what the action constitutes (as 
the treatment remains consistent, comprising a blend of physical and chemical restraints) but who 
is the actant, who is authoring the narrative. This assumption of agency is the ‘extraordinary’ quality 
that makes the ordinary assertion of medical power acceptable within the narrative: ‘I did the most 
extraordinary thing. On my own, I went to the emergency room …’122 Steele’s acceptance of the 
medication – within a narrative where rejection of medication has been a structural characteristic – 
operates as an acceptance of medical authority, which might be interpreted as the medical narrative 
and the medical construction of Steele’s selfhood. Importantly, he chooses to be compliant 
precisely because he is given the choice of noncompliance: ‘“If you don’t like it, you can stop taking 
it,” he added. No other doctor had ever given me that choice.’123 Steele’s narrative frames his 
complicity as a celebration of agency. A similar move is apparent in an account by Deegan, who 
analyses two contradictory sign-functions generated by two different codings of the prescription of 
antipsychotics: 
I did not experience myself as ‘noncompliant.’ From my perspective, I was actively rejecting my 
psychiatrist’s prognosis of chronicity by throwing away the medicine he prescribed for me. In other 
words, my psychiatrist had paired a profound message of hopelessness (you have a disease from 
which no one recovers) with the prescription to take powerful drugs that often have noxious and 
dangerous side effects, for the rest of my life. Unwittingly, he had prescribed not just medication, 
but a life of chronic illness from which it seemed there was no escape. If my psychiatrist had paired 
the use of medication with the goal of recovery, it is likely my response to the prescribed treatment 
would have been very different.124 
 
In semiotic terms, the recovery movement response to concepts of diagnosis boils down to a 
rejection of the code of medical authority, and the insistence of the adoption of their own code. At 
its core is a refusal to allow a stain of signification from the sign of schizophrenia to inscribe itself 
on the sign of the self. 
 This is a battle of coding, but one with fatal outcomes in reality. Steele died of heart failure 
at the age of 51. He was sufficiently obese for this to be made mention of as the primary defining 
                                                
120 The schism between the medical codification of schizophrenia and the phenomenological codification is 
succinctly conveyed by an exchange between Steele and a Colorado nurse. ‘“Do you have suicidal ideation?” 
she asked me. “I don’t know what that means,” I told her, “but I have voices telling me to jump off buildings 
and to cut my throat.”’ (Steele and Berman, p.112) A simple semiotic reading shows how medical 
terminology functions as a sign of the user’s authority, and reciprocally, forces the patient into a position of 
either accepting the coded account of their experience, and thereby recognizing the greater authority of the 
medical discourse – as Deluzean majoritarian langue – and its author/speakers over their own narrative, or of 
refusing or remaining unable to partake in the coding conventions, in which case the schizophrenic is 
excluded from the very Saussurean ‘community of speakers’ (Saussure, p.66) generating the discourse from and 
within which they are to produce the narrative of their illness.  
121 Steele and Berman, p.111 
122 Steele and Berman, p.111 
123 Steele and Berman, p.193 
124 Patricia Deegan, ‘The lived experience of using psychiatric medication in the recovery process and a 
shared decision-making program to support it,’ Psychiatric Rehabilitation Journal, 31:1 (2007) 62-69 p.63 
 150 
characteristic in a eulogy quoted in the foreword to his memoir.125 The weight gain and related 
cardiovascular problems caused by antispsychotic medication are well documented.126 It is not the 
purpose to suggest that there is a definite causal relation between Steele’s medication and early 
death, but to note how structurally, his memoirs follow a narrative of self-abnegation. In the 
opening chapter his doctor reduces Steele to ‘one word, neatly printed in capital letters: 
SCHIZOPHRENIA.’ 127  The young Steele is described in a tussle of signification with the 
definition he finds in his local library, which culminates in a revolt against these texts – ‘I shoved 
the books across the library table; I desperately needed to put space between me and the terrifying 
message they contained’ – and an interpolation of the narrative voice offering a more amenable 
definition ‘as a biological brain disorder that is manageable if properly treated with medication and 
psychotherapy.’128  
 These competing definitions of schizophrenia operate in the same way as the voices urging 
Steele to kill himself. They fiercely present their own code and generate their own sign-function on 
the sign-vehicle of the body of the subject. Steele’s own death allows Berman’s final 
unchallengeable coding to occur. With all respect to Steele himself, the narrative of self-abnegation 
established appears, with this final codification, as a brutal bastardisation of the hero narrative, one 
in which it is better to be sane and dead, then alive and mad.  
In Steele’s case this narrative becomes self-proliferating. Steele, in the final few years of his 
life, becomes an editor and public speaker. His function is to reiterate his narrative – of 
‘recovery’129 through compliance – but it is now a narrative that insists and excludes all other self-
stories. The memoir ends with Steele’s narrative being re-inscribed on a young schizophrenic, 
Danny. Described by Steele as a ‘miracle,’130 Danny enjoys the ‘opportunities that [Steele had] been 
robbed of’131 and – through the act of graduation – comes to represent a pre-emptively cured (or 
saved, given the redemptive rhetorical tone) Steele. In Frank’s terms, the interruption of illness into 
Steele’s life, which enables him to generate his narrative of recovery, is itself interrupted in Danny’s 
life by Steele applying his prêt-à-porter illness narrative. Steele’s narrative is not merely one of self-
abnegation within his own biographical, material life; it is a narrative designed to infect and 
interrupt other life narratives and to eradicate itself from the narrative possibilities for this other 
                                                
125 ‘Everything about you was big – your size, your intelligence, your personality …’ Steele and Berman, p.xii 
126 For a recent survey see John W Necomer, ‘Antipsychotic medication – induced weight gain and risk for 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease,’ Energy Metabolism and Obesity Contemporary Endocrinology, (2008) 223-245 
127 Steele and Berman, p.12 
128 Steele and Berman, p.15 
129 Steele repeats his story to ‘spread the message that recovery from mental illness is possible and that people 
suffering from mental illness need to be understood and assisted, not feared and avoided.’ (Steele and 
Berman, p.234) Rather like anyone who has ‘reformed’ and renounced a vice, Steele was transformed from 
skeptical absconder from the medical system to psychotropic evangelical. Such Damascene conversations are 
the recurrent structuring thematic of the first person accounts in the Schizophrenia Bulletin. 
130 Steele and Berman, p.239 
131 Steele and Berman, p.239 
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life. Simply, Steele writes himself (as psychotic, as prostitute, as destitute) out of any future life 
narratives, and writes in a version of cure that is based on a born-again enthusiasm for medication.  
At the same time, Steele’s narrative expresses scepticism about the possibility of crude 
narrative re-inscriptions. Steele responds to the illness narratives presented an AA meeting with 
imitative desire: ‘Wow, I thought. Maybe I’m a paranoid alcoholic and not a paranoid schizophrenic. […] 
Alcoholics could get better and stay that way. Schizophrenia, according to what I’d read, was a 
lifetime affliction.’132 The objective of this desperate shove in Steele’s tussle of signification is to re-
diagnose and re-write oneself well: re-coding the symptoms as signs of alcoholism not 
schizophrenia by a simple substitution of signifieds. Unsophisticated and – more importantly to the 
illness narrative ideology – inauthentic attempts at re-writing such as this fairy tale self-re-diagnosis, 
or Steele’s attempt to flee into the alias of Shannon Steele and a false biography of ‘preposterous 
stories’133 (in which, matching the thematic content and tone of his illness narrative, his family 
members have been violently erased in a plane crash) either shatter in the face of more powerful 
narratives (as Steele’s re-diagnosis as an alcoholic yields to the insistence of the symptomatic 
auditory hallucinations) or disintegrate when twisting and turning to accommodate their own fatal 
contradictions (as Steele’s allegedly tragically killed parents are also supposedly alive to raise his 
imaginary son). 
In contrast to Scally’s model of ‘I am not illness,’ Steele and Schiller offer narratives of ‘I 
am not-illness.’ The narrative ‘I’ of the text is a product and object of the illness. Obviously, this is 
not to suggest that the historical individuals Ken Steele and Lori Schiller are ‘products’ of an 
‘illness’ (called schizophrenia). Rather, the Steele and Schiller as narrators within their respective 
texts, are constructed as products of schizophrenia as discourse. Barthes summarises this familiar 
distinction neatly: ‘[n]arrator and characters … are essentially “paper beings”; the (material) author 
of a narrative is in no way to be confused with the narrator of that narrative. The signs of the 
narrator are immanent to the narrative and hence readily accessible to a semiological analysis.’134 It 
is in this sense that the narrators become open to re-inscription; the memoirist is – textually – dead, 
and the question becomes: what is inscribed in its place? 
 
  
                                                
132 Steele and Berman, p.144 
133 Steele and Berman, p.188 
134 Roland Barthes, ‘Structural Analysis of Narratives’, Image Music Text, pp.79-124 (p.111) 
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Re-structuring the memoirist 
The minimal complete plot can be seen as the shift from one equilibrium to another … The two 
moments of equilibrium, similar and different, are separated by a period of imbalance, which is 
composed of a process of degeneration and a process of improvement.135 
 
So even if I ‘hear’ someone saying, ‘Look, she’s at the computer writing,’ I can rephrase it to myself, ‘I am at 
the computer writing.’ I shift from third person to first person. […] One of her [Dr Ann Alaoglu] 
greatest strengths is her ability to paraphrase. When I was stressed or unhappy she may have said, ‘You 
seem really down today. What’s going on?’ I remember psyching myself up for a flight but telling Dr 
Alaoglu that the trees were warning me not to go. Dr Alaoglu responded by saying, ‘You seem a bit 
nervous about your trip.’ If I had said that to a former therapist of mine she would have suspended my 
visit and told me (yes, told me!) I was crazy. I think paraphrasing is critical: Hearing how others 
interpreted what I said gave me a sense of how I was communicating.136 
  
Sass and Parnas (2003) conceptualise schizophrenia as a disturbance of ipseity, defined as ‘the 
experiential sense of being a vital and self-identical subject of experience or first person perspective on 
the world.’137 The supposedly curative process of constructing an illness narrative can serve to 
repeat (rather than redress) this disturbance. The ‘schizophrenic’ narrative subject is – as Leslie 
Greenblatt’s account suggests – highly susceptible to paraphrase. Mechanisms of paraphrase are 
evident in the ‘disease’ and the attempts at recovery: the psychosis translates someone out of their 
pre-illness self, and the response involves insisting on regaining definitional control, through self-
led interaction with voices, psychodynamic therapies or both. However, the disruption and re-
phrasing of the self is further inherent in the nature of writing; to shift from material, historical 
entity to textual narrator is to suffer another disturbance in ipseity. It is also a necessary outcome of 
the ‘minimal complete plot’ as outlined by Todorov. Importantly, over the divide – the ‘period of 
imbalance’ – when the status quo of identity is disrupted, there are two points of equilibrium where 
the sense of the self-identical subject is restored, and yet the subject has altered.138 
Frequently, as with The Quiet Room and The Day the Voices Stopped, these memoirs are not about 
illness. They are distinctly about cure. At the core of the cure narrative is a reconstitution of the 
narrator.139 Building on Todorov’s foundational structuralist assertion on narrative – ‘the minimal 
schema of the plot can be shown naturally by a clause’140 – this archetypal narrative, be it The Quiet 
Room, The Day the Voices Stopped, the Schizophrenia Bulletin first person accounts or Deegan’s illness 
narrative(s), can be formulated as a series of structuralist clauses: 
                                                
135 Tzvetan Todorov, ‘Structural analysis of narrative’, trans. by Arnold Weinstein, NOVEL: A Forum on 
Fiction, 3:1 (1969) 70-76, p.75 
136 Leslie Greenblatt, ‘First person account: understanding health as a continuum’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 26:1 
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137 Louis Sass and Josef Parnas, ‘Schizophrenia, consciousness and the self’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 29:3 (2003) 
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139 This should not be confused with Frank’s restitution narrative; all three of Frank’s narrative types involve 
a reconstitution of the narrator. Applying Todorov’s structuralist account, there is no narrative difference 
between Frank’s restitution and quest narratives (though there are political, ethical and aesthetic differences – 
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narrative typology). Again, Frank’s chaos narrative is not another structure of narrative, but rather is the first 
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140 Todorov, p.74 
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1. X is disrupted by Y 
2. Z tries to reconstitute X by fighting Y 
3. X mistakenly fights Z 
4. X and Z reconcile and fight Y 
5. X ends reconstituted 
Of course, in these narratives, X = the memoirist as self, Y = schizophrenia and Z = psychiatry 
(and psychotropic drugs). The narrative structure is not unique to these memoirs, but may be a 
distinctly American cultural product. The structure works as the ideal narrative of post-World War 
II American military adventures. Try X = Korea, Y = Communism and Z = Capitalism, which 
gives a story of a different but no less enduring Spaltung. In articulating his ‘minimal complete plot,’ 
Todorov was making direct reference to the plot(s) of different tales within the Decameron but his 
‘broad schema’ 141  suits the narratives of these illness memoirs just as well, revealing how 
paradigmatic they are of Western narrative tradition. 
In The Quiet Room, the reconstituted life is a paragon of market capitalist values; the 
consumerist bourgeois definition of a successful life is reaffirmed to the point of parody: 
Now that I’m back to my college weight … I feel chic and pretty again. I dress casually in jeans and 
a sweater, spray on my favorite Calvin Klein Escape perfume and head for local hangouts … I’ve 
met a hot dog peddlar, a fax machine salesman who owns his own company, an IBM programmer, a 
General Motors plant supervisor and a cemetery executive … I very badly want to get married and 
have kids … I would probably be better off trying to find a ready-made family … It’s going to take 
a very special guy to realize how much I have to offer him … (That’s a glimpse of my personal 
ad.)142 
 
To be well in this narrative is to conform to a certain body type (youthful and thin), to associate 
with certain brands, to understand others in terms of their occupation (and by extension their 
wealth), to conceptualise personal relationships in market terms and to find self-worth in a hetero-
normative model of domesticity. It is precisely this life narrative that schizophrenia has overwritten 
for Schiller: ‘[a]long the way I have lost many things: the career I might have pursued, the husband 
I might have married, the children I might have had.’143 Reading the first person accounts in the 
Schizophrenia Bulletin one might be forgiven for thinking that ‘schizophrenia’ was a disease that 
specifically frustrated middle class social ambitions, the main symptom being the interruption of a 
college degree. In such a narrow social class, ‘recovery’ means reclamation of class privilege.144 The 
Hearing Voices Movement (HVM) – despite, or maybe because, of its post-hippie esotericism – 
toes the same ideological line, of capitalist individualism with a liberal (in all senses) sprinkling of 
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evangelical salvation.145 Consider Gavin Young’s contribution to Living With Voices. He frames 
himself as a consumer of the HVM brand, and Escher and Romme’s products in particular, in 
contrast to his store-floor rejection of bio-medical psychiatry: ‘I also bought Making Sense of Voices 
some time ago, and look forward to reading it […] schizo-affective disorder […] a diagnosis I never 
bought.’146 As with Greenblatt, Young describes his life as a puzzle being solved: ‘it’s like a huge 
jigsaw puzzle called “MY LIFE”.’147 The role of Escher, Romme and HVM is eulogised to the 
point of supernatural agency, through extensive religious and celebrity metaphors, two of the most 
potent codes in contemporary American culture: ‘you and Dr Romme gave me the ‘keys to the 
kingdom’ […] and I began to feel empowered again […] my salvation […] you’ve given me a 
‘gospel’ to spread.’ They are ‘celebrities […] heroes’ and Young signs off ‘a real fan.’148 If it seems 
unfair to hold this gushing praise against Romme and Escher, it is worth noting Romme’s 
comments at the start of the volume: ‘We edited the interviews down […] focusing on what was 
said about recovery.’149 
Similar late capitalist values are presented as inarguably good and desirable at the end of 
Steele’s narrative, where he ruminates on the life narrative that he also implies would have naturally 
been his, had schizophrenia’s interruptive narrative not written itself over his life: ‘How different 
my life would have been if I’d been able to finish high school, attend college, graduate, find a job, 
perhaps even marry and raise a family.’150 The hetero-normativity of this might be surprising given 
that the only sexual relationships described by Steele have been homosexual ones, mainly 
comprising two stints as a ‘male hustler’151 and two affairs bordering on prostitution. However, his 
homosexuality is clearly associated with the illness-narrative and the illness-self. Prostitution and 
homosexuality are presented as symptoms of Steele’s illness, although the illness – in the form of 
the voices – is never slow to criticise the homosexuality with aggressive admonishments of ‘Faggot! 
Pig! Whore!’152 Despite this, it is not the homophobia, but homosexuality that is presented as a 
manifestation of illness, with a pathogenesis rooted in the socio-economic (Steele is out of cash), 
the personal and domestic (Steele would rather do anything than return home) and the bio-medical 
(Steele’s decision making and agency are greatly reduced by his on-going harassment by his voices). 
                                                
145 If Apple Inc. and Steve Jobs as brands reasonably represent how 1960s California hippie culture was the 
crucible of early twenty-first century global capitalism, it is (grimly) amusing to see how Eleanor Longden – a 
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The ‘cured’ Christian Steele retrospectively (re)writing his homosexual past as bad and ill is less an 
example of ‘ill people’s self-stories as moral acts’153 as it is of self-stories as moralising acts. The 
phenomenological experience – both content and form – of illness is delineated as bad and then 
rejected wholesale on that basis. All that illness teaches here is the moral goodness of being well.  
Schizophrenia writes its own narrative onto the self, but what it has replaced is not 
something intrinsic to the individual, but simply a rival narrative. Structurally, there are two separate 
life narratives, each causing the schizophrenic memoirist – be it Steele or Schiller – some distress. 
Very clearly, there is a schizophrenic life narrative comprising symptoms (predominantly, for 
Schiller, the Voices and paranoia, accompanied by periods of mania and depression, and in the 
context of hebephrenic disorganisation), prolonged periods of in-patient care and concomitant 
social problems. All of these cause distress in themselves. Supplementary to this, but not necessarily 
subordinate, is the loss of a desired narrative of the bourgeois triumvirate: career, marriage, 
children.154 This loss causes distress parallel to the distress caused by the narrative of schizophrenia, 
but this desired narrative could have been lost (and the distress suffered) without the imposition of 
schizophrenia’s narrative. A diagnosis of cystic fibrosis would have provided a different life 
narrative to the one Schiller or Steele never had. So too might any number of diagnoses, or indeed 
any genre of life narrative. It is not just the sick who do not get to live such a narrative; socio-
economic conditions are, of course, a great determinant of life narrative. 
 Returning to Divided Minds with Todorov’s model of (different) (re)constitutions over a 
space of disequilibrium, this approach resolves a concern that strikes to the core of the memoir. On 
first reading, it is difficult to understand the purpose of juxtaposing Pamela’s narrative with 
Carolyn’s, as the latter is – for a considerable proportion of the book – unaware of her twin’s 
suffering, and is – for much of the remainder – unsympathetic.155 The only plausible objective is to 
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155 Whilst some of Carolyn’s complaints about her sister could be read as a frank, truthful representation of 
the complex emotions psychosis can provoke in relatives and friends, the extended criticisms of her husband 
border on the bizarre. Possibly, they are included to demonstrate that a life without mental illness still has 
difficulties and psychic pain, and indeed once she has filed for divorce Carolyn likens her marriage to 
madness: ‘All these years I’ve doubted my own sanity … Is this how she [Pamela] feels when the voices start 
in on her?’ (p.281) The memoir qua score settling seems to be a family trait for the Spiros. When Pamela 
dissects one psychiatrist to her face with vicious gusto, the reader might agree that the clinician is ‘as idiotic, 
overinvolved and incompetent as she worries she is’ (Wagner and Spiro, p.240), before remembering that the 
psychiatrist has been textually constructed in precisely this way to justify the criticism which – if an accurate 
account in itself – was leveled a decade before the text of Divided Minds was completed. 
 Saks is not above abusing the memoirist’s privilege of turning real, flesh and blood subjects into 
objects within their narrative world. She dedicates two chapters (chapters seven and eight) to her three years 
of psychoanalysis with British analyst Doctor Elizabeth Jones. The termination of their analysis is 
excruciating and terrifying for Saks, and results in her being violently manhandled out of Jones’ home in 
Oxford. But the memoirist, as Author Tyrant, the Toddler-as-God, is perfectly comfortable serving revenge 
up after decades in the memory’s deep refrigeration. On first appearing in the text, Jones is ‘without question, 
the ugliest woman I’d ever seen’ (p.82), and this ‘truth’ is the one secret that Saks – contrary to Jones’ rather 
fascistic rule of complete disclosure of ‘everything that came to […] mind’ – hordes away just for herself: ‘I’d 
break this rule only once: I never told Mrs Jones how ugly I thought she was.’ (p.83) Jones exits the text 
mentally and physically ruined by a brutal car accident, subsequent surgery and then (co-morbid) Parkinson’s. 
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demonstrate the impact of schizophrenia upon a life course, with Carolyn as the non-psychotic 
control experiment with identical environment and genes. Given the degree of shared ‘self’ 
between two monozygotic twins, Divided Minds then stages this plot of ipseity disturbance over 
both a horizontal axis (the linearity of time, specifically in the life narrative of Pamela) and vertically 
(between the two sisters). The text plots their divergence from having one unified, shared self-
identity to each being the other’s alternate life. An anxious rivalry, bound up with their shared 
identity, characterises the relationship between the twins, and this is the structuring motif of the 
narrative, in terms of content and form. Narrative sequences are selected to reiterate – over these 
divided narratives – a lifelong battle for primacy and hunger for the other’s portion of their pooled 
identity, from an altercation on their sixth birthday – ‘I swallow the terrible injustice of life with a 
twin who steals your crown, and I swallow the injustice of being Pammy in the red crown instead 
of Lynnie in the blue’156 – through to their fractious co-writing of the text in 2003. At this stage, 
Pamela has become a ‘size 1X’157 because of her anti-psychotic medication Zyprexa. Carolyn’s 
response illustrates their parallelism: ‘I hate seeing what I’d look like if I gained so much weight. It’s 
like seeing myself in one of those “fattening” mirrors in a carnival.’ 158  The series of photos 
interpolated into the middle of the text – a well-established piece of formal rhetoric for memoirs, as 
an attempt to provide incontrovertible documentary evidence that the narrative is authentic and 
‘real’ – function as picture story of this divergence. Within 22 photos (making brief textual space of 
over a century of living), the twins move from being indistinguishable babies, in which each is 
always, unavoidably recognised in the other (‘This is anyone’s guess, but I’m pretty sure that’s Lynn 
on the left.’159) to being irreconcilable, where almost no trace of twin-ship remains, and each 
becomes the site of the other’s failure to recognise anything of themselves. Carolyn’s image is a sign 
of social, personal, economic and sexual success. She is contextualised by her recreational interests, 
which are clearly expensive and glamorous; explicitly labelled ‘in competition’, she remains a viable 
participator in the world. Conversely, Pam is located temporally by her medication, being ‘post-
                                                                                                                                         
‘White as a sheet, frail and trembling, she reached out her hand and said my name. “I love you,” she said.’ 
(p.171) Saks is magnanimous in her eventual victory. Destroyed, decrepit and demented so ‘she would never 
be who she once was,’ just as Saks had been by her psychosis when she first met Jones in all the glory of her 
ugliness, how does Jones appear now? ‘[I]t occurred to me how truly beautiful she was’ says Saks who, at this 
point within the narrative has ceased medication and has been readmitted to Yale – and at this extra-narrative 
point of writing is a successful professor of law – and is ascendant and empowered over the deteriorated, 
declined Jones. (p.172) To use Jones’ Kleinian terms, the ‘bad breast’ got bitten. 
 Memoirists can easily operate in the paranoid-schizoid position, without challenge. They weave a 
phantasy text in which they are omnipotent, with access to the minds and full control over the actions of all 
persons-as-objects within it. It is a playground of the memoirist’s projection and introjection, for the 
narrative voice is that which always transgresses textual ego boundaries. Of course, this might be par for the 
Kleinian therapeutic course. Why not view this all as healthy acts of spite on the path to reintegration of the 
(narrating) paranoid-schizoid self? But you don’t have to be skeptical about (Kleinian) psychoanalysis to feel 
uncomfortable with the unilateral textual dissection of private persons and private moments. This is the 
tussle of transference as public gladiatorial contest. 
156 Wagner and Spiro, p.16 
157 Wagner and Spiro, p.284 
158 Wagner and Spiro, p.285 
159 Wagner and Spiro, caption for the second plate, unpaginated. 
 157 
Zyprexa.’ The contrasts are shocking – the dungarees versus the ball gown; the ‘crazy’ lady’s cat 
versus the younger man – and the shock is of dubious value. Any reader might wonder at the 
course of the conversation between the twins that settled on this selection and ordering of 
photographs. 
 
Figure 3.2 
A rare case of ex utero twin embolization syndrome 
 
 Just as the body semiotic makes no distinction between the signs of illness and the sign of 
cure, but operates as a system for solidifying these shifting signs into some fixity of meaning, so 
does the narrative plot combat – as well as create – this ipseity disturbance. Shaun Gallagher (2003) 
offers four capacities – grounded in neurological functions – that are necessary for self-narrative: 
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temporal integration of information; minimal self-reference; encoding and retrieving 
autobiographical memories; engaging in reflective metacognition.160 In relation to self-reference, 
Gallagher suggests that ‘I can never subjectively misidentify myself when I say ‘I’. This makes the 
minimal self an extremely secure anchor for self-narratives.’161 However, it is possible that the 
reverse is the case, and that rather than the minimal self being a secure anchor for the self narrative, 
might it not instead be a product of the text? Texts allow for the expression of an ipseity disruption 
in terms of content, whilst potentially negating this disruption through the stabilising (or at least 
reifying) effect of narrative on the subject; this ‘I’ that anchors the text for Gallagher, may well be a 
piece of textual structuring that the text itself generates. At any point within a narrative, a subject 
uttering ‘I’ is perhaps – within the text at least – enjoying a unity of self never experienced by the 
material historical figure being signified by the ‘I’. 
 In her first-person account in the Schizophrenia Bulletin, Ruocchio describes the chaotic state 
of existence between the ontologically stable poles of madness and sanity as the worst self-position 
possible: 
Often I wish that they had left me in the world of insanity where everything is predictable, all is the 
same, and nothing changes. Now I am often uncertain as to whether I am sane or insane and find 
that most of the time I am a mixture of the two, a condition I find almost impossible to tolerate 
because the uncertainty is so painful and terrifying.162 
 
This raises a troubling question for advocates of the illness narrative therapies: to what extent is the 
unification of the self as subject an unavoidable consequence of textual processes, rather than an 
indication of any genuine effect on the material person to whom the narrative pertains? 
Late in Saks’ text, the memoirist describes a conflict between the different ill-self and 
illness narrative constructs of Saks (the patient) and Kaplan (her psychoanalyst). Kaplan attempts to 
write a medical narrative on Saks, using the rhetoric of diagnosis and prognosis: ‘[w]hen you’re ill, 
you’re totally indistinguishable from the worst kind of schizophrenic. It’s not going to change, it’s 
not going to get better, and it’s not going to turn into something better.’ 163  Saks rejects this 
narrative, and reasserts her self over Kaplan’s characterisation of her: ‘I was Elyn and I was 
Professor Saks, but I was not the Lady of the Charts; she was a figment of his imagination, not 
mine.’164 This manoeuver is typical of Saks. Throughout the text, she seeks to re-establish herself, 
in the face of her illness, through identification with her academic and professional achievements. 
Saks is not fighting against being an institutionalised self. Rather, she is battling over the type of 
institution. When hospitalised at Yale-New Haven’s Memorial Unit 10, Saks rejects in-patient care 
as it threatens her self-definition: ‘I need to get back to law school … I was a student, not a mental 
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patient – why couldn’t he see that?’165 When treated at Warneford in the UK, Saks is accepting of 
the therapeutic ‘recommendations’166 of her clinical team, but emphatically rejects their proposal 
that she abandon her graduate studies to become a full-time patient: ‘I will remain enrolled at 
Oxford University … And under no circumstances shall you contact my parents.’167 Universities 
encode the self with a narrative of edification; hospitals, with disintegration. Schiller pursues the 
narrative of disintegration, as a means of clearing away the narrative wreckage of the ill self, and 
building a re-covered self on the vacant plot. Saks holds her self in a point of tension between these 
two dynamics of edification and disintegration. 
Sustaining this tension in the face of the re-insistent recurrence of disintegrating events 
(the moments of psychosis) and the re-establishing structuring objectives (the professional and 
academic achievements) constitutes the narrative of the text. In this way, the memoir’s title, a well-
known quotation from WB Yeats’ ‘The Second Coming’, operates as an organising metaphor for 
the narrative and for the text. The centre that cannot hold is the textual subject, which is constantly 
under threat. This existential threat to the subject is dramatically staged by the delusions as a global 
catastrophe reminiscent of Schreber’s grandiose cosmological apocalypses. Saks attempts to hold 
this self together by her constant re-iteration of her narrative of intellectual development. As with 
Steele, pure agency is the key constituent of the self: ‘[a]s I watched everything I valued disintegrate, 
I nevertheless fought to somehow hang onto my autonomy – my self.’168 Again, as with Steele, the 
narrative is one of the self reconciling this constituent agency and autonomy with an acceptance of 
the chronicity of the disrupting illness and the necessity of adherence to a medical regimen. 
However, Saks’ text does not evangelise about recovery; the medication functions not as a narrative 
turn towards the construction of a ‘cured’ self but rather as a turn towards a reconstituted ill self. 
Kaplan identifies the destructive challenge to Saks’ ipseity as being based in a desire to assert an 
unsustainable, autonomous, non-ill self: ‘I’ve repeatedly told you that you’ll need to stay on meds 
the rest of your life, that trying to get off them keeps you stuck in the same place – going from well 
to symptomatic to well again.’169 Rather than battling to re-inscribe a (re)created self over the text 
of schizophrenia, or to place medication or cure in the space usurped from the self by the illness, 
Saks develops a pragmatic narrative of acceptance, that might match Frank’s idealised heroic model 
of the Bodhisattva, ‘the hero of perseverance through suffering.’170 
Saks’ text is a repudiation of the existence of an Author God who gives biographical and 
interpretative unity to the text. The text is formally presented as having this unity; Saks does not 
share authorship in the way the Steele and Schiller do. However, the closing acknowledgements 
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describe the text as a ‘collaborative effort’171, identifying a ghost writer (Larkin Warren), as well as 
significant contributions from a panoply of textual contributors and influences typical of the 
professional production of texts as commodity. These include editors, agents, publishers and even 
two different teachers of ‘memoir writing.’172 Publisher Robert Miller is credited with choosing the 
text’s title. In these final lines of the text, the idiosyncratic organising metaphor, apparently so 
characteristic of the narrating self, so expressive of the unique phenomenological experience of 
Saks as schizophrenic, so integral to the thematic and rhetorical structure of the text (and thereby 
the construction of Saks) is shown to be a double quotation, a reference to the reference of 
another. In Barthes’ terms, the text (and the narrative self constructed by it) is a ‘tissue of 
quotations’ 173  drawn across culture, from different professional disciplines (psychoanalysis, 
psychiatry, law, publishing) and via the ‘collaborative effort’ of different biographical, material 
individuals. 
Formally, the text enjoys a unity in stark contrast to the narrative content. There is little of 
the disturbed chaos narrative to Saks’ text; it proceeds with a forensic rigour, exposing only a few 
intriguing, and editorially marked, ellipses in relation to Saks’ family.174 In the same way, a unified 
narrative subject appears within the text, despite two important factors: first, the on-going presence 
of a disease that – according to the very content of the narrative – shatters that subject’s unity and 
coherence of self, and secondly, the fact that the unified subject of the text is the product of several 
different authorial sources. The narrative unity then is a textual product, and the acknowledgement 
of this unity (which Frank might consider therapeutic ‘witnessing’) is nothing other than an 
unavoidable consequence of reading, as famously described by Barthes: ‘a text’s unity lies not in its 
origin but in its destination.’175 Structurally, the harmonious unified narrative self is the textual 
embodiment of the narrative’s successful recovery, to reconcile the interpolated illness narrative 
with the projected life narrative. As Saks notes: ‘I needed to put two critical ideas together: that I 
could both be mentally ill and lead a rich and satisfying life.’176 The organising metaphor then 
becomes one of the triumph and ownership of acceptance, rather than the tragedy of an 
inescapable fate. The metaphorical statement ‘the centre cannot hold’ does acknowledge that the 
centre will always be prone to attack and collapse, but at the same time, it reaffirms that such a 
centre – tentative, temporary, transitory – does exist. Moreover, Saks’ text is generating a self that 
                                                
171 Saks, p.311 
172 Saks, p.311 
173 Barthes, ‘Death of the Author’, p.146 
174 Saks is continually offering her parents either no narrative or one that is a ‘shortened, tidier version of the 
truth’ (Saks, p.70). This redaction operates in both directions. Discussion and examination of Saks’ parents – 
surely a recurrent theme in her decades of psychoanalysis – is continually curtailed within the text, and the 
‘wall of appropriateness’ (Saks, p.110) erected between parents and child is replicated throughout the 
narrative. At one point, Saks considers the psychodynamic theories of the domestic etiology of 
schizophrenia. Whilst she notes sardonically that ‘[a]ccording to the crushing weight of a century’s teaching, 
my illness was an indictment of my parents,’ Saks does not attempt to refute this either (Saks, p.157). 
175 Barthes, ‘Death of the Author’, p.148 
176 Saks, p.308 
 161 
requires active location within a temporal stream – where it moves through cycles of holding and 
not holding. She states: ‘[m]y good fortune is not that I have recovered from mental illness. I have 
not, nor will I ever. My good fortune lies in having found life.’177 Without the temporality, recovery 
is not possible, but to what extent is this temporality yet another textual product of the cure 
narrative? 
 
 
  
                                                
177 Saks, p.310 
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Out of time 
[T]emporality is only a structural category of narrative (of discourse), just as in language [langue] 
temporality only exists in the form of a system; from the point of view of narrative, what we call 
time does not exist, or at least only exists functionally as an element of the semiotic system.178 
 
My journal has evolved from the written word to transformation, current lived experience, and the 
expectation of good things yet to come. […] With life and recovery, it is not about seeing me as a 
victim; it is about trying new things and moving forward with an attitude of victory.179 
 
There must be time for cure. These texts are preoccupied with chronology. The Quiet Room and 
Divided Minds time-stamp each individual chapter. Henry’s Demons (2011), a hybrid narrative 
presenting non-integrated, parallel narratives by father and (ill) son, gives a basic chronology of 
Henry’s illness, as if to say that the timeline of events is the one element of the narrative(s) too 
important to be subjected to the inevitable disruptive, deconstructing ambiguities that irreconcilable 
twinned narratives will create. In this, the texts may be staging the clinical obsession with clear, 
linear accounts of illness progression: ‘[c]linical work unfolds in a highly regulated temporal frame – 
clinicians are anxious to nail down the chronology and duration of symptoms.’180 Cure, and the 
cured narrative, follows the straight line. Psychosis though, like a Deluzean Event, denies this 
linearity. Correspondents to the Schizophrenia Bulletin such as M MacPherson rely on the long-
standing organisational metaphor of the hardship memoir: the long journey of return.181 Longden 
similarly entitles a chapter in her memoir ‘The living death – and the long road back’ and compares 
her ‘journey’ to that of mountaineer Joe Simpson in his ‘survival memoir’ Touching the Void.182 
Patrick Cockburn may open his co-authored text with a chronology, but Henry Cockburn is 
continually disordered and displaced in time (and mind) by ‘polka-dot days’, which last various 
periods of time, though rarely equate to a day.183 Divided Minds and The Centre Cannot Hold both 
open with a proleptic incident of acute psychosis, before adopting a cradle-to-grave (or at least 
cradle-to-cure) linear account. Each text exhibits a tripartite position of narrative temporality, in 
which, simultaneously, the narrative voice is located prior to psychosis, within the psychosis and 
after the psychosis. 
Problems with the narrative time are therefore signs of structural unreliability within the 
narrative and the narrator(s). In itself, it does not perhaps matter that Carolyn’s recollection of her 
sixth-grade classmates’ fit of Beatlemania dated November 1963 is historically impossible. Carolyn 
may believe that girls were ‘gathered at Sue’s or Candi’s desk – something to do with the Beatles 
and their newest record’184 on the day of JFK’s assassination but the Beatles never charted in the 
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US until the release of ‘I Want to Hold Your Hand’ on 26 December, 1963.185 This is not an 
exercise in pedantry. The assassination of JFK is presented as a moment laden with significance 
and as the first manifestation of what eventually becomes Pamela’s psychosis. Pamela describes a 
classic delusion of reference – ‘I killed him! I’m to blame!’186 – coincident with a hypersensitivity to 
stimulus – ‘all my senses have been supernaturally enhanced’ 187  – and, most diagnostically 
important, the commencement of hearing persecutory, punning voices – ‘Thrills will kill, Pam 
Spampamamamam. Will you? Kill you?’188 
Within the narrative(s) of Divided Minds, 22 November 1963 is pivotal. It marks the 
appearance of Pamela’s symptoms. The high co-morbidity of stress and a range of psychiatric 
disorder including schizophrenia is a commonly accepted fact, without there being any definitive 
understanding of the processes (social and/or biochemical) connecting the two nor any agreement 
on the direction of causality in the relationship.189 ‘The notion that stress is a precipitating factor 
for psychosis in vulnerable individuals has face validity and resonates for patients and their 
families,’ 190  and this is demonstrated by Pamela’s account of her response to the news. She 
concludes: ‘But I feel ripped apart, and put back wrong. I know that the world is a terrible place, 
that nothing will ever be the same: I know that I am evil.’191 Though the narrative conspires to 
convince the reader that they are getting contemporaneous first-person accounts of the two twins’ 
contrasting responses, this is obviously only a literary technique. Both Pamela and Carolyn focalise 
their accounts through their 12-year-old selves, adopting the present tense and a self-consciously 
constricted vocabulary and expressive range. Carolyn’s non-psychotic response is – at least 
superficially – out of step with the collective mourning: 
I am so confused. I don’t understand what’s going on. I understand that the president is dead, but I 
can’t figure out why it is so terrible. The president doesn’t mean anything to me. He’s the man 
who’s called Mr. President.192 
 
Clearly this is not the narrative voice of a 50-year-old psychiatrist. Nor is it a redacted 
contemporary diary entry, repurposed as illness memoir; the confusion over the Beatles is a mistake 
that could only occur with a retrospective writing. 
 Here is the structural problem with the case study of Divided Minds given in miniature. 
Pamela’s account may well be accurate, but it is unavoidably written from the temporal perspective 
of cure. A reader cannot know whether the narrative operates as an authentic account of the first 
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childhood instance of psychosis written with appropriate accuracy some 40 years after the event or 
whether the narrative simply demonstrates a desire for the self with schizophrenia to provide such 
an account.193 
 A similar operation takes place within The Centre Cannot Hold. Saks presents her anxieties 
about the disintegration of a coherent, unified and delineated self as a prodromal symptom or 
contextual and/or causal characteristic. Describing her first sexual relationship, Saks claims she 
experienced love making as existentially challenging, and therefore frightening: ‘I would suddenly 
get frightened, losing the sense of where I left off and he began … for me, “becoming one” with a 
man felt like a loss of self.’194 The temporal location of this insight is presented as contemporary 
with the experience; however, the similarity of this account of the youthful Saks’ anxiety to the 
Kleinian account of the porosity of the self’s boundaries in the paranoid-schizoid position poses an 
unanswerable question: is this supposed ‘insight’ by the subject self into the subject self authentic or 
is it an example of a past re-inscribed by Saks’ subsequent years of reconstructing herself with her 
Kleinian195 British analyst Dr Jones as the ‘glue’: 
Her tolerance and understanding seemed endless, and her steady and calm presence contained me, 
as if she were the glue that held me together. I was falling apart, flying apart, exploding – and she 
gathered my pieces and held them for me.196 
 
Placing Saks’ description of Jones as ‘the first accomplished professional woman I had come to 
know’197 in the context of Saks’ frequent reassertions of her career as an alternative self to the 
imposed ill-self, raises the possibility that Saks’ re-constitutive narrative is – partially, at least – a re-
inscription of the identity and modes of experiencing and understanding expressed by Jones. This is 
not an attempt to psychoanalyse the text and ask if Jones’ cruel death prompted in Saks a 
therapeutic reconstruction of the dead mother figure in her self-narrative. It is merely to observe 
that textual components of Saks’ narrative self – the focus on the professional identity, the drive to 
rebuild and reiterate, the anxiety about losing the self in the narratives of others – are also textual 
components of Jones, as presented by Saks. To return to the question of ideology momentarily, 
psychoanalysis generally, and Kleinianism specifically, can easily be characterised as bourgeois 
ideology of the self, obsessed with the ‘abstract biological person, biological individual – that which 
has become the alpha and omega of modern ideology.’198 Kleinian psychoanalysis exhibits a pre-
occupation with object relations that, it is almost too obvious to state, constitutes a commodity 
fetish of the emotions.199 The popularity of illness memoirs illustrates the dominant ideological cult 
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of the individual, and the insistence upon framing social problems as individual narratives. Memoirs 
of ‘schizophrenia’ offer a potential threat to this ideology with their protagonists whose unifying 
narrative subjective self is clearly in crisis.  
 For this very reason, if the person with schizophrenia suffers from disrupted or diminished 
autonoetic awareness, these memoirs often exhibit an anxiety about creating that coherent self 
through time. Kai Vogeley and Christian Kupke (2007) map Edmund Husserl’s longstanding 
phenomenological tripartite conception of time consciousness – as ‘the experience of an impressional 
present, rooted in and constantly modified by the mutual relationship and interaction of a retentional 
past and a protentional future’ – onto a similar model drawn from cognitive neuroscience relating to 
the prefrontal cortex by Joaquin Fuster.200 Their paper develops ‘the hypothesis that patients with 
schizophrenia are unable to link the separate aspects of events into a cohesive, memorable, and 
distinctive whole as reflected by a quantitative and qualitative impairment of autonoetic 
awareness.’201 As retrospectively constructed memoirs that project backwards their reconstituted 
recovery authors, memoirs such as Divided Minds and The Quiet Room offer an apparently unified self 
in the Husserlean impressional present, but this is merely a textual effect, and one that can be 
deconstructed on close reading, as demonstrated. 
Texts constructed without the self-conscious professional (be it the literary or medical 
profession) imperative to generate a harmonious narrating self occupying an ever-present now as the 
moment of being-recovered, and without the layers of professional oversight, and over-writing, 
supplied by editors, ghostwriters and medical co-authors, demonstrate Fuster’s account of the 
broken temporal links constitutive of the self. For example, this disrupted autonoetic awareness can 
be seen schizomimetically manifesting formally in Jamie Kershaw’s novel Plan 103f published by 
Chipmunkapublishing, whose ‘professional’ practice is unburdened by editorial interventions (or 
even a proper proofread, to judge by their output). Though not a memoir, Kershaw describes the 
text as a blend of ‘fiction/non-fiction’ in an introduction that also provides a detailed synopsis of 
the story. 202  As forever anxious about losing the narrative thread, the text reiterates and self-
referentially discusses and marks its own progress along a course repeatedly laid out in advance. 
The opening chapter – entitled ‘Exposition’ – offers a starting point that is temporally the 
conclusion of the various characters’ intertwining narratives. Composed of quite strongly clashing 
strains of prolepsis and analepsis in an attempt to affirm the narrative unity, and similarly flowing 
between ‘seven principal characters [that] could be said to represent different aspects of the 
author’s own character, broken dreams, and failed experiences,’ rather than simply disintegrating, 
Plan 103f is caught in a never-ending moment of disintegration.203 Kershaw’s anxiety about his 
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characters collapsing results in frequent recapitulations of their wafer-thin characterisation and 
chronologies; at one point, he breaks off the narrative entirely to give potted character 
summaries.204 The closing lines read like a parody of the individualistic clichés of self-help and life 
writing genres: 
Next they would see a new chapter, a new dawn and a new day. Either way, they were glad 
for what they had been through.  
One thing was for sure – they would have to stick at it, keep ploughing the furrow and 
reshaping their plans. Plan 103f had been for them. The original concepts had come, life had 
thrown down the gauntlet for them, they bit the bullet, and now they were back to themselves once 
again. This was just the beginning.205 
  
A very similar set of schizomimetic textual ‘symptoms’ relating to the self in time can be seen in 
Christina Bruni’s 2014 account in the Schizophrenia Bulletin. In a text of only a few hundred words, 
and which is presented as tale of successful recovery, there are continual temporal signposts of 
specific dates and periods of time, but these again present a chronology that, despite its insistence, 
fails to hold together. Bruni attempts to nail each paragraph into a linear account, and yet the text 
flickers between moments that seem, at best, under-integrated: 
Over 6 years […] a 9-year run […] Since 2002 […] In June 2000 […] over 12 years […] a 7-year gig 
[…] In 1990 […] Friday, September 25, 1987, at five o’clock […] 9:00am that Saturday […] 24 h 
[…] 3 weeks […] over 20 years […] April 1992 […] 2 weeks […] spring of 1998 […] Five years into 
this […] since July 2003, going on 10 years […] April 2007 […] a week before my birthday […] the 
next day […] that April night in 2007 […] For 16 years […] Within 3 days […] the fall of 2007 […] 
in 1987 […]206 
  
Preoccupied with isolating and delineating her ‘breakdowns’ as ‘episodes’ hermetically sealed off 
from the on-going life narrative of recovery and remission, the text reads like the anti-chronology 
of the Deleuzean Event. This is not to poke fun at errors or inadequacies in the writing of a person 
with lived experience of mental ill health. These errors in respect to the self as organized in 
narrative, and specifically in narrative time, simultaneously suggest the inappropriateness of illness 
narrative theories for ‘illnesses’ where the disruption of the unified sense of self is a primary 
‘symptom’ – rather than a secondary effect – and show how texts themselves can embody, in their 
form, experiences that might be inexpressible (or, at least, difficult to express with clarity and 
aesthetic potency) in their explicit content. 
 Henry Cockburn demonstrates a temporal displacement in the chapters he contributes to 
Henry’s Demons. Whilst Henry’s father Patrick provides the bare, factual opening chronology of his 
‘hospital stays’ 207  and the apparently objective account of his ‘illness,’ Henry interjects the 
                                                
204 Kershaw, pp.75-81 
205 Kershaw, p.284 
206 Christina Bruni, ‘Immediate intervention: life-long success’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40:1 (2014) 3-4, pp.3-4 
Even the title speaks to a temporal Spaltung: the ‘immediate’ and the ‘life-long’ pull in opposite directions. 
207 Cockburn and Cockburn, unpaginated. Despite being entitled a ‘timeline of Henry’s hospital stays’, the 
chronology includes an entry for a six-month period in the family home, and a one-term return to Brighton 
University. This speaks to the medicalization of Henry in the eyes of his family. Because he is now a mental 
health ‘patient’, wherever he stays – even if it is his home or his parents’ home – it is conceptualized as a 
‘hospital stay.’ 
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occasional chapter giving a commentary that is by turns complementary and contradictory. 208 
Henry’s own narrative begins in chapter three, by which time the details of his ‘psychotic break’ 
have already been recounted by Patrick Cockburn, setting a pattern whereby the supposedly more 
reliable narrator lays out a biographical and biochemical ‘objective’ version, to be followed by a 
briefer phenomenological, subjective account by the ‘patient’. At the start of Henry’s first chapter, 
he describes his moment of diagnosis as a third (and thereby series establishing) encounter209 with 
the word ‘schizophrenia’ to which he responds: ‘I didn’t think of it as an illness but as an 
awakening, a spiritual awakening.’210 The use of the past tense suggests that Henry – at the time of 
writing in 2009/2010 or at least at some later point in time from the diegetic time of the text – no 
longer holds the beliefs of 2002. Yet, at the close of the same chapter, he shifts to the present 
tense: ‘Do I have schizophrenia? […] I think I just see the world differently from other people, and 
maybe if psychiatrists understood this, I would not have been in the hospital.’211 Henry’s final 
chapter (the last in the text) seems to have a similar split temporal perspective. The first half of the 
chapter appears to be written from Cygnet Hospital in Beckton, and is voiced by a narrative self 
explicitly angry with psychiatrists for extending his incarceration and implicitly proud of his many 
breakouts.212  
Henry offers an ironic belittlement of the hospital psychiatrist’s renewal of his section: 
‘what a psychiatrist says carries a lot of weight compared to that of somebody who has been 
diagnosed as a schizophrenic. He said he believed I was a risk to myself because I used to swim in 
rivers and lakes.’ 213  What is specifically schizomimetic about this is that the irony and the 
‘schizophrenic’ distance (as noted by Sass and referred to earlier) both deploy the same dual 
subjective perspective. Simultaneously, Henry both knows that he is considered a suicide risk 
because he has nearly died by swimming in Newhaven harbour (as well as several other 
misadventures involving heights, water, railway sidings), and also believes that the medical account 
of his experiences (the diagnostic term ‘schizophrenia’) is false or at least very incomplete. The 
psychiatrist would not have said that Henry was a risk to himself because he likes swimming in 
rivers and lakes, and Henry knows that he is redacting the psychiatrist’s own text to make it seem 
ridiculous, and is certainly presenting this as a punch-line of sorts. However, Henry also – in a way 
that seems somewhat contradictory – believes the truth of his own redaction, even as he presents it 
ironically. He ironises then not just the object of his irony – the psychiatrist’s medical account of 
him qua patient – but also the subject of his irony – his own phenomenological, ‘spiritual 
                                                
208 Of the 17 chapters, Henry writes five and contributes some paragraphs to a sixth. 10 are written solely by 
Patrick, with a further two chapters written with additional text from Henry and from Jan Montefiore, 
Henry’s mother. 
209 And here the reader might be instantly reminded of Steele’s response to the word, or the Bellman’s refrain 
that ‘what I tell you three times is true.’ Carroll, Snark, p.46 
210 Cockburn and Cockburn, p.31 
211 Cockburn and Cockburn, p.43 
212 ‘[D]uring those seven years I have escaped over thirty times.’ Cockburn and Cockburn, p.217 
213 Cockburn and Cockburn, p.220 
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awakening.’ 214 It is this ambivalence of subjective perspective that has caused the disruptions in 
tense throughout Henry’s text. It is not that there is a clear before (when he did not have ‘insight’) 
and after (when he does), despite the apparent irrefutable tangibility of the opening timeline. Rather, 
he holds these positions in the same self and at the same time, and this is so integral to the 
disruption of both that the ambivalence manifests itself textually as inconsistent temporal splits and 
contrasts. 
When the text makes its final proleptic shift to Henry in a ‘step-down’ facility (the phrase is 
used by Patrick Cockburn in the opening timeline), the reader has been primed for a textual 
resolution, prefigured in the narrative dumbshow of the opening chronology. At last, it seems, the 
reader has reached the temporal moment when Henry has developed ‘insight’ into his ‘illness’ and 
is now compliant in the pharmacological ‘control’ of his ‘disease’ in accord with Patrick Cockburn’s 
insistence at the close of chapter two (immediately prior to Henry’s appearance as a second 
narrative voice in the text) that ‘[s]o much turned on Henry recognising he was ill and taking 
medication, which might not cure his psychosis but at least control it.’215 Such a conclusion might 
make sense of the temporal twists in Henry’s attitude towards his ‘illness’, yet the moment of 
temporal, textual and subjective unity is dogged by the same ambivalence and irony exhibited 
throughout his text: ‘I am still not sure I am mentally ill.’216 The double perspective described above 
in relation to his ironising of a psychiatrist, is actually a triple perspective, as well as being within 
the ‘illness’ or the diegesis, as a patient or protagonist, Henry has a second perspective as being 
without the ‘illness’ as narrator or a person undergoing a spiritual awakening or as a ‘recovered’ 
patient. The third perspective is a meta-textual one, from which he can ironise the situation of 
being both within and without the ‘illness’ or text. This is a position of Peircean Thirdness akin to 
the self-conscious, post-modernist writer (or, worse, the post-structuralist critic). Consider the final 
two-sentence paragraph of the text: ‘[i]t has been a very long road for me, but I think I’m entering 
the final straight. There is a tree I sit under in the garden in Lewisham which speaks to me and 
gives me hope.’217 The first sentence conforms to the genre expectations of the illness memoir, 
resuscitating the dead metaphor of the journey, but the final sentence tangles this with a deep irony 
that the hope for recovery is inextricably tied to a performed lack of ‘insight’ tantamount to a 
rejection of the concept of ‘insight’ and the ‘disease’ model to which it is appended. It is absolutely 
impossible that Henry, at this point in writing in 2010, was unaware that many (especially 
                                                
214 Not dissimilar from the ‘ambivalent feelings’ 10-year old Henry apparently had towards his four-year old 
brother Alex (p.56). This is a curious detail that Patrick Cockburn should go seemingly out of his way to 
insert into the narrative and, perhaps purely from the reader’s own effort after meaning, starts to acquire 
quasi-diagnostic significance. Its inclusion is less pointed than the rather more lengthy suggestion that 
Henry’s maternal, Jewish genetic heritage bears some aetiological weight. In the Cockburns, ‘there were no 
traces of any mental disorder; both were highly self-confident and tough-minded.’ (p.110) Contrast this with 
the alleged ‘evidence that Hugh [Montefiore’s] family had a genetic predisposition to schizotypy which might 
[…] lead to a mental disorder, and this susceptibility had been inherited by Henry.’ (p.113) 
215 Cockburn and Cockburn, p.27 
216 Cockburn and Cockburn, p.221 
217 Cockburn and Cockburn, p.222 
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psychiatrists) connect a refusal to ‘accept’ a diagnosis with ‘non-compliance’ with treatment and 
therefore a ‘poor prognosis’; cheekily, he makes exactly such a posture the motor to carry him 
across the ‘final straight’ of a ‘long journey.’ Only when aware of this deliberate irony does the 
reader notice that the ‘long road’ may not – as the reader has been conditioned to think – refer to 
recovery or ‘insight’ but could equally be the quest for spiritual enrichment, as which Henry has 
very frequently conceptualised his experiences.  
There will necessarily be different ‘times’ for the illness memoir. First, there is non-existent 
narrative time mentioned by Barthes in the quotation at the start of this section. This time is a 
‘structural category’ of the text, and is subordinate to an organising logic. The examples examined 
above demonstrate how the narrative time can collapse into inconsistency when chronology is 
forced to kowtow to the narrative’s logic. Secondly, there is the materialist timeframe of the simple 
chronology, although it is important to note that this materialist timeframe can become – in 
another analysis – a narrative in itself. When texts attempt to organise themselves into such 
chronologies, they start to undo themselves as the shattered autonoetic awareness of the narrating 
self prevents the assertion of any clear linearity. Thirdly, there is the time of the reader. This thesis 
is not interested in the actual, literal time an individual might spend reading a book, but rather in 
remembering that the text is receiving its – temporary – unity in a reading space that operates 
within a different and ‘real’ time. This reader time-space is the time of ‘the enunciation [in which] 
every text is eternally written here and now.’218 The narrative attempt to construct a self is ordered 
according to the time-logic of the text but the unity is composed in the eternal moment of the 
text’s performance in the time-space of the reader. Textual schizomimetic manifestations – such as 
the temporal Spaltung pulling apart the grammatical tense agreement of Henry Cockburn’s account 
of his illness – both act as the attempt in re-unifying the self and also enact the very disintegration 
they attempt to remedy. Only through acts of considerable redacting and rewriting can a ‘cured’ 
textual subject be created. However, these acts do not have to be intentional. Indeed, some are 
unavoidable. Consider the necessarily linear layout of interpolated voices in a text such as The Centre 
Cannot Hold. Despite voice-hearers routinely describing their voices as multiple, overlapping and 
cacophonous, the mimetic conventions of the illness memoir genre, especially that it be written in 
accessible, clear prose, insist upon an already-sanitised representation of voices, to a degree, 
controlled and regulated in their grammatical, orthographical place. 
Here the thesis returns to the claims made by illness theorists that narrative can function as 
a therapeutic tool, re-establishing the ipseity, agency and coherence of the self disrupted by illness. 
But the textual method of achieving these aims is dishonest – or incompletely honest, at least – and 
edges towards tyranny. To re-use the Big Brother metaphor from earlier, the underlying theory of 
narrative reconstruction of the self is no different from the philosophy that drives the work of the 
Ministry of Truth: ‘Who controls the past … controls the future: who controls the present controls 
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the past.’ 219  The illness memoirist uses their dual dominance of the present (both in the 
performative ‘here and now’ of the text and the materialist present of compiling the book as product) 
to construct a past that suits the dominant ideology of the self. This ideology in the memoirs 
explored is invariably a reiteration of prevailing cultural values – Christ cures, medicine cures, 
success cures, wealth cures. In effect, the text becomes a demand to accept these values, and this 
codification of what it is to be ‘healthy’ or a ‘self’. The potential value of this for the material 
individual (the name on the spine) comes in the reassurance the text then provides about their 
future, which will see the endurance of the thriving, authentic, (re)constituted well self. 
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The dispersed memoirist 
Psychosomatic suffering is the price we pay for this self-propagating folly. Our swarming innards 
cannot live up to the demand placed on them to be meaningless. The psychological root penetrates 
deep into the bodily fluids to become illness. The brain-module cell swarms misunderstand one 
another and send conflicting messages to tissue and glands. We fall ill because our cells cannot quite 
succeed in uniting us.220 
 
When I pretend to write on what I have written in the past, there occurs in the same way a 
movement of abolition, not of truth … I do not try to restore myself (as we say of a monument) … I 
myself am my own symbol, I am the story which happens to me: freewheeling in language, I have to 
compare myself to …221 
 
Barthes’ extraordinary text Roland Barthes (1975) offers a performance of the post-structuralist self. 
Composed of fragments of text, images, even sheet music, and with a shifting narrative perspective 
(sometimes in the first person, sometimes in the third), the text does not engage in the fiction of 
rigidly constructing a unified, over-determined self. Instead, the text remains an un-integrated tissue 
of quotations, or rather the logic of structural integration is self-consciously arbitrary (fragments are 
entitled and alphabetised) and therefore readerly re-integrations are invited. Temporal ordering to 
ascribe a fixed meaning is overtly challenged throughout: ‘[w]hat right does my present have to 
speak of my past?’222 
The narrative subject performs a Spaltung as unifying principle. It is la personne divisée […] 
[as] a dispersion of energy in which there remains neither a central core nor a structure of meaning: 
I am not contradictory, I am dispersed.’223 A similar narrative structure is used in Henry’s Demons, 
where the same ‘story’ is presented within the different (and fragmentary) parallel narratives of 
Patrick and Henry. Unlike Divided Minds, this text does not present a clear polarity of narratives, 
offering the ‘well’ and the ‘schizophrenic’ in an ill-matched dialectic.224 Whereas contradiction in 
illness memoirs demands to be resolved into an authoritative account (the voices were or were not 
real), Henry’s Demons allows for the absence of a central structuring meaning through its dispersed 
narratives. 
Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotics applies a similar model to the biological organism. Psychological 
illness is both a product of and a productive factor in a fundamental disunity. Hoffmeyer 
conceptualises this disunity as playing out in parallel at the cellular and psychic levels. If texts and 
selves both entail a balance between cohering centripetal drive and an incohering centrifugal one, 
then the narrative practice of writing oneself well seems especially ill-suited to ‘diseases’ of ipseity. 
Texts and selves draw material into a unity that is necessarily present to a degree in reading even 
when wholly and deliberately absent in composition. The most obvious examples from literature 
and art are texts constructed according to the Dadaist cut-up technique. To couch it in semiotic 
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terms, a text that is hyposemic provokes a hypersemic reading. This is intrinsically schizomimetic as 
such reading strategies are characteristic of very many ‘schizophrenic’ memoirists. Erin 
Hawkes/Stefanidis writes on several occasions in the Schizophrenia Bulletin of the ‘Deep Meaning’ 
that she discerns in syntagmas of signs: ‘Ah, another clue! […] I was being messaged by various 
things I found on the sidewalk: a red elastic band, intact, meant that I would not have to open my 
wrist and bleed out again; a yellow strip of plastic prophesied that my body would become a crime 
scene with that “Do not enter” warning. I collect them, keep them in a little drawstring bag.’225 In-
keeping with the findings in the previous section, Hawkes’ temporal perspective is split, 
manifesting in textual form her ambivalence about whether Deep Meaning is real or not. 
Voyce’s passion for decoding leads him to misprise a genuine coded message. ‘I knew 
there was Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture which went dot-dot-dot-dash. However, in my learning of 
Morse I thought dot-dot-dot-dash was “B”. I took this to be “B” for “Back”. By signaling “B” you 
were saying: “Get Back”. Pigeons and other birds did this.’ 226  Shifting narrative temporal 
perspective, Voyce – as the post-psychotic writer of the text – laconically notes his delusional 
misreading in parenthesis: ‘(Actually Tchaikovsky was writing V for Victory, the true translation of 
dot-dot-dot-dash.)’ Though right about coding, Voyce misses additional coding from his delusional 
semiological system; it is Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony that begins with dot-dot-dot-dash. At (one 
of the rhizomatic) heart(s) of Voyce’s semiological system sits the concept of Russian military. 
There is no need, at this stage in the analysis, to question whether or not this is itself a metaphor 
displacing some other feared power. (Voyce does frequently describe suffering financially at the 
hands of an overbearing father, but sometimes, a cigar is just a cigar.) However, this concept is not 
quite an ordering principle – for psychosis and sense are not morse code – but more of a recurring 
motif, like that of opening of Beethoven’s Fifth. The ‘psychotic’ system of signification erected in 
Voyce’s narrative around coded messages pertaining to the Russian military is not dismantled 
wholly post psychosis. Though the misprision of B for V is amended by the ‘de-psychoticised’ 
narrative subject, that subject misses the larger misprision of Beethoven for Tchaikovsky and, so 
doing, reinstates the paranoid anticipation of a Russian triumph. Though ‘allied … to the new 
winning side, the incoming Soviets,’ Voyce appears (prudently) fearful of the inevitable Stalinist 
invasion throughout his text.227 
As well as the persistence of the psychotic system, it is worth reiterating its social 
embeddedness. Psychosis is always historicized, and operates as an excess (not a deficit) of meaning 
(or connotative signification). As Vonnegut asks about his own Soviet-infused ‘psychotic’ system of 
signification in the 1980s: ‘Why is there so much meaning when the mind breaks? Why isn’t it just 
static or nonsense? I became convinced that my being willing to wrestle the Russian Bear could 
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avoid a nuclear exchange and save millions upon millions of lives, not to mention the planet, from 
nuclear winter.’ 228  Similarly, when Milton Greek, a correspondent to the Schizophrenia Bulletin 
deconstructs their ‘hallucinations as symbolic stories,’ it is not just that the narrative self, as diegetic 
object in the moment of the psychosis, is hypersemically constructing a sequence of meanings (a 
story), but from a position of Secondness, the ‘cured’ narrative self, as biographical subject after the 
moment of psychosis, is creating a diagnostic/recovery sequence of meaning from the 
hallucinations qua symbolic stories.229 Further, though, in a position of Thirdness, this all unfolds in a 
cultural context comprising these various myths and symbolisations, and in an inter-personal reality 
whereby individuals construct their own (de)codings to make sense of the world. It is for this 
reason that the material within the symbolic stories draws – albeit sometimes obliquely – from the 
same intertextual data. It is not hard to understand, contextually, Greek’s so-called bizarre thinking: 
‘I interpreted the small town to be heaven, and, […] I believe that Jesus was saying that if I went 
into the woods and starved myself to death as penance I would go to heaven.’230 Such tales of self-
abnegation and purgative transcendence of the physical and worldly for spiritual ends infuse human 
discourse, and are no doubt particularly culturally salient in contemporary Ohio.231  
Hypersemia is then a practice by the ‘schizophrenic’ figure within their texts. Just as voice-
hearing might be the symptom of content, and schizophrenese might be the symptom of 
expression, hypersemia might be the symptom of narrative structure. The ‘schizophrenic’ subjects 
are both dogged and defined by it. Schizomimetically, texts can generate a quasi-pathological 
hypersemia in the reader, through the communicative complicity inherent in the reading act. These 
moments can go unnoticed yet they are surely closer to a mimetic representation of the experience 
of being within psychosis than any distancing account composed from the safe, far shore of sanity, 
the key to the Quiet Room in hand. These schizomimetic instances puncture and disrupt the 
reader’s own reality. Scally, for example, gives an account of tearing up his home, searching through 
books, newspapers, CDs and LPs following a trail of ‘clues’ relating to a colour coding 
communication system he is receiving (or, more accurately, constructing). As the chase for 
signification bounces from Far From the Madding Crowd to the symbolism in chess to the colours of 
Manchester football teams to Jim Reeves song lyrics, the reader can follow the loose associations 
but with a certain ironic distance. Scally adds a commentary in italics and frames the account as a 
demonstration of psychotic symptoms: ‘Here, I am just trying to make a small example of how my thoughts 
were going and making links from one thing to another.’232 If he does not explicitly and unequivocally 
repudiate his hypersemic belief system, he certainly has none of the wily ambivalence seen in Henry 
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Cockburn’s text, saying bluntly, ‘I felt like I was Einstein in a lab […] I had probably been more 
like some crackpot professor.’ 233  However, consider his description of the mess in his room: 
‘[t]here was a note on the mirror which was off the wall leaning against the chair (the note reading – 
‘man in the mirror’). Of course the album nearest to it was Michael Jackson’s ‘Off the Wall’ (oddly 
though the song ‘man in the mirror’ wasn’t on that album).’234 The operative word here is ‘oddly’. 
There is – when outside Scally’s sign-constructing discourse – absolutely nothing odd that the track 
is not on Off the Wall. It would be more ‘odd’ – as in less probable – to have the double coincidence 
of the proximity of the seemingly pertinent album and the seemingly pertinent track title to the 
mirror off the wall. However, the reader, and Scally himself, have schizomimetically lost the 
detachment with which the rest of the signifying frenzy was represented. The endurance of the 
signifying chain that Scally – and all illness writing theorists – would wish to see curtailed and 
parcelled off into some antediluvian time of ‘illness’ in contrast to the ‘cured’ moment of textual 
composition, is a re-emergence of the Deleuzean Event. Very simply, it is the paradox of the 
‘schizophrenic’ memoir that it is necessarily always that hypersemia which disrupts the narrative of 
the self qua biological, biographical entity that provides the structuring, signifying unity of the 
narrative of the self qua textual subject and object. 
A similar manoeuvre occurs in Henry’s Demons. After an abortive attempt at initiating a 
romance with a female flat mate on Brighton beach, Henry is left bathetically stoned and bereft, 
cutting a figure that would be comic if not for the tragedy of his impending psychotic break 
(already, with deep dramatic irony, very familiar to the reader, who has reached this point in the 
narrative two chapters before Henry does): ‘I still had my basketball with me. It felt so 
cumbersome, but I didn’t throw it away. I asked if she knew anything about Buddhism because she 
had orange trousers on.’235 The connection between Buddhism and orange trousers might not be 
immediately apparent to any reader of this thesis, but it has been seeded steadily through Henry’s 
text, and is ‘symptomatic’ of his immediately prodromal phrase. The reader of Henry’s Demons is 
constructed to unambiguously read this association as a sign of Henry’s imminent psychosis. The 
drive of the semiotic logic of the text is sufficiently potent, and Henry’s ‘madness’ so well-
established by this point in the text, that it deters the reader from asking if there is not a non-
pathological semiotic process occurring simultaneously: is it unreasonable to add the student’s 
orange trousers to a stream of data comprising her barefoot dancing on Brighton beach and her 
enrolment on an art course in a self-consciously counter-cultural city like Brighton and to then 
construct from this a chain of signs in support of the hypothesis that the person is a Buddhist? This 
is the kind of abduction for which Holmes would be praised.  
In effect, the reader has been driven into a deterministic semiotic of diagnosis, which has 
been subtly – if not intentionally – constructed by Henry’s text. Henry opens his account with the 
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diagnostic semiotic: he is having the word ‘schizophrenic’ appended to himself. His shift from this 
sign construction, endorsed by biomedical authority, to his unauthorised interpretation of a letter D 
painted on a road as meaning ‘daemon’ serves as an ironic riposte.236 Indeed, are Henry’s sign 
constructions any more indicative of magical thinking than the culturally acceptable fear, expressed 
by both Henry’s flatmate and his school teacher, that walking barefoot means running a serious risk 
of HIV infection from a broken needle. This implausible paranoia is gently dispatched by Henry 
with flattened humour: ‘[s]urely there can’t be that many junkies in Brighton, I thought.’237 Henry explicitly 
states his fondness for the ‘symbols and signs’ of Jean-Michel Basquiat and is described by Patrick 
as having a juvenile talent for constructing ambiguous, allegorical artworks.238 Though it may be 
coincidence (much like the coincidence of Scally’s Michael Jackson album), orange images and 
references to Buddhism are woven through Henry’s first chapter. Before nearly dying at Newhaven 
he ‘knocked on an orange coloured door.’239 A few months earlier (but later in his narrative) he left 
‘orange flowers in a pot’ on the grave of his father’s nanny, an important childhood figure for 
Henry.240 Though their colour is not specified, the cider being drunk by a tramp and the basketball 
being (rather ridiculously and impotently) held by Henry are presumably both orange.241 Henry 
visualises a Golden Buddha242 and the chapter concludes with him befriending a female nurse in 
the Priory who tells him – unlike the object of his unrequited affections on Brighton beach – ‘how 
she was interested in Buddhism.’243 Similarly, the impression of beauty on Henry made by his 
fellow student’s barefoot dancing seems thematically inseparable from his sudden ‘psychotic’ 
insistence on foregoing shoes. What is important is not Henry’s intention, nor the plausibility of a 
reading that draws signification from these recurring signs and motifs. Rather, it is useful to 
observe how conjectural hypersemic abduction is an instinctual, integral component of the reading 
process. There is a drive – in the ‘schizophrenic’ or in the complicit reader or in the ‘recovery’ 
patient – to construct a unifying order from potentially random, meaningless data: a drive to make 
signs. In the words of one correspondent to the Schizophrenia Bulletin: ‘[s]chizophrenia is a disease of 
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information. […] In psychosis, nothing is what it seems. Everything exists to be understood 
underneath the surface.’244 
The cohering, unifying signifying structure – posited as cure – is structurally identical to 
the hypersemic determinism of delusions of paranoid conspiracy. Marvin Cohen’s account in the 
Schizophrenia Bulletin details how disparate elements in his environment were transformed into signs 
generating a developed, coherent super-narrative, albeit one that was factually wrong and 
composed of improbable and surprising constructions of meaning. As Hoffmeyer’s biosemiotic 
model suggests, there is an evolutionary purpose to a hypersemic drive: connecting a narrative from 
the data received is a process complementary to developing a unified, enduring self. Once this 
narrative is well-established – whether it is the narrative of a stable psychic identity, a paranoid 
fantasy about being filmed and ridiculed (as Cohen feared) or a cultural myth about the ‘recovery’ 
journey and illness writing – all further signs are easily incorporated into the structure and feed 
towards its conclusion, which takes on the appearance of being inevitable, eternal and objectively 
truthful. Constructing a narrative of any kind is precisely this process of semiotic narrowing 
described by Cohen: ‘An event with many possible interpretations took on only one, sinister 
interpretation.’ 245  Once in place, this semiotic can absorb whatever new data appears and 
(relatively) seamlessly integrate it into its semiological sign system. Consider how no matter what 
input Chris Fleshner receives from his sister, it is incorporated with ease into the signifying system 
he is perpetuating: 
My sister said innocently, “God doesn’t give signs that often.” I thought to myself, “True. I haven’t 
seen a sign in a long time, and there it was - the dog bite - so I’d better pay heed.” Then I said, 
“Maybe it was a sign from the devil.” My sister said, “He wouldn’t bother.” What she meant was 
that the devil would not bother with such a trivial sign as a little nip on the thumb, but what I 
perceived was that the devil wouldn’t bother with me because I was too sinful to worry about.246 
 
This suggests two ideas. First, that schizomimetically, ‘schizophrenic’ thinking and cultural 
mythological representations of the ‘schizophrenic’ ‘as almost mythical and certainly at times over-
determined figure’ function with a similar over-writing, tyrannical hypersemia.247  Secondly, textual 
and signifying unity is pointedly not a bulwark against psychosis or the guarantor of ipseity; it is the 
sine qua non of bizarre thinking.  
 In 2011, Woods called for an account of the genre conventions of illness memoirs: 
A sophisticated account of genre is largely absent from literary and semiotic approaches to 
medicine-related and illness narrative. Genre, with its three dimensions of formal organisation, 
rhetorical structure and thematic content, is a universal feature of all textuality, and a careful 
                                                
244 Susan Weiner, ‘First person account: living with the delusions and effects of schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 29:4 (2003) 877-878, p.877 
245 Marvin Cohen, ‘Emerging from schizophrenia’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 34:3 (2008) 406-407, p.407 
246 Chris Fleshner, ‘First person account: insight from a schizophrenia patient with depression’, Schizophrenia 
Bulletin, 21:4 (1995) 703-707, p.705 
247 Angela Woods, The Sublime Object of Psychiatry: Schizophrenia in clinical and cultural theory (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) p.127 
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examination of how it enables and constrains the production of certain kinds of narratives in an 
array of medical and broader cultural contexts is, I would argue, overdue.248 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to go some way towards providing this account, presenting 
examples of the genre and the supporting narrative theories. Emphatically, the genre through 
formal organisation, rhetorical structure and thematic content has been demonstrated to enact 
tyrannical narratives of ‘cure’. Textual manifestations of psychosis are mediated through the 
narrative logic of cure; the psychosis is kept always at a distance, and sits as the knowable, 
describable object of the text rather than as its ineffable subject or its motivating dynamic. 
Schizomimetic disruptions in these texts, however, illustrate the contradictory consequences of 
writing the self. A unity is imposed by the reader’s hypersemic response, but the restrictions and 
ambiguities of text disintegrate each unity any subject tries to impose. Significantly, parallels have 
been observed between: the sign-generating mechanisms of psychosis; the recovery mythology and 
genre; non-pathological interpretative decodings; and of the functions of text (from the perspective 
of the narrative subject and the reader). These schizomimetic echoes between the form and content 
of the content of these texts, the form and content of the expression of these texts, and the form and 
content of signification-producing selves (pathologised or not) will be further explored in the next 
section in relation to images, and specifically cinematic syntagmas of images. 
  
                                                
248  Angela Woods, ‘The limits of narrative: provocations for the medical humanities’, Medical Humanities 
(2011) 37 73-78, p.74 
 178 
 
III 
IMAGE 
Hollywood and phenomenology 
 
Hallucinations and delusions of reference 
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Chapter Four: Beyond Empathy, to Obtuseness 
Can one understand symbols? Other people’s symbols, not one’s own, can only be seen as they 
appear from without. We cannot understand them from within, from the very heart of their reality.1 
 
If the obtuse meaning cannot be described, that is because, in contrast to the obvious meaning, it 
does not copy anything – how do you describe something that does not represent anything?2 
 
Everyone has seen psychosis. If nowhere else, on Oscar3 night in 1997, 2002 and 2013 when Shine4, 
A Beautiful Mind5 and Silver Linings Playbook6 won for their representations of people living with a 
diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder respectively. On 
the small screen, Clare Dane’s CIA agent, Carrie Mathison, in Homeland7, juggles battling jihadist 
threats to American national security with battling the symptoms of mental ill health.8 But what is it 
that is seen and shown when seeing psychosis?  
Karl Jaspers, in chapters IV and V of his General Psychopathology (originally published in 
1913), outlines a phenomenological approach to decoding the psyche’s objectively verifiable 
physical manifestations (chapter IV) and ‘understanding’ the subjective, and invisible, underlying 
meaningful mental connections (chapter V). This methodology falls naturally into two discrete 
processes. The first is an empirical, reading process: 
The psychic quality, the inward element, can be seen in the outward form and movement of the 
human body, made visible to us as expression. […] Psychic expression as we understand it in men is 
something empirically real. It is accessible to us, present as something that responds; we treat it as an 
empirically real force.9 
 
However, the ‘understanding of expression’ is a reading process conducted on a mutable text, for 
the ‘frontier of understandable expression is not well demarcated’10 and is driven not by a process 
of rational interpretation but by the ‘psychological power of empathy.’ It is possible already to sniff 
                                                
1  Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, I, trans. by J Hoenig and Marian W Hamilton, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1997) [1959], pp.332-333 
2 Roland Barthes, ‘The Third Meaning’ in Image Music Text, trans by Stephen Heath (London: Fontana Press, 
1977), pp.52-68, p.61 
3 Officially, these are the Academy Awards, awarded by the American Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences (AMPAS). 
4 Shine, dir. by Scott Hicks (First Line Features and Miramax, 1996) won Best Actor, and was nominated for 
Best Actor in a Supporting Role, Best Film Editing, Best Original Score, as well as the big three awards, Best 
Director, Best Original Screenplay and Best Picture.  
5 A Beautiful Mind, dir. by Ron Howard (Universal Pictures and DreamWorks Pictures, 2001) won Best 
Picture, Best Director, Best Adapted Screenplay and Best Supporting Actress, as well as being nominated for 
a further four Academy Awards. 
6 Silver Linings Playbook, dir. by David O. Russell (The Weinstein Company, 2012) only won Best Actress, but 
was nominated in all four acting categories, and also for Best Picture, Best Director and Best Adapted 
Screenplay. 
7 Homeland, developed by Howard Gordon and Alex Gansa (Showtime, 2011-ongoing) 
8 Homeland is broadcast in the US on cable channel Showtime, and each season has had between one and two 
million viewers. About twice that figure watched the earlier seasons in the UK, where it screens on national 
network Channel 4. ‘Homeland US return is ratings hit’. BBC Online, 2 October 2012 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-19796962> [accessed 11 January 2015] 
9 Jaspers, p.256 
10 Jaspers, p.255 
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a trace of something worryingly transcendental here.11 This same process of empathy is similarly 
relied upon to ‘understand’ the meaningful mental connections that constitute the psyche. When 
Jaspers outlines this process in chapter V, the observable physical material (the ‘signifiers’) are seen 
to re-emerge, along with their context and boundaries of possibility (the langue) as the psyche itself 
(the ‘signified’) ‘recedes’: 
We conceive the psyche as the objective correlate to the method of understanding. The psyche 
appears to recede and in its place we are occupied with its foreground (phenomena, expression, 
psychic content) and with conditioning factors (the body and Existence itself). What psychological 
understanding gives us is the bond that holds together all that we can understand and all that 
belongs to it which we cannot understand.12 
 
Though Jaspers presents himself as a phenomenologist, his (dis)appearing psyche seems a 
transcendental signified avant la lettre vanishing beneath a wild streaming différance of ambiguous and 
un(der)demarcated phenomena. Bonding all these together into an ‘understandable’ but not 
explainable unity (or succession of unities) by the magic operation of ‘empathy’, is a leap of 
psychological (if not theological) faith. And it is a leap only half taken. As the opening quotation 
from Jaspers notes, there remains always a something beyond the reach of empathy, an 
understanding of the ‘symbols’ of another from within their own reality. 
 When psychosis is ‘seen’ on film, it is precisely this cacophony of Jasperian ‘symbols’ (or, 
to use better terminology, ‘signs’) that is seen. And their proliferation and hyper-visibility 
contributes to a comfortable cultural, medical and filmic shared belief that beneath resides a 
unified, if partially unknowable, whole: the signified psyche. Interrogating and dismantling this 
erroneous belief will be one of the central tasks of this chapter and the next, and it will be done by 
a systematic examination of the structure of these filmic signs. 
At the 74th Academy Awards ceremony in 2002, audiences were presented with a tripartite 
visual sign of a person living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Throughout the programme, on the 
many occasions when A Beautiful Mind was mentioned, the camera moved between images of the 
cast and production crew, and further images from the film. Consequently, a composite visual sign 
was created of the central protagonist, Nobel Prize-winning mathematician John Nash.13 This sign 
comprised images of the real-life Nash in the audience of the ceremony, the fictionalised Nash 
from within the film A Beautiful Mind, and the actor playing Nash, Academy Award-winner Russell 
Crowe (figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). This sign communicates – in no particular order – wealth, official 
                                                
11 Though the exact sentence has the ring of a religious entreaty – ‘[t]he psychological process of empathy has 
been invoked to explain the understanding of expression’ [emphasis added] – Jaspers remains agnostic, leaving 
it an open question as to whether or not that is how understanding works (Jaspers, p.254). 
12 Jaspers, p.312 
13 In truth, Nash was not precisely a Nobel Prize winner. The economics prize he won ‘is not, in fact, a 
Nobel Prize, but rather “The Central Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel.”’ (Sylvia Nasar, A Beautiful Mind (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p.358) Also, he was not – as 
shown in the film – awarded the prize as an individual. Rather, he shared it with fellow game theorists John 
Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten. This is mentioned not to denigrate Nash but to argue that the film showing 
Nash as a solitary winner is a clear sign that the real achievement – in the moral economy of the film – is his 
‘triumph’ over his illness, and not his contribution to economics.  
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recognition, heterosexuality, triumph over adversity.14 In short, the person with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is an exceptional human being in an epic battle, at least when rendered by the 
Hollywood machine.15 Indeed, in France, the film was called Un Homme d’Exception, and the DVD 
cover underlines the synonymity of troubled genius (the beautiful, but sick, mind) and the 
masculine heroism (the exceptional male) (Figure 4.4).16 
                                                
14 In some ways, the implicit message that wealth and remission from schizophrenia are positively correlated 
(if not causally related) is perhaps one of the most accurate communications from A Beautiful Mind. A 2005 
meta-analysis noted that, whether through social selection or social causation, low socio-economic status 
(SES) and schizophrenia are highly correlated across different economies. (Saraceno, Benedetto, Itzhak 
Levav, and Robert Kohn, ‘The public mental health significance of research on socio-economic factors in 
schizophrenia and major depression’, World Psychiatry 4.3 (2005): 181-185) In constructing its filmic sign of 
the schizophrenic, A Beautiful Mind elides Nash’s years of poverty. 
15 Though Crowe did not win the Academy Award for his performance as Nash, he had won it the year 
before playing a gladiator who (successfully) pursues a campaign of revenge against Emperor Commodus. 
Crowe’s semiotic capital was (and remains) his status as a mythic hero, struggling against remarkable odds. In 
terms of the semiotic of A Beautiful Mind, Crowe’s other roles are highly pertinent. As Lotman correctly 
observes, ‘[t]he cinema audience deliberately and consistently connects films having a common central actor 
into a series and views them as a text, a kind of artistic whole.’ (Jurij Lotman, Semiotics of Cinema, trans. by 
Mark E Suino (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1976), p.91) Undoubtedly, ‘Nash’ forms part of text 
compiled from Crowe’s various troubled heroes: the wronged General Maximus (Gladiator, dir. by Ridley 
Scott (DreamWorks Pictures and Universal Pictures, 2000); the revisionist Robin Hood (Robin Hood, dir. by 
Ridley Scott (Universal Pictures, 2010); the loose-cannon cop, Bud White (L.A. Confidential, dir. by Curtis 
Hanson (Warner Bros., 1997), and numerous other leading roles. 
16 The deep structural sexism and misogyny in Hollywood cinematic representations of people with mental 
health problems can be illustrated by a quick comparison between A Beautiful Mind and its exact 
contemporary, Crazy/Beautiful dir. by John Stockwell (Buena Vista Pictures, 2001). In Crazy/Beautiful, Nicole 
(played by Kirsten Dunst) is physically ‘beautiful’ (and by metaphorical confluence wealthy, white and 
distinctly ruling class) whilst being an emotional and psychological mess, and therefore ‘crazy’. It is the male 
protagonist, Carlos (Jay Hernandez) who is smart, sane and hardworking (as well as being poor and Mexican). 
Nicole’s ‘craziness’ is both inseparable from and mitigated by her ‘beauty’, and these are the two balancing 
sides of the equation of her identity. But the ‘beauty’ is only curative and enabling in that it draws Carlos to 
her, and he then – in tandem with Nicole’s father – stabilizes and normalizes her life.  
Conversely, Nash’s beautiful mind (and its supposed curative properties) is wholly his own, and 
though he functionally needs Alicia’s support throughout the film, it is still his mind that ‘solves’ his madness 
when Alicia is in the act of leaving him, by noticing that the visually hallucinated Marcee (Vivien Cardone) 
has never aged. Nash says – after a sequence of images of Marcee – ‘I understand. She never gets old. Marcee 
can’t be real. She never gets old.’ This is an intriguing choice of device for dramatizing a successful instance 
of reality-testing in a film, as one of the most peculiar, almost uncanny, effects of films is that they 
consistently fail to represent ageing. In A Beautiful Mind, none of the characters (hallucinated or not) appear 
to have aged between 1947 and 1956. When ageing is staged in the film – via a disturbingly timeless extended 
montage where 1950s cars and 1970s flares peacefully co-exist, and which (jokingly?) culminates in Nash 
tracing a lemniscate first with his bicycle and then with his finger – it would fail to meet any reasonable reality 
test, being a parade of unlikely facial prosthetics and grey wigs. Very explicitly though, Nash’s ‘beautiful mind’ 
is the solution to its own problem. As Nash says: ‘That’s what I do. I solve problems … All I have to do is 
apply my mind.’ 
It says something for the filmmakers’ idea of their potential audience that they felt it necessary to 
adopt a belt and braces approach to marking the passage of diegetic time. After the opening act in Princeton, 
1948, there is a caption that reads ‘The Pentagon, 1953.’ After a brief pause for comic effect, this is 
supplemented by a second caption: ‘Five years later.’ Howard and Goldsman were not anticipating an 
audience primarily composed of mathematicians.  
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Figure 4.1 
John Nash and Alicia Nash at 74th Academy Awards Ceremony 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Still from A Beautiful Mind 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 
Russell Crowe at 74th Academy Awards Ceremony 
 
Like any authorised cultural epic, A Beautiful Mind reaffirms the dominant ideology, as Ron 
Roberts notes in Real to Reel (2011): 
A Beautiful Mind does not present Nash’s life as a narrative of liberation from his own emotional 
shortcomings, ultimately giving way to an enhanced appreciation of human virtues and an increased 
questioning of the inherent values in the national corporate psyche. Instead we see a degraded ‘epic’ 
of an American hero who managed to overcome the burden of mental illness through the help of a 
devoted wife, aided and abetted by caring psychiatric authorities. This necessarily leaves 
unquestioned the causes of Nash’s apparent psychological meltdown and the significance of the 
wider cultural milieu in it.17  
 
The model of a recovered or ‘cured’ life is very familiar from the previous chapter’s reading of 
illness memoirs such as The Quiet Room: individualistic success in the capitalist triumvirate of career, 
                                                
17 Ron Roberts, Real to Reel: Psychiatry at the Cinema (Ross-on-Wye: PCCS, 2011), p.45 When considering A 
Beautiful Mind a ‘degraded epic’, it is worth remembering that screenwriter Akiva Goldsman was best-known, 
prior to this film, as the writer of Batman Forever dir. by Joel Schumacher (Warner Bros., 1995) and Batman and 
Robin dir. by Joel Schumacher (Warner Bros., 1997). 
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domestic life and heterosexual sex. As ‘Nash’ himself puts it to Doctor Rosen, when explaining his 
‘noncompliance’ with his antipsychotic regimen: ‘Because I couldn’t do my work. I couldn’t help 
with the baby. I couldn’t respond to my wife.’ Further, the epic (‘degraded’ or not) is necessarily, 
definitionally, a celebration of the age. Though the age celebrated by the film is very much the age 
of the production rather than the diegetic age depicted. It is a monument to the medical 
humanitarianism of the turn of the 20th century, in contrast to the gruesomely depicted insulin 
comas and straightjackets of the mid-20th century. 18  The world had to catch up with Nash’s 
brilliance (and Alicia’s therapeutic devotion and kindness). As an epic, A Beautiful Mind whiggishly 
insists on how much better the ‘now’ of production is than the ‘then’ of the story. 
 
Figure 4.4 
French Two-Disc DVD wrap around cover (2002) 
 
 
Figure 4.5 
Trade press advert targeting the members of the  
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences (2001) 
 
The most commonly occurring images from A Beautiful Mind – and consequently some of 
the most commonly occurring examples of the filmic sign of schizophrenia – are of three kinds. 
First, those emphasizing Nash’s ‘genius’ by juxtaposing him with visual props of (exceptional) 
intelligence, specifically chalk boards and windows adorned with unintelligible (to the un-
                                                
18 Indeed, as Nasar notes, even in the flawed ‘then’ of the late 1950s, insulin treatment was already rather 
‘then’ in contrast to the more ‘now’ antipsychotics and electroshock treatments. (Nasar, p.293)  
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exceptional, at least) mathematical equations. Figure 4.5 provides an example, where ‘Nash’ is 
framed within the equations scrawled romantically on his Princeton accommodation window. 
Formally, he resides literally within the mathematics produced by his eponymous beautiful mind. 
This maps very neatly onto the thematic message of the film, that Nash (and the schizophrenic) 
lives within their own idiosyncratic code, or world or world-as-code, that other (less beautiful) 
minds cannot penetrate. What Figure 4.5 shows being offered to Academy members ‘for your 
consideration’ is a highly conventional cultural myth of madness-as-genius.  
The second kind of image is of the ‘schizophrenic’ saved by love. Frequently in images 
from the film, ‘Nash’ is pictured with his wife ‘Alicia’. One of the key divergences the film makes 
from Nash’s biographical history is that it presents him as a monogamous, heterosexual married 
man. The well-known biographical fact is that Nash had several homosexual relationships, and 
another long-term heterosexual partner with whom he had a child, and that he and Alicia were 
divorced for almost 40 years, only remarrying some years after the end of the film’s narrative.19 The 
US Blu-Ray and DVD covers (figures 4.6 and 4.7) show ‘Nash’ and ‘Alicia’. In Figure 4.6, the two 
figures are sharing a gaze, indicating not only ‘love’ but also ‘understanding’. In Figure 4.7, ‘Alicia’ 
is cradling ‘Nash’s’ head, simultaneously sharing the burden of his illness20 and supporting his 
genius; both genius and illness are constructed as a weight physically embodied, and requiring two 
(in heterosexual union) to carry. Figure 4.2 stages the same message. ‘Alicia’ and ‘Nash’ are sharing 
a reading experience. ‘Nash’ is showing her his way of seeing the stars. Again, this production of 
images from the stars is simultaneously creative mathematic geometric genius and hallucinatory 
mental ill health. They are presented as one unity, rather than two discrete things. Similarly, 
‘Alicia’s’ empathetic, love-inspired melding of her vision of reality with ‘Nash’s’ (operating both 
literally, in picking out images from the stars, and figuratively, in embarking on a Christian model of 
marriage21) is conflated with the filmic spectator’s own act of empathetic complicity. ‘Nash’s’ 
seduction of ‘Alicia’ is also the mechanism for the film’s seduction of the spectator into its own 
mythology of ‘schizophrenia’. 
The final type of image is that of the schizophrenic-as-hero, very obviously demonstrated 
by figure 4.6. Compare this pose of taut alertness and gaze of haunted intelligence with those 
employed by Crowe two years earlier on the poster for The Insider, also based on a true story in 
which Crowe’s character believed himself to be both victim of and existential threat to a shadowy 
conspiracy (figure 4.8). Any spectator-reader making an empathetic leap to ‘understand’ these 
                                                
19 Nash’s romantic misadventures comprise an entire section of Nasar’s biography. The Hollywood filmic 
machinery over-writes Nash’s arrest for ‘public indecency’ in much the way he attempted to at the time, 
through an insistent re-iteration of his heterosexual qualifications. ‘[Nash] “pulled a picture out of his wallet 
and showed us a picture of a woman and a little boy. ‘Here’s the woman I’m going to marry and our son.’”’ 
(Nasar, p.186) 
20 As shall be discussed in more detail in the next section, schizophrenia is communicated in the filmic 
semiotic as a presence located predominately within the head. 
21 ‘For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church’ King James Bible, 
Ephesians 5.23 
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physical phenomena will be led, with A Beautiful Mind, into the same delusion experienced by the 
protagonist. This is the obvious intent of the filmmakers, but it creates a problem for the 
representation of the schizophrenic, when dressed in rhetoric borrowed from a different 
ontological status and mental state, or – in filmic terms – genre. This is empathy misplaced. 
 
Figure 4.6 
US Blu-Ray wrap-around cover (2011) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 
US Two-disc Awards Edition DVD wrap-around cover (2002) 
 
 
Figure 4.8 
Poster for The Insider, dir. by Michael Mann (Buena Vista Pictures, 1999) 
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All this matters, as A Beautiful Mind is the 309th highest grossing film at the global box 
office ever,22 almost 42 million Americans alone saw the Oscar ceremony,23 and John Nash’s face is 
the first anyone sees if searching for a ‘famous schizophrenic’ via Google (Figure 4.9). It matters 
too because there is a strange level of acceptance of these filmic representations. They bring a self-
authenticating weight of proof, measured in reels of celluloid. So it is that a Canadian psychiatrist 
can write of A Beautiful Mind with straight-faced sincerity that: 
‘[i]t is a very rare person with schizophrenia who can selectively ignore visual and auditory 
hallucinations, let alone work at the high level that Nash does. This is a movie about an exceptional 
person, and as such is not a typical representation of schizophrenia.’24 
 
The logic of the first sentence should raise the intellectual possibility that the symptomatology on 
display in A Beautiful Mind is false. When something flies in the face of clinical accounts, is it really 
‘very rare’ or just bunkum? Rather than untypical, the representation is merely untrue. The 
Hollywood hero myth seduces spectators (even psychiatrists) into a seeing ‘a very rare person … an 
exceptional person’. Another US psychiatrist, Jason Rosenstock, is equally beguiled by the film’s 
self-authentication. First he notes the derisive responses the film provokes from those with a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. Secondly, he adds that clinicians have reservations about the very 
atypical symptoms attributed to Nash and that the film is peppered with historical inaccuracies. 
Thirdly, he further suggests that the film might actually contribute to the stigmatisation of those 
living with a diagnosis, as they will be under the weight of a cultural expectation to recover (and 
perhaps scoop a Nobel Prize on the way), and finally he refers to director Ron Howard ‘having 
admitted taking liberties for dramatic effect, raising doubts as to how much should be believed.’ All 
this before, rather perversely, concluding that ‘A Beautiful Mind is a powerful and influential film 
that will and should be used in psychiatric education.’25 Powerful, influential, derisively inaccurate, 
of doubtful honesty and liable to increase social stigma, are qualities that make for a fairly toxic 
mixture. 
 
Figure 4.9 
Google Image search for ‘famous schizophrenic’ 
                                                
22 Only two films dealing (very broadly) with mental health conditions feature higher in the list: Black Swan at 
288 and Rain Man at 249. Both won Academy Awards.  
<http://www.boxofficemojo.com/alltime/world/?pagenum=4&p=.htm>[Accessed on 17 November 2014] 
23  Gary Levin, ‘Least-watched Oscars still puts ABC at No.1’, USA Today, 27 March 2002 
<http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/life/enter/tv/2002/2002-03-27-nielsens.htm> [Accessed on 17 
November 2014] 
24 David J Robinson, Reel Psychiatry, (London, Ontario: Rapid Psychler Press, 2003), p.45 
25 Jason Rosenstock, ‘Beyond A Beautiful Mind: Film Choices for Teaching Schizophrenia’, Academic Psychiatry, 
27:2 (2003) 117-122, p.118 
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The composite sign of Nash-‘Nash’-Crowe is of a recognisable type in the semiological 
sign system of Hollywood. These triangular character signs are routinely created by the cinematic 
productive machinery, and are especially evident on Oscar night. The celebrity or real-life biopic 
and the illness biopic are established cinematic genres, and A Beautiful Mind offered a deeply 
alluring blend of the two. 26  The culturally received wisdom is that these roles are especially 
successful on Oscar night as they allow actors an opportunity to give virtuoso performances, 
offering the representational red meat of a real life, an existentially and emotionally ‘real’ event in 
the form of illness and/or death, or a combination of the two. However, observing the tripartite 
sign created, another plausible explanation is that in such roles, the representation (from within the 
diegetic material of the film itself) is subordinated to the act of representation, signified by the 
tripartite sign of the historical figure, the diegetic figure, and the actor figure (in the case of celebrity 
or real-life biopics), or the tripartite sign of the historical embodied illness, the diegetic embodied 
illness, and the embodied acting (in the case of illness biopics). It is surely acceptable to claim that 
in the semiological system of A Beautiful Mind, the sign of the real-life, Nash-‘Nash’-Crowe, equals 
the sign of the illness, schizophrenia-‘schizophrenia’-acting. This equivalence operates between the 
matching component parts, in that Nash and schizophrenia are equivalents, and between the 
composite signs as wholes. Following the logic of the construction of the tripartite sign of the real-
life biopic, these are not sign systems within which the sign of the actor vanishes into the diegetic 
character. Consider this tripartite sign in terms of Peirce’s triadic structure of the sign.27 Figure 4.10 
shows the Peircean triad. Historical Nash might stand in the position of Firstness as the Object, with 
diegetic ‘Nash’ as the Representamen, and a spectator-reader in the position of Thirdness as Interpretant. 
However, when placing this sign in the semiotic logic of the Academy Awards ceremony, it might 
be better restructured to have Crowe (the actor, ‘for your consideration’) as the Object, with ‘Nash’ 
as a Representamen of his acting prowess. Therefore, when the act of representation is foregrounded 
over the representation, the semiotic Object and also – by extension – the object of study becomes 
the representational process itself, in this case the filmic productive machinery. 
 
                                                
26  The BBC noted that 16% of Academy Award-winning performances between 1927-2012 were for 
characters based on real people. Another, not entirely over-lapping, 16% were for characters with a ‘mental 
illness or physical disability’. Since that article, Jennifer Lawrence won for a character with an unspecified 
mental health problem, and Daniel Day-Lewis won as Abraham Lincoln in 2013. In 2014, Matthew 
McConaughey won for a performance (of a real person) that culminated in dying of Aids, and Cate Blanchett 
for one that culminated in being destitute and delusional. In 2015, the best actor and best actress awards were 
won for portrayals of neurological illnesses, Lou Gehrig’s disease and Alzheimer’s disease respectively. (Lucy 
Rogers, ‘How to win an Oscar’, BBC Online, 25 February 2012 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-
arts-16932374> [accessed 17 November 2014]) 
27 Peirce, ‘Logic as semiotic’, pp.98-119 
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Richard Maltby’s comprehensive survey of US cinema – Hollywood Cinema (2003) – 
discusses the duality of the performing body, occupying a position both within and without the 
diegetic world of the film: 
Star acting simultaneously provides audiences with autonomous and integrated performances. The 
star is present as a production value and as a known bundle of personality traits, and therefore 
performs his or her star persona in a movie autonomously. At the same time the star is an actor 
“disappearing” into his or her role.28 
 
Maltby adds that this ‘star acting’ of ‘classical’ Hollywood (by which he means pre-1950s) was 
superseded by the Method acting of Lee Strasberg. However, despite the Method’s much vaunted 
claims to ‘truth’, Maltby argues that ‘much more explicitly than the performance styles of Classical 
Hollywood’s star vehicles, the Method registered the distinction between actor and character … 
[and] Method performances were very visibly performances, collections of expressive gestures and 
techniques.’29 With Nash-‘Nash’-Crowe, as is common in a mainstream cinema that has effortlessly 
fused star vehicles with (supposedly) highly psychologised post-Method performing styles, there is 
                                                
28 Richard Maltby, Hollywood Cinema, 2nd edn (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2003), p.382 
29 Maltby, p.399 
Figure 4.10 
The Peircean triad 
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Thirdness 
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a cinematic product which synthesises a ‘known bundle of personality traits’ – a bankable epic hero 
of proven manliness and exceptionality – with a performance that is ‘very visibly’ a performance.30 
 As the public flocked to see Crowe-Nash do valiant battle with his own ‘mind’, attitudes 
towards those with a mental illness were simultaneously hardening in the UK, 31  US 32  and 
Germany.33 It would seem that the public was seeing schizophrenia more, understanding it better, 
and liking it less.34 As a 2012 meta-analysis of studies of public attitudes towards mental illness put 
it: 
Two distinct developments emerged: first, the public’s literacy about mental disorders clearly has 
increased. Second, at the same time, attitudes towards persons with mental illness have not changed 
for the better, and have even deteriorated towards persons with schizophrenia.35 
 
At first glance, it might seem that this is but evidence for the theories of Sander Gilman on the 
function of illness stereotypes as a mechanism for re-enforcing a cultural ideology that locates – via 
reassuring fantasy – all loss of control, all deviancy, all that is evil and bad in a pathological Other. 
If so, could a decreasing social acceptance of the mentally ill be driven by popular representations 
such as A Beautiful Mind, despite the sympathetic nature of the representation, because the 
schizophrenic so depicted, is a radically Other stereotype? Gilman says specifically of 
representations of mental illness: 
Of all the models of pathology, one of the most powerful is mental illness. For the most elementally 
frightening possibility is loss of control over the self, and loss of control is associated with loss of 
language and thought perhaps even more than with physical illness. Often associated with violence 
(including aggressive sexual acts), the mad are perceived as the antithesis to the control and reason 
that define the self. Again, what is perceived is in large part a projection: for within everyone’s 
fantasy life there exists a play of aggression not essentially different from that of the initial moment 
of individuation, an incipient madness that we control with more or less success.36 
                                                
30 Sass conceives of a post-Kantian ‘dual self-consciousness’ (Sass, Paradoxes, p.80) at the (solipsistic) heart of 
the schizophrenic subject. Referencing a patient of Eugen Bleuler’s, who experiences himself as both ‘King 
of the World’ and unable to leave the asylum, Sass suggests that ‘one may even begin to suspect, in the 
presence of such patients, that they are somehow only playacting’ (Sass, Paradoxes, p.4). Is it too much to 
suggest that there is a blend of autonomous and integrated performances at work when ‘the Virgin Mary or 
the Queen of England continues, without protest or any apparent feeling of incongruity, to perform the same 
menial tasks as other patients’? (Sass, Madness and Modernism, p.274) 
31 Nisha Mehta, Aliya Kassam, Morven Lesse, Georgia Butler and Graham Thornicroft, ‘Attitudes towards 
people with mental illness in England and Scotland, 1994-2003’, The British Journal of Psychiatry, 194 (2009) 
278-284 
32 Bernice Pescosolido, Jack Martin, J Scott Long, Tait Medina, Jo Phelan and Bruce Link, ‘“A disease like 
any other”? A decade of change in public reactions to schizophrenia, depression and alcohol dependence’, 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 167 (2010) 1321-1330 
33  Matthias Angermeyer, Herbet Matschinger, Mauro Carta and Georg Schomerus, ‘Changes in the 
perception of mental illness stigma in Germany over the last two decades’, European Psychiatry, 29 (2014) 390-
395 
34 ‘Understanding … better’ insofar as the dominant biomedical and psycho-social disease models are better 
disseminated and elucidated. Pescosolido et al found that – between 1996 and 2006 – there had been a further 
increase in the preference for neurobiological explanations over personal-moral ones, with just short of 90% 
of people surveyed conceptualizing schizophrenia as a brain disease best treated by psychiatrists and medicine 
(p.1324). 
35 Georg Schomerus, C Schwahn, A Holzinger, P Corrigan, H Grabe, Mauro Carta and Matthias Angermeyer, 
‘Evolution of public attitudes about mental illness: a systematic review and meta-analysis’, Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica, 125 (2012) 440-452, p.448 
36 Sander Gilman, Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race and Madness, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1985), pp.23-24 
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This psychologising of the public may well be correct, and certainly provides an explanation for the 
otherwise counter-intuitive observed results that people are growing less tolerant of the mentally 
ill.37 
 However, this third section of the thesis will attempt another explanation, which does not 
require recourse to a very Kleinian-infused psychological doctrine like Gilman’s. Instead, this thesis 
will argue that there is something about the cultural encoding and representation of schizophrenia 
that is both informed by and perpetuates a social hostility towards those living with a diagnosis. 
This section will consider a series of filmic representations of schizophrenia. For convenience and 
relevance, these will be restricted to 21st century fictional representations in the US or UK. 38  This 
is not merely a matter of expediency. The studies quoted earlier – including the 2012 metanalysis – 
charting increasingly negative social attitudes towards people with schizophrenia are almost entirely 
drawn from US and UK cohorts. 
 This section will perform a close semiotic reading of the following filmic representations 
of schizophrenia or psychosis: Some Voices 39  (2000); A Beautiful Mind (2001); Spider 40  (2002); 
Tarnation41 (2004) Keane42 (2004); Blue/Orange43 (2005); Poppy Shakespeare44 (2008); The Soloist45 (2009); 
Silver Linings Playbook46 (2012); Ollie Kepler’s Expanding Purple World47 (2013), The Voices48 (2014) and 
US network TV programme Perception49 (2012-2015). This examination is timely. To quote a 2015 
paper on filmic representations of ‘madness’, such cultural products – whilst certainly comprising a 
well-established, centuries-old cross-media genre – are proliferating exponentially: 
Although Western art has always been interested in the phenomenon of madness, the medium of 
film, with its interest in visualizing a person’s frame of mind, has particular potential when it comes 
to representing mental illness. However, a review of the history of film productions in the US 
reveals that a [sic] number of films dealing with the topic of madness has indeed increased drastically 
over the last 10 years or so. While approximately ten films took up the subject in the 1980s, and 25 
                                                
37 British daily newspaper The Sun, which prosecutes a seemingly endless campaign of maligning the mentally 
ill, exhibits just such a tension in its attitude to the sexual objectification of teenage females. For older men to 
enjoy images of naked teenage females above a certain age is as absolutely right and ‘good’ as older men 
enjoying images of naked teenage females below a certain age is absolutely wrong and ‘evil’. That Sun 
journalists see themselves (consciously or not) catering for the ‘play of aggression’ constitutive of the fantasy 
lives of their readers, and themselves, gives a perfectly psychologically plausible (if unfalsifiable) rationale for 
their preoccupation with violent acts committed by those living with a mental health diagnosis. 
38 This chapter will not be considering the box office hit Me, Myself & Irene, dir, by Bobby and Peter Farrelly 
(20th Century Fox, 2000) for the reason that, as the charities Mind and the National Schizophrenia 
Fellowship, and the Royal College of Psychiatrists argued at the time, ‘[t]he behaviour portrayed in the film 
[…] has nothing whatever to do with schizophrenia.’ (Rita Baron-Faust, Me, Myself & Irene, British Medical 
Journal, 321 (2000) 770, p.770) 
39 Some Voices, dir. by Simon Cellan Jones (Film Four Distributors, 2000) 
40 Spider, dir. by David Cronenberg (Sony Pictures Classics, 2002) 
41 Tarnation, dir. by Jonathon Caouette (Wellspring Media, 2004) 
42 Keane, dir. by Lodge Kerrigan (Magnolia Pictures, 2004) 
43 Blue/Orange, dir. by Howard Davies (BBC Four, 2005) 
44 Poppy Shakespeare, dir. by Benjamin Ross (Channel Four, 2008) 
45 The Soloist, dir. by Joe Wright (Paramount Pictures, 2009) 
46 Silver Lining’s Playbook, dir. by David O Russell (The Weinstein Company, 2012) 
47 Ollie Kepler’s Expanding Purple World dir. by Viv Fongenie (Nimbus Films, 2013) 
48 The Voices, dir. by Marjane Satrapi (Lionsgate, 2014) 
49 Perception, created by Kenneth Biller and Michael Sussman (Turner Network Television, 2012-2015) 
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dealt with it in the 1990s, this number doubled in the new millennium with approximately 50 films 
produced up to the present time.50 
 
As Stephen Harper observes, with particular reference to A Beautiful Mind, Keane and Spider, these 
cultural products frequently exhibit: 
one of the most significant changes in the representation of mental distress in recent years: the shift 
in narrative point of view from the third to the first person. Mental distress films, if seems, 
increasingly aim to get ‘inside the heads’ of their subjects. For many conservative critics, this drift 
towards subjectivism sails close to spurious relativism.51 
 
This thesis offers a different criticism, and will argue that – in attempting to visualise internal 
phenomenological states that are neither knowable, nor certainly known to exist – the filmic 
productive machinery generates a semiotic of empty and re-purposive signifiers which, when 
accepted through an empathetic ‘understanding’, serve to generate unhelpful myths about the 
experience of living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Most importantly, these images simulate the 
very empathetic understanding their production presupposes. It is this all-too easy empathy, this 
self-perpetuating empathy that empties the public of sympathy for people living with a diagnosis; 
their imagined phenomenology is experienced as-if understood, and moreover, is experienced as-if 
experienced by the spectator. Hostility towards those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia both 
manifests as and is furthered by an eradicative pseudo-empathy, that re-encodes the pathological 
subjectivity according to cinematic and social norms. 
To counter this problem, this chapter will then suggest that by rejecting empathy and 
allowing for the un-understandable obscure signs that the filmic machinery accidentally generates, a 
semiotic system of unresolved deictic tensions and fluctuating signifieds can emerge. This filmic 
representational mode, of unruly obtuseness, will be termed schizomimesis, for its quality of 
representing schizophrenia in a semiotic that formally echoes the representational modes of 
schizophrenia. The following three sections will map out schizomimesis, in distinction to empathy, 
first in the domain of signifiers and then in the domain of signifieds. The final chapter will then 
continue this argument by exploring the implications of schizomimesis for deixis, the construction 
of the self and new filmic (or quasi-filmic) avatar therapies, and deictic drama therapies for people 
with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, as well as the implications for a semiotic theory of film. 
  
                                                
50 Susanne Rohr, ‘Screening madness in American culture’, Journal of Medical Humanities, DOI 10.007/s10912-
014-9287-3 Rohr offers a very wide definition of what constitutes a film ‘dealing with the topic of madness’, 
including a controversially wide and open range of mental states or illnesses (‘bipolar disorder, dissociative 
identity disorder, paranoia, amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, autism and others’). Given that, her figures seem – 
as she says – rather ‘approximate’, but the picture she paints is broadly accurate. 
51  Stephen Harper, Madness, Power and Media: Class, gender and race in popular representations of mental distress 
(Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2009), pp.70-71 
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The visual delusion 
John, look at me. Do I look like I’m imagined?52 
 
The film is artistic and it doesn’t describe accurately the nature of the delusional thinking that was 
my history, and it interprets … It has someone who sees imaginary persons, sees that different 
persons are actually present there / ---/ and that is not, that’s not even typical in schizophrenia. But 
that interprets the idea of delusions. More typically a person may hear voices, they’re talking with 
spirits or something which are not there. This is the form of more typical delusions. But you can’t 
illustrate that in a movie very well. I mean if the movie shows someone who can be seen, then the 
person seeing the movie can better understand it. This can occur in mental illness but it’s the less 
typical form.53 
 
Film makes the same attempt that psychology or neurology makes: to peer into the mind or brain 
of the schizophrenic. If neurology tries to offer a purely scopic, materialist, causal account of the 
brain, and psychology an emotional, phenomenological, empathetic sense of the mind, film 
promises, tantalisingly, a mixture of the two. Film can both provide visual evidence and personal 
testimony. As a form of phantasmagoric ‘Total Work’54, film alleges to provide the life as lived, 
from the subjective and objective viewpoints.55 
 Roberts notes that screenwriter Akiva Goldsman and director Ron Howard both confuse 
their terminology by referring to visual delusions rather than visual hallucinations. 56  Strictly 
speaking, delusions are psychic ‘mistakes’ whereas hallucinations are sensory ones. As the quotation 
from Nash above demonstrates, it was a mistake that he himself made when talking about his 
symptoms and experience. Experientially, perhaps, it feels as though these elements, partitioned 
hermetically into symptoms (hallucinations, delusions etc.) by clinicians and researchers, are but 
different manifestations of the same phenomenological state. That laypersons have little interest in 
terminology is unremarkable, but the confusion raises a useful question: are thought production 
and sensory reception two discrete processes? Saussurean semiotic theory would suggest not, as 
both are conjoined halves of an indivisible coding process. In these terms, thought belongs to the 
realm of the signified, and sensory data to that of the signifier. To reference again Crow’s torque,57 
to suggest that a person might suffer from the semiotic disorder of schizophrenia only in relation 
                                                
52 Parcher (Ed Harris) in A Beautiful Mind. 
53 John Nash in interview with Marika Griehsel, 2004. ‘Transcript from an interview with Dr John Nash’, 
Nobelprize.org, 1-4 September, 2004 <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/1994/nash-interview-transcript.html >[accessed on 25 November 2014] 
54 Theodor Adorno describes the phantasmagoric work as follows: ‘In the absence of any glimpse of the 
underlying forces or conditions of its production, this outer appearance can lay claim to the status of being. 
Its perfection is at the same time the perfection of the illusion that the work of art is a reality sui generis that 
constitutes itself in the realm of the absolute without having to renounce its claim to image the world.’ 
Theodor Adorno, In Search of Wagner, trans. by Rodney Livingstone (London and New York: Verso 2009) 
p.74 
55 Maltby overtly likens film to ethnography, referencing James Clifford’s account of ‘participant observation’ 
in The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). Maltby quotes Clifford 
referring to a ‘continuous tacking between the “inside” and the “outside” of events … a dialectic of 
experience and interpretation’ (Maltby, p.342; Clifford, p.34). Maltby does not continue to follow Clifford, 
though, who claims ‘there has been a marked shift in emphasis from the former to the latter’ (Clifford, p.34). 
In film, and in the culture of empathy, there has been a marked shift in the other direction.  
56 Roberts, p.54 
57 See Chapter Two. 
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to delusions (signifieds) or hallucinations (signifiers) would be as odd as a neuroscientist insisting 
that a patient only had schizophrenia in one or other hemisphere. When a person with a diagnosis 
of paranoid schizophrenia remarks ‘I could smell burning flesh and believed women were being 
gassed, raped, murdered, cremated … I would be next’58 there is a clear signifying chain. The smell 
of ‘burning flesh’ is the signifier that combines with the signified of burned bodies to form the sign 
of bodies being cremated. This sign then becomes a signifier that combines with the signified of 
‘women being gassed, raped, murdered, cremated’ to form an important structural sign in this 
person’s ‘paranoid’ narrative. 
 Schizophrenia here has more in common with storytelling than psychology. The semiotic 
of schizophrenia offers an aesthetically pleasing unity.59 Roberts, or any other psychologist, or 
psychiatrist or anyone else wanting to separate out delusions from hallucinations is missing a truth 
inadvertently captured in A Beautiful Mind: psychosis is an holistic system. Although it is wholly 
fictionalised by Goldsman, and unrelated to the psychotic mythology experienced by the real-life 
Nash, the signifying chain that unites the visually hallucinated Parcher and the delusional narrative 
of cold war conspiracy is coherent, logical and easy to analyse. Formally, it is as integrated as the 
signifying chain drawn from the account of a person living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia.60 
 However, if the ‘visual delusions’ of A Beautiful Mind can be justified because of the formal, 
aesthetic and thematic cohesions between schizophrenic signifiers (hallucinations) and signifieds 
(delusions), that is not to place them beyond criticism. The cinematic imperative to render-as-
visible (‘visibilise’) is currently in an awkward tension with cultural, political attitudes towards the 
                                                
58 Research study respondent, female with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. Quoted verbatim from a 
written response. Ellipsis in original. 
59 The interrelated nature of schizophrenic phenomena too frequently treated as discrete symptom entities is 
compelling described in a 2015 paper by Humpston and Broome. The paper lays out three methodological 
assumptions that mirror those underpinning a semiotic account of schizophrenia: 
1) Belief and perception are interconnected; 
2) Experiences are not static and can morph into one another; and 
3) The phenomenology of schizophrenia and related psychoses needs to be understood in the 
totality of the experience, rather than as isolated and atomistic mental events. 
Clara S Humpston and Matthew R Broome, ‘The spectra of soundless voices and audible thoughts: towards 
an integrative model of auditory verbal hallucinations and thought insertion’, Review of Philosophy and Psychology 
(2015) 1-19, p.2 
60 If Goldsman’s fictional psychosis is to be compared unfavourably to Nash’s, it is surely in the paucity of its 
imagination, and the timidity of its execution. Whilst Goldsman’s ‘Nash’ furtively toils away in a half-
abandoned shed at the bottom of his garden, like some frightened animal, the real-life Nash was prone to 
jump in his Mercedes and head for Washington DC to pressgang ambassadors and world leaders into 
forming a global government (Nasar, p.251). Goldsman’s supposed KGB operatives are hackneyed men in 
black; Nash imagined them with a bold expressionist streak, decked out with red neckties (Nasar, p.242). 
Whereas Goldsman’s Parcher briefs ‘Nash’ on an explicit Russian plot to move atomic weapons around US 
soil, Nash’s plot transcends the terrestrial in favour of the celestial. He is the ‘left foot of God on earth’ 
(Nasar, p.275) and is decoding messages in the New York Times sent from ‘abstract powers from outer space’ 
(Nasar, p.241).  
Of course, it was a common metaphor in Hollywood in the 1950s for the fear of communism to be 
mythologized as an alien invasion – Invasion of the Body Snatchers dir. by Don Siegal (Allied Artists Picture 
Corporation, 1956) is the well-known archetype – and Nash’s psychosis drew from this cultural context. That 
Hollywood could enjoy such creative flights of fancy in the 1950s, but felt compelled to bring Nash’s 
narrative back down to earth, literally and figuratively, in early 21st century tells in itself the story of the steady 
neutering of popular culture. 
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mentally ill. Whereas for centuries, displaying a visual otherness was central to representations of 
madness, there is now a need to display those with mental health problems as un-other or to in-
visibilise. Much has changed since Otto Wahl’s landmark critique of media representations of 
mental illness, Media Madness (1995). Wahl recounts the famous anecdote about why real psychiatric 
patients were not used as extras in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 61: 
Using actual patients from Oregon State Hospital, where the movie was filmed, for walk-on roles 
was considered, but such use was rejected because the real patients did not look distinct enough to 
depict mental patients on the screen.62 
 
Even the most cursory study of the film reveals a smorgasbord of visibilised otherness, where 
mental ill health is insistently signalled over and again through out-sized beards, missing clothes, 
crooked grins, wheelchairs, lop-sided faces and so on (see figure 4.11). This contrasts noticeably 
with the prevalence of public awareness campaigns designed to promote the destigmatisation of 
mental health generally (and ‘schizophrenia’ specifically) and which tend to do so by emphasising 
the intrinsic non-otherness of mental ill health. The much-mobilised statistic that one in four 
people experience mental ill health at some point in their life encourages visual representations 
where mental ill health is pointedly invisible, or a shaded difference between otherwise identical and 
interchangeable figures, as can be seen in examples from current US and UK mental health 
organisations (figures 4.12 and 4.13).63 The (creative) tension between the cinematic imperative to 
visibilise and the socio-political imperative to in-visibilise explains an historic shift in the visual 
rhetoric of ‘madness’, as evidenced in several filmic and televisual representations of schizophrenia: 
rather than looking different, the mad look differently. Indeed, this pun is central to the early 
publicity for TNT’s Perception (figure 4.14). 
 
 
Figure 4.11 
Psychiatric in-patients from One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
A highly visibilised parade of psychotic physiques 
 
                                                
61 One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest dir. by Miloš Foreman (United Artists, 1975) 
62 Otto Wahl, Media Madness: Public Images of Mental Illness, (Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, 1995), 
p.38 
63  Mental Health Association of East Tennessee, ‘Frequently asked questions’, mhaet.com, 
<http://www.mhaet.com/faqs.php> [accessed 5 January, 2015] and the Mental Health Foundation, UK, 
‘Statistics’, mentalhealth.org.uk, <http://www.mentalhealth.org.uk/help-information/mental-health-statistics/> 
[accessed 5 January, 2015] See also the 2015 Get the Picture campaign by Time to Change (the activist 
organization run by leading UK mental health charities Mind and Rethink Mental Illness) aiming to offer 
alternative images of mental illness to the notorious ‘headclutcher’ image. ‘Get the picture,’ time-to-change.org, 
<http://www.time-to-change.org.uk/getthepicture> [accessed 28 March, 2015] 
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Figure 4.12 
Mental Health Association of East Tennessee, US website 
 
 
Figure 4.13 
The Mental Health Foundation, UK website 
The invisible illness 
 
 
Figure 4.14 
Print and online advert for Perception (2012) 
 
 As with TNT’s Perception, so too within A Beautiful Mind’s semiotic, schizophrenia is 
enacted by both looking different and looking differently. The opening image sequence of a 
welcome address by the head of department firmly establishes ‘Nash’ as apart from his peers. The 
composition of the shot in figure 4.15 clearly creates an ‘expressive space’64 in which ‘Nash’ is 
physically apart from the rest of the new intake at Princeton. This signified difference is doubled by 
‘Nash’ not looking at Professor Helinger (Judd Hirsch), in contrast to all his peers. (Significantly, 
rival student Hansen (Josh Lucas) is the only other person to look away from Helinger and to see 
Nash. This is one beautiful mind recognising another, or one half recognising the other half of an 
                                                
64 Maltby, p.316 
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antagonist pairing, as they are each ‘the other winner of the distinguished Carnegie scholarship.’65) 
In combination, the camera and ‘Nash’ establish a narrative of looks. First, looking away, which 
signifies an arrogance and aloofness. Secondly, as the camera closes in on ‘Nash’, the look is 
evidently distracted, now signifying contemplation, and – of course, as it is ‘Nash’ – an exceptional 
genius. Finally, there is the look of ‘Nash’’s hands, which – in their nervous, erratic twitching, 
awkwardness and extension of his thought (and speech) processes (see figure 4.18)66 – function as a 
conventionalised gesture of his mental state. Each of these three looks, frames the schizophrenic as 
looking different, in three different contexts: the social (figure 4.15), the psychic (figure 4.16) and 
the physical (figure 4.17). Yet simultaneously, both because gawping at the mad for entertainment is 
formally out of fashion67 and because the primary signified of the sign ‘Nash’ is ‘performance for 
consideration in the Academy Awards,’68 the film exchanges looking at ‘Nash’ for looking through 
‘Nash’. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.15 
Not-looking as looking different 
 
                                                
65 A Beautiful Mind dir. by Ron Howard 
66 Most probably, Crowe’s hand gestures were meant in imitation of the real Nash. The film’s Facebook page 
alleges that Crowe studied video footage of Nash to prepare for the role. However, remembering the 
tripartite sign described earlier, it is very clearly the case that these hand gestures signify not Nash nor 
schizophrenia, but ‘Nash’ and ‘schizophrenia’ as the products of a performance within a filmic machinery. 
‘Friday Fun Fact: For A Beautiful Mind Russell Crowe prepared for his role by watching videotapes of real-
life mathematician John Nash, studying his writing and reading his biography by Sylvia Nasar.’ 6 April 2012 
<https://www.facebook.com/ABeautifulMindFilm> [accessed 20 January, 2015] 
67 In Andrew Scull’s evocative description of Bedlam: ‘the crazed were reduced to a spectacle, an ever varied 
menagerie from which an audience of both provincial bumpkins and urban sophisticates could derive almost 
endless amusement.’  The Most Solitary of Afflictions: Madness and Society in Britain, 1700-1900 (Yale University 
Press: New Haven and London, 1993), p.52 
68  The underlying equation is ‘Nash’ = ‘schizophrenia’ = ‘cultural product (performance) validated by 
productive industry (AMPAS).’ As formally validated epic of the dominant capitalist ideology, it is 
implausible that ‘Nash’ should be an undesirable other, and seen as ridiculous or odd. His social oddness, and 
odd mannerisms, exist only as prodromes of his ‘schizophrenia’ and therefore as key exhibits in the case for 
his genius. During his long period of recovery, a young Princeton student demonstrates that ‘Nash’, within 
the diegetic reality, looks different and is a suitable object for the classical spectator mockery of Georgian 
Bedlam. However, within what Etienne Souriau terms ‘spectatorial reality’, ‘Nash’ is a hero. The spectator 
empathises with ‘Nash’ (and thereby with the position of ‘schizophrenic’), and the student’s cruel, 
anachronistic joke is further evidence of the moral superiority of the cultural ideology of the film’s 21st 
century production over that of its mid-20th century diegetic reality. (Etienne Souriau’s seven levels of filmic 
reality are detailed in Warren Buckland, The Cognitive Semiotics of Film (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
2000), p.47) 
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Figure 4.16 
Looking differently as looking different 
 
 
Figure 4.17 
Looking at a difference as looking different 
 
 
Figure 4.18 
The gesture of ‘beautiful’ thinking 
 
 
Figure 4.19 
Putting a camera inside the head of a ‘schizophrenic’ 
 
 
 
Figure 4.20 
Genius as prodromal symptom 
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 This partial focalisation through ‘Nash’ is achieved by the camera assuming the subjectivity 
of ‘Nash’, whilst retaining ‘Nash’ – in part – as an object within a shared inter-subjective diegetic 
reality. Figure 4.19 details the movement of the camera into the head of the ‘schizophrenic’: there is 
a shot of ‘Nash’, amused by a private thought; there is a shot of ‘Nash’ manipulating a glass 
tumbler to refract light; the camera tracks along the table following the refracted light, pausing to 
illuminate a bowl of lemons; finally the tracking shot settles on another student’s ‘bad’ tie (figure 
4.20). As the shot tracks, the soundtrack is disturbed: the voices of the students assume a distance 
and echo; there are chimes and an ethereal wind.69 The entire sequence has executed a complete 
(but temporary) interiorising of the filmic narrative viewpoint within ‘Nash’’s subjectivity, from a 
point of absolute exteriority, in which ‘Nash’’s objectivity was signified by the enigmatic 
connotation(s) of his un(der)motivated smile (or ‘inappropriate affect’ as the diagnostically minded 
might say). This focalisation-through-tracking-shot might be termed the empathetic camera move. 
Certainly, that interpretation is being easily invited. However, this empathetic identification is too 
beguiling, and ought to be resisted. It is pseudo-empathetic, rather than empathetic (see figure 4.21 
for a Peircean model of the empathetic triad and figure 4.22 for a graphic explanation of how 
‘Nash’ as a subjective point remains outside the triangle of empathy created in the sequence). Might 
the camera manoeuvre not more sceptically but more accurately be described as thought insertion, 
enacted cinematically? The thought insertion is dual. Within the diegetic material, it stages the 
insertion of an improbable thought: that the light refraction through the tumbler illuminates a 
decodable narrative of steadily degrading patterns, meaning that the ‘bad’ tie is mathematically 
explainable. Within the spectatorial reality, the focalisation inserts the thought that ‘Nash’ is a 
mathematical genius, and that something mathematical (and brilliantly, beautifully so) has taken 
place. This is thought insertion rather than simple implication or connotation as the pseudo-
empathetic camera shot creates the ‘visual delusion’ of having seen this genius at work, through its 
own subjective eyes. Apparently accidentally, this short sequence raises a hypothesis with 
implications for analyses of schizophrenia: empathy and thought insertion are structurally and 
functionally identical, and are distinguished only by volition, in that empathy is a product of 
conscious will, whereas thought insertion is perhaps a failure of the conscious will to exclude, or 
the product of unconscious will. 
                                                
69 As a soundtrack to psychosis, this is risible aesthetically, if not clinically. It sounds as though it were a track 
on an sound effects CD entitled ‘uncanny moment’. 
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Figure 4.21 
The pseudo-empathetic triad 
Object 
(tumbler, lemon, 
tie etc.) 
Firstness  
Representamen 
‘Nash’ as subject 
viewing Object 
Secondness 
Interpretant 
camera in 
movement 
Thirdness 
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Figure 4.22 
The pseudo-empathetic tracking shot 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Line NT = line of vision for ‘Nash’ encompassing tumbler, lemons, bowl and tie 
Line CE = line of movement of camera, converging with NT at point of empathy 
Triangle CNT = the shot sequence 
Triangle CNE = empathy gap  
NB ‘Nash’ as subjectivity falls outside the visual empathetic triangle CET.  Supposed 
empathetic insight into ‘Nash’’s subjectivity is a retro-engineered visual effect of cinema. 
Space 
Time 
‘Nash’ 
Camera 
Tie 
Empathy 
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Figure 4.23 
Seeing differently 
 
 
Figure 4.24 
The reverse-shot as head-shot combines enforced pseudo-empathy with a re-enforced, heavy metaphor for 
genius. 
 
 
Figure 4.25 
With the passage of time, ‘Nash’’s intensifying thought is signified by the contrast between the emptying 
room and the greater size of his head in relation to the rest of the Pentagon. In the ‘profilmic’ reality, all that 
has happened is that Crowe has taken a step or two closer to the camera. 
 
Later, when ‘Nash’ is invited to do some code-breaking at the Pentagon, the film performs 
another empathetic camera shot sequence, to indicate that the spectator is looking through ‘Nash’ 
(figures 4.23, 4.24 and 4.25). This shot sequence comprises two 360° rotations around ‘Nash’, 
followed by shot-reverse-shots of him ‘decoding’ seemingly random numbers displayed on outsized 
(and surely anachronistic) computer screens. These shot-reverse-shots are punctuated by angled 
zoom shot, as though ‘Nash’ were catching the supposed Soviet encrypted communication 
unawares. The camera rotation operates connotatively, to communicate (with the doubled rotation 
for emphasis) that nothing escapes the eye of the genius, and also operates pseudo-empathetically, 
as the spectator appears to be taking in all that ‘Nash’ sees, but in actuality is only taking in ‘Nash’ 
engaged in seeing (or rather ‘seeing’ or ‘looking differently’). The spectator’s subjectivity swirls 
down the cinematic plughole into ‘Nash’’s subjectivity. Throughout this shot sequence plays a 
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soundtrack of the ethereal movie score, overlaid with a voice – possibly, but not certainly, that of 
‘Nash’ – wittering numbers. This sub-audible, incoherent verbal intrusion, offered (perhaps) as 
evidence of a beautiful mind whirling at super-human speeds, might be one of the few depictions 
of symptomatology within A Beautiful Mind recognisable to people with lived experience. 
Retrospectively, it is very hard to establish how real this scene is. Formally, ‘Nash’’s super-
human decoding in this scene is identical to that in later ‘schizophrenic’ moments: shot-reverse-
shot, dramatic music and random letters, numbers and shapes arising spontaneously from a more 
homogenous mass. Similarly, ‘Nash’’s looking different(ly) has been well-established as a sign 
symptomatic of ‘schizophrenia’, or rather that ‘schizophrenia’ and looking different(ly) are both 
symptomatic of his genius (his beautiful mind). Also, it is ultimately revealed that ‘Nash’ has been 
hallucinating since his first day at Princeton, five years earlier, if not before.70 Certainly, Parcher’s 
passing appearance in the Pentagon scene is – within the film’s diegetic reality – an hallucination. 
But this confusion in relation to this scene is actually just bad craftsmanship rather than an attempt 
to capture the ambiguity and uncertainty of being within psychosis.  
On the contrary, the film – aside from this scene – is remarkably efficient at tidily assigning 
images, figures, events, sounds to ‘Nash’’s subjectivity or to the objective diegetic reality. As such, 
the film effects not a descent into madness – because the madness was not really visible as 
madness, nor formally or semantically very mad – but rather an ascent into reason. This is no 
accident. For the film to function, there has to be clarity – for the spectator, and only once the 
‘reveal’ that Parcher, Charles (Paul Bettany) and Marcee (Vivien Cardone) are symptoms of mental 
ill health – about what belongs to the diegetic reality and what belongs to the delusional reality 
drawn from ‘Nash’’s subjectivity through the filmic mechanisms of (pseudo)empathy. ‘Alicia’’s 
panic – on finding visual evidence of the return of ‘Nash’’s psychosis – is only dramatically 
effective and affecting if the spectator is in complete agreement with her on the state of ‘Nash’’s 
mental health. It is impossible to fear for the baby, which ‘Nash’ has left in a running bath believing 
it to be watched over by Charles, and also believe that Parcher is real. The spectator has to choose a 
reality at this point. This is not particularly taxing, given how sign-posted the ‘right’ decision is. 
Further, it is worth recognising that ‘Nash’’s visual hallucinations do produce objectively verified 
residue, in the form of posted decoded messages to Parcher or the scattered, fragmentary texts in 
                                                
70 Although Nasar’s book includes several references to Nash being an ‘eccentric’ before then, it claims that 
the ‘strange and horrible metamorphosis’ (Nasar, p.240) of the psychotic break only occurred in early 1959. 
In the film, ‘Nash’ has been hallucinating Charles (Paul Bettany) for five years without any – documented – 
additional symptoms (unless refracting light across ugly ties counts). Aside from duplicating the reveal, that 
‘Nash’ and through him, the film, has been hallucinating, Charles does not serve much narrative purpose. He 
and Marcee muddle the clinical picture, not only for being sustained visual hallucinations, but for being 
benevolent and friendly towards ‘Nash’. Presumably, it was thought they might add a bit of sentimental 
tension to ‘Nash’ renouncing his hallucinations and delusions. Without them, he would just have to have 
given up being wrong (thinking he is involved in national security, believing medical professionals are KGB 
agents and so on). With them, he has to say goodbye to dear friends in order to get ‘better’. Also, with the 
Charles subplot, it is very easy to imagine the elevator pitch for the movie being something like: ‘Ivy League 
Fight Club.’ 
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his office. This residue then gets repurposed in the film as visual evidence not of the truth, but of 
the falsity, of his experiences and beliefs. It is also essential to understand that the ‘reveal’ is only 
complete once ‘Alicia’ discovers and accepts that ‘Nash’ is psychotic. Throughout, ‘Alicia’ 
structures the spectator’s reading of the film. For all the pseudo-empathy with ‘Nash’, there is a 
projective empathy with ‘Alicia’. Even before she has entered the narrative, the representation of 
‘Nash’ is a prodromal prefiguration of her subsequent view of him. Only ‘Alicia’ can see ‘Nash’ as 
the film has conditioned the spectator to see him all along: as an eccentric, heroic genius worthy of 
(nearly) unconditional love.71 The empathy mechanism is a function of love: ‘Alicia’’s love for 
‘Nash’, contemporary culture’s love for flawed heroes or mad geniuses but also – distantly – the 
surviving love of seeing psychic suffering as ghoulish entertainment. Like any love mechanism, this 
empathy constructs the object of its love.72 
 This easy empathy – that the filmic machinery can generate almost unthinkingly – empties 
both the ‘schizophrenic’, as object of enquiry and diegetic subject, and the ‘schizophrenic 
phenomenology’, as experiential object and mimetic subject, of any subjective psychosis. To put it 
another way, this simple interchange of subjectivity between spectator and (retrospectively 
constructed) character, is dependent on the content and the form of the representation being 
distinctly non-psychotic. As Parcher shouts at ‘Nash’, ‘John, look at me. Do I look imagined?’ No, 
or at least, no less than the butterscotch Happy Days Princeton campus or the Fred and Ginger 
black-tie star gazing of ‘Nash’ and ‘Alicia’. Indeed, all residual psychosis is objectified even within 
the ‘schizophrenic’ subject. ‘Nash’ – as a subjective self – suffers no intrinsic split. The visual 
                                                
71 Despite the inelegance of the doubled quotation marks, the reader should be able to understand the 
importance in referring to the figures within the diegetic reality as ‘Nash’ and ‘Alicia’ to avoid confusion with 
the historical individuals. The reality of their relationship was fundamentally different from that within the 
narrative of A Beautiful Mind. This difference is very neatly demonstrated by how the film alters a small detail 
from their first meeting in a calculus lecture, in which Alicia was a student and Nash was the lecturer. Both 
film and biography represent the lecture room as unbearably hot for the students, because Nash, distracted 
by outside noise, has refused to open the windows. Nasar’s text shows Alicia successfully challenging Nash’s 
bullying and indifference: ‘Alicia jumped up from her seat, ran over to the windows in her high heels, and 
opened them one after another, each time with a toss of her head. On her way back to her seat, she looked 
straight at Nash, as if daring him to reverse her action. He did not.’ (Nasar, p.196) 
 In the film, there are workmen directly beneath the lecture room windows, giving an acceptable 
rationale to ‘Nash’’s insistence on keeping them closed; he is sensitive genius rather than insensitive tyrant. 
‘Alicia’ opens the windows, apparently in a challenge to ‘Nash’’s authority, but the tension is quickly diffused 
when it becomes clear she has only opened them in order to ask the workmen to take a break for 45 minutes. 
‘Nash’ acknowledges – with a cryptic reference to the multiple possible solutions to quadratic equations – 
that ‘Alicia’ has successfully resolved this problem. So, a biographical gesture of defiance, emblematic of a 
relationship that would proceed very haphazardly through sometimes violent opposition and rejection, is 
exchanged for a fictionalized gesture of empathetic and mutually acceptable conflict resolution, emblematic 
of a relationship – within the diegetic reality of the film – where ‘Alicia’ sacrifices herself repeatedly to 
support her husband, and to give a platform to his genius. Significantly, ‘Alicia’ is constructed as a desirable 
female at this very moment. She applies her desirability (and makes a play of helplessness) to persuade the 
workmen to take a break, and – through a leering shot focalized through ‘Nash’ of ‘Alicia’ leaning out the 
window – Howard establishes that this faux-fawning and bending over are sufficient bedrock for a supposed 
love able to trump schizophrenia. 
72 Erotomania – as this chapter will demonstrate – is a driving dynamic of cinematic texts, in terms of 
structure, aesthetic, content and affect. In schizomimesis, this erotomania is doubled; psychosis is reduced to 
a cinema of erotomania whilst cinema accelerates into erotomaniacal psychosis. 
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hallucinations project any pathology away from his self and his sense of self, leaving a wholly intact 
identity, ego and set of cognitive faculties. Visibilised in this way, schizophrenia becomes an illness 
of the senses only; the visual hallucinations are specs of dust trapped somewhere in the oracular 
device, and something to be swept away or ignored. Film is an art form that necessarily operates 
across several different realities,73 therefore, the diegetic level happily accommodates an additional 
subjective reality (experienced through pseudo-empathetic focalization) which stands only in the 
relationship of an error to the objectively verified diegetic reality represented. There is nothing 
particularly ‘bizarre’ about ‘Nash’’s delusions, especially in the context of a Hollywood film. They 
just happen not to be true.74 Hence, the cinematic motion of empathy is actually one of dissociation 
and rupture, splitting the schizophrenic subject from their schizophrenia, both in terms of form 
and content. This empathy is then a blanketing motion, one that conceals the obtuseness 
constitutive of psychosis. What is produced is madness sanitised. Nor is there any great artistic 
dividend earned in this cheap disbursement of authenticity. As any casual viewer of the film would 
testify, the cod thriller elements are little more than a few sinister men in black hats, squeals of car 
tyres and furtive glances through drawn blinds. 
TNT’s Perception ran for three seasons between 2012 and 2015, and has a central 
protagonist, Dr Daniel Pierce (played by Eric McCormack), who is a professor of neuroscience at a 
fictional Chicago university, a person living with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and – as a 
direct consequence of these two complementary (within the diegetic reality of the show) qualities – 
an expert consultant with the FBI. His academic research and his lived experience enable Pierce to 
look differently, and solve (by diagnosis) murders, medical conditions and inter-personal problems. 
Pierce even glosses this convenience with some quasi-neuroscience: his unconscious brain has 
noticed something and can communicate the content of this extra-perceptual neurological stratum 
back to Pierce’s conscious mind by staging a visual hallucination. Madness, in this symbolic 
economy, is therefore rational, goal-driven and perceptually and intellectually superior to sanity. As 
might be expected, Pierce is always battling with institutional failings, from workplace stigma to 
FBI bureaucracy to medical tyranny. In absolute contrast to the socio-economic reality for many 
                                                
73 Souriau’s seven are: afilmic; profilmic; flimographic; screenic; digetic; spectatorial and creational. Buckland, 
p.47. 
74 A Beautiful Mind is in some ways a companion piece to Mel Gibson vehicle Conspiracy Theory, dir. by Richard 
Donner (Warner Bros., 1997). Mel Gibson’s NYC taxi driver begins the film as someone with a pretty 
mundane network of delusional beliefs (secret government agencies, shadowy threats to national security, 
nonspecific tampering with his brain and even a compulsive need to buy Catcher in the Rye). Gradually, all his 
delusions are shown to be true, and he is revealed to be a brainwashed assassin. (Even the repeated purchases 
of Salinger’s novel serve the dull semi-bureaucratic purpose of monitoring his movements.) As with A 
Beautiful Mind, the delusional reality and the non-delusional reality are wholly interchangeable. Being 
‘schizophrenic’ is nothing more than hitching your wagon to the wrong star. That one film is – ostensibly – 
about mental ill health and the other about secret agents is a deeply superficial difference. Both Gibson and 
Crowe play heroes who master their subjective realities; the latter by suppressing it and the former by 
validating it. 
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living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in 21st century America, Pierce is a self-actuating, financially 
independent, middle-class white male, with agency, volition and material means.75 
 Perception has extensively borrowed from the visual rhetoric and filmic syntax and grammar 
of A Beautiful Mind. As Christian Metz observed, on the ad hoc development of conventionalized 
cinematic code(s), ‘there are certain “syntactical procedures” that, after frequent use as speech [parole], 
come to appear in later films as a language system [langue].’76 For certain, Perception and A Beautiful 
Mind are speaking the same langue of filmic schizophrenia. Conventions of cinematic production of 
‘schizophrenia’ qua visual hallucinations that reach their apotheosis in A Beautiful Mind are repeated 
as cliché in Perception. Pierce experiences stable, non-bizarre visually hallucinated people, with whom 
he can interact, and who – invariably – provide essential clues for the resolution of any given 
episode’s murder and plot. Concurrently, Pierce has a long-term sustained visual hallucination: an 
‘imaginary friend’ called Natalie Vincent (played by Kelly Rowan). 77  Visual hallucinations are 
apparent – to the spectator – only through their appearance and disappearance through a 
triangulation of shots: a shot-reverse-shot of Pierce and the hallucinated character, followed by a 
wider shot showing only Pierce. 
 Again, as with A Beautiful Mind, the problem is not just that visual hallucinations are an 
atypical symptom of psychosis, but that these visual hallucinations are intrinsically ordered and 
reasonable, and the hallucinated world and the non-hallucinated co-exist conveniently. A frequent 
feature of Perception is that ‘real’ characters invariably leave seating and standing space around Pierce 
for his hallucinated characters, who are always appropriate for the context (figures 4.26 and 4.27).78 
Also, as with A Beautiful Mind, these visual hallucinations are a method by which the filmic 
representation separates the subject with a diagnosis of schizophrenia from anything resembling 
                                                
75 A recent ethnography of an Assertive Community Team (ACT) in the United States, frames ‘service users’ 
in the context of avolition, poverty, self-destructive behaviour, drug addiction, sexual abuse and medical 
coercion achieved through the control of meagre benefit payments. (Paul Brodwin, Everyday Ethics: Voices from 
the frontline of community psychiatry, (University of California Press: Oakland, 2013)) To ask those in the care of 
the pseudonymous Eastside Service whether the representation of schizophrenia in Perception spoke to them 
of their condition would be an exercise in humiliation. 
76 Christian Metz, ‘The Cinema: Language or Language System’ in Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema, 
trans. by Bertrand Augst (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1991), pp.31-91 (p.41). The French terms are 
added in brackets for clarity. It is worth noting, though, that Metz argues that there is no true langue in 
cinema, only instances of parole [speech] and an inter-textual language (in the Saussurean sense whereby a 
language is the organic sum of a langue and all instances of parole). For Metz, cinematographic language has no 
phonemes or words, and no second articulation and very little first articulation (pp.61-65). Furthermore, its 
signs, in Metz’s analysis, are rarely ‘true signs’ and its communication is only one way (p.75). Hence, it is a 
language without an underlying structural langue. 
77 One amusing contradistinction with A Beautiful Mind is that whereas that film – as mentioned earlier – 
makes a plot point out of the non-ageing of the visually hallucinated characters, the pre-titles hook of the 
season one finale, ‘Light’ (17 September, 2012) is dependent on Pierce’s hallucination ageing perfectly over 
decades. In the episode, Pierce receives in-patient care from a new psychiatrist, Caroline, who is identical to 
Natalie. It transpires that Pierce saw Caroline at a university party decades earlier and – lacking the 
confidence to approach her – hallucinated an entire relationship and friendship with her surrogate Natalie. 
For the drama to work, Natalie and Caroline obviously had to age identically over the intervening years. 
78 Jokingly, in ‘Asylum’ (13 August, 2013), Freud appears to Pierce. As a nice moment of intertextuality, he is 
played by Judd Hirsch, who also played Helinger, the fictional head of the mathematics school at Princeton in 
the opening act of A Beautiful Mind.  
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madness or psychosis. Pierce is simply seeing things that happen not to be true. The psychosis, 
such as it is, is extrinsic to him. Because filmic representation deals in visible forms and objects 
primarily, the phenomenological state has to be externalised, materialised and visualised. In doing 
so, it shifts from phenomenology to simple phenomena. The pseudo-empathy of partial 
focalisation combined with the a-psychotic psychosis makes these phenomena at worst an incorrect 
alternative narrative. At best, as in Perception, they become a very guarantor of the ‘schizophrenic’ 
Pierce’s sense of reality. In the finale to season one, ‘Light’, when confronted with the ‘real’ 
Caroline, rather than her hallucinated doppelganger Natalie, it is alarming to Pierce to discover that 
the person he is talking to is not his hallucination. Pierce’s improbable mastery of his ‘schizophrenia’ 
in the form of compliant, reasonable and helpful visual hallucinations is threatened by the apparent 
existence of a ‘real’ objectively verifiable representation of one of his hallucinations. The logic has 
become so distorted by this apsychotic psychosis that Caroline’s ‘real’ existence disturbs his self-
image and constructed sanity, and he asks his informal carer Lewicki to confirm his sanity by 
reassuring him that he is hallucinating. The dramatic music, close-up on Pierce and sudden cut to 
adverts all indicate that the spectator is meant to share the character’s anxiety, because in the 
semiotic of Perception, the visual hallucination is a sign of Pierce’s sanity. 
 
 
Figure 4.26 
Perception (‘Asylum’, 13 August, 2013) 
Pierce’s hallucinations are so well-integrated into his life … 
 
 
 
Figure 4.27 
Perception (‘Asylum’, 13 August, 2013) 
… there is always a convenient stage-managed spot for them to appear. 
 
 A Beautiful Mind and Perception are filmic representations partially focalised through a 
‘schizophrenic’ protagonist, but where the concept of the ‘schizophrenic’ phenomenology is 
entirely retro-engineered from the visual possibilities and conventions of non-psychotic 
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representations of reality. Spider and Keane offer two contrary models of extended focalisation 
through a ‘schizophrenic’ character. Spider is directed by commercial auteur David Cronenberg, and 
immerses the spectator in a highly subjectified diegetic world. The protagonist (the eponymous 
Spider, played by Raph Fiennes) has been transferred from in-patient psychiatric care to a halfway 
house in the East End of London, where he grew up. As a consequence of this – perhaps – Spider 
is recollecting (and reliving) childhood memories, and specifically – in-keeping with the narrative 
convention of representations of mental illness – the causes, context and occasion of what might 
be termed his psychotic break.  
The focalisation of the holistic diegetic reality operates in both directions. The first, and 
most apparent, direction of the focalisation pertains to that which might be called the narrative 
form and content: older Spider’s re-telling (and literally, re-writing, as he scribbles his narrative in a 
dog-eared notebook, stashed furtively under the carpet in his temporary bedroom) of his earlier 
trauma. This focalisation is vital to the story. Indeed, the story is predominantly a product of 
narrative form, as the dramatic tension entails a steady de-coding of the focalisation to discover 
what exactly happened to this triangular family in the 1950s.79 In this, the film contains strong 
traces of its origin as a novel written in the form of Spider’s own writings about his past.80  It is no 
surprise perhaps that Spider relies on what Deleuze, in his two-part philosophy of the cinema, 
describes as the ‘perception-image’ infused with a ‘semi-subjectivity’, and he notes that Passolini 
likened this form to Bakhtin’s account of free indirect discourse. 81  Deleuze summarises it as 
follows: ‘there is not a simple combination of two fully-constituted subjects of enunciation, one of 
which would be the reporter, the other reported. It is rather a case of an assemblage of enunciation, 
carrying out two inseparable acts of subjectivation simultaneously, one of which is present at his 
birth and brings him onto the scene.’82 Spider is structured as a sequence of these perception-images 
performing two inseparable acts of subjectivation at the same time. 
Spider inhabits his memories, moving through his childhood home, and following his 
parents to the local pub, the family allotment, the river front, the far-flung corners of a 
microcosmic globe born from a child’s mind. As figure 4.28 demonstrates, the older Spider is at 
                                                
79 Triangular is the word. More than anything Spider is a reaffirmation of the Freudian Oedipal complex. It 
might be felt that any 21st century account of schizophrenia that presents a pre-pubescent boy’s wild hostility 
and attraction towards his mother’s newly discovered (for him) sexuality as the overriding, if not sole, 
etiological factor, is dallying rather carelessly with the implicit misogyny that has dogged psychodynamic 
explanations of psychosis (and neurosis) since their conception. 
80 That said, the articulacy and insight of the novel’s narrator, who writes with a ‘fluent hand, the hand of a 
writer’ is degraded into inaudible mumblings, uncomprehending stares and inertia in the film. (Patrick 
McGrath, Spider, (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1992) p.155) When the camera glimpses Spider’s writings, they 
look hieroglyphic: visibilised psychosis. The impact of the medium is significant. No matter how partial or 
unreliable, a literary narrative voice is always, by definition, active and vocal. Trickster god they may be, but a 
god nonetheless. In a film, narrative figures become spectral onlookers. They functionally only need to frame 
the action to indicate, semiotically, that the scene is a product of their memory or narration. They then fall 
into a passive, silent role, which is the attitude adopted by the older Spider for much of the film. 
81 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, (London: The Athlone Press, 
1992), p.72 
82 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.73 
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once immersed in and yet separate from this diegetic reality. Similarly, he is both master of this 
reality, creating it up out of the void, and also prisoner within it, compulsively trapped into reliving 
it. And as an environment, Spider’s subjective reality is both the product and the cause of his 
mental distress. All these qualities show the economic efficiency of Cronenberg’s visual semiotic as 
a metaphor for suffering psychotic delusional thinking. 
 
 
Figure 4.28 
Spider is immersed in the ‘schizophrenic’ diegesis, but subjectively outside his younger self. 
 
 
Figure 4.29 
There seems to be no fixed answer to the question of where and when Spider is, despite (or because of) the 
overbearing sense of place throughout the film. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.30 
There is no outside-of-head in schizomimesis 
 
But the focalisation works in the opposite direction too: Spider’s narrative is focalised 
through the diegetic reality. Older Spider’s environment is distorted. The gas towers loom with a 
dreamlike over-determinacy. London streets are uncannily deserted, evoking early photography, 
when the long-exposure times turned the city’s populace to barely visible ghosts. Time too, is 
unreliable, partial. Spider seems too young, in the first years of the 21st century, to have gone 
through puberty in the 1950s. When asking where and when older Spider is, for example in figure 
4.29, it is not possible to give a determinable answer. This indeterminacy enjoys a tense co-
existence with a visual and temporal filmic schema that is also highly insistent. Almost every 
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moment of screen time is distinctly a place and a moment heavy with inexpressible meaning. In 
this, Cronenberg constructs an environment redolent in schizophrenic difference, and that 
embodies not hackneyed, clinically implausible but cinematically conventionalised symptoms, but 
rather the aura of psychotic disturbance in the materials of its mise-en-scène. Whereas the first 
form of focalisation provides a de-psychoticising and empathetic unriddling of Spider’s madness 
(where, ultimately, every mystery has a motivation, according to a very traditional Freudian master 
signifier code, and the web of events can be unspun into a linear progression), the second form of 
focalisation undoes this, by laying an obtuse webbing of uncanny, unresolvable signifiers onto the 
filmic material (figure 4.30). The mise-en-scène, the weave of cinematic signifiers, is schizomimetic, 
in contrast to the a-psychotic signified content as a plot of (and also plot as) mental illness resolving 
along the lines of risk factors, prodromal symptoms, first episode, (medical) intervention, (partial) 
recovery, relapse, and so on.83 It is schizomimetic in that it very particularly enacts specific elements 
of schizophrenic symptomatology, in this case that space, as Jaspers – building on Binswanger – 
describes it, ‘takes on an affective character’84 and that time is constructed according to a schizotypal 
‘autonoetic awareness.’85 
 
  
Figure 4.31 
A composite, object sign of phenomenology 
 
 
Figure 4.32 
Visualising the embodied phenomenology 
 
                                                
83 With plot-as-mental illness, each filmic text conforms to this narrative structure. Whether the film has a 
sentimental happy ending or not depends on whether the narrative ends at the point of recovery or relapse. 
A Beautiful Mind ends in an orgy of recovery; Spider, with a poignant slip back into psychosis, and – naturally, 
for the moral economy of the film – back into in-patient medical care. 
84 Jaspers, p.81 Italics in original. 
85 For an account of autonoetic awareness see Hannah Winfield and Sunjeev K Kamboj, ‘Schizotypy and 
mental time travel’, Consciousness and Cognition, 19 (2010) 321-327. Or, alternatively, read that famously 
schizomimetic novel written in the ‘telegraphic schizophrenic manner’ (unpaginated title page) whose 
protagonist is ‘spastic in time’ (Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse Five, (London: Random House, 1991) p.17). 
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In Keane, director and writer Lodge Kerrigan also uses mise-en-scène to enact 
phenomenology, but his film constructs the schizophrenic subject as a composite object in 
conjunction with his environment, thereby implicitly incorporating the socio-economic 
determinants of mental ill health in the semiotic (see figure 4.31). Unlike Howard or Cronenberg, 
Kerrigan makes no attempt to represent the phenomenological experiences of the central 
protagonist literally or metaphorically. Keane, played by Damian Lewis, remains the literal object of 
the camera’s gaze, and the psychosis is visibilised through the cinematic representational technique. 
These comprise predominantly: shaky hand-held camera work; erratic cuts within scenes to indicate 
small jumps in time, thereby cinematically performing Keane’s agitation; very few cutaways; a tight 
focus on Keane, especially his head; repeated use of off-screen dialogue.86  
The last of these devices is especially witty. For example, in a scene where Keane behaves 
slightly erratically in a mostly empty bar, and provokes an argument with the bartender about the 
volume of a song he has selected on the jukebox, he stands on a chair to be closer to the speaker 
and sings along (loudly and inaccurately). The bartender starts shouting at Keane to get down, and 
cinematic convention (loosely adhered to throughout this brief exchange so far) would have the 
camera move or cut between bartender and Keane to capture action and reaction. Instead, the 
camera maintains its focus on Keane, and only the bartender’s voice is heard. Although this is not 
an auditory hallucination within the diegetic reality of the film, the disconcerting effect of an 
auditory hallucination is subtly played out on the spectator who is inevitably discomforted by the 
flouting of this cinematic convention. 
 Here is a solution to the thorny problem of reconciling the cinematic imperative to 
visibilise with the objective invisibility of someone’s subjectively experienced phenomenology: an 
embodied phenomenology. The camera maintains a close, scrutinising gaze on Keane for much of 
the film; his head is rarely out of the frame, and is most often in a close shot, even when cinematic 
convention might prompt a cutaway, reverse shot or wider shot. At the same time, Lewis stages the 
experience of a schizophrenic phenomenology but to be read, by the spectator, un-empathetically. 
He mutters under his breath. His eyes dart wildly. It is very possible that he is experiencing auditory 
or even visual hallucinations. He is undeniably paranoid, and his behaviour is objectively peculiar.87 
Importantly, though the presence of an altered (or at least, alternative) phenomenology is very 
clear, and easy to read, the content of that phenomenology remains obtuse. There is no empathetic 
invasion of Keane’s subjectivity by the spectator. Yet this is not a simple voyeuristic re-stating of 
                                                
86  The confluence between the cinematic rhetoric of the espionage myth and mental illness is nicely 
evidenced by Lodge Kerrigan bringing this distinctive nervy directorial style to an episode of Homeland, ‘State 
of Independence’ (14 October, 2012), also starring Damian Lewis. 
87 Kerrigan does not establish the oddness of Keane’s behavior and appearance by triangulating him with 
other figures within the diegetic reality and the extra-diegetic spectator. This would be a simple Peircean triad, 
with Keane in the position of Firstness (behaving oddly), other diegetic figures in the position of Secondness 
(shown in shot reacting to this oddness, and thereby constructing it as odd) and the spectator in the position 
of Thirdness (validating the social construction of Keane’s behavior as odd). Doing so would push the 
spectator into identifying with the reacting figures in the position of Secondness. 
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the (pleasurable) gap between the non-pathological spectator and the schizophrenic object, a 
comforting cultural balm as described by Gilman in the introduction to this chapter. Rather, it is 
schizomimetic in the domain of the signifier.  
What is meant by that term? Whilst presenting the phenomenology as embodied in the 
figure of Keane, Kerrigan also enacts this embodiment in the formalism of the film. The 
symptomatology of schizophrenia is represented metaphorically in the form, rather than the 
content, of the representation. Rather than focalising through the subjectivity of the figure of Keane, 
Keane’s subjectivity is focalised through the filmic representational machinery. It is contra-
empathetic, or indeed schismatic or schizoid, in that it breaks association between the spectator and 
either the object of Keane or other figures (in the position of Secondness) within the diegetic 
material. However, this break with Keane is counterbalanced by the formal embodiment of his 
phenomenology. 
 Consider figure 4.32. In the image on the left, Keane is anxiously sidling around a central 
pillar in the New York City Port Authority Bus Terminal, a location he is compulsively drawn to 
repeatedly during the film, and where – according to his account – his daughter was abducted from 
him several months ago. 88  Keane appears simultaneously desperate to confront his daughter’s 
abductor – whom he seems sporadically convinced will reappear at the same time of day that his 
daughter disappeared – and also petrified of being followed or watched. At one and the same time, 
he is the subject and the object of a pursuit. The spectator is denied any external, objective 
evidence to support or refute Keane’s belief that he is being followed. Whilst the camera frames the 
diegetic reality of the film objectively, eschewing literal focalisation through Keane, it also excludes 
visual information that would help the spectator develop fixed, certain ideas about the truth (or 
otherwise) of Keane’s interpretation of reality. In this image and the second image in figure 4.32, 
where Keane is searching through lockers in a panic, the camera keeps Keane, as embodied 
psychosis, in its gaze at all time. This very process of relentless objectification of Keane means 
                                                
88 In relation to Keane’s possibly abducted daughter, the film enacts the experience of holding beliefs in the 
absence of confirmed objective grounding, a ‘psychotic’ symptom. It is impossible to determine, 
unambiguously, whether or not Keane had a daughter, and whether or not she has been abducted, or 
whether the abduction is, for example, a Freudian psychotic defence imagined to shield Keane from a truth 
less palatable to his ego, such as, his daughter having decided to break contact and live with her mother and 
stepfather, or perhaps merely a metaphor for Keane’s ex-wife refusing to allow Keane access to his daughter. 
No interpretation is verified, and the diegetic reality yields little in the way of proof. No one at the Port 
Authority Bus Terminal can remember the abduction, but then, why should they? A spectator might be 
considered complicit in Keane’s psychosis to imagine that this monumental event in his life should have any 
such impact in the lives of complete strangers, especially given the necessarily transient nature of the 
community of people at a bus terminal.  
Conversely, though, the spectator’s empathetic bias might be criticized for tilting too far in the 
opposite direction, revealing a psycho-normative urge to write Keane’s tragedy off as the hollow yarn of a 
delusional brain. To take the lack of verification of Keane’s narrative by people at the bus terminal as proof 
of its status as delusion would be to make the self-same referential error attributed to Keane above: the 
abduction would not have touched their lives to make sufficient impression, so the absence of such an 
impression cannot be assumed as evidence that the abduction was fictitious. The spectator is, therefore, 
suspended in a profound Derridean semiotic uncertainty. The signified of signs may be one thing, or that 
thing’s complete opposite or, naturally anything between those two poles. This schizomimesis in the domain 
of the signified will be addressed in the next section. 
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refusing cinematic convention to frame in wider establishing shots or to follow his line of vision. 
As a consequence, the spectator, through the restricted gaze of the camera, reaches a point of 
epistemic uncertainty. The spectator cannot see whether there is a reasonable potential suspect on 
the other side of the pillar in the first image, nor can they see whatever is (or is not) in the locker in 
the second image. This filmic technique, termed here schizomimesis in the domain of the signifier, 
forces the spectator to experience an uncertainty phenomenologically proximate to that 
experienced by a subject in a delusional state interacting with a reality at odds with their beliefs.89 
 
 
Figure 4.33 
The schizophrenic as self-conscious object of the cinematic gaze 
 
Keane challenges the cognitive function that Warren Buckland describes as ‘filmic 
competence […] the spectator’s knowledge or intuition about filmic meaning.’90 Specifically, as 
demonstrated, it does this by schizomimetically collapsing the ordering dichotomy that Buckland 
attributes to cognitive film theorists like David Bordwell: either objective, non-focalized and from 
the perspective of a non-diegetic narrator (somewhat equivalent to the third-person form in 
writing) or subjective, focalized and embodied in a character within the diegesis.91 Keane engages the 
spectator in a dialectical exchange, through an objective yet embodied and focalized perspective, 
which projects the meanings and affects generated within the filmic text back out onto the 
spectator. The character Keane’s paranoid and delusional game of cat and mouse with imagined 
second parties is enacted through a verifiable game of cat and mouse between Keane and the 
spectator. When Keane is overcome with paranoia whilst taking Kira (a young girl he befriends) ice 
skating, he starts shouting: ‘What are you looking at? Don’t look at me.’ Within the diegetic reality, 
no one is looking at him. (Granted, his shouting may well have changed that.) However, he has 
been visibly discomforted by the gaze of the spectator for an hour of ‘filmophanic reality.’92 He is 
an object (self)conscious of the camera’s gaze (see figure 4.33). In this way, schizomimesis uses the 
co-existence of different realities within the same filmic text to enact meanings and affects 
pertaining to its content: the lived experience of mental distress. The spectator, feeling their gaze 
                                                
89  Consider the affective visual hallucinations of the unnamed protagonist (N played by Anna Maxwell 
Martin) in Poppy Shakespeare (figures 4.34, 4.35 and 4.36) constructed of bold sweeps of metaphor. 
90 Buckland, p.141 
91 Buckland builds this account through the second chapter of his book, but see especially pp.49-51.  
92 Souriau’s term relating to the reality of the film as projected on the screen. Buckland, p.47 
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disturbing the diegetic character, experiences something proximate to the psychotic delusion of 
reference, whereby the person with lived experience of psychosis feels that their thoughts or acts 
are influenced by or influencing events shown on television. 
 The relationship between enacted delusions of reference and the play of signifieds in these 
representations is the central concern of the next section of this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 4.34 
 
 
Figure 4.35 
 
 
Figure 4.36 
Poppy Shakespeare 
Visual hallucination as affect and metaphor 
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Schizophrenic signified; the absent transcendental 
RAY It’s a sign.  
LAURA What’s it a sign of? 
RAY It’s meaningful. 
LAURA What does it mean? 
RAY I don’t know, I don’t know what it means. It’s just meaningful.93 
 
A visual or an auditory theme […] once it has been placed in its correct syntagmatic position within 
the discourse that constitutes the whole film, takes on a value greater than its own and is increased 
by the additional meaning it receives. But this addition itself is never entirely “arbitrary,” for what 
the theme symbolizes in this manner is an integral situation or whole process, a part of which in fact it 
is, within the story told by the film […] In short, the connotative meaning extends over the denotative 
meaning, but without contradicting or ignoring it. Thus the partial arbitrariness; thus the absence of 
total arbitrariness.94 
 
Film, like schizophrenia, finds it hard not to mean. Both rapaciously accumulate signifiers and then 
equally as generously dole out signifieds. Christian Metz, a founding father of film semiotics, 
identifies several mechanisms underlying this surfeit of signification, though it should be noted that 
he does not analyse it in these terms. Firstly, there is the unavoidable denotative signification of 
cinema, inherited from photography. No photograph can avoid denoting its various objects by 
what Metz calls a form of simple iconic analogy, and these objects recorded (at least in the pre-
digital age) are represented within the image through mechanical reproduction and analogy rather 
than code: ‘denotation is a visual transfer, which is not codified and has no inherent organisation.’95 
Metz reiterated this claim, drawing on the work of Pier Paolo Pasolini, claiming the filmmaker’s 
‘raw material is the image – that is to say, the photographic duplication of a real spectacle, which 
always and already has a meaning.’96 When a shot of a house is shown, it is impossible for this to 
not signify a house. This denotation is so strong that it cuts through all layers of reality 
encompassed within a film. It is an absolute denotation, and does not require any other language. 
Indeed, even if, as per the apocryphal ‘founding myth’97 of cinema, spectators were unable to 
distinguish between their reality and that on the screen, this denotative signification still functions. 
 Secondly, as Metz also notes, each act of denotation is additionally constructed. This is a 
marked difference between the static, unitary photograph and the moving pictures of cinema. In 
                                                
93 Some Voices, dir. by Simon Cellan Jones (Film Four Distributors, 2000) 
94 Christian Metz, ‘Problems of denotation in the fiction film’ in Film Language, pp.108-146 (p.110) 
95 Metz, ‘Some points in the semiotics of the cinema’ in Film Language, pp.92-107 (p.98). Metz makes this 
point at several stages in his theories. Here he is borrowing explicitly from Roland Barthes for whom ‘the 
photograph (in its literal state), by virtue of its absolutely analogical nature, seems to constitute a message 
without a code.’ Roland Barthes, ‘Rhetoric of the Image’ in Image Music Text, pp.32-52 (pp.42-43). For Peirce, 
given the underlying physical causality in the process, photographs are not iconic but indexical signs. (Peirce, 
p.106.) See Chapter Five footnote 75 for a fuller discussion. In a very literal sense, all digital photography 
(and film) is coded, obviously. Presumably, it is possible to use that coding process to produce metaphorical 
representations of objects by, for example, rendering the image in computer code, or translating it into 
sound, words, movements or some other form. However, whether seen as iconic or indexical signs, it is 
definitely correct that there is no coding involved in the recording process of pre-digital, photo-chemical 
photography. The composition and interpretation processes clearly do entail forms of coding. 
96 Metz, ‘The modern cinema and narrativity’ in Film Language, pp.185-234 (p.212) 
97 Martin Loiperdinger and Bernd Elzer, ‘Lumière’s arrival of the train: cinema’s founding myth’, The Moving 
Image, 4:1 (2004) 89-118 
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cinema, there is a ‘whole semiotics of denotation’98 and the significate99 ‘house’ can (and indeed, in 
some senses, must) be constructed through an assemblage of images. Even the shift from a simple 
establishing exterior shot of a house would contribute to a montage shot denotatively signifying 
‘house’ upon cutting to an interior shot. Similarly, holding the exterior shot of the house for any 
period of time would construct a composite shot signifier of the denotative signification ‘house’, 
establishing that part of the significate ‘house’ is the object quality of endurance through time.100 
This is perhaps taken to its logical, artistic endpoint with Andy Warhol’s Empire (1964), a film 
composed of one slow-motion, eight-hour (and five minutes) shot of the Empire State Building. 
Thirdly, each shot, Metz asserts, is an actualized unit, equivalent not to the linguistic word 
but to the sentence. As Metz states: ‘[t]he image of a house does not signify “house,” but “Here is a 
house”; the image contains a sort of index of actualization, by the mere fact that it occurs in a 
                                                
98 Metz, p.98 
99 The term ‘significate’ is used here for ‘signified’. Although both are different translations of the same 
French word signifié, the two codings into English allow for a nuance of difference. In this case, to talk of the 
signified ‘house’ might sound as though a specific house is being referred to, whereas to use the terminology 
‘significate’ – and to talk of the significate ‘house’ – makes clearer that what is signified is the concept of 
‘house’ as well as (and inextricably linked to) the specific house also being signified. Throughout this chapter, 
‘significate’ is used when it appears to offer a certain precision that would be lost by always using ‘signified’. 
100 For Metz, this shot would surely be an exemplar of his first syntagmatic type, the autonomous shot (see 
Metz, pp.124-135). Metz does not believe that either first or second articulation is possible within film 
semiotics. Of course, many films have soundtracks that are partially linguistic, and therefore entirely 
susceptible to articulation to the level of phonemes. Non-linguistic soundtracks are also naturally divisible 
down to minimum distinctive units of sound that lack signification on their own, or at least have less 
signification. The infamous stabbing strings during Marion Crane’s murder (Psycho, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock, 
Paramount Pictures, 1960) can be dissected into phonemes (or phoneme equivalents) that do not, 
individually, contain the signification that the whole theme does.  
 Metz correctly interprets the shot, and even the discernable moments within a shot, as equivalent to 
a sentence or actualized statement, and this is at least partially because even in this moment of near-
simultaneity, film offers a sufficient range of units to generate signification. As recognized, each visual 
element within a frozen frame of film – assuming it is a representational non-abstract element – has 
immediate, unavoidable denotative signification, and so cannot be likened to the phoneme, and this 
signification can be autonomous, so the element cannot be likened to a morpheme. To take figure 4.34 as an 
example, all sub-images within the shot take the diegetic object and the profilmic object as their referents. So, 
the signifier of the image of a figure in the bunny suit has two signifieds: the affective visual hallucination of 
N (the diegetic significate) and the actor in a bunny suit (the profilmic significate). Given that the bunny is 
absent from the novel’s account of N’s assessment (see Clare Allen, Poppy Shakespeare, (Bloomsbury: London, 
2007), pp.215-218), the figure in the bunny suit has a further meta-filmic signification, functioning as a sign 
of the differing requirements and functions of film in contrast to those of the literary text, specifically the 
need to visibilise, and the aesthetic demands and parameters of such a need. 
 However, very obviously, the shot can be broken down into distinctive units analogous to 
morphemes and phonemes, lacking individual signification. In terms of the filmic image, the spaces between 
individual signifying object images, the quality of lighting, the position of the camera are certainly distinct 
elements that contribute to the signification of the shot but do not signify in themselves. (It is important to 
distinguish between the technical acts – for example, positioning a camera, selecting a lens and focus range, 
arranging lighting and applying filters – and the image effect, for example, that figures are seen from above, 
that they are warmly or coldly lit etc. Only these image effects can be considered analogous to phonemes and 
morphemes as only they are manifest within the shot, albeit that they follow absolutely inevitably and causally 
from the technical acts that fall outside the shot, and outside the filmic semiotic.) Similarly, as already 
demonstrated, the soundtrack is divisible into analogous components. 
 This observation is helpful primarily to emphasis how signification is constructed synchronically 
across the multiple signifying layers of the shot (including its soundtrack) in profound contradistinction to 
the chronologically linear construction in sound (be it drama, spoken poetry and prose, music or just plain 
noise) and in print (without images). That film’s second articulation exists by separating out these differing 
signifying layers is an observation apparently missed by Metz. 
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film.’101 Film, therefore, is an unruly meaning-generating machine, that cannot but denote (at least, 
as long as its raw materials of denotation are drawn photographically from a non-abstract reality 
composed of objects capable of being rendered mimetically). Further, this denotation is necessarily 
highly motivated, rather than arbitrary, and penetrates across signifiers, with a self-narratising drive 
that has no subjective agency behind it, as in the case of the composite signifiers denotatively 
signifying ‘house’ through a shot sequence. Finally, this non-intentional, irrepressible denotative 
sub-narrative of signification and presence is self-conscious and its own meta-narrative. So, ‘house’ 
and ‘this is a house’ are concurrent narratives of denotative signification. This emphatic insistence 
is then a very easy hook for any connotative signification, as a spectator asks, ‘why a house?’ or 
‘why this house?’  
Jean Mitry, a contemporary and generally fellow traveller of Metz’s, summarises the 
tendency of filmic representation to supercharge its objects with signification neatly:  
Objects become in it the symbols of what they are in a representation concealing, far beyond 
superficial similarity, a truth which they themselves are incapable of expressing. Reproduction is richer 
in meaning than the reproduced object.102 
 
This supercharging of objects with signification is not just a tendency of filmic representation but, 
as this section shall argue, is also the underlying semiotic process in the Schneiderian first rank 
symptom of the delusional percept. Jaspers’ description of the ‘delusional atmosphere’103 as foundation 
for delusions in schizophrenia bears clear similarities with the semiotic account of supercharged 
signification in film: 
Patients feel uncanny and that there is something suspicious afoot. Everything gets a new meaning. 
The environment is somehow different […] perception is unaltered in itself but there is some 
change which envelops everything with a subtle, pervasive and strangely uncertain light. A living-
room which formerly was felt as neutral or friendly now becomes dominated by some indefinable 
atmosphere.104 
 
Jaspers conceptualizes the primary delusion as a self-conscious process of a ‘seeing of meaning’,105 or 
what might in semiotic terms be described as a (hyper)consciousness of (supercharged) 
signification. For Jaspers, ‘the delusional experience of reality [is one] in which the environment 
offers a world of new meanings’: 
Perceptions are never mechanical responses to sense-stimuli; there is always at the same time a 
perception of meaning. A house is there for people to inhabit; people in the streets are following 
their own pursuits. If I see a knife, I see a tool for cutting. If I look at an unfamiliar tool from 
another culture, I may not see its precise meaning but I can appreciate it as a meaningfully shaped 
object.106 
 
Simple perception entails not just a perception of meaning, but a subjective projection of meaning. 
Even, as Jaspers hints, when the perceiver has no ‘precise meaning’ to project, on an enigmatic or 
                                                
101 Metz, p.116 
102 Jean Mitry, Semiotics and the Analysis of Film, trans. by Christopher King (London: The Athlone Press, 2000), 
p.186 
103 Jaspers, p.98 Italics in original. 
104 Jaspers, p.98 
105 Jaspers, p.99 Italics in original. 
106 Jaspers, p.99 
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obtuse object, then the concept of meaning is projected, enabling the perceiver to ‘appreciate it as a 
meaningfully shaped object’. These projections of signification are amplified in both the psychotic 
state (Jaspers’ delusional atmosphere) and also the filmic text. In both, objects are supercharged 
with signification so that ‘[o]bjects, persons and events are simply eerie, horrifying, peculiar, or they 
seem remarkable, mystifying, transcendental. Objects and events signify something but nothing 
definite.’107 Cinema entails a psychotic supercharging of signification; psychosis entails a cinematic 
atmosphere of meaningfulness.  
If this chapter is arguing that many of the conventional cinematic effects which project a 
constructed subjectivity back onto the spectator are – in semiotic terms at least – identical to the 
processes detailed in Jaspers’ account of morbid phenomenology (specifically, thought insertion, 
delusional thinking, voice-hearing, affectivity of space and time), then how can it also be claimed 
that Jasperian empathy is neither desirable or possible through cinematic representations of 
psychotic phenomenology? Central to this argument is that cinema is a productive mode that 
conceals its own effects constitutive of its (un)reality. Similarly, a delusional belief system conceals 
the mechanisms and effects through which it is constituted. To empathise would be to be complicit 
in these concealments, regardless of which semiotic system (cinematic or delusional) is being 
empathized with. At heart, empathy is an accepting of a system of signification (be it the subjective 
phenomenology of another person, or the meaning structure of a filmic text, or both) as-if 
understood. In contrast to practicing a complicit empathy, this chapter’s call to obtuseness 
translates here as a focus on precisely those signifying elements within these semiotics that fail to 
mean, or missignify, and do so instructively, revealing the mechanism of the semiotic’s construction 
and the falsity of its effects. 
Structurally, the way in which signification is bound onto and explodes out from images 
within the semiotic of cinema is identical to the operation of signification in the coding act 
pathologised as ‘delusions of reference’. Certainly, the cinematic staging of mistaken decoding by 
‘schizophrenic’ characters within the narrative is one common way in which ‘schizophrenia’ is 
signified within filmic representations and, in contrast to the visual hallucinations discussed in the 
previous section, this ‘symptom’ is typical (rather than atypical) in clinical accounts. As a rhetorical 
convention signifying schizophrenia, there are numerous examples in A Beautiful Mind and 
Perception. In both, this compulsive decoding doubles as signification of ‘character’. ‘Nash’ and 
Peirce are decoders, a mathematician and a neuro-psychiatrist respectively, and each has a supercrip 
alter-ego as Cold War spy or FBI consultant. Decoding, as an act, signifies across three levels, or 
genres: the medico-diagnostic (the decoder qua ‘schizophrenic’); the personal and professional (the 
decoder qua validated professional); the romance or fantasy (the decoder qua superhero, spy, 
detective etc.). Naturally, the assumptions of these roles in turn affirm the ideological constructs 
within which the roles function, so the ‘schizophrenic’ decoder affirms the medico-diagnostic 
                                                
107 Jaspers, p.100 
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model of mental disease, the qualification-bearing professional decoder affirms a liberal capitalist 
order that equates productive employment with character, and the sleuth decoder affirms the 
fantasy of contemporary Hollywood and television. 
A conventional decoding shot sequence from A Beautiful Mind has already been analysed in 
the previous section for its formal qualities and how it constructs the signifier of ‘schizophrenia’. 
This section is concerned with what happens to the signified within the process of decoding. The 
UK film Some Voices (2000) – adapted by Joe Penhall from his 1994 stage play of the same name, 
described as ‘a film that rises above the usual dross of mental illness movies’108 not least for its 
reasonably clinically faithful representation of ‘schizophrenic’ symptomatology – opens with a 
sequence of (potentially faulty) decoding. Being driven by his brother Pete (David Morrissey) to 
Shepherd’s Bush, London on release from an undisclosed (and, in 2000, rather anachronistic) 
asylum, Ray (Daniel Craig) seems preoccupied with some unusual sights alongside the motorway. 
The film cuts between these images – including a half-missing junction sign (figure 4.37) and a 
group of builderers (figure 4.39) – and Ray’s face (figure 4.38). 
 
 
Figure 4.37 
Self-conscious denotation segues into connotation for both the ‘schizophrenic’ and the spectator, in the 
opening sequence of Some Voices (2000). 
 
 
Figure 4.38 
The decoding subject as filmic object. 
 
                                                
108 Peter Byrne, ‘Some Voices [Review]’, British Medical Journal, 321 (2000) 770, p.770 Byrne praised particularly 
the use of audio effects to recreate the sensation of auditory hallucinations, in contrast to A Beautiful Mind’s 
dubious metaphorical visibilising of hearing voices into seeing people. 
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Figure 4.39 
The accidental signifier: by placing it within the filmic syntagm, profilmic material beings to denote and 
connote. The semiotic of cinema forces a panoply of different significates on these accidental signifiers, with 
the amorous gusto of the florid ‘psychotic’. 
 
Six different processes of signification take place within this shot sequence, with different 
signifieds. Narratively, the sequence signifies Ray’s return home from in-patient psychiatric care, 
and his unfamiliarity with what he sees suggests an extended period of time away from London. 
Thematically, the uneasy and questioning glances at the world establishes the disharmonious 
relationship Ray, and all the protagonists, have with their environment and their lives. This is a 
clear example of ‘schizophrenia’ as both product of and metonym for socio-economic problems; as 
writer Joe Penhall said (of the original stage play): ‘Some Voices was about the difficulties of 
assimilating in the metropolis.’109 Formally, this interchange establishes a degree of focalisation 
through Ray. Any spectator somehow unfamiliar with any simple synopsis of the film will, by this 
early point, have intuited – as a result of this shot sequence – that Ray is the central protagonist, 
and that they are invited to empathise with him and adopt his perspective (literally with figures 4.37 
and 4.39). Diagnostically, especially coming after Ray’s release from an asylum, the sequence is the 
first cinematic symptom sign, or rather a prodromal sign, of the ‘schizophrenic’ episode that will 
erupt within the film’s diegesis; Ray’s main ‘symptom’ is delusions of reference, particularly a belief 
in communicating with aliens via swirls, wheels and crop circles. Here are four processes of 
signification – the narrative, the thematic, the formal and the diagnostic – constitutive of the filmic 
text. What of the final two processes of signification? 
These two significations are meta-filmic, signifying about the film itself rather than about 
its diegetic material. The first meta-filmic signification of this sequence shot is that Some Voices is 
schizomimetic in the domain of the signified. How to explain the implications of that term? It is a 
reasonable assumption that the builderers and the partial motorway sign belong to the profilmic 
reality, and were not staged for the film but merely recorded. Cellan Jones’ direction to Craig may 
have been an instruction to look awed or confused by these first glimpses of post-institutionalised 
life. Within the editing process, by simple montage alternating candid footage of profilmic reality 
                                                
109 Joe Penhall, Some Voices, in Plays: 1 (Methuen: London, 1998), p.ix. This is the central structuring theme of 
Joe Wright’s The Soloist also, which is as much about black poverty in Los Angeles as it is about a disease 
called ‘schizophrenia’. Similarly, Joe Penhall’s subsequent play and film Blue/Orange is as much about race and 
poverty, and the dialectical relationship between urban social alienation and ‘psychosis’, as it is about a set of 
symptoms and a diagnosis. 
 220 
with reaction shots of Craig, the director has constructed an exchange modelled on Jakobson’s 
model of communication (discussed and modified in Chapter Two; see figure 4.40). These 
profilmic elements are already signifying denotatively. As described, they additionally acquire 
connotative signification, as the spectator asks why they are being included within the film. By 
introducing these signifiers into an alternating montage with an actor’s reaction, they gain even 
greater connotative weight. In the position of Thirdness, the spectator is validating the semiotic 
communicative exchange whereby these profilmic elements signify. What is important though is 
that these self-same elements exist outside the filmic semiotic without those signifieds (both the 
four forms of signification mentioned earlier and these two further meta-filmic significations). This 
sequence – in its use of profilmic material to act as signifiers of a delusion of reference – has 
schizomimetically performed that very delusion of reference, and has re-appropriated these 
signifiers (or rather has taken wholly formed signs from reality and degraded them into signifiers 
within a new semiotic of their delusion of reference) and then pushed highly idiosyncratic signifieds 
onto them.110   
 
 
To understand how this schizomimesis enacts the represented delusion of reference, it is 
necessary to analyse the delusion within the diegesis as experienced by Ray, and its filmic rendering. 
Some Voices moves between a focalization through Ray (figures 4.37 and 4.39) and viewing his 
subjectivity as a filmic object (figure 4.38). In Peircean terms, the spectator shifts from a position of 
                                                
110 This process – the schizomimetic rhetoric of textual accounts of delusions of reference – was detailed in 
the previous chapter with reference to Henry’s Demons.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.40 
The modified model of communication 
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Secondness – in which the spectator shares the perspective of Ray in relation to the Firstness of a 
supposed sign (in these examples, the motorway sign or the builderers) – and a position of 
Thirdness, in which the spectator (through filmic montage) establishes Ray in a position of Secondness 
in relation to the Firstness of the sign. Hence, Ray is placed within Jakobson’s communication 
model in the role of the supposed addressee, and this continues throughout the film as he is seen 
experiencing messages from graffiti, the television and extra-terrestrials (through crop circles).111 
This is an important cinematic sleight of hand here as, of course, in the film’s diegetic reality there 
is no intended message; nothing that Ray interprets as a sign is actually such, except for him. To 
employ the triadic sign model here: Ray is Interpretant to the Representamens of crop circles, windmills 
and so on, in which the Object is not the literal object (crop circles, windmills and so on, which is 
also the denotative signified of the image-objects in the diegesis) but rather the opaque, quasi-
cosmic message Ray believes himself to be receiving. Here is a working definition of the mystic and 
mystifying signified at the heart of the delusion of reference. A schizophrenic sign is one where 
there is no independent Object in the position of Firstness.  
To return to this meta-filmic level of signification – the schizomimesis in the domain of 
the signified – the filmic process necessarily constructs the re-occurrence of swirls within Some 
Voices as meaningful; rendering them, by all accounts, as signifying coded messages capable of 
communication. A perfectly adequate triadic sign is established in which the re-occurrence of swirls 
are Representamens of the Object of the psychotic subjectivity, and are easily understood by the 
Interpretant, either the spectator of the film, or – within the diegesis – those characters registering 
Ray’s psychotic behaviour and thinking as unusual. In this triangulation, the spectator or a character 
like Pete would stand as Intepretant and in position of Thirdness to Ray and his delusions, themselves 
now in a position of Secondness to, in the diegesis, the non-present Firstness of the message content. 
However, as shown, in the meta-filmic level of signification, there is an entirely non-psychotic 
Firstness and Object, which is the signified psychotic subjectivity. This leads to the sixth and final 
process of signification. 
The second meta-filmic signification is that filmic schizomimesis in the domain of the 
signified is quasi-therapeutic, or at least self-negating and operates as its own antipsychotic. Once 
the operation is performed – creating and staging a delusion of reference – it undoes its own 
performance. The delusion of reference ceases to be such. Meta-filmically, as the builderers and 
broken sign start to signify Ray’s delusion of reference, Ray’s response ceases to be a true delusion 
of reference. By virtue of rendering these delusions through a filmic semiotic – by representing 
them – their signification ceases to be ‘symptomatic’ of psychosis. Psychosis becomes the referent, 
the signified, the non-psychotic Firstness and Object, rather than a quality of the act of signification as 
performed by the ‘schizophrenic’ subjectivity. This meta-filmic catharsis of filmic schizomimesis in 
                                                
111 See the Jakobson communication models, figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 in Chapter Two of this thesis, and figure 
4.40. 
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the domain of the signified will be considered further in Chapter Five. What is worth noting at this 
stage is how easy it is for a non-psychotic spectator to empathise with a represented subjectivity 
where the troubling psychosis is parcelled off under a lower-level semiotic; as long as the filmic text 
makes sense, as long as its chains of signification and exchanges of meaning are unproblematically 
accepted by the spectator, then rather than a straightforward Othering of the ‘psychotic’, as 
described by Gilman, there is an empathy with a psychotic subjectivity that has internally Othered 
its psychosis. Recognising and allowing the obtuseness concealed by the filmic machinery would be, 
surely, a more respectful and genuine witnessing than this pseudo-empathy. 
These meta-filmic significations perform a relentless, futile drive for meaning making. In 
the act of searching for meaning, meaning is constructed. Some Voices illustrates these two meta-
filmic significations very well. Throughout the film, Ray’s delusions of reference grow and infiltrate 
the visual rhetoric and thematics. Within the diegesis of the film, Ray – searching for meaning, for a 
grand signified to attach to all the signifiers he feels weighing upon him – tries to use Laura (Kelly 
Macdonald), and their love affair, as a kind of transcendental signified. In the uncontrolled 
proliferation of signs that is the delusion of reference, a transcendental signified can put a stop to 
the merry-go-round of meaning, and give a subjectivity some terra firma for building a stable 
phenomenology. This is evident in the quotation at the start of this section, in which Ray insists 
that his meeting Laura and their subsequent relationship are both inherently meaningful. Rather 
than playing games, as the behaviour of the psychotic might seem to the unsympathetic observer, 
the ‘schizophrenic’ is attempting to stop such play, which is existentially threatening, and to 
establish a transcendental signified against the Derridean constant sliding of meaning constitutive 
of ‘a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never 
absolutely present outside a system of differences.’ 112  The schizomimetic sign – in the filmic 
semiotic – is the sign par excellence as it realises what Lotman calls, in his monograph on film 
semiotics, the prime function of the sign: ‘the basic feature of the sign is its ability to realize the 
function of substitution.’113 Lotman – as Metz and Mitry before him – observes that the sign within 
the filmic semiotic becomes super-charged, and simultaneously over-determined (in the 
unavoidable iconic denotations) and under-determined and hyper-re-purposive (in the enigmatic, 
multi-layered connotations). When the schizomimetic sign is rendered in the filmic semiotic, this 
super-charged, untethered signification is precisely what is staged: a forever-displaced signified is 
chased through the play (or screenplay) of repeated attempts at decoding. 
 
  
                                                
112 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, sign and play in the discourse of the human sciences’, in Writing and Difference, 
pp.351-370 (p.354) 
113 Lotman, Semiotics of Cinema, p.2 
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Figure 4.41 
The warning sign … 
 
 
Figure 4.42 
… the symptom sign … 
 
 
Figure 4.43 
… reconciling into the love sign.  
The thematic, therapeutic semiotic of film acts out a dynamic of love. 
 
 
Figure 4.44 
The locus of the delusion – the head shot operates as a signifier of the presence of mental ill health and 
delusional thoughts. 
 
 
Figure 4.45 
Both the ‘schizophrenic’ and the filmic spectator are immersed in a landscape of signification. 
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Figure 4.46 
Keane never allows the spectator to close the ambiguous play of meaning. The signifier and signified can never 
be resolved into a stable sign, just as Keane himself cannot be reconciled to his reality. The film is an 
extended, futile hunt for the transcendental signified. 
 
With Some Voices, the chasing of the deferred signified gives a narrative structure to the 
film. The displaced, recurring signifiers of the swirl chart the progress of the central character (see 
figures 4.41, 4.42 and 4.43).114 Although he is ultimately unsuccessful in his love affair with Laura – 
who returns to Glasgow to have another man’s child – he is successful in ordering these signifiers 
which have been oppressing him throughout the film into a signifying system of love rather than 
threat. The swirl is gradually refunctionalised until, retrospectively, it provides justification for Ray’s 
assertion to Laura that it is a meaningful sign, signifying their love. Undoubtedly, by the final 
sequence, when Ray places the burnt out Catherine wheel from his early idyllic escape to Hastings 
with Laura, the swirl has inarguably become a sign of love. (That this sign should also be so very 
apparently burnt out, spent and a piece of detritus is an aesthetically pleasing instance of semiotic 
excess.) It is worth comparing the film with the original stage play (1994), which has no equivalent 
of the recurring swirls, either in the semiotic of the film’s aesthetic or in the accounts of Ray’s 
symptomatology. Similarly, his ‘relationship’ with Laura in the play is tentative and sporadic, rather 
than merely short-lived. The delusional signifying system of messages from outer-space is given to 
another ‘schizophrenic’ character Ives, who is all-but absent from the film (played fleetingly by 
Nicholas Palliser): 
IVES  I, I, I, I, I, I’m not from round here no. I come from far away. A distant and very 
beautiful planet, the Planet Vega as a matter of fact. […] I was in the gasworks before that. 
Sixteen years in the gasworks and the whole fucking lot goes sky high. Explosion. I was 
there, I saw the missiles go up. High into the sky they went and on the ground a great 
flaming fireball. No safety precautions on account of the fact they wanted it to happen, 
you understand? They sent the missiles up as a signal. Why? To let them know I was ready. 
Why? Because they wanted to get rid of me.115 
 
Ives’ various accounts of Planet Vega in the play, and the reoccurring swirl motif in the film are 
both serving the same function, signifying the presence (and also a degree of the form and content) 
                                                
114 Contrastingly, Keane never allows either its protagonist nor its spectator any such resolution. Keane’s 
obsessive, repetitive search is pure wild goose chase. In desperation, every single scrap of signage around 
New York City can potentially be incorporated into his decoding narrative. The delusional thinking is 
established, semiotically, through abstracting close-ups of the head and concurrently diffused through the 
schizomimetically relentlessly signifying city, until the landscape is an interpretable construct of Keane’s 
delusional semiotic. Whereas Ray ultimately settles on the transcendental signified of love (or rather ‘better to 
have loved and lost’), Keane gets no such end point. See figures 4.44, 4.45 and 4.46. 
115 Penhall, p.48 
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of a delusion of reference. However, a social realist play cannot be schizomimetic without drifting 
distinctively into expressionism; an essentially social realist film, though, can – and in fact must – 
adopt the delusional signifying system by virtue of representing it. Lotman asserts that ‘[v]isually 
perceived action is possible only in one mode – the real.’ This is true for cinema – but not for 
theatre, where action is always partially unreal, if only on the purely denotative level of signification 
and can, in accordance with long-established conventions, stage wholly unreal and metaphorical 
action comfortably. The problem for cinema, which makes for filmic schizomimesis, is that it 
cannot help convert what it represents into the mode of the real, even a delusional reference 
system. 
Hence, schizomimesis in the domain of the signified is both a quality of form and a quality 
of content.116 The detached signifier reoccurs throughout the filmic syntagma, in the same way that 
Ray’s swirls and circles proliferate throughout Some Voices. And similarly, different and 
contradictory signifieds (or multi-layered clusters of significates) proliferate around these signifiers. 
These signifiers agglomerate around cinematic protagonists and around ‘schizophrenics’, emulating 
the infectivity and rapid binary fission of the bacterium. The homogeneity and low informational 
value of the signifiers only – through the cinematic machinery – serve to radically increase the 
potential for signification, generating an unstoppable torrent of substitution in the domain of the 
signified. Consider the ubiquitous maths signifiers, the impenetrable jumble of formulae, proofs, 
algorithms and coordinates, that echo through A Beautiful Mind.117 Their continual substitutions in 
the domain of the signified, in the face of their implacable immutable constancy in the domain of 
the signifier, provides the narrative structure to the film, and the character arc of its protagonist. At 
Princeton, the maths signifier is attached to the significate of ‘Nash’’s ambition, his promise, his 
search for his ‘truly original idea’, and also concurrently his eccentric (and prodromal) personality. 
This is the status of the signification at the level of narrative but within the diegesis, of course, the 
signifier is infinitely re-assignable. ‘Nash’ demonstrates this to (the hallucinated) Charles, pointing at 
different, incomprehensible signifiers and explaining (or, effectively, ascribing) their meaning: ‘This 
is a group playing touch football. This is a flock of pigeons fighting over breadcrumbs. This is a 
woman chasing a man who stole her purse.’ (See figures 4.47, 4.48 and 4.49. for an account of how 
the sign is steadily disemembered by schizomimesis.) 
 
                                                
116 The schizomimetic for Mitry would be a sub-genre of Expressionism as he says ‘the strange fascination of 
the genre is due to the fact that the form of the expression is none other than the form of the content, according to a 
formula unique in the cinema.’ (Mitry, p.189) 
117 An impenetrable jumble for the lay-spectator, that is. As a product of the financial and temporal capital 
enjoyed by major Hollywood pictures, the production employed a professor of mathematics from Colombia 
University as a consultant. This, despite the fact that the elegantly and apparently accurately fashioned maths-
as-signifier is never used to signify about maths itself, and the one moment in which at which maths is 
signified about – during ‘Nash’’s Princeton bar eureka moment – the maths in question, the Nash equilibrium, 
is simplified beyond meaningful recognition. David Bayer, ‘Profile: Barnard College Colombia University’, 
barnard.edu 
<https://www.barnard.edu/profiles/david-bayer> [accessed 10 February 2015] 
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Figure 4.47 
The wide shot stages an open Peircean sign triad of Object (maths), Representamen (‘Nash’ actively attributing 
signification) and Intepretant (Charles, to whom he is explaining the signification.) 
 
 
Figure 4.48 
The sign triad closes in. The Object is now ‘the group playing football’, the Representamen is the maths and the 
Interpretant is ‘Nash’. 
 
 
Figure 4.49 
Finally, the sign triad collapses. The Object is eternally substitutable, the Representamen is endlessly repetitive, 
and the Interpretant ultimately hallucinatory. The sign – in schizomimesis – is diegetically internal, solipsistic, 
‘pathological’ and meaningless through a surfeit of signification. But, in the film’s semiotic it is external, 
communicative and only meaningless through a paucity of signification, as no one understands or cares 
especially about the maths qua maths. 
 
 
Figure 4.50 
Maths as maths 
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Figure 4.51 
Maths as madness 
 
 
Figure 4.52 
Maths as meds 
 
In ‘Nash’’s office at MIT – the next narrative segment – the maths signifier signifies still as 
his eccentric (now prodromal tending towards symptomatic) personality. Additionally, it signifies 
his professional status as a mathematician. Hence, it is maths signifier as maths signified (figure 
4.50), although it is important to stress that there is nothing specifically mathematical being 
signified, but rather the signifier just signifies the presence, and connotative social and professional 
status, of maths. As the narrative progresses, the maths signifier comes to signify the presence of 
disease; ‘Nash’’s compulsive decoding – which mostly involves translating words, letters or 
concepts (signifieds) into mathematical expression (signifiers) – is symptomatic of ‘schizophrenia’ 
as rendered in the film (figure 4.51). The maths signifier is later attached to the signified impact of 
antipsychotic medication on ‘Nash’’s beautiful mind (figure 4.52). The maths signifier reoccurs 
ultimately as a sign of his improving mental health, culminating in the sign(s) of the sign: when the 
signifiers of pens and the Nobel Prize substitute for mathematical brilliance, mental health recovery 
and social validation. It should be added that these things are not discrete entities in the film’s 
moral semiotic. As with ‘psychosis’, the obtuseness of highly advanced mathematics is either elided, 
by it being able to only signify metaphorically or truncated, as a meta-signification of its own 
presence. The cinematic deception of pseudo-empathy is easier to see through in relation to maths 
than psychosis; far fewer spectators would come away from a viewing of A Beautiful Mind believing 
they have learnt something about maths, or about being a prize-winning mathematician, or having 
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had an empathetic experience of maths, than come away believing some or all those things in relation 
to schizophrenia.118 
The signifier of classical music is used in a similar way in The Soloist (2009), based on the 
LA Times columnist Steve Lopez’s series of articles, and subsequent book, about a homeless 
‘schizophrenic’ with the ‘good hook’ that he is an alumnus of the Juilliard School.119 The classical 
music functions to mark Nathaniel Ayers (Jamie Foxx) out as exceptional, and deserving of effort 
and attention not afforded the under-differentiated mass of mentally ill and distressed service-users 
of Lamp (the Los Angeles mental health facility that offers Ayers accommodation) and/or street-
sleepers of Los Angeles’ Skid Row. Unlike maths in A Beautiful Mind, classical music is also allowed 
to signify itself throughout The Soloist, frequently denoting music being played within the diegesis. 
Simultaneously, the music signifies Nathaniel’s brilliance and his madness; that he is literally two 
strings short of a violin when Steve (Robert Downey Jr) first meets him seems an example of 
semiotic excess, real life working in over-wrought metaphors.120 Exceptionality – signified with 
maths signifier or the classical music signifier – is deemed worthy of empathetic understanding. So, 
such texts imply the converse: the unexceptional are not worth understanding. 
Ayers exhibits flights of linguistic associative fancy, and mangled speech, very similar to 
that of Ives from Some Voices. Early in his book, Lopez provides an extended example of Ayers’ 
speech. A short excerpt is sufficient to illustrate that it exhibits loosened associations between 
signifier and signified, with sliding across both the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes as described 
in Chapter Two: 
Cleveland doesn’t have the Beethoven statue. That’s a military-orientated city, occupied, 
preoccupied, with all the military figures of American history, the great solders and generals, but you 
don’t see the musicians on parade, although you do have Severance Hall, Cleveland Music School 
                                                
118 With his death on 23 May 2015, the signifiers and signified of mathematics and schizophrenia were 
perhaps eternally fused in relation to Nash. Most obituaries moved between discussions of his (real) 
mathematical achievements and his (Hollywood) psychosis, barely distinguishing between the two. As with 
the composite sign from the Academy Award ceremony, Russell Crowe, Russell Crowe as ‘Nash’ and even 
Russell Crowe’s (self) praiseful tweet of appreciation for Nash and Alicia’s passing ‘beautiful minds, beautiful 
hearts.’ (@russellcrowe, 24 May 2015)  
<https://twitter.com/russellcrowe/status/602468781911183360> [accessed 24 May 2015] 
See the Guardian’s obituary for a typical blending of Nash and ‘Nash’. 
Len Fisher, ‘John Nash Obiturary’, The Guardian, 25 May 2015 
<http://www.theguardian.com/science/2015/may/25/john-nash> [accessed 25 May 2015]  
119  Steve Lopez, The Soloist, (Uxbridge: Transworld, 2008), p.21 For all its apparent unlikeliness and 
journalistic novelty, the central conceit of a Juilliard-trained, street-sleeping black ‘schizophrenic’ was the 
basis of a schlocky murder mystery novel – The Caveman’s Valentine by George Dawes Green (London: 
Sphere, 1994) – which was later turned into a film staring Samuel L Jackson, dir. by Kasi Lemmons 
(Universal Focus, 2001). The novel was actually reviewed by Erika Taylor for the L.A. Times on 20 February 
1994, though that was several years before Lopez joined the paper. ‘Romulus fights the power: The Caveman’s 
Valentine by George Dawes Green’, 20 February 1994 <http://articles.latimes.com/1994-02-20/books/bk-
24917_1_george-dawes-green> [accessed 10 March 2015] 
Perhaps this was what Morley Safer had in mind when he described the story of Ayers and Lopez as ‘one of 
those urban fables that happens to be true.’ ‘How Mr Lopez met Mr Ayers’ 60 Minutes, CBS 17 March 2009, 
<http://www.naayers.org/60minutes.html> [accessed 10 March 2015] 
120 ‘I notice for the first time that his violin, caked with grime and a white chalky substance that looks like 
fungus, is missing an important component or two. […] His goal in life, Nathaniel tells me, is to figure out 
how to replace the strings.’ Lopez, p.18 
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Settlement, Ohio University Bobcats, Buckeyes of Ohio State. Al the great soldiers are there from 
the United States military, World War Two, Korean War, whereas in Los Angeles you have the 
LAPD, Los Angeles County Jail, Los Angeles Times, Mr Steve Lopez. That’s an army, right? The L.A. 
Times?121 
 
In both Lopez’s text, and this thesis, Ayers’ speech is interpolated as a kind of documentary 
evidence of his underlying pathology. In the film, as is natural to the semiotic of cinema, although 
this speech – and other instances like it – are included, they are woven into the filmic fabric of 
various simultaneous signifying processes. Ayers’ free play of linguistic meaning is linked within the 
filmic semiotic to other series of detached signifiers on Lopez’s first encounter with him. Ayers is 
diachronically and synchronically composed as a point of intersection between several accumulating 
syntagma of signifiers. As figure 4.53 shows, his body is constructed of signifiers detached from 
their signifieds: the clothes separated from their functional purpose (in this shot, a hi-visibility work 
jacket, in later shots, a traffic cone on his head, a Lucha libra mask, white-face paint, garbage bag 
capes, to name but a few) 122 ; names and slogans graffitied onto his person, and immediate 
surroundings; a trolley cart of eclectic possessions; the classical music itself, so separated from its 
conventional context; Ayers’ chosen personal icon, the Pershing Square statue of Beethoven. 
 
 
Figure 4.53 
The ‘schizophrenic’ as accumulation of detached signifiers. 
 
                                                
121 Lopez, p.38 It is unclear whether this is a verbatim transcript from a tape recording made by Lopez, or 
whether it is a composite of various speeches, or just a fictive recreation. For the purposes of this current 
analysis, that is not a relevant concern. However, Safer does also remark on Ayers’ ‘tangled thoughts’ and 
‘lightening-speed’ rattle through his various ‘fixations’, so it seems that the passage is broadly representative 
at worst. 
122 Whilst the film reserves this bizarre clothing as – like the classical music – a distinct signifier of Ayers’ 
character (and pathology), Lopez describes other mental health service users as equally bizarrely dressed. One 
noticeable example being a lamp-shade and sunglasses wearing attendee at the Village walk-in clinic (Lopez, 
pp.70-71). In the film, this would challenge the exceptionality of Ayers as narrative hero. After all, why would 
the spectator want to enter into empathetic understanding with just any old street kook? A journalistic literary 
signifier of a medical condition is therefore transmuted into a cinematic signifier of an (exceptional) 
individual. 
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Figure 4.54 
Stood between a sculpture of a World War One US soldier and a collection of canons, the statue of 
Beethoven in Pershing Square is a mystifying presence, at odds with its military context. That is comes to 
stand to Ayers for the perplexing environment he finds himself – another musician surrounded by hostility – 
undoes that perplexing, arbitrary nature of the sign. It becomes a motivated cinematic sign of Ayers’ 
alienation and psychosis. ‘I am absolutely flabbergasted by that statue. It knocks me out that someone as 
great as Beethoven is the leader of Los Angeles. Do you have any idea who put him there?’ (Lopez, pp.38-39) 
 
 
Figure 4.55 
The signifiers of self-hood that resolutely fail to guarantee a stable signified self.  
 
 
Figure 4.56 
The physical metaphor for classical music that dominates downtown LA becomes a potent sign in The Soloist, 
denoting place but also connoting Ayers’ musical aspirations and Lopez’s aspirations for Ayers’ recovery. 
 
 
Figure 4.57 
The history of race relations in America as enigmatic sign of illness. 
 
 Although this accumulation of signifiers is the biographical Ayers’ method of self-
construction, it is redoubled in the film’s semiotic, as the signifiers are layered on top of each other. 
First, in a combination of shot reverse and focalisation, the camera follows Lopez, drawn through 
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Pershing Square by the sound of a violin. Again, focalised through Lopez, the camera views both 
Beethoven’s statue (figure 4.54) and Ayers’ trolley (figure 4.55), before seeing Ayers. After Ayers 
stops playing, he begins his free-flowing discourse, and Lopez (and the cinematic spectator) slowly 
absorbs all these signifiers, and also the nest of graffiti Ayers has built around himself, 
predominantly from names of musicians (Stevie Wonder, Tchaikovsky, Walt Disney and his 
Juilliard colleagues). From the decoding perspective, shared by Lopez and the spectator, this welter 
of signifiers is enigmatically meaningful. Literal bulk in the signifier (the weight and presence of 
Beethoven’s statue, emphasised through a 180-degree rotating shot and the steep angle in figure 
4.54; the proliferating litter of names) attempts to compensate for a fragmented signified. Just as 
Ayers tries to stave off irrelevance by accumulating the signifiers of names and a trolley of 
possessions, to which he attaches an importance and value risible to Lopez and any spectator 
(diegetic or filmic), so too does the film schizomimetically pile up signifiers, to visibilise and, 
particularly, physicalize Ayers’ ‘fixations’.123 But a mass of signifiers is no remedy for a displaced or 
disintegrated signified; each addition is also a dilution. It is noticeable that in order to provide 
greater narrative and psychological coherence, the film prunes away at Ayers’ fixations, reducing 
the number of signifiers agglomerating around him in its representation, despite the fact that the 
cinematic machinery inevitably generates signifiers from the profilmic objects as raw materials. 
 What is striking about The Soloist is that all these signifiers belie an absence of signifieds, or 
rather the signifiers obscure the signified. Ayers is shown experiencing paranoid delusional thinking 
and possibly hallucinating whilst at Juilliard, but the sequence is brief and all that is communicated 
is the form of the content – that Ayers finds it distressing – rather than the content itself. Again, 
schizophrenia appears only as a signifier of its own presence, emptied of a signified. Although there 
are hints as to the content of Ayers’ delusions – such as the repeated word ‘whiteness’ and a short 
sequence where Ayers, as a young boy, sees a burning car, whilst his sister, in a voice over that 
within the diegesis is directed to Lopez, makes a veiled reference to the civil rights movement (‘the 
world was changing’) – there is nothing to compare with the very clear and frequent references in 
the book to Ayers’ highly racialised worldview (see figure 4.57). Visiting Ayers at Lamp one day, 
Lopez is challenged by another service-user to ‘write the real story about […] Nathaniel […] the 
way he treats people around here […][t]he names he has for people.’124 The biographical Ayers was 
not just a black student in a ‘nearly all-white environment’125 but at a particularly febrile, incendiary 
time and place for US race relations, as a Juilliard contemporary of his notes: 
It was September 1971, after all. The riots at Attica State Prison in upstate New York served as a 
potent and deadline reminder of racial divisions that ran deep and wide in American culture. An all-
                                                
123 Even the aural signifier of the music is physicalized into the statue and Frank Gehry’s Walt Disney 
Concert Hall (figure 4.56). Gehry’s parabolic surges offer up an easy visual metaphor for music, as was surely 
the architect’s intention. That the building demonstrates a certain lack of fixity, and inscrutability, makes it a 
particularly suitable symbol for Ayers’ subjectivity. Not least as the film – in contrast to the book – gives very 
scant details of Ayers’ early life, and the course of his psychosis. 
124 Lopez, pp.261-262 
125 Lopez, p.193 
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white guard unit had boasted of bashing inmates with batons they called nigger sticks. So Nathaniel 
had an attitude?126 
 
As the Jakobson model of communication (figure 4.40) makes clear, the decoding of any sign is 
dependent on an understanding of the code and an acknowledgement of the context. Whilst the 
film of The Soloist brings hints of this context into its signifying system, they are faint and further 
clouded by the fact that Jamie Foxx is very visibly too young to have experienced the civil rights 
and post-civil rights tensions. Despite ageing make-up and very distinct period details in all the 
flashbacks (the requisite roll-neck and afro hair for a young Ayers circa 1972), the inter-textual 
nature of Foxx’s ‘star’ status means that spectators will unconsciously erect a generational barrier 
between Ayers’ biography and Foxx’s representation. 
 It makes commercial sense for a Hollywood film to steer wide of layering unsavoury racial 
anger onto a (mental) illness role that was surely being positioned as an Academy Award contender; 
Foxx had previously won for a performance of real-life disabled black musician with the biopic Ray, 
dir. by Taylor Hackford (Universal Studios, 2004). It is telling that, emptied of this politically 
charged signification, Ayers’ voice-hearing in the film primarily consists of his name being echoed; 
there could be no more sanitised signifier of psychosis. The void of meaning that this elision 
produced gives Ayers’ symptomatology in the film’s semiotic a vacuity that is then re-functionalised 
as if ‘natural’ to the disease (or at least to this particular ‘schizophrenic’); the lonely burning car 
becomes not part of the context that – in an ethno-cultural theoretical framework, exemplified by 
Jonathan Metzl’s The Protest Psychosis – would be seen as causative of ‘schizophrenia’ but rather 
becomes a symptom and sign of underlying, organic pathology. The film’s signifying system 
(unwittingly) reverses the claim to a protest identity: 
But instead of a condition caused by civil rights, schizophrenia resulted from the conditions that 
made civil rights necessary. Civil rights did not make people crazy; racism did. Instead of a mark of 
stigma, schizophrenia functioned as a protest identity and an internalized, projected form of 
defiance.127 
 
Amputating the historical influence of the civil rights movement from Ayers’ biography when 
translating it into a filmic semiotic, generates purposeless signifiers – for example, Ayers’ ire at 
cigarettes butts and general dirt appears, in the book, metaphorically linked to ideas of the 
degradation (and self-degradation) of black Americans – and presents these as part of the 
symptomatology of schizophrenia. In both the film and a 60 Minutes piece on Ayers and Lopez, 
their agreement to call each other formally by their last names is presented as a sign of the 
eccentricities of ‘schizophrenia’; Lopez’s book makes clear that it owes more to Ayers’ keenly felt 
sense of racial injustice.  
The Soloist does not always signify in good faith. In a pivotal scene, where Ayers assaults 
Lopez, Lopez jokily registers a poster of Neil Diamond who Ayers apparently believes to be Lopez 
(figure 4.58). As a detached, de-contextualised signifier, the image of Neil Diamond does little more 
                                                
126 Lopez, p.93 
127 Jonathan M Metzl, The Protest Psychosis, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009), p.118 
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than signify an eccentric, hero-worshipping fixation with Lopez on the part of Ayers, who has 
previously called Lopez his god, adding him to the roll call of names next to Beethoven and Stevie 
Wonder. This quirky ‘psychotic’ delusion juxtaposed so starkly and suddenly with a violent attack, 
which leaves Lopez bloody and scrambling an escape on all fours, forms a syntagm communicating 
a message that the ‘schizophrenic’ can move almost instantaneously from unjustifiable adoration to 
unprovoked aggression, and – most importantly – that these two modes and acts are inseparable 
parts of the one condition. It is not hard to see how this might contribute to stigmatising 
misapprehensions about people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. It is an unusual moment within 
a film that is mostly sympathetic and sensitive in portrayal and it is a rare deviation from the 
biographical fact; in the book, Ayers’ violence is only verbal. 128  It seems that the cinematic 
machinery’s hunger for visible action in the mode of the real trumped fidelity to Lopez’s book at 
this point. Moreover, the detachment from context of Neil Diamond qua signifier of mental ill 
health changes the signification. In the book, the poster is part of a set of decorations that also 
include a map of the USA, a photo of Ayers’ deceased mother and a review of the Broadway 
production of Alice Walker’s novel The Color Purple. In combination, these signifiers very obviously 
create a more complex signified ‘schizophrenic’. 
This signifying mechanism is truly schizomimetic. The detachment of the signifier from 
the signified and its re-appropriation into a new, novel signifying system is exactly the process that 
Ayers – whether in the book or the film – has enacted when he has ‘mistaken’ Neil Diamond for 
Lopez. Mistaken may not be the appropriate term; the image may be a sign in some langue or code 
in which it is perfectly reasonable to signify Steve Lopez. Within the code available to the spectator, 
the signifier becomes obtuse, in the sense used by Barthes in his essay on a selection of stills from 
Eisenstein films. Barthes posits the existence of a third meaning, following after the primary level 
of meaning – the informational – and the secondary – the symbolic. This ‘other meaning, the third, 
the one “too many”, the supplement that […] intellection cannot succeed in absorbing, at once 
persistent and fleeting, smooth and absorbing’129 throws the signifier, and filmic signification into 
crisis. As product of a ‘signifier without a signified,’ 130  the obtuse meaning forces a different 
semiotic structuring of the signs in film which marks a passage into a mode of signification that 
goes beyond language and therefore, for Barthes, serves as ‘the founding act of the filmic’.131 Again, 
this unruly, ambiguously signifying disruptive element within the filmic semiotic is the self-same 
structural interruption that creates the schizophrenic semiotic (see figure 4.59). This co-presence in 
cinema is the central characteristic of what is meant by the neologism schizomimesis. 
                                                
128 Whilst Ayers’ life – though edited for Hollywood as described – remains unfictionalised, Lopez’s life and 
character are both sensationalized for the film. Perhaps to suggest that there is no ‘normal’ in mental health, 
Lopez morphs from a stable husband and father into a figure that owes more to the inter-textual persona of 
Robert Downey Jr, bundled with signifiers of louche extroversion and glib self-obsession: a trilby; an ex-wife 
(Catherine Keener); a propensity to drink; a comic tendency to cover himself in urine. 
129 Barthes, ‘The Third Meaning’, p.54 
130 Barthes, ‘The Third Meaning’, p.61 
131 Barthes, ‘The Third Meaning’, p.65 
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Figure 4.58 
The mis-appropriated signifier. ‘Okay, I’ve got no response to that.’ (Lopez, p.219) 
 
 
Figure 4.59 
The obtuse meaning of the Mexican wrestling mask. ‘The filmic, then, lies precisely here, in that region where 
articulated language is no longer more than approximate and where another language begins.’ So too lies the 
semiotic of schizophrenia. (Barthes, ‘The Third Meaning’, p.65) 
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Erotomania; or, film’s love affair with meaning 
 ROBERT You may just as easily have said red. It’s harmless. 
 CHRISTOPHER It means something. 
 ROBERT What does it mean? 
CHRISTOPHER It’s a sign. Cos nobody believes me but I think it proves it. He likes oranges. 
Everyday a shipment from Nairobi. I just proved that. I come in here, first thing I 
see, oranges! They turn blue. A signal.132 
 
TIFFANY (Reading letter.) The only way you could … 
PATRICK … beat my crazy was by doing something crazy yourself. Thank you. I love 
you.133 
 
Schizomimesis, it has been demonstrated, works in both directions. In Some Voices, profilmic 
material was integrated into the film’s semiotic and turned into signifiers; a signified (or several 
layers of signification, in fact) was added, where none had been before the material was placed 
within the film’s semiotic. Conversely, in The Soloist, signs – included entirely through artistic choice 
rather than photographic accident – are emptied of their signifieds. 134  Once emptied of that 
signified, they first function as irrational empty signifiers that – on a meta-diegetic level – signify 
‘schizophrenia’, and subsequently, they become again rational, motivated signs within a ‘cured’ 
semiotic of the film. 
However, it is a key principle of the concept of schizomimesis that it has meta-textual 
functions, as demonstrated with the meta-filmic significations described in the decoding sequence 
from Some Voices. The same mechanism is in place within A Beautiful Mind, strengthening the 
assertion that schizomimesis in the domain of the signified is an inherent formal quality of 
cinematic machinery. As with the signs (of love, of alien contact, of general, free-floating meaning) 
so assiduously sought after and (re)interpreted by Ray in Some Voices, the detached signifiers of A 
Beautiful Mind function as a meaningful sign sequence – as detailed in the previous section – and 
one that opens up the text to de-pathologising readings. Exactly as Derrida argues in relation to the 
free play of signification and its relation with the transcendental signified, to be schizomimetic is 
both to institute and enact a sequence of substitution in the domain of the signified, and yet at the 
same time to hold the countervailing aim of a fixed, definitive signification. As these substitutions 
are inherent in all signification, but especially tangibly so in cinema, and as they also form a 
‘symptom’ of ‘schizophrenia’, schizomimesis is at its most virulent and apparent in the filmic 
semiotic.  
                                                
132 Joe Penhall, Blue/Orange, (London: Methuen, 2001), p.69 
133 Silver Linings Playbook 
134  Director of Joe Wright – with a Hollywood budget – did not have to capture afilmic reality and 
incorporate it into his syntagma. Rather, he was able to reconstruct downtown LA’s Skid Row, and even hire 
500 homeless Skid Row residents to play themselves, and consult on the reconstruction. The filmic 
machinery thereby turned this homeless community, and their neighborhood, into both a denotative sign of 
itself and a connotative sign of mental health and other social problems in contemporary America. See 
interview with John Patterson, ‘The Soloist’s Skid Row symphony’, Guardian, 24 September 2009  
<http://www.theguardian.com/film/2009/sep/24/the-soloist-joe-wright>  [accessed 10 March 2015]  
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Some Voices writer Joe Penhall plays this game, self-consciously, in Blue/Orange, which was 
staged at the National Theatre in 2000 and adapted for film in 2005. Two white psychiatrists – with 
antagonistically composed temperaments, politics, objectives and conceptualisations of mental ill 
health and schizophrenia – engage in an extensive battle over the (diagnostic) fate of a black 
patient, Christopher (Shaun Parkes) at the end of his 28-day section 2 detention period. This battle 
involves, amongst other fronts, extended definitional and diagnostic duels. The older, explicitly 
Laingian consultant, Robert (Brian Cox) hopes to discharge Christopher; the younger neo-
Kraepelinian Bruce (John Simm) believes Christopher should be sectioned for further in-patient 
care. As the title suggests, at the heart of the narrative is an enigmatic sign: the blue orange. 
Christopher sees oranges as blue. For Bruce, this is incontrovertible proof of neurological disorder. 
For Robert, this is an example of the ethno-social construction of the schizophrenic, and the blue 
orange could be a meaningful sign within Christopher’s Belgian-infused Congolese expatriate 
culture. Blue/Orange is not subtle, though that is not its intention. Exchanges where the ontological 
status of Christopher’s mental health, paternity, ethnicity, social role and position, the diagnostic 
entity of schizophrenia and the wider concept of mental health are all re-interpreted reoccur 
throughout. Indeed, these exchanges again comprise the structure, form and content of 
Blue/Orange; each of the three acts enacts a reversal or seismic change in the power-relations 
between the three protagonists based on the signification of the blue orange. This exchange in Act 
One is typical: 
ROBERT ‘Le monde est blue comme une orange.’ 
BRUCE  What? 
ROBERT It’s a poem by Paul Eluard. He was a French surrealist. 
BRUCE  You don’t say. 
ROBERT The world is as blue as an orange. (Beat) It’s an analogy. 
BRUCE  Classic hallucinatory behaviour. 
ROBERT Or is it a simile? 
BRUCE  Already, he’s building a system of logic around it.135 
  
As a talisman of schizophrenia, as discussed in Chapter One, the blue orange is hyper-mutable; at 
this moment, both Bruce and Robert are building the blue orange into their mutually exclusive 
accounts of Christopher’s mental health. And, in the spirit of Derrida, it is not truly a blue orange, 
but – as the title claims – blue/orange, and unable to fixedly be one or the other, just as the 
conflict(s) between Bruce and Robert, or Christopher’s shifting (potentially delusional) personal 
narrative and represented phenomenology refuse any permanent resolution. 
Here, then, is a clear example of how a schizomimetic obtuse representation of psychosis 
resists tidy readerly interpretations. Despite the film’s sophisticated re-enactment of the ambiguity 
of signification within psychosis, and despite its own self-proclaimed social conscience, Blue/Orange 
reaffirms stigmatising stereotypes. And this is a direct consequence of how the filmic machinery 
                                                
135 Penhall, Blue/Orange, p.35. In Act Two, quoted at the start of this section, Robert deflates the sign of its 
meaning – ‘[y]ou may just as easily have said red. It’s harmless’ – driving Christopher into an urgent 
countermove of super-charging its signification – ‘[i]t means something […] It’s a sign […] A signal’ (p.69). 
 237 
cannot help but generate empathetic exchanges even when these exchanges serve to unpick a more 
sophisticated narrative approach. With Blue/Orange, the narrative itself is clearly critiquing the very 
idea of empathy as an unproblematic recognition of another’s unknowable subjectivity. Robert’s 
empathy stands in counterpoint to Bruce’s empirico-rationalism, yet both are equally strategies for 
territorialising Christopher as the grounds of their professional skirmish. As a play, the text might 
implicitly be urging a detached sympathetic acceptance of the ‘pathological’ phenomenology as 
lying beyond the reach of empathy; but cinema’s machinery, when used conventionally, is an 
empathy machinery, even when empathy is not possible and contrary to the objectives and morality 
of the specific text. 
How does rendering the play as a film then serve, via this empathy. to recapitulate negative 
social conceptions of schizophrenics? One of the few differences between the stage and film 
versions of Blue/Orange is that the film includes closing sequences of Christopher as a static, un-
integrated atomized figure in the threatening swirl and bustle of London. These images are cut into 
a discussion between Bruce and Robert, and the alternating syntagm allows for signifying 
juxtaposition of the medical professionals’ abstracted, theoretical and highly partial debate with the 
real social situation of the ‘schizophrenic’.  
It is worth noting how the shots of Christopher (figures 5.60, 5.61 and 5.62) are 
constructed through a combination of two cinematic conventions for signifying psychosis: the 
isolated figure and the meaningful headshot. The former component signifies – both denotatively 
and connotatively – Christopher’s social marginality. The latter component operates, as all close-
ups do, to abstract from the object represented. In the case of the head shot of the ‘schizophrenic’, 
this metonymically operates as the locus of ‘disease’ and is infused with the neo-Kraepelinian 
ideology of schizophrenia as a faulty brain. At the same time, the head shot operates as a metaphor 
signifying psycho-emotional distress. As the thinking and the affective state of the mind cannot be 
visibilised, the weight of the visibilising imperative of cinema is carried by the representable object 
of the outside of the head. As throughout Blue/Orange different etiological accounts and diagnostic 
measures of psychosis jostle brusquely, so does this sequence of shots accommodate the range of 
social and material risk factors, from being a poor black man in London to having a neurological 
malfunction, composing, therefore, a cinematic icon of the biopsychosocial model of disease. 
 
 
Figure 4.60 
Blue/Orange and the ethno-cultural sign of the schizophrenic. 
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Figure 4.61 
The cinematic sign of the biopsychosocial model of disease. 
 
 
Figure 4.62 
The film resolves into this ambiguous image. Christopher’s head-on eye-contact with the camera could be 
aggressive paranoia or a return to healthy deixis, or any point between these extremes. 
 
As with Some Voices, the majority of the signifiers of this model of disease within these 
shots are profilmic objects that have been re-appropriated into the film’s signifying system to 
communicate this message. The shots of London have not been staged, though there was no doubt 
directorial and cinematographic artistry and construction in their selection, composition and so on. 
Nor too are the unconcerned passers-by acting, yet their presence is seamlessly incorporated into 
the film’s semiotic. There are, however, distinct choices in the soundtrack, cutting and camera 
movement to suggest an atmosphere of threat and anxiety. 
An empathetic exchange is established between Christopher – who makes and breaks eye 
contact with the camera throughout this sequence – and the spectator. Christopher is experiencing 
a sense of threat, which he has discussed several times during the film. He enters into empathetic 
deictic exchange with the spectator, not least as he is unable to construct any deictic recognition 
within the diegesis, being a solitary figure on a London street. However, the threat is only a filmic 
product; there is no diegetic threat. The filmic level of signification is schizomimetic with the 
diegetic paranoid mental state of the protagonist, as with Keane. Similarly, the spectator is integrated 
into the delusional mental state, as the threatening other, making the camera and the spectator the 
object of that same threat processed through Christopher. In this, the ‘schizophrenic’ 
phenomenological experience of being threatened turns into a representation of being threatening, 
and the empathetic exchange enacted by the filmic signifying machinery makes Christopher (and 
the film itself) the aggressor towards the spectator now empathetically feeling threatened. This 
analysis demonstrates why the pseudo-empathy of filmic representations of ‘schizophrenics’ serves 
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to calcify social (mis)conceptions of ‘schizophrenics’ as perpetrators of real violence, rather than 
victims of psychic and/or self-inflicted violence. 
Whilst the obtuseness and irresolvable unknowability of Christopher’s internal 
phenomenological experience presents a barrier to empathy, or rather delineates the outer limits of 
an empathetic range, a more recent, high-profile filmic representation of psychosis offers up a 
pseudo-obtuseness that naturalises itself as a sign of psychotic subjectivity via the mechanisms of 
all-too-easy empathy. Significantly, this pseudo-empathy is very glibly constructed by a cynical, and 
unjustified, decoupling of signifiers and signifieds. The outcome was critical acclaim, box office 
gold and Academy Award success. 
 
 
Figure 4.63 
US poster for Silver Linings Playbook 
 
David O Russell’s Silver Linings Playbook constructs a representation of psychosis that, for 
much of the film, is little more than a bricolage of ‘Hollywood indie’ eccentricities, and then uses 
this muted, mis-representation as evidence in support of the film’s central thesis: that all people are 
a bit cuckoo.136 The film is the cinematic equivalent of the once-popular workplace sign: ‘you don’t 
have to be crazy to work here, but it helps!’ It repeatedly severs motivated sign relations between 
                                                
136 The protagonists of the film trade heavily on their supposed truthfulness and rejection of social niceties 
and bourgeois judgments about what is and is not appropriate; Tiffany (Jennifer Lawrence) separates herself 
and Pat (Bradley Cooper) from her sister saying ‘maybe we know something you don’t’. This difference and 
non-conventional knowledge is mostly represented by Pat and Tiffany calling each other ‘crazy’ or ‘nuts’. 
Tiffany refers to Pat by using ‘crazy’ as a noun; Pat tells his therapist Cliff (Anupam Kher) about his ‘crazy 
sad shit’; as the quote at the start of this section shows, their love affair is about Tiffany beating (i.e. curing) 
Pat’s ‘crazy’ (and doing so by being ‘crazy’ herself).  
Tiffany’s two key quotes, celebrating the honesty (and honesty-as-difference) of the mentally ill and 
contradictorily engaging in the one-up-manship of the sane, are sufficiently emblematic of the politics of the 
film to adorn the poster: ‘we’re not liars like they are’ and ‘you think that I’m crazier than you?’ (Figure 4.63) 
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signifiers and signifieds to create a pseudo-obtuse aesthetic of ‘psychosis’, whilst conversely also 
suggesting that ‘psychosis’ is easily explicable as a non-pathological but unconventional (and 
frequently magical or distinctly Hollywood) mode of reasoning. The Hollywood chase for the 
transcendental signifier of love is self-consciously semiotically tied to ‘plays’ in American football, 
and more specifically the imaginative ‘plays’ of armchair coaches engaged in watching and 
consuming (rather than actually playing) the game (see figures 4.64 and 4.65). These play schema 
make sense within an explanatory context, but simultaneously to the uninitiated they are an 
incoherent mass of scribbles. That the Hollywood chase can just as easily be for renown as a 
mathematician as finding true love (not least because renown as a mathematician, within A Beautiful 
Mind’s semiotic, equals finding true love) and can be represented by the same schema is 
demonstrated by figure 4.66. These narratives enact an erotomaniacal drive towards an object-
supposed-to-love. Within the diegesis, this object may be the under-developed female given no 
subjective rationale for her love for a male protagonist who is neglectful, selfish, self-absorbed, 
thoughtless, socially maladjusted and impoverished, as well as exhibiting love towards some other 
object, be it mathematics, an American football team or an ex-wife. Meta-filmically, the object-
supposed-to-love is the empathetic spectator who will accept this representation of psychotic 
subjectivity as meaningful. Indeed, a spectator who will project that very meaning into the void of 
signification beneath these texts of hollowed-out, decoupled signifiers. The implications of this will 
be considered after a closer analysis of the erotomaniacal narrative as exemplified by Silver Linings 
Playbook. 
 
 
Figure 4.64 
Schematic for a silver linings ‘play’ from Silver Linings Playbook US poster 
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Figure 4.65 
Schematic for an American football ‘play’ from <http://www.soccerissue.com/2012/09/10/ready-set-
play/> [Accessed 15 February 2015] 
 
 
Figure 4.66 
Schematic for a touch football ‘play’ and also a ‘play’ at theorising Nash equilibrium avant la lettre. 
 
 
Figure 4.67 
The garbage bag signifying: narratively, that Pat is packing to leave; in terms of character action, that Pat is 
focussed on losing weight; in terms of objectives, that Pat wants to win back Nikki; thematically, that Pat 
looks and fundamentally is ‘different’; diagnostically, that psychosis is just a form of eccentric behaviour; 
meta-filmically, this candid shot is emblematic of the candid, shaky-cam honesty of the film and also of the 
mentally ill. At the same time, it is denotatively, the signifier of a garbage bag.  
 
One of the most striking signifiers in the film is that the protagonist Pat (Bradley Cooper) 
is very often seen wearing a garbage bag. This is (potentially) confusing to the spectator, and that 
confusion is represented within the diegesis in a brief exchange between Pat and his parents Pat Snr 
(Robert De Niro) and Delores (Jacki Weaver): 
PAT SR  Why’s he wearing a garbage bag? 
 DELORES Why are you wearing a garbage bag? 
 PAT  To sweat. 
 
Pat’s reasoning is consistent with his ordering philosophy of silver linings and his overarching 
objective of making himself more attractive to his estranged wife Nikki (Brea Bee). The extra 
sweating will mean that Pat will lose weight faster than if he had exercised without the garbage bag. 
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However, this reasoning is left for the spectator to intuit, and the signifier, which is presented 
wholly decontextualized in the opening shot sequence of the film (figure 4.67), is further decoupled 
from the signified through repetition. Lotman notes that repetition in film is a unique importation 
of a novelistic device into visual art: ‘Repetition of one and the same object on the screen creates a 
certain rhythm, and the sign of the object begins to separate from its visual source […] repetition 
muffles the material meanings and emphasizes abstract meanings – logical and associative.’137 The 
combination of a scant and incomplete explanation of its motivating rationale and the repetition of 
the signifier, partially de-couples the garbage bin signifier from its iconic, literal, denotative signified 
(‘garbage bag’) and institutes it into a thematic system of signification, where it elucidates Pat’s 
character (as an emblem of his attitude and aims) and also functions as a motif of the narrative (the 
ultimately futile attempt to regain his wife). But it also serves to function as a signifier of Pat’s 
psychotic difference. It acquires an emphasized abstract layer of signification: the signified of a 
person with a diagnosis of bipolar disorder is associated with the signifier of a person dressed in a 
garbage bag. 
Within the film’s semiotic, this apparently central signified (person with diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder) is actually a further super-imposition. In the original novel by Matthew Quick, the 
main protagonist Pat does not have a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, as he does in the film. Rather, it 
is implied that he has traumatic brain injury. In its translation from book to film, there has been a 
curious switch of causality. In the book, Pat’s violent reaction to his wife’s infidelity results in his 
‘illness’, as his wife, Nikki, bashes his head in to stop his attack on her lover. In the film, it is Pat’s 
underlying, pre-existing inherent ‘illness’, which is explicitly described as bipolar disorder but is also 
placed in the general familial context of short tempers and sudden violence,138 that is the cause of 
his assault. Many of the novel’s signifiers of the underlying pathology – traumatic brain injury – are 
imported directly into the semiotic of the film, but with the fundamentally different signified of 
‘psychosis’. When the diagnosis of bipolar disorder is explicitly introduced into the film, it is made 
very clear that Pat suffers from delusions; this ‘weird thinking’ as he describes it to his psychiatrist 
becomes, like Ray’s delusions in Some Voices, a naturalised and depathologised signifying system. 
The distinction between Some Voices and Silver Linings Playbook is that the diegesis of the latter 
embraces the ‘weird thinking’ whereas Ray’s system of signification is rejected by Laura and Pete. 
This might serve as a distinction between a Hollywood rom-com and an independent comic drama: 
have the other figures in the diegesis accepted the idiosyncratic signifying system? 
To demonstrate how the film re-purposes signifiers from the novel, consider the difference 
between a pivotal scene in both texts: Tiffany (Jennifer Lawrence) and Pat’s ‘date’ at a local diner. 
                                                
137 Lotman, Semiotics of Cinema, p.45 
138 The family are rewritten for the film as Italian-American, and given as a patriarch, Robert De Niro, whose 
iconicity as an actor is built on playing a range of boxers, mobsters and ‘psychotics’. Pat Sr’s friend, and 
architect of the bet plot device, Randy is also played by perennial gangster Paul Herman. This meta-filmic 
intertextuality in the casting immediately signifies Randy’s ambiguous status as both friend to and parasite on 
Pat Sr. 
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In both texts, Pat orders raisin bran. However, in the novel, his ordering raisin bran is part of a 
sequence of acts that signify he is having some trouble functioning in social situations. In addition 
to being disbarred from driving and having to get de facto pocket money from his mother for the 
evening, Pat clearly finds the process of ordering food confusing and anxiety provoking: 
As I read the menu, I worry that I won’t have enough money, which is silly, I know, 
because I have two twenties on me and most of the entrees are under ten bucks, but I do not know 
what Tiffany will order, and maybe she will want dessert, and then there’s the tip. […]  
I am worrying about all this so much that I must have missed Tiffany’s order, because 
suddenly the waitress is saying, “Sir?” 
When I put my menu down, both Tiffany and the waitress are staring at me, as if they are 
concerned. So I say, “Raisin bran,” because I remember reading that cereal is only $2.25.139 
 
The raisin bran operates as a signifier of a range of significates: Pat’s infantilisation by his traumatic 
brain injury, forming a chain of signification with his inability to drive and his reliance upon his 
parents for material support, as well as the pseudo-childish tone of his ‘daily memoirs’;140 Pat’s 
socio-economic status; Pat’s preoccupation with weight loss; and, as the narrative develops, and the 
raisin bran eating is repeated as relationship ritual, the tentative love affair between Tiffany and Pat. 
 In the film, this sign is taken and the signifier and the signified are detached. In fact, at one 
point, the significate in the novel of raisin-bran-as-love-ritual is flatly contradicted by Pat: 
TIFFANY Why did you order raisin bran? 
PAT  Why did you order tea? 
TIFFANY Because you ordered raisin bran. 
PAT I ordered raisin bran because I didn’t want there to be any mistaking it for a date. 
TIFFANY It can still be a date if you order raisin bran. 
PAT  That’s not a date. 
 
Pat’s contention as to why he ordered raisin bran is not particularly persuasive. It may well have 
been a deliberate sign, within the diegesis, to Tiffany that this was not be confused with a romantic 
date, but Pat’s claim fits into a general pattern of antagonistic tit-for-tat exchanges that orders the 
love affair between Pat and Tiffany (and, for that matter, between almost all protagonists in 
contemporary Hollywood ‘rom-coms’). That ordering raisin bran was a provocation to Tiffany 
seems the only reasonable interpretation; that it was as icily and precisely pre-meditated as Pat 
                                                
139 Matthew Quick, Silver Linings Playbook, (London: Picador Pan Macmillan, 2009), p.69 
140 Quick, p.7 The novel presents itself somewhat in the tradition of the epistolary novel, provoking the same 
thought in the reader that Clarissa or Dracula might: how and when did the protagonist(s) manage to write all 
this? The insistent visualization of time within film makes it much harder to conceal the incompatibility of 
such extensive action with such extensive documenting of said action. Pat’s moral umbrage taken with A 
Farewell to Arms and its ‘worst ending imaginable’ (pp.21-22), or The Bell Jar and its ‘implied ending’ (p.122), 
and his contrasting love of heroic, sentimental Hollywood movies and their inevitable happy endings (p.15) 
constitutes the ordering philosophy of both the book and the film. Whilst the book very overtly presents its 
ending, of Pat and Tiffany cloud-watching together, as an alternative happy ending, or even an alternative to 
the ‘happy ending’, in contrast to the explicit ending of Pat’s internalized ‘movie’ life with Nikki, the film 
gives a hyper-conformist ‘happy ending’, which is unambiguous, hetero-normative, neoliberal and reaffirms 
the threatened patriarchy. As Nadel and Negra note: ‘[s]uccess in all relationships, the film’s conclusion 
makes clear, is achieved when everyone, gathered together for a football playoff game, assumes his or her 
designated place in the patriarchal order, as the arrangement in the household makes clear: while Pat Sr. 
prepares for the game, Dolores is in the kitchen sharing recipes with Danny; the “boys” are playing in the 
living room; and Pat and Tiffany are cuddling in a chair.’ (Alan Nadel and Diane Negra, ‘Neoliberalism, 
magical thinking, and Silver Linings Playbook’, Narrative, 22:3 (2014) 312-332, p.316)  
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suggests seems unlikely. Within the semiotic of the film though, the raisin bran certainly signifies a 
distinctly ‘crazy’ mode (and mood) of rationalisation, or an anti-rationalisation.141 In the translation 
from novel to film, the sign of the raisin bran has been, at least partially, emptied of its motivated 
signification (as a sign of healthy eating, anxiety about money etc.) and given an arbitrary (and 
contestable) signification (as ‘not date’, which is a direct contradiction of the status of raisin bran as 
love sign that develops later in the novel).142 
 
 
Figure 4.68 
The motley … 
 
 
Figure 4.69 
… and the devil, are supposedly arbitrary signifiers (within the diegesis) but function as motivated signifiers, 
offering an ironic commentary on the action. 
 
 
Figure 4.70 
Raisin bran – from motivated signifier to arbitrary signifier. 
 
                                                
141 The characters in Silver Linings Playbook, especially Pat and Tiffany, all employ various strains of magical 
thinking. The love story is driven by a fierce anti-rationality encapsulated in the film title.  
142 Additionally, in the film, this scene is set on Halloween. This has no narrative function. But thematically 
and aesthetically, it allows for the non-date and the subsequent argument in the street, in which Pat nearly 
succumbs to a violent explosion, to be populated by ghouls, devils and monsters. On the one hand, the 
costumes provide an ironic commentary on the alleged difference of the mentally ill. In a very literal sense, 
Pat and Tiffany look more ‘normal’. However, this is obviously in a context in which to look abnormal is 
normal. The only other person out of costume in this sequence is the local cop, who is – on one level of 
signification – most certainly ‘dressed up’ as a cop. These Halloween costumes within the diegesis are 
arbitrary signs, or rather do not signify at all; within the filmic semiotic though, they are transformed to 
motivated signifiers, commenting on the characters and actions of Pat and Tiffany. Again, the filmic semiotic 
performs the meaning-generating function of the psychotic delusion. (See figures 4.68, 4.69 and 4.70.) 
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Nadel and Negra see Silver Linings Playbook performing the same manoeuvre as Some Voices. 
A delusional reference system composed of wrongly decoded signifiers is enacted, initially as a 
signifier itself of mental ill health. The film then adopts and endorses this very delusional reference 
system. Just as by the close of Some Voices, the swirls and circles of Ray’s delusional reference 
system have become meaningful, and coherently signify for the spectator, so too does Silver Linings 
Playbook deliver the silver linings signified for the protagonists throughout the film (figure 4.71). 
The staging of the delusional belief system demonstrates a truth about filmic signification, as 
Lotman notes: ‘[a] network of meaning is super-imposed on what we see. Knowing that we are 
watching an artistic story, i.e. a string of signs, we necessarily disassemble the flow of visual 
impressions into meaningful elements.’143 Filtered through the signifying conventions of film, the 
free play of signification constitutive of the delusion of reference, is standardised into an internally 
coherent, uniform signifying system, capable of transcending ambiguity (as in the pseudo-
obtuseness of Silver Linings Playbook) or at least in partitioning it off (as in Blue/Orange). 
 
 
Figure 4.71 
Pat Snr’s unsuccessful magical playbook, signified by the superstitions of the handkerchief and the remote 
controls, abandoned in the closing shot sequence. The moral is that delusional thinking is not wrong, only 
delusionally thinking the wrong thing is wrong. 
 
 These acts of decoding construct their own narratives and provide their own retrospective 
justification. These signification-generating acts extend beyond the diegesis and the filmic surface 
to implicate the spectator. In schizomimesis, the ‘schizophrenic’ mind is signified by aimless or 
misguided decoding on two levels of representation simultaneously. Within the diegesis, the 
‘schizophrenic’ subject is engaged in endless, uncontrollable acts of decoding, of reading 
signification erroneously. This can be seen in figure 4.72, a still from a sequence of aimless 
decoding by ‘Nash’ that – for all its very evident sound and fury – signifies nothing other than his 
‘schizophrenic’ mind. Concurrently, the spectator is presented with a string of signifiers – which are 
the very same signifiers read by the ‘schizophrenic’ subject – and similarly is drawn into assigning 
them signification they do not hold through any inherent qualities or by virtue of their context. 
Arbitrary signs belonging to a film’s semiotic are mistaken for ‘natural’ symptoms of pathological 
phenomenology.144 The builderers from Some Voices are an obvious example, but within A Beautiful 
                                                
143 Lotman, Semiotics of Cinema, p.25 
144 Accepting the ‘traditional distinction between sign and symptom, based on artificiality, arbitrariness, and 
conventionality in the case of the former, and on naturality, non-arbitrariness, and motivation in the case of 
the latter’. Gian Paolo Caprettini, ‘Peirce, Holmes, Popper’, in The Sign of Three, pp.135-153 (pp.137-138)  
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Mind, the spectator is encouraged to actively interpret the represented schizophrenic 
symptomatology as meaningful and motivated. Roberts, in reference to both Nasar’s biography and 
the film, is lured into a false empathy through an easy decoding of schizomimetic signifiers. 
Roberts insists Nash’s ‘claim that “his career was being ruined by aliens from outer space” is not 
unintelligible. On the contrary it is easily intelligible if a modicum of effort is expended.’145 Of 
course, this creation of meaning by attaching signifieds onto the detached or empty signifiers of the 
delusion of reference is the very same operation being performed by “Nash” (see figure 4.73).146 
That this process is so effortless for film in contrast to other mediums explains both film’s 
attraction to and for stories of ‘psychosis’, as well as its formal inability to present, self-consciously, 
a delusion of reference without meta-filmically unpicking the delusion. By demonstrating that what 
is represented is a delusion, the representation ceases to represent, or rather it becomes the sign of 
what it is not. In A Beautiful Mind – for example – the visibilised act of decoding becomes a signifier 
of the absence of a code or message (figure 4.74). As mentioned earlier, this scene does not easily 
parse into delusion and objective diegesis. 
 
 
Figure 4.72 
Aimless decoding, presented as a signifier of a ‘schizophrenic mind’ 
 
 
Figure 4.73 
Decoding as forcing meaning, schizophrenia as empathy – ‘easily intelligible if a modicum of effort is 
expended.’147 
 
                                                
145 Roberts, p.50 
146 This de-psychoticised mode of delusional decoding is essentially anagrammatic. All the pieces are there 
waiting to be assembled correctly. This is particularly common in the psychosis qua detective narrative 
semiotic. See figures 4.75 and 4.76 for an example of psychosis functioning as intuitive crossword solving 
from the pilot episode of Peception, or figure 4.77 for the way in which these a-psychotic delusions resolve into 
hyper-rational, hyper-perceptive and hyper-inevitable solutions. 
147 Roberts, p.50 
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Figure 4.74 
Rather than discernable psychotic and non-psychotic phenomenological viewpoints, everything in the film is 
leavened into a landscape of general gibberish. 
 
 
Figure 4.75 
Perception (Pilot episode, TNT, 9 July, 2012) 
 
 
Figure 4.76 
Decoding as reordering the signifier to uncover the signified. This anagrammatic problem solving eliminates 
excess signification and turns delusional messages into inevitable and ultimately rational Rubic’s cube. 
‘Psychosis’ is merely a syntactical error. 
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Figure 4.77 
Print advert for Season Two of Homeland 
 
 
Figure 4.78 
Madness, signposted. 
 
Conversely, when not dealing with diegetic delusions of reference, film often formally 
enacts such delusions, as in Silver Linings Playbook when the film adopts the ‘magical’ or ‘weird’ 
thinking of its protagonists. This is a therapeutic dynamic, as already mentioned. The opening, 
explicit signifier of Silver Linings Playbook is Pat’s hand-drawn paper sign, written to himself and 
stuck to the wall in his ward bedroom, reading ‘Excelsior’ (figure 4.78). At the start of the film, this 
is a signifier of mental ill health, yet – just as Cliff (Anupam Kher) urges Pat to do – the spectator 
adopts as a strategy the logic of the meaning system of which this is a signifier. By the close of the 
film, the spectator has been incorporated into the signifying system in which ‘Excelsior’ is 
demonstrated as a proven, successful strategy (playbook) for living. The psychotic signifying system 
is, therefore, highly insidious, at least when incorporated into the cinematic signifying system. The 
similarities are not just structural; the ‘Excelsior’ quest for a happy ending is the fundamental 
Hollywood cinematic narrative, and self-actualisation through a successful search for romantic love 
is its moral tent pole. The psychotic subjectivity becomes then a locus for signifiers to converge 
and to have their signified re-confirmed. Emptied of actual signification of psychosis, the psychotic 
subjectivity is a serene and mutable space for this (or any) signifying acts to take place; as shown, 
Pat functions as the site of inscription for the fortunes of the Philadelphia Eagles, and by extension 
– or perhaps more accurately intension – the fortunes of Pat Snr’s business, the fortunes of his 
family and friends, and ultimately his own socio-economic, romantic and medical status.  
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This section’s analysis of schizomimesis in the domain of the signified has demonstrated 
repeatedly a structural similarity between cinematic and ‘psychotic’ signification. The film semiotic 
and the delusion of reference semiotic would be represented by the same Jakobsonian schema. The 
combination of the unavoidable denotative weight of any filmic object as signifier with the 
consequent connotative weight is the same insistence towards signification that occurs in a delusion 
of reference. Further, the filmic syntagm is always a sequence of signifiers unfurling through one 
time and in one place, whilst generating a different temporal and spatial context that exists only as 
product of those signifiers (the diegetic reality).  
For film and delusional thinking then, the adapted model in figure 4.79 is proposed. In the 
delusion of reference, the addresser, at least as conceived in relation to the message by the 
addressee, is actually a construct of that message; in effect, the addresser is in the position of 
signified. There is a pop psychological explanation for the delusion of reference as the need on the 
part of the addressee to establish a meaningful relationship; semiotically, this is the erotomaniacal 
drive, whereby the signifying act, created from arbitrary signs mistakenly taken for motivated by the 
addressee, constructs the imaginary addresser as the object-supposed-to-love. This will be analysed 
further in the next chapter, as a matter of self-affirming semiotic deixis. Similarly, just as the 
message in non-delusional communication is a unique poetic creation, so, in delusional 
communication, is the contact. There is no phatic function to the contact because, in literal terms, 
there is no actual contact beyond the poetic function of the delusion. The phatic function is 
adopted by the code itself. In all these examples examined in this section, the ‘schizophrenic’ in the 
position of the addressee has experienced not contact with the message of an addresser but only 
contact with the materials from which they are contiguously constructing their code. For example, 
although neither the Soviets nor their supposed routing orders existed (except within ‘Nash’’s 
poetic imagination), the raw material from which ‘Nash’ generated the code – the newspapers, 
magazines etc. – certainly did exist and it was these that performed the phatic function. 
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Vital to the structure of the delusional communicative model is the fact that the addressee 
occupies both positions in the exchange. The imagined addresser may exist (as in the case of the 
Soviet Union) or they may not (as in the case of Ray’s extra-terrestrials) but either way, the 
imagined addresser is not actually transmitting the communication (although they may well be 
producing the raw material that is then transformed into signs by the delusional semiotic system). 
The addressee erotomaniacally imagines that they are in a shared communication exchange with the 
addresser, based on an empathetic understanding. In the same way, the filmic machinery pushes 
signification onto raw materials of objects or other subjects, and then reads back the very meaning 
it has placed upon them, whether this is done through the process of candidly filming a city street, 
of composing shots of inanimate objects (a garbage bag on a bed, a statue of Beethoven) or of 
recording and then reconstructing performances by actors. At the heart of this communicative 
model is a short circuit of the emotive and conative function. Here is a subject emoting towards 
and thinking about itself, which explains why film narratives and delusional narratives are 
structured around a search.148 Requited, this short circuit becomes erotomaniacal. Denied, it turns 
murderous. Always, though, the film or the delusion constructs a signifying system that necessarily 
attaches signification to pseudo-addressers within its signification, creates an unreal mode of 
contact that is folded into the message itself (the absence of a non-screenic presence in the filmic 
communication), precludes a two-way exchange (the film is always communicating the same thing, 
and regardless of and unreceptive to any spectator) and operates through a code that self-validates. 
                                                
148 And, glibly, why Silver Linings Playbook seems so very obviously in love with itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.79 
The semiotic of a delusion of reference 
‘Addresser’ and context 
(Referential) 
Message and contact 
(Poetic) 
‘Addressee’ 
(Emotive and conative) 
Code 
(Metalingual and phatic) 
‘Addressee’ 
(Emotive and conative) 
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The filmic machinery is therefore a delusional machinery. Meaningful signification is 
frustrated. The signifiers of traumatic brain injury are blithely attached to the signified of psychosis 
in Silver Linings Playbook; the signified of US race relations is excised from The Soloist, with psychosis 
rushing in to fill up the empty space; the ineffability of madness and the universe are conflated in 
Ollie Kepler’s Expanding Purple Universe as the protagonist’s voice-over analogises his mental state with 
unified field theories. The empathetic spectator has entered into this delusional game, believing – 
when engaging with popular representations of psychosis in A Beautiful Mind, Silver Linings Playbook 
or Perception – that they are worthily accessing, and respectfully admiring, representations of 
pathological, psychotic phenomenological subjectivities. In truth, they are simply basking in the 
reflected glory of their projected, self-righteous cultural fantasy.  
This raises the question of what therapeutic and deictic responses can be made to this 
semiotic, and these will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five: ‘Here’s looking at you, kid.’1 
Only I can truly understand my experience. Just like, I can never fully understand anyone else’s. […] 
So I felt. […] Now I get to regard this very tree as an equal, experiencing the world just as I am but 
through a different lens.2 
 
The individual consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from them; it reflects their 
logic and laws. The logic of consciousness is the logic of ideological communication, of the semiotic 
interaction of a social group. If we deprive consciousness of its semiotic, ideological content, it 
would have absolutely nothing left. Consciousness can harbor only in the image, the word, the 
meaningful gesture, and so forth.3 
George Berkeley’s assertion that esse est percipi haunted Samuel Beckett. It is the conceptual 
cornerstone of the exquisite torture of ontology enacted in his late novella Company (1980) and is 
the opening caption of his 1965 Film.4 The torture cuts both ways. Although to be perceived is to 
be tyrannized, to not be is to be obliterated. In semiotic terms, this is a deictic threat; the threat of 
being forced, interpellated, into the power structures of the majoritarian language or the the threat 
of being ‘softly and silently vanished away.’5 This thesis has already discussed the role of deictic 
crisis in the generation of ‘schizophrenese’ and this chapter will examine how psychotic 
‘symptomatology’ operates as a corrective to a challenged deictic status. It is worth plainly restating 
that this thesis is operating on the (partial) assumption that the specific challenges to an individual 
deictic status are social, and specifically socio-economic, and also acquired through a person’s 
specific life history and environment, for example severe childhood trauma. That the same social 
conditions and comparable personal trauma may produce psychosis in one person and not in 
another would give credence to theories that there is an underlying biochemical susceptibility to the 
destabilizing effects of a threatened (and threatening) deictic status. However, whether such a 
susceptibility is truly pre-existing, or is just another manifestation of the social and personal inputs, 
is well beyond the scope of this investigation. It is worth asking though – in the absence of 
technological methods or a cultural appetite for profound meddling in the human genetic code – 
what gain it may be to people living with a diagnosis to learn of the existence and location of some 
aetiologically culpable strip of DNA, especially in contrast to the obvious gain when scant 
resources for mental health are directed towards practical programmes of material, educational and 
social support.  
Existential worry in the face of deictic threat may be at play in the various slide animations, 
calendars, stories and essays published by Voyce through his SlideShare account. 6  When he 
publishes a slideshow called ‘Broken Display’ counting through single digits on two displays, one 
                                                
1 Casablanca dir. by Michael Curtiz (Warner Bros., 1942) 
2 From a short story ‘Truth in the Trees’ written by a respondent with lived experience. 
3 Vološinov, Marxism, p.13 
4 In the screenplay only. In the finished film, the opening caption and image were replaced by an extreme 
close-up of an eye. Film dir. by Alan Schneider (Evergreen Theatre, 1965) 
5 Carrol, Snark, p.96 
6 All images are taken from slides downloadable from his SlideShare profile. And are highly recommended. 
<http://www.slideshare.net/AndrewsAsylumLife?utm_campaign=profiletracking&utm_medium=sssite&ut
m_source=ssslideview> [accessed on 23 February 2016] 
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working perfectly and one where the liquid crystal display is broken along the left-hand side, 
mutating the digits, he is inviting readers into a dynamic co-spectating space, where the 
‘schizophrenic’ subject and the non-‘schizophrenic’ subject both see what the other sees, and also 
sees them seeing it. This Peircean triangulation is essential, as it provides a mutual guarantee of 
both co-spectators. They are collaborators in their own socius and – through this creation – they 
further create themselves. Both ways of seeing are co-existent within the same sign, and are 
mutually establishing. In contrast to the individualistic quasi-celebrity display of the illness 
narrative, this text offers a shared space of play with mutual recognition. Indeed, the co-
dependence is vital to the functioning of the sign. The broken display alone would be opaque; the 
functioning one would be otiose. Such a collaboration, perhaps, drains the dialectically constructing 
interplay of being and being perceived of some of their Beckettian existential horror. Rather than a 
demand to be seen, it generously enacts that seeing.  
   
Figure 5.1 
The digits 6 and 8 from ‘Broken Display.’ The text allows the viewer to see well, see poorly and to see each 
of those acts of seeing. In so doing, the viewer sees the other viewer. 
Certainly, as the last chapter argued, there is a need to go beyond empathy. Google ngram 
(figure 5.2) suggests that talk about empathy, and finding a common interpersonal ground, and talk 
about ‘schizophrenia’, perhaps the quintessential human difference, are positively correlated. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 
‘For there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so.’7 
                                                
7 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Shakespeare, William, Hamlet, ed. by Bernard Lott (Harlow: Longman, 1968) 
II.ii.247-248 
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It might not be too glib too suggest that empathy presupposes difference, whereas co-spectatorial 
play presupposes commonality. Specifically, empathy requires a pre-existing difference in state, but 
co-spectatorial play is predicated on the possibility of a shared purpose, even if that purpose is 
nothing more than mutual recognition. Empathy, therefore, is not a method for caring for the 
mentally ill, but a defensive mechanism for defining them and avoiding joining their ranks. As 
Hoffmeyer observes, the discovery by an organism of the umwelt would drive it mad without a 
moderating mechanism of empathy: 
 This creature perceived its own existential alienation from the world. 
Fortunately, before our creature made this dreadful discovery – which, had it been totally 
unprotected, would have driven it insane – it had succeeded in safeguarding itself through the 
development of a gift for empathizing with other similar creatures.8 
 
The idea that empathy is a ‘gift’ is intellectually unacceptable. It must, by the dictates of semiotic 
theory, be a social dynamic, sustained mutually (if unselfconsciously) by inter-subjective exchanges. 
Estrangement from society makes empathy impossible; an inability to engage empathetically 
estranges one from society. 
 Given Hoffmeyer’s analysis and the correlation between the usage of the terms empathy 
and schizophrenia, it is hardly surprising that neuroscience increasingly defines ‘schizophrenia’ (as 
well as other ‘illnesses’ such as autism spectrum disorder) as empathy deficient. If empathy keeps a 
person sane in the face of the umwelt, then those insane must – by definition – lack empathy. 
Neuroscience papers arguing for a reduced theory of mind (ToM) and empathy in people with a 
diagnosis schizophrenia are, perhaps, misconceptualising a maladjustment resulting from a process 
of social estrangement as a neuro-genetic innate disinclination (or disability) in relation to social 
integration.9 The causal assumption inherent in statements such as ‘impaired ToM in schizophrenia 
has also been found to contribute to patients’ compromised social functioning in the community’ is 
insufficiently interrogated in the literature.10 Voyce’s textual invitation to participation in a shared 
spectating space, comprising irreconciled but co-existing perspectives, poses a strong challenge to 
this assumption. People with psychosis do not have a deficit in the ability to integrate, rather they 
experience a deficit in finding willing collaborators. The deficit is, as described by Vološinov in the 
opening quotation, a deficit of the consciousness insufficiently nurtured on signs, deprived of 
semiotic content. 
There is a developing research programme in the relationship between an impairment in 
mirror neuron functioning and the disturbances in ipseity amongst people with a diagnosis of 
                                                
8 Hoffmeyer, pp.34-35 
9 Such research builds on Simon Baron-Cohen’s work on ToM in relation to people with a diagnosis of 
autism spectrum disorder. For an initial account of the fMRI ‘evidence’ for a ToM deficit in ‘schizophrenia’ 
see TA Russell, K Rubia, ET Bullmore, W Soni, J Sucklingm MJ Brammer, A Simmons, SC Williams and T 
Sharma, ‘Exploring the social brain in schizophrenia: left prefrontal underactivation during mental state 
attribution’, American Journal of Psychiatry, 157 (2000) 2040-2042.  
10 Martin Brüne, ‘“Theory of Mind” in schizophrenia: a review of the literature’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 31:1 
(2005) 21-42, p.37 
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schizophrenia. Mirror neurons, as the posited ‘physiological substrate of social cognitive ability,’ 
provide a neurological mechanism for ToM and empathy.11 Researchers such as Giovanni Buccino 
and Mario Amore (2008) are keen to use the mirror neuron system (MNS) as an explanatory model 
for empathy, and from here unpick ‘psychiatric disorders’ (specifically in this paper autism and 
schizophrenia) as mirror neural deficits.12 In this conceptualisation, human social cognition is – in 
its fundamentals – no different from the imitative process of monkeys, and the theory rests on 
observations in the 1990s that monkeys’ mirror neurons discharged similarly whether performing 
or watching a goal-directed action.13 Consider a 2015 paper that performs a multi-level correlation, 
mapping subtle changes in facial mimicry in people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia onto mirror 
neural (in)activity, and mapping that (in)activity onto flattened affect and then further mapping that 
onto self-disorders. Two assumptions underpin this maneouvre. First, that these four categorically 
different things – involuntary muscular activity; neurons firing in the brain; the communication of 
emotions; a stable narrative of self – are isomorphic. Secondly, there is a clear suggestion of a chain 
of causality starting with ‘abnormalities in the mirror neuron mechanism’ and running through to 
‘anomalous subjective experiences.’14 At its organisational centre, the concept of mirror neurons 
holds a structuring assumption identical to ToM and empathy. As mirror neuron pioneer Vittorio 
Gallese (2007) notes: ‘the ability to react to and understand another, not as a stand-in for an 
internalized object but as who that other actually is, is not a taken-for-granted given; rather, it is an 
achievement that constitutes a central criterion of mental health.’15 However, cognitive semiotician 
Rick Grush (2007) asserts that ‘mirror neurons are, in a sense, no mirror neurons at all’ but rather 
fire up in response to any representation of an agent performing an action, and that such 
representations – a representation of the self as other – are integral to human self-conscious 
functioning.16 Grush posits an ‘alter-egocentric emulator’ working in conjunction with egocentric 
mental representations of the world (which, it seems safe to say, can be taken for granted in all 
philosophies of mind):  
                                                
11 Urvakhsh Meherwan Mehta, Jagadisha Thirthalli, Rashathi Basavaraju, Bangalore N Gangadhar and Alvaro 
Pascual-Leone, ‘Reduced mirror neuron activity in schizophrenia and its association with theory of mind 
deficits: evidence from a transcranial magnetic stimulation study’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40:5 (2014) 1083-1094, 
p.1083 
12 Giovanni Buccino and Mario Amore, ‘Mirror neurons and the understanding of behavioural symptoms in 
psychiatric disorders’, Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 21 (2008) 281-285 
13 The establishing papers are Vittorio Gallese, Luciano Fadiga, Leonardo Fogassi and Giacomo Rizzolatti, 
‘Action recognition in the premotor cortex’, Brain, 119 (1996) 593-609 and Akira Murate, Luciano Fadiga, 
Leonardo Fogassi, Vittorio Gallese, Vassilis Raos, and Giacomo Rizzolatti, ‘Object representation in the 
ventral premotor cortex (area F5) of the monkey’, Journal of Neurophysiology, 78 (1997) 2226-2230 
14 Mariateresa Sestito, Andrea Raballo, Maria Alessandra Umiltà, Emanuela Leuci, Matteo Tonna, Renata 
Fortunati, Giancarlo De Paola, Mario Amore, Carlo Maggini and Vittorio Gallese, ‘Mirroring the self: testing 
neurophysiological correlates of disturbed self-experience in schizophrenia spectrum’, Psychopathology (2015) 
DOI:10.1159/000380884 
15 Vittorio Gallese, Morris N Eagle and Paolo Migone, ‘Intentional attunement: mirror neurons and the 
neural underpinnings of interpersonal relations’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 55:1 (2007) 
131-176, p.153 
16 Rick Grush, ‘Agency, emulation and other minds’, Cognitive Semiotics, 0 (2007) 50-67 p.65 
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The second, alter-egocentric emulator represents the environment from the surrogate point of view. 
This emulator must, recall, work knowledge of the agent’s own actions into its representational 
manifold differently from the first [emulator]. This emulator represents the agent itself as an entity 
in the environment. […] From the surrogate point of view, the self is an other[…] it is the 
understanding of oneself simultaneously from the inside and the outside that underwrites the 
agent’s explicit understanding of itself as an agent.17 
 
In this semiotic account, the story of mirror neurons is consistently being told backwards. It is not 
the case that humans extrapolate from their subjective self to imagine the object as subject; rather 
the external model of the other self as object is interpolated into the psyche – indeed constitutes 
the psyche – and creates a triadic psychic self with the subjective self occupying the positions of 
Firstness and Thirdness simultaneously. The next section of this chapter will lay out this theory in 
further detail, using cinematic representations of psychosis (and voice-hearing in particular) and 
evidence from people with lived experience in support of this argument. 
This chapter shall argue that texts made by people with lived experience such as Voyce’s 
slideshows and Jonathan Caouette’s Tarnation create this co-spectating space. It will be argued that 
this co-spectating space schizomimetically enacts a spectatorial Thirdness inherent in the human 
psyche, and present with increased sensitivity in persons with experience of psychosis. 
Concurrently, this chapter will analyse how the deictic crisis in people with psychosis is rendered 
cinematically, and use this analysis to develop insights into the deictic and spectatorial methods 
underpinning two novel treatments: the open dialogue method, pioneered in Finland, and avatar 
therapy, under development at University College London. The benefit of the co-spectating, from a 
position of Thirdness, rather than an insistence of empathetic exchange, in a position of Secondness is 
that it is intrinsically social, rather than inter-personal, and that it offers co-existence in place of a 
power struggle to determine meaning or ‘objectivity.’ It transcends the atomised trade in empathy, 
that keeps the ‘schizophrenic’ firmly entombed in their biological difference, and offers a liberating 
porosity of self whereby, in the words of the person with lived experience quoted at the start of this 
chapter, co-spectators exist as ‘equal, experiencing the world just as I am but through a different 
lens.’ 
  
                                                
17 Grush, p.65 
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Deixis and the cinematic fishbowl 
 RAY Tell me you can see me Pete. Tell me I’m here.18 
 
Hearing voices, talking to tele, thinking I made some songs, but obviously it all weren’t true because 
I’m not rich or owt.19 
 
Satrapi’s The Voices (2015) would not have been possible without the long history of what Anna 
Harpin and Juliet Foster (2014) call ‘madness’ busy onscreen presence.’20 It is a film as much (if not 
more) about cinematic signs of madness as about madness itself. Well-worn ‘psycho slasher’ tropes 
– beautiful women with broken-down cars; knife-wielding chases through foggy nocturnal 
woodland; boarded-up houses steeped in cookie-cutter backstories of childhood abuse – are 
mischievously re-deployed, with satirical intent if not effect. Protagonist Jerry (Ryan Reynolds) has 
a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which manifests mainly through hearing voices that he assigns to his 
pets, the cat Mr Whiskers and the dog Bosco (both voiced by Ryan Reynolds). One of the few 
successful comic moments comes when Jerry’s potential love interest and fellow cat-owner Lisa 
(Anna Kendrick) overhears him in a discussion with his voices: 
JERRY What you heard is that I sometimes, I talk to my pets. A lot of the time. 
LISA No, me too. 
JERRY All of the time. And they sometimes talk to me, sometimes. 
LISA I get that. 
 
The main purpose of the exchange is to function as simple, comic misunderstanding, with the 
characters talking at cross-purposes. No spectator would be confused about the very different 
processes taking place when Lisa talks to her cat and when Jerry talks to Mr Whispers. But 
explaining that difference is rather more troublesome. 
 
Figure 5.3 
‘Hey fish. ‘Hey Jerry. How you doing man?’ ‘Uh, I’m a little bit bummed.’ 
 
 
Figure 5.4 
‘Well duh. She stood you up.’ ‘I’m sure there’s a reason.’  
                                                
18 Some Voices 
19 Interview transcript 
20Anna Harpin and Juliet Foster, ‘Introduction: Locating Madness and Performance’ in Performance, Madness 
and Psychiatry, ed. by Anna Harpin and Juliet Foster, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) pp.1-16 (p.4) 
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Figure 5.5 
‘I sure hope so. I’d help you Jerry, but I’m just a fish.’ 
 
 When stood up for a date by his colleague Fiona (Gemma Arterton), Jerry, stuck alone at a 
table in an empty restaurant, acts out a conversation with a decorative goldfish in a bowl on the 
table (see figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5). Jerry and the fish are shown in the same shot throughout their 
conversation, and Jerry is shown to be voicing the fish’s dialogue. Potentially, this is how Satrapi 
might have shot a sequence with Lisa talking to her cat. Jerry’s conversation with the fish works to 
communicate to the spectator his disappointment at being stood-up, and to emphasise his 
loneliness. The cinematic triad established is of the Object – protagonist’s feelings of isolation and 
rejection – the Representamen – the pseudo-exchange between Jerry and the fish – and the Interpretant 
– the spectator (figure 5.6). At the same time, within the diegesis, a different triad is established. 
The Object and the Representamen are the same, but the Interpretant is Jerry himself (figure 5.7). This is 
a non-psychotic model of communication, recognisable from real life, and would have been 
applicable to a comparable scene in which Lisa returned home and talked to her cat about how she 
wished she had a boyfriend. The same model of communication can have a third-party Interpretant 
as in the extra-diegetic triad; consider any real life example of one person communicating to 
another via a staged conversation with an animal or baby.21 
 
  
                                                
21 ‘Wasn’t daddy lazy for letting you sit in your dirty nappy whilst mummy was out?’  
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Figure 5.4 
The cinematic triad in The Voices 
 
  
 
Figure 5.7 
The diegetic triad in The Voices 
 
 
 
Object   
Jerry’s internal  
emotional and  
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Representamen   
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Object   
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state   
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conversation  
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Interpretant   
Jerry  qua   
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When Jerry talks to his pets, whose voices he is supposedly hallucinating, the sequences 
could have been shot in the same way as the pseudo-conversation with the fish. However, instead, 
as figures 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10 demonstrate, the conversation is shot through a reasonably standard 
sequence of establishing shot, followed by a shot reverse shot exchange, with one significant 
difference being that the camera remains with the ‘speaking’ character whilst they ‘speak’. There is a 
practical purpose to this, as it reduces any possible confusion on part of the spectator, who might 
find it hard to remember to assign the voices to Jerry’s cat and dog without the shot reiterating and 
clarifying who is – at least within Jerry’s psychosis – apparently speaking. At the same time as 
providing clarity, and, formally at least, presenting the hallucinations as real, these shot sequences 
undermine the delusional reality by their slight but noticeable break from cinematic convention. 
Similarly, at times in his discussions with Mr Whiskers and Bosco, all three acknowledge that they 
are all products of Jerry’s consciousness. As with the filming technique that undermines their 
individual subjectivity whilst staging it, so do the exchanges between all three both establish and 
challenge the idea that they are separate individuals. 
 
Figure 5.8 
Thirdness – the spectator establishes that Jerry and Bosco (voiced by Ryan Reynolds) are sharing the 
same space. 
 
 
Figure 5.9 
Bosco seen in a standard shot reverse shot conversation. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 
When Jerry is in conversation with his voices (assigned to his pets or severed heads) the cameria is 
often on whoever is ‘speaking’, rather than focussing on the person listening and getting the reaction shot. 
The film enacts the delusion – that the voices are coming from sources external to Jerry – whilst 
simultaneously challenging the reality of the delusion in the very process of creating it. 
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 Potentially accidentally, therefore, The Voices – in its representations of the conversations 
between Jerry and his voices – provides an important insight. The act of voice-hearing conforms to 
a common, non-pathological model for communication, in which the Object and the Interpretant are 
different strata of the same subjectivity. The defining difference between Jerry’s exchange with the 
fish in the restaurant and his conversations with Bosco and Mr Whiskers may be a difference in 
outcome, rather than an a priori state of mind. The exchange with the fish may be a model of a 
message successfully delivered, and a frustrated cathexis successfully discharged, 22  with the 
Representamen – the imaginary inter-subjectivity with the fish – dissolving itself on completion, 
concurrent with the recognition that the fish is only a fish. The contrary model, of the discursive 
and unresolved moral, philosophical debates with Bosco and Mr Whiskers, is a model of a message 
unsuccessfully delivered. The Interpretant refuses (or is unable) to accept the Representamen of the 
Object. In the case of Jerry’s habitual voice-hearing, there are various Objects to these messages, all of 
which would be understandably unpalatable to accept: that he is in fact alone, without family, 
friends or moral advisors; that he himself has committed murders intentionally and found them in 
some way gratifying, empowering or exciting; that by not taking his anti-psychotics he has created a 
delusional reality. Rejecting these messages prevents the Representamen from dissolving; Bosco and 
Mr Whiskers (and later Fiona’s severed head) do not enact developed identities but rather repeat 
one fixed idea or attitude. In refusing – in his position as Interpretant – the messages, the 
Representamens remain and the messages repeat indefinitely. 
 In this self-communicative exchange, to refuse to play Interpretant manifests as a refusal to 
recognise and therefore to resolve the Representamen, and the endurance of an unrecognised and 
unresolved Representamen necessarily throws the Object into existential uncertainty. Simply put, in 
listening to Jerry’s message to himself, communicated through his staged dialogue with the fish, he 
is able to receive the message, dismiss the (only ambivalently held) fantasy of the fish and 
acknowledge his own position of primacy, in semiotic Firstness as originator, signified and Object of 
the communicative act. Though any causative chronology would be speculative, and it would be 
unjustified to argue that this model demonstrates that non-acceptance of self-communication causes 
persistent auditory hallucinations, which then like a simple three-act filmic structure leads to the self 
being in deictic crisis, and ultimately losing a sense of self-presence, it is certainly the case that 
semiotically these different elements are all inter-dependent components of the triadic sign model. 
The collapse of the sign, the irresolution of the communication, entails a barrier to receipt in the 
position of Thirdness, a perseverance and repetition in the position of Secondness and an existential 
crisis in the position of Firstness. Conversely, this irresolution can be an act of resurrection. The 
titular protagonist of 2013 British film Ollie Kepler’s Expanding Purple World (played by Edward 
Hogg), is first seen – deep in a florid psychotic episode – arguing with his kettle, which he has 
                                                
22 Or perhaps not, as soon after this conversation Jerry murders Fiona. 
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inscribed in the deictic exchange with the personality of his recently deceased fiancé, Noreen (Jodie 
Whittaker). Here the irresolution has an obvious psychic benefit for the traumatised Ollie.23  
 This irresolution is self-perpetuating exponentially. Increasing amounts of energy are 
expended on the Representamen, explaining the unruly deluge of signifiers that proliferate over the 
void of a disappeared signified. This is enacted by Ayers throughout The Soloist. The accumulation 
of signifiers is both a product of the collapse of the subject’s sign relation and also a strategy for 
reversing it. Usurped in the deixis, the self-as-Object, the signified recedes – or is lost to easy 
retrieval – and leaves a signifier that is at least partially detached. As the quality of the signifier is 
compromised, the subject attempts to compensate, and to acquire the same degree of deictic 
guarantee in the sign, by generating additional signifiers. Ayers covers himself in names, and wears 
clothing and make-up that constitute a firework display of signifiers (see figures 5.11 and 5.12). 
Detached signifiers however, by their nature, create and communicate overwhelmingly the 
impossibility of communication. Ayers’ aggressive bid for a place in the deictic exchange further 
pushes him out of conventional communication; the person in the street calling out Biblical slogans 
through a megaphone in a public space is less likely to be engaged in conversation, and to receive 
the sought-for deictic recognition, as their conflagration of signifiers burns ever brighter. Very 
clearly, nothing approaching empathetic understanding can function in this context, because to 
address the deictic displacement head-on is to either magnify it, by becoming another Interpretant 
unable to recognise the ‘schizophrenic’ subject’s position as Object, or to bluntly occlude it by 
forcing a pseudo-empathetic constructed (pseudo)Object back onto the ‘schizophrenic’ Object. This 
pseudo-empathy is the hard interpretation, or the forced effort after meaning, which insists upon 
explaining and defining. Contrast this failed empathy with figure 5.13, where Ayers is re-integrated 
into a community and into the communicative sign, by sharing the position of Thirdness in relation 
to a different, shared Representamen. This is a model of spectatorial tolerance of difference. 
Accommodation within a community cuts the Gordian knot of empathising with an unknowable 
(even, in part, to itself) subjectivity, as spectating colleagues necessarily share a perspective, 
communicative position and deictic status in relation to some other Object (in this example, an 
orchestral performance). Spectating colleagues within a social grouping of Thirdness can maintain a 
mutual obtuseness, and the heterogeneity of the collective Interpretant is not a threat to meaning, but 
a condition of its very production.24  
                                                
23 The opening exchange with the kettle, whose voice the filmic spectator does not get to hear, is paralleled 
by a closing exchange between Ollie and a voice telling him not to go out to the pub with his best friend 
Tom (Andrew Knott). This voice is audible to the spectator. Ollie listens to it for a moment before brusquely 
telling it to ‘fuck off.’ Just as the opening exchange signifies an acute failure to manage psychosis, this closing 
one signifies successful living with voices. Now, it is socially and psychologically healthy to reject the message 
from the projected addresser (a warning to not enjoy an evening out with a friend). 
24 This must be the breathtakingly simple truth to Deleuze and Guattari’s famous assertion: ‘A schizophrenic 
out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch. A breath of fresh air, a 
relationship with the outside world.’ (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R Lane, (London: Continuum, 2004), p.2) The 
creation of a heterogeneous community based on tolerance has been a therapeutic method of various 
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Figure 5.11 
The accumulation of signifiers of colleagues (the names with which Ayers surrounds himself) only heightens 
the visibility of his isolation. The weakness in the quality of the detached signifier as deictic guarantor creates 
an urgent drive to compensate by wildly increasing they quantity. 
 
 
Figure 5.12 
An aggressive bid for deictic recognition. 
 
 
Figure 5.13 
Accommodating difference. 
 
Does this happen though, outside the movies? The second quotation at the start of this 
section was taken from an interview with a person living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
recruited through the Leeds and York Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (LYPFT) in 2014. The 
respondent has absorbed the language (and beneath this, the conceptualisations) of the healthcare 
profession, and particularly CBT, speaking of ‘hot thoughts’, ‘triggers’ and ‘distraction 
                                                                                                                                         
residential clinics, and was pursued with particular radical zeal at La Borde under Guattari’s management. 
Nicolas Philibert’s 1996 documentary, La moindre des choses, showing the production of a contemporary opera 
by carers and patients of La Borde, demonstrates the endurance of this approach after Guattari’s death. 
Philibert strikes at the same idea expressed by this semiotic analysis of the collective Interpretant when, in an 
interview with Patrick Leboutte, he describes the ethos of La Borde as follows: ‘Caring is first and foremost 
trying to live together whilst preserving each person’s singularity and identity.’ (La moindre des choses, dir. by 
Nicolas Philibert (Canal +, 1996); DVD inlay interview trans. by Tim Leicester (Second Run DVD, 2006) 
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techniques’.25 More, the respondent has adopted the position of the spectator. The explanation 
given for the non-reality of the symptomatic delusion – believing to have written several successful 
pop songs – is the appeal of the person in the position of Thirdness to the Firstness of the subject and 
the Secondness of the delusion. It is an external, empirical, rationale appeal that asks the subject to 
consider the truthfulness of their relationship to the delusion-object. It demonstrates, 
grammatically at least, that the subject holds two contrary positions in relation to the object (the 
idea of being the writer of some pop songs). In the first position (the position of Firstness), this 
object is a real psychic belief. In the second (the position of Thirdness), it is a demonstrably untrue 
objective statement. If a subject, in a position of Firstness, no longer holds a belief, they do not need 
recourse to a position of Thirdness to objectively disprove it. In Firstness, it is enough to say such and 
such a thing is not true. However, if someone in a position of Thirdness seeks to disprove another’s 
assertion or belief, rather than appealing to its intrinsic lack of truth (the argument of Firstness), they 
are in the position to appeal to the extrinsic lack of truth. In this statement, the subject 
demonstrates a genuine schizophrenia, in that the subject’s mind is occupying two positions 
simultaneously: that of Firstness and that of Thirdness. To reflect on the opening section’s comments 
about mirror neurons, this would appear to fit with Grush’s thesis. This respondent is not suffering 
from some deficit in recognising the self-hood of another subject (in position of Secondness). Rather, 
they have an overactive recognition of the self as other; they have too strongly held the position of 
Thirdness in relation to themselves. 
 This might be an important defining characteristic of ‘schizophrenia’; the mind as its own 
spectator, which simultaneously maps onto the arrangement – in a Peircean semiotic triad – of the 
schizophrenic subject as playing Interpretant to its own Representamen and Object. In other words, 
there is an absolute domination of the triadic sign by the subject. In non-semiotic terms, this might 
be called ‘being in a world of one’s own.’ As a semiotic position, though, this duplication within the 
triadic structure coupled with the irresolution of the communicative act enshrines a series of what 
could be considered structural misreadings. In medical terminology, these are the delusional 
frameworks, specific delusions of reference and auditory hallucinations. All are linked components 
of the semiotic misreadings both consequential and constructive of this rearrangement of the 
fundamental triad of the sign. 
What is important to grasp here is that the difference between the ‘schizophrenic’ and the 
non-pathological interpretation of the very same sign material can be entirely explained by a 
difference in the Peircean order assigned to the sign material. The ‘schizophrenic’ reading is to 
mistake an iconic sign for an indexical one. Peirce offers a concise account of the difference 
between sign types: 
                                                
25 This linguistic absorption is rather subtler than that of another respondent, an attendee of a ‘survivor-led 
crisis centre’ who remarks: ‘I have mental health.’ The language of the medical discourse interpellates and 
constructs the subject who then speaks it. This is language subjectivating people at its very crudest. Who 
would ever – outside this discourse (or medical parole) – describe themselves as having ‘hot thoughts’ or 
‘mental health’? These are Delueze and Guattari’s order-words writ large (or at least, writ obvious). 
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An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it significant, even though its 
object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a 
sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, but 
would not lose that character if there were no interpretant.26 
 
To return to an analysis of cinematic representations, Ray’s delusional decoding through Some 
Voices involves him interpreting signs as though they had a verifiable, if elusive, Object. This is the 
meaningfulness that he alludes to when talking to Laura about signs, and it re-occurs throughout 
the film. Conceptualising this ‘symptom’ as a shift from the iconic to the indexical order of the sign 
offers an arguably more precise and rigorous account of the long-observed concrete thinking or 
over-literalness supposedly typical of ‘schizophrenics’. Harold Searles offers this definition: ‘[t]he 
so-called “concrete” thinking of schizophrenic patients is undifferentiated thinking – thinking in 
which there is no differentiation between potentially concrete meanings and potentially figurative 
meanings.’27 In this, and all similar conceptualisations, there is an assumed dichotomy between the 
literal and metaphorical, which is not supported by a semiotic analysis. Semiotically, metaphors 
enjoy complex, multi-layered sign relationships, whereby an iconic signified may be exchanged (or 
co-present) with a symbolic signified.28 In both a delusion of reference, as that experienced by Ray, 
and within so-called ‘concrete’ thinking (which, as argued throughout Chapter Two, is actually, for 
purposes of analysis, only tangible as speech not thought), it is not a question of operating at the 
wrong end of a binary opposition but a bias towards a different signifying order: a bias from the 
iconic to the indexical in delusions of reference, and from the symbolic to the iconic in ‘concrete’ 
thinking. With the latter, the signifying process is biased towards the iconic order of the sign and 
pointedly away from the symbolic order of the sign. Given that the symbolic order of the sign is 
reliant on conventional, socially assigned and validated meanings (signification) which are relatively 
un(der)motivated, in contrast to the explicitly motivated signification in an iconic sign built on 
                                                
26 Charles Sanders Peirce, ‘Sign’ in Peirce on Signs, ed. by James Hoopes (Chapel Hill and London: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp.239-240 (p.239) 
27  Harold F Searles, ‘The differentiation between concrete and metaphorical thinking in the recovering 
schizophrenic patient’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 10:22 (1962) 22-49, p.47 
28 Peirce asserted repeatedly that all words are symbolic signs, just as Saussure (loosely) asserted that words 
were conventionalized signs, and therefore arbitrary and unmotivated. However, within this, it is possible to 
stratify the word (or phrase or unit of meaning) into an iconic and a symbolic order of signification when 
used metaphorically. Take the phrase ‘to have one’s cake and eat it.’ The metaphorical meaning of this phrase 
is well known and the literal meaning is unproblematic too. But these cannot be separated out into separate 
signs; the literal meaning is part of the metaphorical signification. They are unified within the same sign, but 
operating at different levels.  
The symbolic, conventionalized level of signification is easy enough to describe. It constitutes the 
generally held meaning of the metaphorical expression. But, in truth, the phrase does not have a literal 
meaning, in that no one, in any context, has absolutely had their cake (uneaten) and eaten it too. Rather than 
tortuously attempting to separate out the interwoven fabrics of literalness and metaphor, it should be enough 
to say that there is an iconic mode to the sign, based on the similarity between the signifiers (the words 
themselves, which are on their own conventional or symbolic signs) and the signifieds of the concept of the 
words; iconically, the phrase appears – because of these similarities – to be making a nonsensical statement 
about cake, but this reading is instantly dismissed by most. So, metaphor always has an iconic signification 
(the concept of the words used, the so-called ‘literalness’) and a symbolic signification (the metaphor proper). 
The conflation of the iconic sign with the appearance of ‘concreteness’ is not unexpected, as Lotman 
observes, ‘[t]he iconic sign is primordially concrete, whilst it is impossible to see the abstraction.’ (Lotman, 
Semiotics of Cinema, p.44)  
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similarity between signifier and signified, it makes sense that socially disconnected individuals – 
whether or not they carry a formal diagnosis of schizophrenia or some other psychosis – should 
lean towards the iconic and away from the symbolic in their semiotic processes. That there should 
be any uncertainty about studies showing that incidence rates of schizophrenia are significantly 
higher amongst migrant communities and other individuals excluded from wider social groupings 
seems ridiculous in the light of this semiotic framing of the problem. To be outside the community 
defining and deploying conventionalised sign relations is to be outside those relations, and – it 
follows – to find those signs harder to engage with. Iconic signs (mostly) transcend this 
conventionalising; they are common ground for the migrant, the alienated, the ‘ill’ to occupy 
without permission from the majoritarian community. 
Understanding the semiotic modes of meaning communication in the delusion of reference 
or the ‘concrete’ thought (or schizoprehenese) therefore reconciles formal symptomatology with 
the individual’s personal, socio-economic context. If the shift in schizophrenese – from symbolic to 
iconic – is symptomatic of a ‘disease’, then the shift in delusions of reference – from iconic to 
indexical – is potentially a psychic defensive manoeuvre or recovery process. The former process is 
both a product of and – dialectically – a contributing factor to the person’s socio-psychic 
estrangement;29 the latter process is about enshrining the estranged person within a meaningful 
relationship, as the recipient of messages laden with signification. It is a reassertion of the lost 
deictic status. With reference to Some Voices, the shift from iconic to indexical sign relations is 
driven by Ray’s need to discover some meaningfulness to his own existence, and to counter the 
invisibility he feels in (post)Thatcherite Shepherd’s Bush. 30  Hence, Ray constructs these faux-
                                                
29 Here is an etiological account of ‘schizophrenese’ as ‘symptom’ of ‘schizophrenia’. Posit that there exists 
some quantum of consciousness, analogous to the dark matter of physicists, which makes the modified 
Jakobson communication model function. Remember, that in this modified model, every subject (addresser 
or addressee) has their own code and context (neurologically, these are products of the brain processing the 
raw data of the diachronic and synchronic contexts). By some process – which might map onto Peirce’s third 
process of reasoning, abduction – subjects can jump over gaps between these codes and contexts, to 
communicate and share conventionalized meanings (specifically symbolic signs including, but not limited to, 
natural languages). This process may find its neurological, organic basis in mirror neurons. 
 Then consider the high anecdotal incidence of childhood trauma (most commonly sexual abuse) in 
people with diagnoses of schizophrenia or psychosis of some kind. Is it too reckless an imaginative leap to 
ask whether – as a neuro-psychosis of defence – the traumatised subject withdraws from such inter-
subjective reasoning, and erects psychic barriers to such processes, much as a plant grows away from 
existential threats. That these barriers should inhibit abduction, participation in collective meaning-generation 
and inter-subjectivity naturally follows; indeed, there may be no barriers as such, but rather an erosion of the 
psychic material and/or mechanism for inter-subjective consciousness. The langue of schizophrenese then 
develops as the subject shifts further from symbolic sign relations, and therefore has additional significatory 
processing power to displace onto other sign relations, which explains the prevalence of iconic sign relations 
instead. 
 Of course, this all sounds incredibly speculative and transcendental. However, it is a theory reached 
inductively (and very tentatively) from an analysis of verifiable linguistic processes and examples. This 
analysis does dovetail with the theories underpinning avatar therapy that ‘revives the concept of psychotic 
symptoms as relational phenomena – both in terms of aetiology and intervention.’ (James A Rodger, ‘Avater-
assisted relational therapy for persecutory voices’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 203 (2013) 233-234, p.233) 
30 That the same ideology could argue simultaneously that there is no such thing as society and that the 
severely mentally ill should be cared for in the community demonstrates how arrogance always triumphs over 
consistency. Here are Thatcher’s comments about society – from a 1987 interview with Women’s Own – as 
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indexical signs. In one of the film’s comic moments, Ray’s attempt to make himself visible and 
meaningful by constructing this indexical sign relationship dialectically serves to increase his social 
alienation (and thereby adds greater urgency to his need for recognition); as he builds a swirl in the 
middle of the road from rubbish and street ephemera, whilst naked and shouting, he is assiduously 
ignored by other people. When Ray explains this phenomenon to Laura, it is unclear (to the 
spectator and to the character himself) how ironic he is being:  
I don’t need clothes. I’m invisible. […] You see the way people are looking at me? They’re looking 
at me like I shouldn’t be here. They’re looking straight through me. But this means I’m here. It’s a 
spiral. […] What are you looking at? This is it, they can’t hear me either. 
 
There is, therefore, a clear primary gain for Ray in making this semiotic shift from the iconic to the 
indexical, to fulfil the need expressed by Ray’s final plea to his brother Pete: ‘Tell me you can see 
me Pete. Tell me I’m here.’ The construction of these indexical sign relations re-establishes the 
‘schizophrenic’ deictic relations that have been damaged, as evidenced (and no doubt worsened) by 
their anti-deictic shift from the symbolic to the iconic order of the sign in their speech. 
Although the original play Some Voices has a very similar scene in the kitchen of Pete’s 
restaurant, Ray’s symptomatology and fears are somewhat different. He has adopted a delusional 
system based on auditory hallucinations (the eponymous Some Voices) which owes a debt of 
influence to the intergalactic ramblings of (now deceased) Ives. Even though voice-hearing is far 
more prominent amongst Ray’s ‘symptoms’ in the play than in the film, these voices are not staged, 
whereas they are in the film. Nor in the play does Ray have a developed interest in swirls and 
circles. Film makes continual deictic statements. As has been discussed already, everything in a film 
is a sign, as all objects in the film are transformed – by the process of filming – into images 
denotative of themselves. This creates both the possibility of schizomimetically staging a process of 
generating signification from a sequence of signs (as analysed earlier in Chapter Four) and 
simultaneously creates a need to show. Hence, there is firstly a pressure to represent Ray’s voice-
hearing in the film with a soundtrack of mumbles and whispers, for example when Ray becomes 
confused and paranoid whilst trying to sign on for welfare. Secondly, there is pressure to visibilise 
this, either through some implied pseudo-visual-hallucinations. For example, there are interpolated 
shots of Laura’s aggressive ex-boyfriend Dave (Peter McDonald) when Ray is becoming psychotic 
during a visit to the supermarket, and the film continually uses close-up shots of Ray’s face showing 
his reaction to voices. Indeed, as often people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia are considered to 
                                                                                                                                         
taken from a transcript of the interview: ‘they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There 
is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do 
anything except through people and people look to themselves first.’ As the transcript makes clear, the 
Thatcherite view of society is based on individual desires tied into a network of familial responsibilities either 
literally (at the household level) or metaphorically (at the national society-as-household level). When social 
and civic structures outside the familial recede – overwhelmingly for reasons of cost – the difficulty of 
finding a place within this new, narrower model of society is but the same problem as finding a place within 
the family unit, only writ large. It makes sense then that Some Voices stages the problems of decarceration as a 
domestic drama. Douglas Keay, Interview with Margaret Thatcher, Woman’s Own, 23 September 1987 
<http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689> [accessed 10 March 2015] 
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exhibit flattened affect (and this clinical symptom is inferred from a lack of semiotic expression of 
affect in the face), then these close-up shots of facial signs of distress contradict the remarkably 
serene expression of real-life persons in the throes of voice-hearing.  
It might be possible, using this analysis of deictic crisis in schizophrenia, to offer an 
explanatory account of this flattened affect. Vološinov notes the social, objective nature of gesture 
and intonation, and how these are orientated around the listener (as addressee, Interpretant or 
position of Thirdness) and the signified (as message, Object or position of Firstness – or in Vološinov’s 
terminology the ‘hero’). 31  Considering flattened affect in a person with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, a semiotic explanation would be that the speaker (in the position of Secondness) is in a 
(delusional) social relation with Interpretant and Objects that do not exist in the objective world 
occupied by the spectator (for example, a clinician observing flattened affect). Simultaneously, for 
them, sharing a different social context with the spectator, and one in which the true addressee and 
‘hero’ are absent for the ‘schizophrenic’, the range of their intonation and gestures is necessarily 
restricted and impoverished. 
Theatre is not subject to the same deictic tyranny experienced by film, where to show 
something is also to make the reflexive metalinguistic affirmation of its existence and presence. In 
Ridiculusmus’ 2014 stage play, The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, exploring the open 
dialogue therapy pioneered in Finland, the easy ability of theatre, over cinema, to have presence in 
the realm of the signifier without that necessarily implying presence in the realm of signified is 
exploited. 32  The play stages two different acts concurrently on a bisected stage for a divided 
audience; each half hears the other act as disembodied interpolations into the act they are watching. 
This theatrical technique brings the voices heard by both Richard and his mother into the mimesis 
clearly – in contrast to the cluttered, repetitive mumblings favoured in filmic representations – 
without necessarily having to give them an equally clear status within the diegetic reality, or within 
the characters’ psychological landscapes. The play is full of obtuse signs, with an opaque narrative, 
bizarre acts and non-sequitur interpolations, and yet everything is incorporated into a network of 
signification, albeit an imperfect one, and one that the spectator does not require recourse to 
                                                
31 V.N. Vološinov, ‘Discourse in life and discourse in art (concerning sociological poetics)’ in Freudianism A 
Marxist Critique, pp.51-196 (p.173) 
32 The open dialogue (OD) approach pioneered in Finland is a dialogic, social-constructionist therapy that 
engages the patient and their immediate social network in a series of discussions with a care team. In its 
accommodation of obtuseness (a ‘tolerance of uncertainty’ in its foundational principles) and its emphasis on 
developing meaning collectively, it shares much with the semiotic model of spectating colleagues in a position 
of Thirdness developed in this chapter and the previous one. For an account of OD, including a list of its 
seven principles, see Jaakko Seikkula, Birgitta Alakare and Jukka Aaltonen, ‘Open dialogue in psychosis I: an 
introduction and case illustration’, Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 14:4 (2011) 247-265. See also: Jaakko 
Seikkula, Birgitta Alakare and Jukka Alatonen, ‘Open dialogue in psychosis II: a comparison of good and 
poor outcome cases’, Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 14:4 (2011) 267-284; Jukka Aaltonen, Jaakko Seikkula 
and Klaus Lehtinen, ‘The comprehensive open-dialogue approach in Western Lapland: I. The incidence of 
non-affective psychosis and prodromal states’, Psychosis: Psychological, Social and Integrative Approaches, 3:3 (2011) 
179-191; Jaako Seikkula, Birgitta Alakare and Jukka Aaltonen, ‘The comprehensive open-dialogue approach 
in Western Lapland: II. Long-term stability of acute psychosis outcomes in advanced community care’, 
Psychosis: Psychological, Social and Integrative Approaches, 3:3 (2011) 192-204. 
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(pseudo) empathy to engage in as they experience it too. The liveness and deixis of theatre allows 
for an equality of experience between those within and without the diegesis; as well as being 
simultaneously at different points in the diegesis, the performers are also without it, and in the 
room with the audience: 
DOCTOR A colleague of mine – we did a training course together on a way of working that 
has practically eradicated schizophrenia in … 
RICHARD Western Lapland? 
DOCTOR You know it? 
RICHARD Very well, it’s the name of the play what we’re in. 
DOCTOR  Play? Right. Well then you’ll have heard they think psychotic meaning making is 
meaning making – they don’t want to medicate meaning making… anyway my friend, he 
got struck off.33 
 
Here, the person with a diagnosis of schizophrenia within the diegesis is performing the same split 
identified in the interviewee earlier, and stepping outside the phenomenological landscape to 
observe from the outside, whilst also remaining inside and thereby observable to itself. As said, this 
is the same subjectivity occupying positions of Firstness and Thirdness, or an Object that is also its own 
Interpretant context. In so doing, the subjectivity is opened up, creating – in the performance – a 
literal and metaphorical space into which other spectators can project themselves, as Voyce does 
with his slideshows. This is schizomimetic in that it embodies in its form the schizophrenic 
phenomenology qua content that it seeks to represent. The very deictic crisis of schizophrenia 
thereby becomes the method by which the spectator, freed from any need to empathise, 
experiences, as spectatorial colleague invited into and also remaining outside the subjective 
phenomenology. 
 Voyce achieves something similar with his slideshow collection ‘Vignettes …’ in which a 
recurrent figure in his texts, based closely on the biographical Voyce but called Ray, has various 
apparently meaningless and mundane encounters (catching a train, buying some milk, etc.) that are 
suddenly interrupted by a magical figure (who may be Bart Simpson; it is hard to be certain from 
the drawing and the context, in this playful space, cannot pragmatically deliver anything close to 
semantic certainty). This figure then reinterprets the encounter for Ray as part of his self-appointed 
mission to get Ray to ‘wise up to the big deals that are going on.’ Bart is assertive and brusque, if 
not actively aggressive, and speaks with the confident authority of an old hand helping out the 
naïve Ray, and inducting him in how to perceive the not immediately apparent ‘truth’ operating 
beneath the surface of these seemingly inconsequential social interactions: ‘but didn’t you see what 
was going on there?’ Schizomimetically, though, Bart is not just educating ‘Ray’ but also the 
spectator. The spectator’s position, of Thirdness, is assumed by the figures within the diegesis, who 
step out its reality; most often, although the backdrops remain, the scenes become depopulated 
when Bart arrives, with the diegetic drama evaporating akin to the departure of actors from a stage. 
                                                
33 John Haynes and David Woods, The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland, (London: Oberon Books, 
2014), p.64. This exchange is not given as printed in the published script but as performed, and supplied in 
personal correspondence with David Woods. 
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At the same time, this dislocation by the diegetic subject (Ray in the position of Firstness) into 
Thirdness enacts the fusion of Firstness and Thirdness in the spectator; this formal method echoes the 
structure of the ‘psychotic’ hypersensitivity to the self as other. 
 
  
Figure 5.14 
The deictic reach extends out of the slide to welcome the spectator into the text itself. 
 
 Film cannot play the same deictic game, at least not with the same truth and impact. When 
N in Poppy Shakespeare turns suddenly to eyeball the camera, or The Voices ends with a surprise 
Brechtian musical number, in which the mimetic space between the performers and their characters 
collapses whilst the diegetic one gapes wide, these moments do not have the same effect as the 
meta-theatrical twists of The Eradication of Schizophrenia in Western Lapland. With a live performance, 
the deictic relationship is real; in film, no matter how wittily rendered, it is always a deceit. As Metz 
observed, film is necessarily a one-way communication, and one in which, strangely, it is the figure 
of the addresser that disappears to a vanishing point behind a play of images. Similarly, Voyce’s 
slideshows involve a form of literal, physical co-presence, as the spectator is actively involved in 
turning the wheel of the narrative, by clicking through the slides. Already implicated in the 
mechanical production of the reality, and already engaged in a spatially and temporally dislocated, 
but still physically, materially real deictic contact with the figures of the diegesis, the spectator of 
the slideshow is more sensitive to the deictic swerves and schizomimetic effects of the text. Voyce’s 
confusion and alienation are not merely represented, but are enacted in the spectator through the 
co-production of the text. 
 Whilst Voyce and his spectator are engaged in a playful to-and-fro, where they mutually 
co-construct and are mutually implicated in the visual syntagma, film sculpts the entire 
communication, dictating the addressee’s response. The spectator of a film – unlike that of a play – 
can only look where the camera takes their gaze. In film, the boundaries of possibility are tightly 
and imperceptibly drawn in, so that the spectator-as-addressee has their part written for them, 
without noticing. In The Soloist, the empathetic exchanges between the spectator-as-addressee and 
the protagonists are constructed through the whole range of cinematic processes, from the script 
through to the composition of individual shots. The service-users of Lamp and the residents of 
Skid Row are not presented as figures for psychological empathy. They function as quantitative 
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data provided as evidence in support of the text’s central thesis that schizophrenia is a bio-psycho-
social disorder. Whilst the spectator is taken within Ayers’ phenomenology, with the synaesthesic 
reverie he experiences when listening to the Los Angeles Philharmonic presented through a 
montage of the phenomenology represented in the position of Firstness (figure 5.15) and in Thirdness 
(figure 5.16), other ‘schizophrenic’ figures are established as impenetrable and not for empathy 
(figure 5.17). The empathetic locus is Lopez; he and the spectator both observe his namesake Steve, 
an otherwise fairly anonymous Lamp service-user, and the filmic spectator moves between an 
empathetic pseudo-position of Secondness, observing the ‘schizophrenic’ service-user, and the 
position of Thirdness authenticating and making sense of Lopez’s detached observation of Steve. 
 
 
Figure 5.15 
The schizophrenic phenomenology in Firstness. 
 
 
Figure 5.16 
The schizophrenic phenomenology in Thirdness. 
 
 
Figure 5.17 
Not for empathy. 
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Figure 5.18 
The metonym, 
 
 
Figure 5.19 
Quantitative data. 
 
 
Figure 5.20 
Visual statistics. 
 
 Empathy is not just uninvited. It is refused and made impossible. Service-user Steve is 
closed off, and is not much more than an embellishment of the large signpost on Lamp’s imposing 
metal security gate; he is an indexical sign signifying ‘this way madness lies.’ Consider figure 5.18. 
Metonymically, the individual service-user and the condition of living with a diagnosis of psychosis, 
are signified by the cigarette butts, in conjunction with the stoop of the service-user to pick up 
some stubs suitable for smoking. These butts are discarded and overlooked, much as the 
population(s) of Lamp and Skid Row are. These figures, as the cigarette butts, are visually 
multiplied but to suggest reiteration and quantity rather than variety (figure 5.19), and almost 
invisiblised by aerial shots where individual perspectives give way to undifferentiated visual 
statistics signifying that Los Angeles is a machine for producing homeless psychotics (figure 5.20). 
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This seems acceptable contextualising of the specific case study of Ayers, in that he is one subject 
from this sea of data, one datum from the set. But Ayers has repeatedly distinguished himself 
against the filth and degradation of the city around him, and has latched onto cigarette butts as a 
metonymic signifier of all that is morally reprehensible in his ‘Beethoven city.’ As the film displaces 
the biographical Ayers’ racial anger at his Julliard colleagues onto himself, so does it redirect the 
biographical Ayers’ contempt for other psychotics into a generalised dislike of dirt. However the 
semiotic of the film allows these to return as excess significations. Therefore, what is semiotically 
accentuated by these shots is not Ayers’ position as exemplar but as exception, as with ‘Nash’; 
again, Hollywood contra science favours the narrative of the exceptional, the outlier datum. 
This is partially a product of their narrative conventions. The filmic three-act structure 
lends itself very specifically to the trajectory of the illness-as-recovery narrative. As Stephen Harper 
asserts: ‘[t]he tripartite structure of classical Hollywood narrative film tends to mirror that of 
‘equilibrium-breakdown-recovery’ pattern of mental disturbance.’ 34  To adjust this slightly, A 
Beautiful Mind, Some Voices and Ollie Kepler’s Expanding Purple World all stage the narrative of the 
disease rather than the patient. Further, they structure this narrative according to the following 
pattern: 1) prodromal signs and symptom emergence 2) florid psychosis 3) (compliance with) 
treatment and remission. As one critic observes of Pat in Silver Linings Playbook: ‘[t]he main 
character’s preoccupation with achieving the success of the “silver lining” and with winning back a 
former fiancée are shown to be no more or less bizarre than the energetic ambition of many an 
admirable movie hero.’35 This recourse to the mythology of the hero is understandable, as Gilman 
notes: ‘Myth-making usually surrounds fictive signs and symptoms, like black bile, as a means of 
representing an invisible state – mental illness.’36 Because the ‘schizophrenic’ phenomenology is 
beyond empathy, myth-making fills the vacuum and ‘psychotics’ in film become 
hyperconventionalised hero figures. 
The question to be asked is: how can film avoid constructing and directing the lines of 
spectatoral empathy to write these mythic narratives over their ‘schizophrenic’ subjects? 
  
                                                
34 Harper, Madness, Power and Media, p.103 
35 Bernard Beck, ‘Into the cuckoo’s nest: Silver Linings Playbook and movies about odd people’, Multicultural 
Perspectives, 15:4 (2013) 209-212, p .210 
36 Sander Gilman, Disease and Representation: Images of Illness from Madness to AIDS (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988), p.19 
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The spectator mind 
The ability of cinematography to divide the human figure into “pieces” and to arrange these 
segments into a temporally sequential series transforms the external appearance of a person into a 
narrational text.37 
 
There is a new breed of signs, opsigns and sonsigns. And clearly these new signs refer to very varied 
images – sometimes everyday banality, sometimes exceptional or limit-circumstances – but, above 
all, subjective images, memories of childhood, sound and visual dreams or fantasies, where the 
character does not act without seeing himself acting, complicit viewer of the role he himself is 
playing, in the style of Fellini.38 
 
Filmic ways of looking seem common to both the semiotic of cinema and of psychosis. It might 
not be too much to say that film has a psychotic eye, and psychosis a filmic one. A research 
respondent described her dissociative psychosis as a sequence of ‘flashbacks’ and displacements in 
time, space and subjectivity: ‘I’m getting it again now where I’m sort of floating behind and I see 
the back of me and what’s going on in front.’39 This ‘psychotic’ misalignment of the person’s 
subjective perspective is structurally identical to the standard filmic technique for establishing 
empathetic identification, the over-the-shoulder shot. The advantage of this shot is that it places 
the subject as object within the diegesis, whilst also maintaining an approximate shared perspective 
between the subject and the camera, a propinquity with the ‘true’ subjective position of the POV 
shot. As discussed in the previous section, here the subject is split between the position of Object in 
Firstness and Interpretant in Thirdness. 
 For Deleuze, this order of Thirdness in cinema creates the ‘mental-image’ and, in his critical, 
philosophical semiotic history of film precipitates a ‘crisis of the action-image’ (the action-image 
being the established cinematic mode in the order of Secondness dominant in early and mid-twentieth 
century film).40 Deleuze stresses the relational nature of the mental-image, and explains that it is not 
definitionally required to represent ‘pure thought’ but rather ‘it is an image which takes as objects of 
thought, objects which have their own existence outside thought, just as the objects of perception 
have their own existence outside perception. It is an image which takes as its object, relations, symbolic 
acts, intellectual feelings.’41 This relationality within the filmic mental-image maps onto the deictic 
exchanges identified within the previous section. Any framed deictic triad, even that within the 
individual mind, as with the research respondent quoted in the previous section, is a mental-image 
with a relation as its object. Composing a mentalised version of this mental-image may even be the 
                                                
37 Lotman, Semiotics of Cinema, pp.85-86 
38 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, (London: The Athlone Press, 
1989), p.6 
39 Interview with a service-user at a survivor-led crisis centre. This ‘survivor’ had over a lifetime of psychosis, 
received several diagnoses, including – but not restricted to – schizophrenia, which they rejected, and 
dissociative identity disorder, which they accepted. 
40 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.197 
41 Deleuze, Cinema 1, p.198 
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consequence of the exhortation common in CBT for the service-user to ‘look at’ their behaviour in 
certain situations.42 
 The research respondent quoted above positioned their spectating perspective, in an 
hallucinatory, filmic way, so that they could place their self inside a mental-image. There was no 
great action or affect to be documented but rather the self seen as a relational object. This 
manoeuvre, as suggested already, might have some primary gain as either defensively removing the 
subjective self from an exchange that was painful (for instance, an occasion of abuse) or serve to 
re-assert the subjective self’s deictic presence, by confirming its own relational existence. However, 
it also acts to undermine deixis at the same moment, as the self is pulled out of the exchange and 
into an aloof position of Thirdness. The research respondent was keen to stress that the 
hallucinatory experience is more immersive than a screenic projection: ‘it’s not like seeing a TV 
screen; it’s the whole of your vision.’ The respondent explained the techniques they had, such as 
focussing on sounds and smells, for example the ticking of the clock or various aromatherapy oils, 
which ‘can bring you back.’ ‘I’ve had to find ways to keep me in the here and now’; this is a clear 
statement of the deictic threat of psychosis. But again, it is important to note that this shifting into 
Thirdness is both symptom and cure: positioning oneself as a relational object, and thereby seeing 
oneself seeing, is an essential element – according to Grush’s reading of mirror neuron theory – of 
constituting the self as an inter-personal subject in a wider, objectively real (through its reality for 
other, perceived subjects) socius. Just as Voyce’s staging of his estrangement from his social 
interactions in ‘Vignettes …’ conversely creates a co-spectating space qua microcosmic community 
with the spectator, so does the retreat from deixis offer the integrating perspective of Thirdness vital 
to a subject’s return to deictic relations. 
  
                                                
42 It is important to remember that Deleuze’s mental-image is not an image of mentalisation, but a literal 
filmic image which takes relations and thoughts as its object. In CBT, the service-user is mentally conjuring 
up a non-literal, psychic equivalent of the mental-image. Whether prior to the cinematic proliferation of 
images (not limited to mental-images) individuals did mentalise according to such images, or to such an 
extent, is a question that cannot be addressed here.  
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Figure 5.21 
Dissociation from the world as image. 
 
 
Figure 5.22 
Dissociation from the self as image. 
 
 
Figure 5.23 
Medical imaging as a dissociative act. 
 
In The Soloist, the spectator often occupies this position of wavering between Firstness and 
Thirdness, in relation to Lopez and Ayers. Compare the position of the camera in the right hand 
image in figure 5.21 with the positioning of the co-spectator in relation to Ray and Bart in figure 
5.14 and with the research respondent’s account of psychotic dissociation ‘where I’m sort of 
floating behind and I see the back of me and what’s going on in front.’ The spectator is both 
watching television news footage from Lopez’s perspective and simultaneously watching Lopez 
watch the television. Both the images in figure 5.21 show Lopez watching news reports of the 
devastation wrought on New Orleans, and specifically its impoverished black population, by 
Hurricane Katrina. He is utterly unresponsive, and neither he nor anyone else refers to this within 
the diegesis. Obviously, this is part of providing his character with a recognisable Hollywood 
narrative arc. He journeys from impassive consumption of images of the ruined lives of poor black 
Americans to a literal physical immersion in the reality of similarly ruined black American lives 
down in Skid Row, only a few blocks away from his workplace. 
 If The Soloist stages a reversal of (or cure for) dissociation from the world qua image, the 
insertion of its protagonists into an image semiotic stages social, personal and psychological 
dissociations. The film opens with a sequence in which Lopez injures himself in a cycling accident. 
Primarily, this incident serves to illustrate how medicine – via its scanning technology and scopic 
imperative – transforms individuals into images (figure 5.23). The human story of Lopez’s accident 
(his ‘illness’ in Kleinman’s terms) worn as indexical sign on his face is occluded by the MRI scan 
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that indicates an absence of underlying neurological damage (‘disease’ for Kleinman). No spectator 
can feel any serious concern for Lopez – whose injured face is mocked by his co-workers – as the 
‘all clear’ medical image has negated any such empathy. Ayers is similarly inserted into a self-
conscious image semiotic within the diegesis. His initial psychotic break and, of particular 
importance as a plot point, his fear of living indoors, are dramatized by a combination of anxious 
voices and a television showing images of a distressed baby (figure 5.22). It is hard to tell whether, 
and to what extent, the crying baby on the television belongs to the objective diegetic reality in The 
Soloist and how much to Ayers’ pathological phenomenology. Certainly, Ayers is in an empathetic 
deictic transference with the image of the baby; his paranoid anxiety is both projected onto and 
read back off of the image. The relationship with the image places Ayers both within and without 
his own experience of distress. 
 This sequence is followed by a sequence in which Ayers first visits his new apartment at 
Lamp secured by Lopez, to which Lopez has lured him with the bait of a cello lesson from a 
(fictional) member of the Los Angeles Philharmonic, Graham Claydon (Tom Hollander). 
Throughout the lesson, Lopez films Ayers playing. This cinematic eye within the cinematic eye 
performs similar grammatical moves to those conventional to the schizophrenic filmic semiotic, 
but accentuated by the doubled-vision of this film within the film: close-up shots of Ayers’ eyes and 
face in expressions of concentration and concern, signifying exceptionality, both as musical 
brilliance and aberrant subjectivity; Ayers’ hands working the cello; Claydon’s approval and 
appreciation. Here Lopez is literally re-inserting Ayers into a cured Deleuzean mental-image, where 
he is happy in his own apartment and engaged in productive activity (practising his cello). This re-
insertion is both diegetic, as it is not uncommon for people to record momentous occasions in life, 
and also meta-filmic. The mental-image created temporally offers a counterbalancing resolution to 
the mental-image of Ayers’ exchange with the televised baby in his previous apartment decades 
earlier. Once the exchange with Claydon – who is patronising and has some religious evangelising 
agenda – turns sour, Lopez’s camera continues to film but from an oblique angle. As with the baby 
on the television, these images cut into the filmic syntagm are of unstable diegetic status. Is Lopez’s 
camera still filming within the diegesis? It seems unlikely, as Lopez put the camera down earlier and 
appeared to turn it off in the process. The film within the film offers a mental-image of the fragility 
of Ayers’ emotional, inter-personal and psychic relations, with the image distorting and shattering 
as Ayers’ anger crescendos. 
 What is this potentially curative power of these images? Clearly the video camera here 
operates, to use Anna Poletti’s term for Caouette’s use of home videos in Tarnation, as a 
‘technology of the self’ empowering the subject to place themselves within an image semiotic over 
which they can exercise some control. As with the example from The Soloist, this is a countermove 
that is structurally identical to the way in which psychosis itself displaces a person’s subjectivity. For 
Poletti, the video camera is not simply a ‘technology of the self’ that allows Caouette to create an 
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autobiographical ‘illness’ narrative; unavoidably, this technology also demonstrates how the self is a 
product as well as an originator of filmic representations of the self.43 Caouette’s self on display in 
Tarnation both disintegrates within and comprises an assemblage of documentary and re-
appropriated footage. As Poletti observes: 
Tarnation demonstrates that the introduction of archival moving image footage can destabilise 
meaning as much as it can provide evidence or memory work supporting a narrative’s themes and 
subject […] the materiality of video footage produces an excess within the relational narrative of 
Tarnation which points to the potential of the video camera to function as a means of experimenting 
with the tropes of popular culture for the structuring of affect and the exploration of identity.44 
 
This double-movement is apparent throughout Tarnation, for example when addressing Caouette’s 
depersonalization disorder, a medico-clinical description of the disease appears as scrolling text on 
the screen over archive footage from Caouette’s childhood, including him as an 11-year-old boy 
performing a pseudo-confessional monologue as an abused working class wife who murders her 
husband (figure 5.24). It is not just that Caouette’s post-modern documentary form – 
indiscriminately interpolating footage from home videos and television programmes and other 
avant-garde film experiments by Caouette – is aptly suited to representing the fractured psychic and 
interpersonal associations of Caouette and his family. Rather, the filmic text enacts that 
dissociation. As with the shot sequences from The Soloist, by displacing the filmic subjectivity from 
Firstness to Thirdness, the filmic text offers up this porous boundary for the spectator to perform the 
contrary (pseudo-curative, empathetic) shift from Thirdness to Firstness. The filmic text creates a 
liminal space in which the subjective ‘psychotic’ phenomenology and the spectating subjectivity can 
co-spectate. 
  
                                                
43 Anna Poletti, ‘Reading for excess: relational autobiography, affect and popular culture in Tarnation’, Life 
Writing, 9:2 (2012) 157-172, p.159 
44 Poletti, p.159 
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Figure 5.24 
Depersonalisation disorder as film; film as depersonalisation disorder. 
 
 
Figure 5.25 
A steady flow of opsigns and sonsigns, in which distinctions between narrative and affect, subjectivity and 
spectatorship melt away. 
 
 
Figure 5.26 
The deictic relation becomes a useful, ‘healing’ fiction, or at least a fiction about healing. 
 
 This co-spectating space and the images that inhabit and constitute it correspond to 
Deleuze’s concept of the time-image, as detailed in the quotation at the start of this section. 
Tarnation is distinctly composed of these opsigns and sonsigns and is a text comprising a sequence of 
‘optical and sound situations’45 which have abandoned firm distinctions between subjectivity and 
objectivity, diegesis and meta-filmic, memory and fantasy (see figure 5.25). Deleuze accounts for 
this inter- and intra-subjective porosity as follows: 
As for the distinction between subjective and objective, it also tends to lose its importance, to the 
extent that the optical situation or visual description replaces the motor action. We run in fact into a 
principle of indeterminability, of indiscernibility: we no longer know what is imaginary or real, 
                                                
45 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p.5 
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physical or mental, in the situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to 
know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask.46 
 
Similar bold, Deleuzean claims are made for Internet vlogs by people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, or psychotic experience. In a 2014 paper Fletcher describes these vlogs as 
‘horizontal, interactive, dialogical, and rhizomal assemblages, constantly unfolding and reforming in 
reality.’47 By their hypertexted networking and inter-user dialogism, Fletcher contends that these 
vlogs – like Tarnation – provoke rhizomal re-conceptualisations of what constitutes schizophrenia, 
and the person living with a diagnosis. It is difficult to square this grand assessment of the impact 
of YouTube vlogs on schizophrenia with the fact that such vlogs most often garner only hundreds 
or sometimes tens of views and a handful of comments. By way of contrast, trailers for and clips 
from A Beautiful Mind – released four years before YouTube existed – routinely clock up views by 
the hundreds of thousands; videos of kittens generally notch up many millions. If these have not 
fundamentally changed conceptualisations of cats, it seems reasonable to doubt that YouTube 
schizophrenia vlogs can account for changes in social attitudes towards people with a diagnosis. 
It is worth considering the implications (or the pseudo-implications) for the mental health 
of the producer of these cultural products. Paul Arthur sees Tarnation as a remarkable exemplar of 
‘self-therapy documentaries’ and identifies two countervailing forces at work in the film: the 
dissociative and curative. Significantly, the finished text is both process and evidence of recovery: 
‘where his earlier self-inscriptions were fragmentary and provisional – a perfect emblem of 
Caouette’s sense of psychic disarray – Tarnation is a token of successful sublimation of past 
traumas.’48 The film’s signifying chains of ‘successful cure’ and ‘accessible, self-production’ extend 
beyond the content and form of the filmic text respectively and into the meta-filmic. As a cultural 
product, Tarnation became well-known – beyond those who actually saw the film – for having been 
produced for a ‘lunch-money budget’ of only $218 on iMovie, a piece of bundled Apple software.49 
 The first quotation at the opening of this section is from Lotman, detailing how the filmic 
semiotic dissects the filmed body into a narrational text. Tarnation demonstrates how it is possible, 
through a Deleuzean assemblage to turn the relational subjectivity into a cinematic syntagm. The 
film presents intersecting layers of time-images – archival home footage, old television 
programmes, cinema verité – that form a relentless flow of opsigns and sonsigns. Little in Tarnation can 
be taken with certainty, the final shot sequence, a low-key denouement of reconciliation between 
Caouette and his mother, Renee, is evidently staged for camera, with a third person, most likely 
Caouette’s partner David Sanin Paz, operating the camera (figure 5.26). As Deleuze says, this form 
                                                
46 Deleuze, Cinema 2, p.7 
47 Erica Hua Fletcher, ‘Dis/assembling schizophrenia on YouTube: theorizing an analog body in a virtual 
sphere’, Journal of Medical Humanities, p.10 
DOI: 10.1007/s10912-014-9286-4 
48 Paul Arthur, ‘The moving picture cure: self-therapy documentaries’, Psychoanalytic Review, 94:6 (2007) 865-
885, p.881 
49 B. Ruby Rich, ‘Tell it to the camera’, Sight and Sound, April 2005 
<http://old.bfi.org.uk/sightandsound/feature/215> [accessed 10 April 2015] 
 281 
transcends questions of falsity.50 That this moment can be analysed as a pseudo-verité piece of 
sentimentalism, like Caouette’s childhood confessional performance, only means that the spectator 
needs engage in a multi-layered semiotic reading. This shot is both idealised mental-image of 
successful documentary film ‘self-therapy’ and also a repudiation of the viability of such a catharsis. 
 Such is the double bind of a spectator mind and the filmic co-spectating space created, into 
which the spectator empathetically extends themselves (aided by the filmic manoeuvres of the text) 
whilst the filmic subjectivity dissociatively removes themselves. 51  Through this process, the 
dissociative counterforce within empathy is illustrated. The spectator – whilst empathetically 
entering into the shot – is deictically reconfirmed in their place of Thirdness as exterior spectator. 
Only a dissociative rupture in the ipseity of the spectator can allow true empathy to take place. But, 
given that the spectator is then dissociating, this schizomimetic spectator effect goes beyond 
empathy, to a point where the spectator has experienced a shared subjectivity with that embodied 
and enacted through the filmic text. To experience is not to empathise, and this experience takes 
the spectator to a point beyond empathy where their experience, their self, and their experience as 
and of self is rendered obtuse. Like Rick’s (Humphrey Bogart) self-consciously staged farewell to 
Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman), both co-spectators are simultaneously within and without the tableau they 
have created, and the position of Thirdness – the perspective of seeing the being seen; the meta-
recognition that they may always have but will not always be who they were in Paris – is included 
within the diegesis: ‘here’s looking at you, kid.’ 
 There is no practical research with ‘service-users’ to support the idea that the construction 
of a shared, spectating post-empathetic filmic space is therapeutic, either for those making or 
watching the film. However, there is a small body of papers demonstrating the apparent efficacy of 
the very reverse: a process whereby the pathological subject’s own subjective phenomenological 
reality is reformulated as a filmic representation and becomes an object of spectating empathy for 
them, rather than an act of subjective experience. A team of researchers at University College 
London, led by Julian Leff, have pioneered a novel treatment for reducing the impact of auditory 
hallucinations in medication-resistant voice-hearers using computer-generated avatars. A proof-of-
concept paper was published in the British Journal of Psychiatry in 2013 showing significant reductions 
on Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale (PSYRATS) and Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ-
R), but not on Calgary Depression Scale (CDS), during the therapy, and improvements on all three 
                                                
50 Indeed, Caouette goes further in his sequel, Walk Away Renee, dir. by Jonathon Caouette (Sundance Selects, 
2012), by supplementing his documentary footage of a road trip with his mother with a sci-fi subplot about 
inter-dimensional travel and alternate universes, including an extended CGI sequence. Other moments of 
pseudo-verité – either wholly or partially staged – are perhaps successful, in that they stimulate in the spectator 
the sensation of not being able to confidently differentiate what is real from what is fiction, but repeatedly fall 
flat as simple pieces of drama. 
51 To use a recent, semiotically infused definition: ‘a double bind is a pathological pattern of interaction with a 
significant other in which conflicting messages at different logical levels of analysis are loaded with polar 
values.’ Yair Neuman, ‘Double binds, triadic binds’, Semiotica, 174:1 (2009) 227-240, p.228 
 282 
at three-month follow up.52 Essentially, the therapy involves the voice-hearer designing an avatar to 
match their auditory hallucination using computer technology. The voice-hearer then acts out a 
conversation with the avatar, which is voiced invisibly by the therapist who is in another room and 
speaking through a computer that distorts their voice to sound like that hallucinated by the voice-
hearer. In fact, the therapist plays two roles in the performance, also interjecting as themselves – 
still invisibly and via a microphone and computer from another room – to offer support and 
encouragement to the voice-hearer in their (staged) confrontation with their persecutor. As Leff 
explains in another 2013 paper: 
It is in fact a trilogue because the therapist plays two roles, the persecutory avatar and the 
supportive therapist. As the sessions proceed the two roles merge and the avatar progressively 
agrees to stop abusing the patient and begins to make helpful suggestions and boost the patient’s 
self-esteem. In accord with this, the avatar’s expression is changed from menacing to neutral to 
smiling. Although the patients interact with the avatar as though it were a real person, because they 
created it they know that it cannot harm them, as opposed to the voices, which often threaten to kill 
or harm them or their family.’53 
 
The therapy performs three significant reversals. First, it de-psychoticises the psychosis, attributing 
the persecutory voice to a body just like any un-hallucinated voice. Secondly, it fictionalises the 
psychosis. Rather than being a real exchange (albeit one with perhaps no addresser), it becomes a 
role-play and a game acted out through video screens and performance, and thereby emptied of the 
threat of harm normally experienced by the voice-hearer. Finally, it neutralises the hostility, as 
aggressor segues into supportive companion. 
With its reliance on the computer technology for, firstly, designing and animating an avatar 
and, secondly, for morphing the therapist’s voice, avatar therapy is a process as reliant on a 
representational machinery for its construction of the ‘schizophrenic’ relational and communicative 
exchange as cinema is. ‘Construction of an avatar requires a program to create a face, animation 
software to synchronise lip movements with speech, and software to enable the therapist to speak 
through the avatar with the voice the patient hears.’54 As with the filmic representations, avatar 
therapy visibilises a non-visible phenomenological experience, and it necessarily fictionalises the 
symptomatology of the ‘illness’ it treats. Leff and his team implicitly acknowledge that in many 
cases the voice-hearer has no visual image to go with the voice they hear, and even when they do, 
these images may not be clear and tangible, but dreamlike and indistinct; ‘[i]n cases where the 
patient does not clearly perceive a face, he/she is asked to choose a face which they would feel 
                                                
52 Julian Leff, Geoffrey Williams, Mark A Huckvale, Maurice Arbuthnot and Alex P Leff, ‘Computer-assisted 
therapy for medication-resistant auditory hallucinations: a proof-of-concept study’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 
202 (2013b) 428-433, p.431 
53 Julian Leff, Geoffrey Williams, Mark Huckvale, Maurice Arbuthnot and Alex P Leff, ‘Avatar therapy for 
persecutory auditory hallucinations: What is it and how does it work?’ Psychosis: Psychological, Social and 
Integrative Approaches, 6:2 (2013a) 166-176, pp.170-171 
54 Leff et al (2013b), p.428 
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comfortable talking to.’55 In filmic terms, this at best is just some relatively harmless re-casting of a 
role, but at worst it is a fictitious distortion of the person’s experience. 
The narrative arc is similarly indebted to Hollywood. It is an arc of recovery, of triumph 
over the aggressor: ‘[t]he therapist controls the avatar so that it gradually comes under the patient’s 
control over 6 weekly sessions of 30 min duration. Over the course of the therapy the avatar 
progressively changes from being persecutory to being appreciative and supportive.’ 56 ‘ 
Unavoidably, the therapist is play-acting in this trilogue, and although initially drawing on material 
provided by the voice-hearer, the therapists are ultimately reliant on their own improvisation skills 
and creative inspiration for scripting the avatar: 
[I]t is a crucial requirement that the patient accepts the avatar as a realistic representation of their 
persecutory voice. This is achieved by asking the patient at their first contact to report on the 
habitual phrases they hear. The therapist’s voice is morphed into a variety of forms, from which the 
patient selects the one that is closest to the voice they hear. […] In the first session of therapy the 
therapist, as the avatar, speaks the phrases the patient has reported hearing in order to establish the 
identity of the avatar as their persecutor.’57 
 
As with the representations of John Nash or Nathaniel Ayers, so here does artistic licence come 
into force. The problem with this is twofold. Firstly, that the persecutory content will have been 
filtered by both the voice-hearer – who may easily be reluctant to share the worst excesses of the 
abuse with the therapist, or even with their own conscious self – and then by the therapist who 
would surely not be as comfortable or competent in the role of aggressor as the ‘real’ voice. 
Secondly, the very intrinsic nature of the voice experienced in AVHs surely gives it a potency and 
impact, and also an access to a reservoir of fears and neuroses and personal secrets, that would 
make its interjections and attacks more fearsome than any possible through this representational 
system. In combination then, the effect is that the representation is restricted in scope in contrast 
to the ‘real’ persecution. 
The reason for the very success of avatar therapy also poses a deeply worrying problem, 
which is that it works with the delusional mechanism. Consider all these representations through 
film of the ‘schizophrenic’ receiving instructions from televisions or screens (a model that is 
mirrored by the cinematic process itself); avatar therapy employs the same mechanism. Whether 
this is genius or folly is hard to tell, but certainly it is using the delusional communicative channel 
and model, when – as Leff describes – an avatar tells a person hearing voices that they will now ‘say 
only pleasant things’;58 the avatar, the screenic reality, is telling the spectator as interlocutor what 
they will be experiencing in life. How does this differ, structurally, from Ray’s response to Captain 
Scarlett? Not one bit. How does it differ, in content and intention, from Pat’s immersion into 
                                                
55 Mark Huckvale, Julian Leff and Geoff Williams, ‘Avatar therapy: an audio-visual dialogue system for 
treating auditory hallucinations’ , Interspeech Conference 2013, p.1 
<http://www.researchgate.net/publication/263045193_Avatar_Therapy_an_audio-
visual_dialogue_system_for_treating_auditory_hallucinations> [accessed on 20 March 2015] 
56 Leff et al, (2013a), p.167 
57 Julian Leff, ‘Author’s reply’ to James A Rodger, ‘Avater-assisted relational therapy for persecutory voices’, 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 203 (2013) 233-234, p.234 
58 Leff et al (2013a), p.170 
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Hollywood narratives as a means of inspiring (or bluffing) himself with the thought that things 
must necessarily improve, and develop towards a happy ending? Again, not one bit. (‘Many 
clinicians view this approach as collusion with the patient’s pathology and likely to perpetuate the 
symptoms.’)59 
 Indeed this delusion seems to extend to the therapists themselves, who appear, in their 
accounts, to have slightly lost their grip on the reality of what is taking place. The representations in 
the sessions become real for them also. ‘From the psychiatric point of view, the introduction of an 
avatar allows the researchers to study the relationship between the patients and their voices, at first 
hand and for the first time.’60 It most surely does not. The researchers are studying a performance 
and one that is decreasingly accurate as a representation of any pre-existing relationship between 
patients and their voices. And it is a representation built upon two very shaky assumptions: that the 
hallucinated voices have a consistent, stable identity comparable to that of voices belonging to 
objectively verifiable people, and that the computer-altered voice of the therapist can achieve a 
reasonable representational likeness of these voices. On the former assumption and its 
implications, the researchers are laconic to the point of farce; ‘of course, no actual samples could be 
obtained.’ A 2014 paper by Humpston and Broome proposes a spectral model linking auditory-
verbal hallucinations (AVH), ‘soundless voices’ (reported by voice-hearers) and thought insertion 
(TI) reasoning that ‘the actual audibility of AVHs is debatable to say the least … which brings the 
perceptual or sensory properties of AVHs into question and links the phenomenology of AVHs to 
that of TI.’61 In semiotic terms, avatar therapy constructs a signifier of something that does not 
exist: the image of a fictional person. This signifier is then taken to signify a real Object which is the 
AVH and/or the persecutory personality behind them. Indeed, the researchers even give figures for 
the ‘accuracy’ of these representations; these are measures of the accuracy of a representation of a 
thing that does not exist.62 This is very obviously a fiction though and whilst apparently therapeutic 
it cannot be an appropriate object of study for researchers, or at least, it cannot be considered as a 
signifier of the ‘relationship between the patient and their voices, at first hand.’ Consider figures 
5.27 and 5.28. The former is a poster by a voice-hearer for a survivor-led support group. The 
‘voices’ – at least in their pictorial representation – are no such thing; they are a collection of 
sounds and also signifieds that lurk behind (or within) the voices, when ultimately constituted as 
personified voices. In Chapter Two, this thesis argued that the attribution of personhood, of 
identity and pronouns, to the voices was a secondary procedure. Figure 5.28 is an image produced 
by a person with lived experience of voice hearing who explicitly conceptualises the voices as 
                                                
59 Leff et al (2013a) p.171 
60 Huckvale, Leff and Williams, p.6 
61 Humpston and Broome, ‘The spectra of soundless voices and audible thoughts’, p.12 In this, Humpston 
and Broome build on G. Lynn Stephens and George Graham, When self-consciousness breaks: alien voices and 
inserted thoughts, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2000). 
62  60-70% accuracy for the avatars’ faces; 60-90% accuracy for the voices. These figures are hard to 
understand. Presumably, lower than 50% would mean the avatar looked and sounded more unlike than like 
the hallucination. Huckvale, Leff and Williams, p.3 
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individuals she has co-opted and ‘brought in’ to her mind, as a psychic reaction to childhood 
trauma; again, the personifying is secondary to the trauma, and the need to share a co-spectating 
this space, in this case for the very simple reason of having someone to share the trauma with, and 
to have another figure to repair the shattered deictic relations resulting from abuse. What is 
important to note here is that the person with psychosis’ response to trauma – to interpolate and 
personify voices – and considered as a primary symptom of ‘illness’ is the same response enacted 
through avatar therapy. 
 
 
Figure 5.27 
When voices are not voices. 
 
 
Figure 5.28 
The mind as co-spectating space. 
 
 At the heart of avatar therapy for voice-hearing is a recognition of the need to place 
subjects within a deictic relationship with a multi-layered biosemiotically signalling corresponding 
subject: ‘[h]earing a disembodied voice abusing you in stereo-typed phrases taxes your resources as 
a social human being. Because the entity is invisible there are none of the usual cues of facial 
expression and non-verbal communication by which we signal agreement with, attention to, and 
turn-taking with the speaker.’63 So, a screen representation is created, and the voice-hearer is placed 
in a firm position of Firstness as the voice is given a clear Secondness, external to their own 
subjectivity and now resident in the avatar. Interestingly, the voice-hearers also as part of the 
                                                
63 Leff et al, (2013a), p.167 
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therapy listen to recordings of their trilogues with their avatar and therapist on MP3 players 
between sessions, shifting them from this absolute position of Firstness to an absolute position of 
Thirdness to their earlier experience. The split identified whereby people with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia occupy positions of Firstness and Thirdness simultaneously is therefore widened into a 
complete schism, in which the voice-hearer acts out and creates a representation of their 
experience, and then plays spectator to that representation. As already argued, this performs an 
inverse operation to that of the schizomimetic, polyphonic and dissociated filmic representation 
and embodiment of psychosis as exemplified by Tarnation. Instead, a voice-hearer’s ‘real’ experience 
is fictionalised, externalised and ultimately transformed into a Representamen for them to empathise 
with. 
 It is worth stressing that this avatar therapy does not fit easily into the long history of 
drama therapies for psychosis. Something that unifies most drama-therapy practices is that they 
operate ‘from the distance of metaphor’64 achieved through ‘techniques and dramatic processes 
[…] such as storytelling, performance-making, improvisation, creation of therapeutic rituals, and 
use of masks, puppets, and symbolic objects.’65 As this examination of the semiotics of empathy in 
filmic representations has demonstrated, and as is supported by the researchers’ own accounts of 
avatar therapy, there is no ‘distance of metaphor’ because the representational metaphor invites 
such pseudo-empathetic engagement that both researchers (for certain) and voice-hearers 
(speculatively) mistake the metaphor for the real, or mistake the Representamen for the Object. The 
deictic reality of theatre in contrast to the deictic crises of cinema – driven by the proliferating 
signification and heavily denotative nature of filmic images – means this mistake is unlikely to 
happen. The metaphorical machinery of theatre operates contrary to signification in cinema. 
Whereas objects in film always denote their own absent presence, in theatre they denote their own 
present absence. Caouette’s childhood home in Tarnation is the sign of the real house not present in 
the auditorium; if he acted out a childhood scene as part of a theatrical dramatherapy, the set would 
be the sign of the not-house really present. 
At its root, avatar therapy attempts to reaffirm the threatened deictic status of the voice-
hearer by simulating a deictic exchange, and at the same time reducing the real exchange between 
voice-hearer and therapist, as the therapist erodes from disembodied voice (a pseudo-AVH 
booming at the voice-hearer from nowhere) to squatter in the personality of the persecutory avatar. 
Such simulated empathetic exchanges and deictic triads are the stuff of movies.  
The problem is the movies are no substitute for real life relations. 
  
                                                
64  Lambros Yotis, ‘A review of dramatherapy research in schizophrenia: methodologies and outcomes’, 
Psychotherapy Research, 16:2 (2006) 190-200, 197 
65 Yotis, p.191 
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The Hollywood ending 
“I believe in happy endings,” I tell him. “And it feels like this movie has gone on for the right 
amount of time.”66 
 
It’s an exchange. If we’re shitting the bed and dribbling all over the place, it makes them feel better 
about themselves. Public service, isn’t it?67 
 
Inserting ‘schizophrenia’ (and its own semiotic) into the representational semiotic of the cinema 
throws the nature of the structure of both into relief. The semiotic representational process breaks 
the disease (as master-signified) into component communicable elements, which in a medical, 
diagnostic context are termed ‘symptoms’. It seems reasonable to assert that exterior, objectively 
verifiable symptoms of schizophrenia might be understood as signs of any of the three Peircean 
types: icon, index and symbol. The indexical sign is the simplest to deal with. The symptom in this 
case would be understood as a sign produced through a tangible, provable physical connection. The 
often-used example is the raised body temperature as indexical sign of a bacterial or viral infection. 
Of course, the reading of such an indexical sign is dependent on the cultural and personal context 
of the reader or Interpretant and the status of the Representamen. Obviously, a GP might give the 
suggested reading, whereas the individual with the temperature (broadcasting and disseminating the 
sign) might read this as just being too warm. Similarly, it would be impossible prior to the 
emergence of germ theory, to read the indexical sign as having the Representamen of a bacterial or 
viral infection. 
To analyse the symptom as a symbolic sign means to appreciate that the relationship 
between whatever external behaviour observed and the posited internal state has become culturally 
enshrined. The Peircean symbolic sign is broadly isomorphic with the Saussurean sign, in which 
signifier and signified are linked in a cultural association. For the symbolic sign, this cultural 
association can exist either because or in spite of some other cause. To return to the example, a 
raised temperature was culturally associated with being ill prior to the microbiological description 
of the underlying mechanism (bacterial or viral infection), and continues as a cultural association 
regardless. Truth is not an appropriate measure of a symbolic sign. In Barthes’ account of ‘The 
Iconography of the Abbé Pierre’, he details how the Franciscan ascetic haircut becomes a sign of its 
own function: ‘neutrality ends up by functioning as the sign of neutrality … first conceived 
negatively … it quickly becomes a superlative mode of signification, it dresses up the Abbé as Saint 
Francis.’68 This is an unavoidable habit of the symbolic sign, a tendency towards ‘a superlative 
mode of signification.’ To take a generic example from Hollywood relating to schizophrenia, or at 
least, to madness, consider the image of an impoverished, potentially homeless person with some 
kind of psychosis, muttering to themselves and pushing a shopping trolley full of bottles, cans69 or 
                                                
66 Quick, p.15 
67 N in Poppy Shakespeare 
68 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. by Annette Lavers (London: Vintage, 1993), p.47 
69 http://www.gettyimages.co.uk/detail/photo/man-wheeling-trolley-of-empty-cans-and-high-res-stock-
photography/200452037-001 [accessed 14 November 2014] 
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general brick-a-brac.70 It is a common practice in the US, to offer cash redemption for old bottles. 
Collecting bottles for redemption then is a practical, sensible occupation for the workless poor. It 
clearly has no necessary epidemiological link to schizophrenia or psychosis. However, as the 
symbolic sign tends towards superlative signification, pushing a shopping trolley full of bottles has 
become associatively redolent of mental ill health. Instead of being an indexical sign of a 
reasonable, motivated response to poverty, the act (or rather the act-as-image) has become a 
symbolic sign of a disordered, psychotic mental state. In this example, taken from the cinematic 
semiological sign system of schizophrenia, an indexical sign has been transformed into a symbolic 
sign.71 
The hope for a cinematic sign of schizophrenia might be that the shot or film as 
assemblage of shots is a Representamen in relation to an Object, which is the (or at least an) 
experience, a phenomenon, of schizophrenia (see figure 5.29). The viewer then stands in the 
position of Thirdness to this relationship, as Interpretant. But does this triadic arrangement ever come 
to pass? Fixing the viewer in the position of Thirdness, what Representamen and Object may be in 
tension? A cinematic syntagm as Representamen of schizophrenia (encompassing screenplay, 
performance, framing, direction, cutting and so on) stands in relation not to an Object that is an 
internal phenomenological experience (at least, not verifiably; even if all elements of the syntagm 
have been composed by the subjective self who experienced the phenomenon, neither the 
verifiability of nor the Object itself are within any kind of grasp of another subject) but rather in a 
relation of Secondness to the camera (and here ‘camera’ is a convenient shorthand for all the 
mechanical, technical and human components of film production; the entire film machinery). What 
the Interpretant spectator constructs as an Object of schizophrenia, or the schizophrenic experience, 
from the Representamen of the cinematic syntagm is – in truth – only the productive machinery of 
film, a conglomerate of cheap tricks: shaky camera movements, oblique angles, sudden jump cuts, 
emotive stabs by the score. The cinematic sign of schizophrenia is then a sign of cinema pushing 
up against the very limits of its capacity to represent (see figure 5.30). 
 
  
                                                
70  Pat Harman, ‘Homless is another word for nothing left to lose’, housethehomeless.org, 11 May 2011, 
<http://www.housethehomeless.org/051211-homeless-is-another-word-for-nothing-left-to-lose/> [accessed 
31 March 2016] 
71 As Ivanov notes in his assessment of Eisenstein’s montage theory, this – for Eisenstein – is a necessarily 
cinematographic act. Vjačeslav Vsevolodovič Ivanov, ‘Eisenstein’s Montage of Hieroglyphic Signs’ in On 
Signs, ed. by Marshall Blonsky (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp.221-235 
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Figure 5.29 
Ideal cinematic sign of ‘schizophrenia’ 
 
 
 
Figure 5.30 
Actual cinematic sign of ‘schizophrenia’ 
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Only in the Barthesian Third Meaning, only in this very distinct yet elusive, this 
unintentional and unintentionable representation, does cinema generate an unruly Representamen that 
– dynamically – stands for the Object of the schizophrenic phenomenon. This is the importance of 
obtuseness that is beyond the reach of empathy. However, the Third Meaning, and its appearance, 
is always a matter of the productive subjectivity of the spectator. In this way, the Representamen of 
the schizophrenic phenomenon in film is always a product not of the film but of the spectator. 
Here a triad opens up where the spectator is in a position of Secondness in relation to a Firstness that 
is immanent only to their consciousness, and the cinematic syntagm itself stands as the relational 
context, the Thirdness. Necessarily, this triad is wholly idiosyncratic and unreproducible; in this, the 
triad itself, constituent of the sign, is dynamically identical to a unique psychic phenomenon.72 
 The cinematic syntagm of schizophrenia is, on one level of analysis, a Peircean Firstness, 
and of the sign type of the icon; in this analytic structure it has an unassailable essence – its Firstness 
– that does not require the independent objective existence of the Object. To return to Peirce’s 
description of the icon: ‘An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it 
significant, even though its object had no existence’73. A simple illustration of this in relation to the 
cinematic syntagm: many people would recognize Mickey Mouse in a cartoon, and would be able to 
judge the very degrees of accuracy in a range of cinematic representations of Mickey Mouse, yet no 
Mickey Mouse exists (outside the agglomeration of these representations which are, in this sense, 
Peircean icons). Similarly, cinema presents a Peircean icon of schizophrenia that can be analysed 
regardless of the existence or otherwise of the disease entity or the subjective phenomenological 
experiences that this icon takes as its object. If there is a moral mission to the construction of the 
ideal cinematic sign of schizophrenia it is captured in Peirce’s belief that ‘a great distinguished 
property of the icon is that by direct observation of it other truths concerning its object can be 
discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction.’74 It follows logically, though, 
that if the object itself is false, than it is falsehoods, not truths, that will be discovered by direct 
observation of the object’s icon sign. 
 At a different analytic level the cinematic syntagm of schizophrenia is of the sign type of 
the symbol.75 Very simply, it is reliant, in one mode, on the existence of an Interpretant to ascribe (or 
                                                
72 Sonesson identifies the opposition between Peirce’s semiotics and a phenomenology based on empathy. 
Semiotics is the antithesis of empathy, predicated on the unknowability of internal mental states. In this 
sense, Jaspers’ conception of understanding is in close accord with Peirce’s semiotics. (Göran Sonesson, ‘The 
natural history of branching: approaches to the phenomenology of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness’, 
Signs and Society, 1:2 (2013) 297-325, p.315) 
73 Peirce, ‘Logic as semiotic’, p.104 
74 Peirce. ‘Logic as semiotic’, pp.105-106 
75 Peirce does state that photographs are indices, rather than icons, as they are physically connected to their 
object, being produced through the chemical reaction of photons that have touched the object. It is easy to 
demonstrate that the cinematic sign is certainly not an index in this way, because the sign is not the individual 
photographic frame (the film still, of interest to Barthes) but rather the composite Deleuzean movement-
image produced by the succession of photographic images and its accompanying soundtrack. The film still, 
however, is certainly an index and its object is the film itself, as can be seen by the use of film stills on DVD 
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at least read from within it) some meaning. This is the process that takes place when answering the 
question: what is this film about? No film is ‘about’ merely the assemblage of its icons or likenesses. 
Properly, the conventionalized meaning, the signified content of the symbol of the cinematic 
syntagm should be subordinate to the signified content of the internal icons. In other words, if an 
internal icon is changed then the encompassing symbol will change in proportion to the 
significance of the icon and also the change. However, when there is no verifiable object for the 
icon(s) within the symbol, the relationship can be reversed. A conventionalized meaning, or 
signified, regarding the encompassing symbol generates the internal icons, which then are likenesses 
only of other icons placed within comparable cinematic syntagms as symbols. To summarise this 
point simply: a false cultural myth will, in cinema, generate its own false icons.  
Instead of generating these false icons, cinematic schizomimesis can – through its obtuse 
signs, through its co-spectatorship, through its Deleuzean flow of opsigns and sonsigns – 
communicate, beyond representation, the signification processes and mechanics of psychosis. Film 
might even be the most appropriate representational form for this act. Film more easily 
encompasses the enigmatic or incoherent than literature does. Whilst any reader might labour over 
an impenetrable sentence or ambiguous interpolation, and thereby pause, suspend, redact or – in 
extremis – abandon the reading, there is nothing the spectator can, nor need, do other than allow 
the succession of images on the screen. (Of course, in various contexts, it is possible to pause, 
suspend, redact or abandon films, but it is telling that rarely would a spectator pause a film because 
they did not understand an image shot or walk out of a cinema because they found the film difficult 
to watch, in contrast to how very frequently people will muse over a sentence or put down a book 
as unreadable.) 
There might be three main types of schizomimetic diagnostic filmic syntagma. The first is 
structured similarly to a conversation, and – as in Ray’s reaction to the sights of the approach to 
London at the opening of Some Voices or various moments in Perception and A Beautiful Mind – 
structured around a series of shot reverse shot exchanges; this might be termed the alternate 
schizomimetic syntagm. This syntagm involves a complete triadic sign and is in the order of 
Thirdness, in that it shows something standing for something to someone. This, for obvious reasons, 
fails to do anything more than de-psychoticise psychosis itself. 
The second involves sudden interpolations of mysterious, obtuse signifiers, where an 
image appears as an autonomous shot within a syntagm that has another signifying purpose. For 
example, when Ray in Some Voices douses himself with petrol and tries to set fire to himself with a 
lighter, there is a brief, explosive shot of a Catherine wheel firework. This shot is not within the 
diegetic reality (at least not temporally, as it is either footage from or a least echoing an earlier trip 
Ray and Laura make to Hastings, and one which is rich in meaning for Ray). Its insertion into the 
                                                                                                                                         
boxes and in cinema programmes. Properly, perhaps, it should be said that the cinematic syntagm is a 
Peircean Argument, which is the symbol but in the order of Thirdness, rather than Secondness.  
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syntagm enacts the compulsive volatility that Ray may himself be experiencing; it is a cinematic 
rendering of the command hallucination or compulsive drive to self-immolation. It is impossible to 
conclusively label this autonomous shot as either a metaphor for Ray’s emotional, psychological 
state or as a visualizing of his actual thoughts within the diegetic reality (in that, at this suicidal 
moment, his thoughts are violently reflecting on this earlier, happier moment with Laura). Indeed, 
aesthetically, the moment probably is successful because it does both, whilst also providing the 
spectator with a bluntly sensationalist jolt, and moment’s uncertainty as to whether or not Ray has 
set fire to himself. Hence, this syntagm is in the order of Secondness, in that the Object (psychosis) is 
being seen to directly impact upon the Representamen. The gap between Representamen and Interpretant 
has essentially vanished. 
Logically, the third type of schizomimetic diagnostic syntagm is one where all elements of 
the triad have collapsed into the order of Firstness. The syntagm stages the Object of the 
schizophrenic subjectivity from within as a consistent, stable reality, with occasional autonomous 
shots or subsequent syntagma demonstrating its unreality. For example, recent Oscar-winner 
Birdman, dir. by Alejandro G Iñárritu (Fox Searchlight Pictures, 2014) is constructed almost entirely 
as one pseudo-continuous shot, in which distinctions between objective diegetic reality and the 
phenomenological subjectivity of the protagonist cannot be conclusively reconciled. (Though not 
explicitly about psychosis, Birdman’s protagonist has sustained delusions – of powers of telekinesis 
and flight – recounts hearing voices and also attempts suicide.) Similarly, most of the syntagma 
comprising The Voices are infused with the protagonist’s psychosis (see figures 5.31 and 5.32); the 
spectator only receives a hint of the non-pathological diegetic reality when Jerry (Ryan Reynolds) is 
briefly compliant with his medication regimen. It should be noted that this is not the same as 
narrative focalization, as seen in Keane and Spider. In The Voices, there are sequences of narrative 
from which Jerry is absent and of which he is ignorant – for example, when Fiona (Gemma 
Arterton) goes to a karaoke night, standing Jerry up at a Chinese restaurant – that are still 
schizomimetic. It does not matter for the purpose of this analysis whether this is the result of 
deliberate artistic choice or bad craft, whereby directorial choices contradict the script. 
Respectively, these three types of schizomimetic diagnostic filmic syntagma might be termed: 
alternate shot, interpolated shot and sustained, immersive frame. This final schizomimetic syntagm, 
where hierarchies of perspective and the power to define the shared semiotic are perpetually 
defeated strikes close to Deleuze’s new cinematic form of the time-image, and offers itself as a 
method for expressing, obliquely, a phenomenology beyond the representational grasp and rule 
even of the subjectivity with whom it originates. 
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Figure 5.31 
In The Voices, the film’s signifying system and the character’s (psychotic) signifying system are 
indistinguishable. This is apparent across a range of signifiers, from subtle, repetitive colour patterns, 
narrative ellipses, inappropriate affect, self-conscious head-on staging and framing of shots … 
 
 
Figure 5.32 
… and rather less subtle signifiers like animated butterflies. And talking pets. 
 
When Hollywood makes schizophrenia function as a metaphor – for genius (A Beautiful 
Mind) or normality (Silver Linings Playbook) – its makes for bad or potentially offensively ignorant 
films. When schizophrenia is made to function as a metaphor for the filmic process (Spider or The 
Soloist or, most iniquitous, Birdman), it offers a form of empathy (albeit empathy as entertainment) 
but runs the risk of solipsism. Most dangerously, these films generate a false mythology of 
psychosis which, coupled with a pseudo-empathy that propagates a stigmatising assumption that 
because ‘we all go a little mad sometimes’76 then psychosis is a part of everyday life, as a cultural 
hero myth that is co-owned by society. This pseudo empathetic filmic mythology projects its values 
and experiences back into each consumer spectator, and therefore, just as any non-psychotic 
spectator has pseudo-empathetically been psychotic, so too should all real-world psychotics equally 
triumph within their own Hollywood life narratives 
But when the filmic process goes beyond attempts at empathy and functions as a metaphor 
for schizophrenia, it offers the possibility of – if not cure – then at least a reconstruction of the 
delusional phenomenological landscape in which the psychotic subjectivity is empowered, and 
reconfirmed in their deictic status, and where a co-spectating space allows the non-pathological 
subject to experience something akin to the obtuse signification processes occurring in psychosis. 
This going beyond empathy, and this tolerance of the obtuse signification and a schizomimesis that 
stimulates an authentic shared attitude of experience – in contrast to a passive downloading of an 
easily empathised-with cinematic product – serves in turn to promote a parity of subjectivity, one 
that should elicit not a consumerist empathy, prompting only narcissistic self-examination, but 
                                                
76 Norman Bates, the eponymous Psycho, dir. by Alfred Hitchcock (Paramount Pictures, 1960). 
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rather a genuine sympatico, a shared, self-conscious heterogeneous construct, and a socialised and 
socialising confluence of purpose (rather than imitation of affect) that can serve as motivator for 
compassionate action. 
Essentially, a happy ending. Just like in the movies. 77 
  
                                                
77 As Nash himself is reported to have said at his second wedding to Alicia in 2001: ‘A second take […] Just 
like a movie.’ Sylvia Nasar, ‘The sum of a man’, Guardian, 22 March 2002 
<http://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/mar/26/biography.highereducation> [accessed 24 May 2015] 
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How to build a schizophrenic 
 We are within it, but it – all of it – is within us.78 
[I]n abduction the relation between premises and conclusion is iconic and is dialogic in a substantial 
sense, in other words, it is characterized by high degrees of dialogism and inventiveness as well as by 
a high-risk margin for error.79 
 
Semiosis, as Peirce knew, is infinitely recursive. Signs proliferate, and only give way to other signs. 
The signifying process knows no conclusion or resolution, only stops of relative degrees of 
motivation and arbitrariness. Ultimately, the only elements that constrain a line of signification are a 
lack of ‘world enough, and time.’80 Though personally degenerative, as a subject increasingly relies 
on conventionalised signs and decreasingly seeks to reorder their Umwelt with the passing of years, 
and so shifts from the hypersemia of youth to the hyposemia of age, semiosis itself transcends the 
temporal corporeal limitations of any interpellated signifying subject. This is not a metaphysical 
transcendence, of course. Similarly, whilst ‘schizophrenia’ is personally degenerative as the 
signifying potential of the individual living with a diagnosis is, for the most part, systematically 
worn away – by medical and social labelling; exclusion from collectives of employment, wealth and 
power; the disorientation and devaluing of their own semiotic responses to the world around them 
both by internal and external factors; and perhaps a lifetime of tranquilizing medication – yet 
‘schizophrenia’ itself again transcends the fatal deterioration of any signifying subject. As said in the 
introduction, ‘schizophrenia’ endures.  
 So too, drawing an end to an exploration of the signifying energies of this dialectic of 
‘schizophrenia’ and semiotics is more indicative of a finitude of time and space than an unpuzzling 
and resolution of all the lines of meaning and sequences of sign exchanges. Rather than 
recapitulate, this thesis will close with an illustrative détournment that offers in microcosm those 
macro forces of signification examined over these past chapters.  
 On Monday, 7 October 2013, the Sun – the best-selling daily newspaper in the UK – ran a 
front page ‘exclusive investigation’ under the headline ‘1,200 KILLED BY MENTAL PATIENTS.’ 
To avoid any possible ambiguity, it coloured the digits blood red. Leaving aside the fact that the 
‘exclusive investigation’ was no such thing – rather, a flagrant misreporting of a study by 
Manchester University – it was still taken sufficiently seriously to provoke complaints from mental 
health charities and activists. Certainly, the visual layout of the article, juxtaposing smiling, soft 
faces of ‘victims’ (one wearing her graduation mortarboard, as a detail compounding the crime) 
with red banners advertising their violent demise (‘BLASTED BY A BOLT GUN’; ‘KNIFED 39 
TIMES’) and off-kilter, awkwardly cropped, blank-faced mugshots of their murderers coupled with 
                                                
78 Lotman, Universe of the Mind, p.273 
79  Augusto Ponzio, ‘Modeling, dialogue and globality: biosemiotics and semiotics of self. 1 Semiosis, 
modeling, and dialogism’, Sign Systems Studies, 31:1 (2003) 25-64, p.37 
80 Andrew Marvell, ‘To his coy mistress’, The Complete Poems, ed. by Elizabeth Story Donno (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1996), p.50 
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one-word epithets (‘rage’ ‘dangerous’ ‘stalker’), would have left readers in little doubt as to the 
cultural meta-narrative at play. 
 
Figure P.1 
How the unsympathetic tabloid press build a schizophrenic. 
 
 If people living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia were not up in arms about this 
misrepresentation, it must be because they are on the receiving end of semiotic constructions that 
continually occlude, insult, demonise or patronise them, and that this is done through signs 
propagated by people and institutions with far nobler intentions than the Sun. Consider the cover 
of Henry’s Demons, a mostly sensitive, thoughtful, multi-perspective account of the impact of a 
young man’s psychosis on his life and those of his immediate family, and also – as the cover says – 
a Sunday Times bestseller. 
  
Figure P.2 
How the sympathetic, Sunday-broadsheet-reading class build a schizophrenic. 
 
The cover is a blood red. The ‘schizophrenic’ figure is faceless (as if subjected to the 
depersonalisation of a Capgras delusion on the part of the reader) and in the pose of a child playing 
make believe at being an aeroplane or a bird. 81 In short, the figure is stripped of identity and 
adulthood. Beneath, the title and subtitle are presented in a font one could imagine featuring in a 
                                                
81 See Joseph Capgras and Jean Reboul-Lachaux, ‘L’illusion des sosies dans un délire systématisé chronique’, 
Bulletin de la Société clinique de la médecine mentale, 11 (1923) 6-16. It is important to note that the Capgras 
delusion has been observed in patients with many different diagnoses, including well-understood organic 
brain diseases, and is not exclusive to schizophrenia. 
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drop-down list in Photoshop under the name ‘Torment’; it seems modelled on the quasi-demonic 
scribbles with which a classic B-movie ‘madman’ might decorate the walls of his ‘lair.’ Given that 
Henry Cockburn is – according to the text – a talented amateur artist, with a taste for complex, 
enigmatic allegorical images, this cover appears, at best, something of a missed opportunity. 
 Attendees at NHS outpatient clinics have a range of leaflets, in spinning wire racks or 
stacked in loose piles on windowsills and coffee tables, with which to pass the time. In contrast to 
the cover of bestselling books about their experience, leaflets designed for a charity run by 
‘survivors’ for people in crisis, chose to give a human face to people with psychosis. Another leaflet 
produced by a mental health housing charity similarly decided to give the space over to a person 
with lived experience to provide the artwork. 
 
 
Figure P.3 
How patients build a schizophrenic. 
 
Here, a ‘schizophrenic’ is a person, with personality, expressive ability, agency, anxieties and 
operating in a grounded, real-world life history. Their look of distress or fear is contextualised: 
because ‘nobody else hears.’ So too, is their defiance and their confidence to face the viewer 
directly; with ‘emotional support and information’, they feel empowered to face the future with 
(literally) a head held high. 
 Photographs of real people are absent from the NHS materials. Indeed, there is a wariness, 
following TS Eliot’s warning that ‘human kind/ Cannot bear very much reality,’82 to show people, 
situations or treatment, let alone symptoms. On the front of an information sheet detailing the 
‘disease’, schizophrenia qua sign is itself dissolved into an abstract, semi-transparent plane of 
distortion and inversion, as if the word were disintegrating out of neurotic fear of its own 
deterministic, signifying potency. The NHS intensive community service (ICS) metes out a regimen 
of regular home visits and enforced medication that reproduces the control mechanisms of the 
asylum system but in the social housing, sheltered accommodations and city streets of the UK. 
                                                
82 TS Eliot, ‘Burnt Norton’ in Four Quartets (London: Faber & Faber, 1959) pp.42-43 
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Here, the ICS is re-imagined as the magical dandelion wish-list of the (invisible) ‘service-user’; the 
blue-sky thinking of the front of the leaflet undermined by the impersonal tick-box list on the back. 
 
 
 
Figure P.4 
How healthcare builds a schizophrenic. 
 
Finally, a care plan leaflet shows cartoon ‘schizophrenics’ with empty speech bubbles popping out 
of their flat smiles; though, in many cases the speech bubbles actually appear to be coming out of 
their shoulders, echoing the position of their voices, rather than their own voice. Even the largest 
of the figures is dwarfed by the care plan, which takes centre stage. 
 For all the justified complaints against the Sun and other thoughtless misconstructions of 
people with psychosis – such as Thorpe Park’s unapologetic stance over their Asylum Halloween 
event, also in October 2013 – the semiosphere remains a predominantly hostile signifying 
environment for those living with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Stepping out of popular discourse 
and into the supposed sanctuary of the healthcare system, those in mental distress might be 
forgiven for feeling like Marlowe’s damned souls: ‘why this is hell, nor am I out of it.’83 
  
                                                
83  Christopher Marlowe, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, in The Complete Plays, ed. by JB Steane 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986), I. 3.76 
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